


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ETHICS

In Theory and Application

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PSYCHOLOGY

In Theory and Application

THOMAS Y. CROWELL CO.
NEW YORK

ETHICS

In Theory and Application

BY

HORATIO W. DRESSER, PH.D.

Author of "Psychology in Theory and Application"

NEW YORK

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY

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PREFACE

THE purpose of this volume is to consider the great issues of moral life and theory anew in the light of recent tendencies, that ethics may be brought into closer accord with practical life and the other social sciences. Moral issues, always subject to change and calling for fresh estimates, have passed through an unusual upheaval since the outbreak of the World War, and the moral situation has enlarged in scope. Psychology has been adding to our knowledge of human nature, disclosing new possibilities of human development, and supplying new topics for ethical criticism. Under the head of psychology, study of the sources of war, analysis of motives which actuate the crowd, and renewed interest in the solidarity of the race, people have been fostering ethical inquiry without calling it so. Controversies over religious creeds have also increased our interest in questions which are strictly ethical. The movement toward the abolition of war involves questions of moral principle not to be settled save through reconsideration of our loyalties.

The objections raised against philosophy in general, namely, that philosophers deal in abstractions and seldom agree, do not apply to ethics. There is indeed remarkable agreement among the few schools of thought to which ethical types may be reduced. This agreement noted, there is increasing opportunity for alliance between ethics and other fields of interest, such as international law, not usually brought into close relation with ethics. With the breaking down of the old theoretical barriers, all the social sciences have come into more intimate relation with issues for which people are contending day by day. There is no longer any reason why the student of sociology, economics, or history should stand aloof as if ethics were merely a study of justice in the abstract, an analysis of

motives, or a mere inquiry into the nature of conscience. All science eliminates what is peculiar or transitory, in favor of what is significant or permanent. Indeed, there is a meeting-point for all the social sciences in the concrete study of human relations in their complete natural environment, in the light of social well-being. We are approaching a time when the study of human nature may be regarded as the discipline of greatest significance.

Ethics or moral science is regarded in these pages as the science which makes more explicit and persuasive than any other this profound interest in human character. Any lack of interest in ethical matters is taken to mean failure in the past to show the connection between daily life and the moral ideal, to misunderstanding of terms, or to neglect of the relationships between the sciences. This book makes articulate the reaction against the moralizing of the past, by putting new emphasis on spontaneity, the dynamic or energizing principle of daily life, and on practical ideals. The first two parts cover the ground of a semester course, so far as general principles are concerned, while the third is devoted to the application of ethical principles in various fields. The book is intended for use in college classes, and the order of subjects, the mode of presentation is based on experience in teaching classes in ethics. But the book is also intended for the general student of human life and literature, history, economics, sociology, social psychology, and social problems in general; hence the references appended to the chapters are for both the college student, taking up ethics for the first time, and for the student who has opportunity for general research. The appeal is to those larger interests which we are never able to satisfy while we limit our studies to mere description of facts, the use of statistics, or any merely quantitative method.

The style has been made as untechnical as possible, in view of the fact that ethics calls for the finest analyses and the most precise definitions. The reader is frequently reminded that the way to grasp ethical principles is to turn to daily experience for reconsideration of our prevailing interests. We have all been reared under a system of moral

instruction. If we take exception to it, this criticism implies some other ethical ideal, and the standard which we prefer may be made more intelligible by putting it in relation with the great teachings of the past. Questions are appended to some of the chapters, to suggest application to daily life, lest the student make the traditional mistake and regard ethics as purely abstract or general.

In acknowledging indebtedness, it is impossible to say how much is due to Professor G. H. Palmer, under whose guidance the writer began his studies in ethics, and whose work as a teacher of ethics he came to know intimately while Assistant in Philosophy in Harvard University. Such work means knowing men as men seldom know one another. It means placing men in public life, renewing ancient culture at its best, showing the unity between Greek and Christian ideals, and compassing the wide field where science and religion are too often sundered. Professor Palmer's great influence in the field of ethics ought indeed to receive such recognition and such a tribute as he himself has given in his widely read volume, "Alice Freeman Palmer."

This book attempts to apply this same idealism by connecting the older interest in "goodness" with present interest in moral values, and by calling attention anew to the ideal of the ethical organism which Professor Palmer, more than any other teacher of ethics, has emphasized. The writer is also much indebted to Professor J. M. Warbeke, Miss Margery Carr, and other friends in Mount Holyoke College, who have read portions of the book while in preparation, and have given valuable criticism. The footnotes and references indicate other indebtedness. The references have been chosen with the realization that many are today interested afresh in values—economic, moral, religious—and that many are raising the question anew, What is worth while? Is it possible to acquire a scale of values? Some of the standard text-books have been included in the lists of references throughout the volume, so that one or two of these may be constantly at hand by way of comparison. It will be profitable for the student to make an analysis

of some subject of present interest, such as international law, or to make a special study of a work like Myers' "History of Past Ethics." The method of study most strongly advised is a union of the historical and analytic methods. Hence in the following pages there are frequent references to the ethical teachings of the Greeks. Ethical science is indeed in part a philosophy of history, or study of human progress; hence it is important to ask, What constitutes progress? To what extent are the ethical ideals of today new formulations of principles which have appeared and reappeared in the past?

HORATIO W. DRESSER.

Hillside, South Hadley, Mass.
April 1, 1925.

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ETHICS IN THEORY AND APPLICATION

PART ONE

THE BASIS OF ETHICS

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF ETHICS

Definition.—Ethics is the science of the moral life. It is concerned with human conduct in relation to character and a conception of the good, commonly referred to as the highest good. It considers conduct with reference to right and wrong, good and evil, the basis of moral obligation, the nature of duty, conscience, freedom; and the problems of egoism, altruism, social service and development in the light of the highest ideals. It is the science of the ideal element of life on its moral side, the science of moral values or goodness, the permanent element in human conduct in contrast with the transient. Morality, or the moral life, is the sphere of activity with which the science of ethical values is concerned. The experience exists long before the philosophy. The science seeks to make explicit the distinctions, standards, laws, meanings, and values implied in the moral experiences of the race. It brings to a focus the ideal interests involved in conduct judged to be conduct of the highest type, conduct pursued with a purpose in view which involves a philosophy of life.

Moral Conduct.—Conduct known as moral differs from the behavior of organisms in general. Science describes the behavior of animals with reference to energies operating mechanically in bodily organisms. This mechanical behavior is said to take place in response to stimuli, as in reactions to light; and interest centers about the natural environment with its forces, the sense-organs, the bodily or perhaps the chemical conditions. The description is made as simple as possible with reference to the implied reflex or instinct, as when wild geese are seen in flight, following a leader, or when various species of quadrupeds are found herding together. As part of the mechanical order of nature, man too may be described with reference to what his organism is seen doing, as he works, plays, responds to bodily wants and needs, foregathers, makes war, or dwells in peace with his neighbors. For biology man is a unit among many other units whose behavior psychology describes for us by regarding the mind as in intimate relation with the body. But the simpler the description of man's life the more matters are left over as not yet accounted for. When activities which are measurable become the standard, questions of worth or value, and ultimate purpose persist in coming up for later consideration. While man may indeed respond to a herd instinct, as one of the higher animals whose behavior is determined by his habitat and his heredity, he is also an individual in a sense which marks off his life from that of even the highest animals we know.

Moral conduct presupposes activities which the various descriptive sciences, such as biology and psychology, portray, but it is especially concerned with the quality of man's inner life, his intimate experience, the contrasts and conflicts which in a measure separate him from external nature. For such conduct implies that man becomes self-conscious and in a degree self-directive. It discloses judgments passed upon the conduct of others, involves a persistent contrast between the ideal and the actual which runs through his whole experience. Thus his inner life may be far removed from the behavior of his

organism, as in war, when his heart may disapprove of what his hands are compelled to do. His inner life may seem indeed to have had a higher origin and to imply a standard radically different from that of brute force. His inner life implies interests which develop without limit and in such a wealth of sentiment that each man dwells in a measure in a world of his own; the world of personality, of efforts to be individual, produce, excel, attain more abundant life. His ideals as surely exist for him as the experiences which bring him in contact with nature and ally him with animals. Hence the need for a special science which takes up matters of profoundest interest when we have sought the utmost that can be bestowed on us by history, economics, psychology, the arts, and even when religion has brought its surest satisfactions. Moral conduct then is distinctively concerned with judgments implying contrasts between higher and lower, in which emphasis is placed, not on the mere origins or bodily conditions of the energies pulsating in man, but on the ends pursued. Man is regarded as a person in so far as he knows himself, wills to be a complete individual in the light of a moral standard. If then we define ethics as the science of the conduct of life, in contrast with behavior, we especially note that "conduct" is an *active* term, implies something to be done; hence an art of morals should follow from the science of morals, and we should consider under what conditions moral conduct becomes most effective.

What Ethics Assumes.—In thus beginning with the facts of moral conduct, with its varied problems, as discovered by the individual, ethics regards man as a real self in relation to other moral selves, in a real universe of space and time, although the moral order of the universe may also be said to be independent of given space and particular time. It is also assumed either that man is morally free or that, so far as his conduct may be determined, he is still accountable for his actions; that is, the facts in any case are admitted by those who believe and those who disbelieve in freedom of will. The presence

of an ideal element, a realm of eternal principles, sometimes called "the world of appreciation," is implied. That is, the reality of duty and right, the existence of the moral order, is regarded as sure, howbeit this reality is not attested to in the same way as the existence of things in space which we see and touch. Indeed, in various connections nothing is so real for man, nothing so convincing, or unescapable as the pronouncements of conscience, the judgments of his fellowmen, and the results of conduct which neither law-courts nor the mutations of time can take away. Ethics is the one science which above all others pushes through doubts and contrasts to a single principle.

The Realities of Moral Experience.—This experience for individual man constitutes his inner life or world, "inner" not in the sense of being discoverable by self-analysis as if you and I were cut off in utter exclusiveness from each other, in contrast with deeds done, as when by an act of heroism another's life is saved. It is moral experience as conceivably existing for all, hence as in its way, disinterestedly there for an intelligent observer to witness in its fullness. While at one moment we may be aware of employing physical forces, eating and living like animals; conscious of desires that are unappeased, of appetites that are unchecked; of temptations to do wrong, to cheat, lie, steal, take cowardly advantage, to be idle or lazy: at other moments we are aware of aspirations, ambitions to be good, respected, influential in the best sense, upright, true to the highest we know. The conflict makes us know what we call conscience, which sits in judgment on our motives, and conduct, and somehow affects our conduct so that we can not explain it as due to the individual self alone. In case we yield to temptation, if we sin, drop down in the scale of actions, we are made more painfully aware of conscience, shame, remorse, guilt. Thus conscience, giving us a sense of responsibility, shows how profoundly real is moral experience. Some try indeed to flee from conscience, lightly concluding that if their misdeeds are not found out all will be well with them; but the contrast is part and parcel of our nature. No less strong is the conviction, among

those who fathom this persistent moral experience, that there is a greatest good for the greatest number which we might all labor to achieve.

The most familiar description of this experience is that we are aware of two "voices," one telling us to do right, the other bidding us do wrong. Even if we do not do wrong, we are aware that we might have yielded. Hence, the question arises, Have we two natures that must remain two? The moral problem is to make of the diversity, however great, one consistent self, to bring order out of chaos. Plainly, we must divide our problem, asking: What are these impulses arousing into action within us? What is the self morally regarded in relation to its two natures? What shall guide us in the adjustment? What is the nature of the goodness we seek and to which we assign the highest value? Are we really free to act in and from ourselves? What is the authority of conscience? What is the basis of moral obligation? What is the relation between these matters of the individual life and the problem of our relation to society?

Standards.—In all departments of life we find people tending to classify according to norms or standards, for example, standards in architecture, in the construction of railroads, in methods of business, in reference to music and painting, in language, in computation, in reasoning. In the moral life we seek a standard that we may judge, gauge our impulses, weigh our desires, and put an estimate on our volitions. For we find it impossible to say that all motives are equally good. The moral life is not like a plain. The barest act of condemnation, the merest sentiment of dissatisfaction implies a higher and a lower alternative, and the higher suggests a highest, hence a scale. We find that wrong deeds are not merely lower, and right deeds higher, as if they occupied a fixed position in the scale; our judgments imply that some acts of conduct are of greater worth in a scale involving progress such that the greater of today may be only the great tomorrow. We seem to be in quest of an absolute standard; and not without reason have idealists put the Beautiful, the True, and the Good in most

intimate relation as somehow constituting a realm of eternal values.

There is indeed a popular theory that the way to be rid of an undesirable tendency is to express it, for example, the impulse to swear, the tendency to be uncouth, to say anything that occurs to you, do anything you like, even disregard law; since this is "a free country." But experience shows that desire is insatiable. We are creatures of habit and tend to continue expressing. Mere expression is indeed no guide. This sort of life not only fosters selfishness, it is selfishness. So we need a way to estimate our tendencies in the light of their origin, nature, and results. Otherwise we would assume that because a thing exists, therefore it is right; we might even say, with Pope, "Whatever is, is right." People often try to defend this statement that what exists is right. But we find our thought involved in a whirl of complexities and contradictions when we try to apply this assumption universally, when we tend to accept human society as it is, with all its injustice, its hatreds, and its warfare. Over against these ready assumptions stands conscience calling for a scale of values. If the right exists, if values are real, and goodness a fact—this indeed is the great truth we have gone in quest of amidst relativities which baffle and uncertainties which dishearten.

Again, the popular assumption appears in the guise of a proposition that there is but one thing we can do, as if it were written in the book of fate precisely what desire we should express. But our moral consciousness all the while puts conflicts before us, with the conviction that the alternatives are real: we feel it incumbent upon us to make a choice, and somehow the conviction also persists that a choice will make a difference, perhaps for untold years or for eternity. We are aware that we shall be held accountable, and this would be unmeaning if there were but one course to pursue. We are at times left to act on faith, make the venture. There appears to be a law over us in all these matters. For better or worse, we find ourselves choosing. Plainly, much depends on our standard in thus choosing, and our standard implies acceptance of author-

ity, civil, ethical, or religious. And however we may have procrastinated we may begin now to acquire the highest standard, as we might in the fine arts seek the masters of music to know what the supreme music is. Wherever we look we find a relationship implying quests or the ultimate standard concerning the Beautiful, the True, and the Good.

Moral Consciousness and Ideals.—The most appealing way to put the matter is in terms of ideals, without at first asking whether there is anything absolute about morality. If we were to confine ourselves to what *is*, life would indeed be prosaic, as in the drudgery and routine of many occupations. We know that very much depends on the way a thing is done, what we hope to achieve, the opportunities for relaxation we have in mind. We are able by ideal consciousness to change almost anything in life from prose to poetry, even labor or work may become “self-expression” of which we heartily approve, granted a certain attitude which makes it so. Education enables us to live in world upon world where it is the ideal meaning that signifies, as we pass from history to a special science, as we compare economic relations, systems of government, types of belief. Love admits us to the world of the heart, and for the sake of love we labor, sacrifice, persist; and love as an incentive sends us forth into the realms of Beauty and Truth, as well as into the sphere of the Good. All these activities mark a departure from what merely *exists*, and in so far as moral judgments intermingle there is a transition to what *ought to be*. Life should be for love’s sake, we say, it should be made beautiful, truth should prevail.

If in some sense that which ought to be already is, so that moral experience is realization, the “ought” is potential in the self or the moral order; and the contrast remains between ideal and actual in the given world of experience. Then too the moral ideal is in large part a human achievement. We contribute to the ideal by meeting life, with its poverty or stern necessities, accepting alternatives and winning victories where the odds are apparently against us. The moral life is not a mechanical unfolding. We live under an actual system of government where customs are

being tried out, where legal enactments are undergoing tests. The significant fact is that the ideal element assumes the right to rule. We feel the need of an art of life to help us work together so that the ideal element shall indeed triumph. Ethics comes forward to increase in value by its criticisms whatever any practical science or art may already have contributed as its share. Action, it is said, is concerned with the particular which can never be exhausted by general principles, example is better than precept, and experience better than either.¹

The Ideal Element.—Inquiring more closely into the activities of the individual than when we are merely interested in describing his behavior, for instance, in the stock exchange or the theater, as students of ethics we note distinctions between (1) the instincts which prompt man from within, the spontaneity which sends him forth to produce, organize, achieve; (2) the conditions which life takes on, in contrast with its tendencies; (3) the conditions it encounters, the opposition which produces inner struggle and which may be turned to account in the development of character; and (4) the tendencies of life as made explicit in the form of ideals, or purposes. We are all dimly aware at least that it is the ideal element which makes life worth while. By making the ideal element explicit in relation to conduct and character, ethics is partly a science but also in part directly practical. The love of life which is so strong implies this quest for the ideal which is never satisfied with conduct or science alone, but which seeks closer coördination between theory and practice. If ethics did not exist we would need to create it. Whether we have previously realized it or not, we have needed to distinguish the ideal element from mere utility.

Quantity and Quality.—The need for our science becomes indeed the greater the more insistently external life breaks in upon us, with its attempts to reduce everything to measurement, dollars, mechanical skill, and speed. Unwittingly, we are constantly making selections in quest of a scale of values which shall set us free from mere mechan-

¹ J. S. Mackenzie, *A Manual of Ethics*, p. 13.

ism. Bare fact teaches us that we are creatures of heredity and environment, conditioned by the stream of events which records itself in the plastic substances of the brain. But a life of never-ceasing effort springing up from within reminds us that we can not escape responsibility. Over against the sheer play of circumstance is the play of motives, intentions, purposes; the quest for balance, wisdom, justice; and the demand for progress in the relationships between individual and society such that inner virtue shall become social conduct. Even when we yield most fully to love of pleasure, over against it is conscience, our awareness of this inner situation, with its ideal element, its sense of moral obligation or duty, its intimation that there is an end which we ought to pursue.

We may define the good in a preliminary way as the end we aim at, despite any failure, while the right is a particular thing done toward the realization of the good. The wrong deed is conduct which conflicts with this standard. Ethical philosophers differ indeed regarding the sources, foundations and ultimate ends pursued. But our first interest is to see that moral science is implied in all our conduct whether we are aware of it or not. The method to be pursued in this volume calls for constant appeal to the life going on round about us today, so that all statements may be tested or verified by concrete analysis of moral life as thoughtful individuals know it.

Custom and Ideals.—That to be moral means in a profound sense to take exception to that which exists in favor of that which ought to be, is evident even in the definition of the term from which the name of our science is derived. The term *morals* is derived from *mores* (customs, manners), and came into use to translate the corresponding Greek word *ethos* (custom, habit, usage), from which the term *ethics* has come. The term would seem to indicate that to be moral is to obey established customs and usages. There is a sense in which this is true. The moral spirit tends to express itself in habitual forms, in codes like the Ten Commandments, and institutions like the Christian Church; and to be righteous in a given period of history may mean

to stand by these established forms. But the mere fact that a custom exists in society or that a principle has received formulation in a code, whatever that code may be called, however high its authority, is no guarantee that it is right; and men have sought for centuries to determine precisely what is right with reference to a given commandment, such as, Thou shalt not kill. It is not a mere question of fact, never an affair of mere origin, not even if the custom is said to be established by law revealed from heaven. Blind obedience is not ethical. A custom which was in very truth moral when it became habitual, under conditions which then obtained, may in course of time become allied with purely external observances and serve other than moral ends by persisting as a habit. It is forever the moral spirit, the inner principle of judgment or authority that makes a custom moral. If that spirit moves elsewhere we follow it, even at the risk of deserting external observances altogether. A custom becomes moral for me because I relate it to my ethical ideal.

History discloses various peoples pursuing their distinctive modes of activity, their folkways, as in the dance, the ceremonial of initiation. Some of these folkways become customs, that is, settled habits, *mores* which are insisted upon, while others are not vested with moral authority. Out of these social habits come in time moral codes, and a code in turn implies a system. So the great moral systems of the world are seen in contrast, and one may if he prefer begin the study of ethics by investigating the great systems to see if he can discover a standard.² The habit of the individual ordinarily harmonizes with the custom of the tribe which prescribes rules for its members. But moral habits become more specific than other habits, and the moral life is more ideal in content than custom in general, with its relation to conventionality and good form. We form habits for various purposes, the highest of which are moral. We adopt customs as we follow fashion, submitting to its decrees, responding to its changes. We are moral in re-

² See, for example, P. V. N. Myers, *History as Past Ethics*, 1913; G. S. Fullerton, *A Handbook of Ethical Theory*, 1922, Chap. I.

sponse to custom long before we ask why. The tribe imposes its customs on the individual, and the only righteousness seems to be what the tribe decrees, the only wrong that which the tribe condemns. But later the individual compares custom with custom, refusing to regulate his conduct by the fact that things have always been done in a certain way. Although morality has grown up amid custom, the moral life tends to become more distinctive by calling customs in question. War was long taken as a matter of course as the only way of settling disputes or enlarging territory, and is only at this late day receiving the criticism which it deserves. In a sense the individual becomes confessedly moral by putting his conduct in relation to every custom whatsoever to see if social habit meets with rational approval. Custom develops in the fields of politics and economics, as well as in the spheres of the practical arts and the fine arts. Ethics is distinguished by a peculiar kind of criticism, even of its own sources and the highest moral codes as history discloses them. And so in time the moral law comes to be regarded as a constant or immutable principle, not dependent on tribal decrees, not limited by any group of commandments, by time, place, leader, book, nation, or institution. Hence the distinctive terms, such as right and wrong, goodness, conscience, duty, moral obligation, moral freedom, need to be considered by themselves. Ethics, defined as "the science of values in their relation to conduct as a whole."³ undertakes the supreme criticism of conduct and systems, customs and codes, individual and social habits, and makes a comparative estimate of all interests regarded as worth while.

Moral Philosophy.—Although the term moral philosophy is in general the equivalent of "ethics," the former term now has different associations in our minds, and we note certain changes of thought which have come about. Most of us object to the moralizer. The moralizing historian is to-day antiquated. We permit the dramatist to introduce a moral purpose, but it must be by means of the art which conceals art. We prefer a novel in which the

³ W. G. Everett, *Moral Values*, 1918, p. 7.

author's purpose is so hidden that critics differ concerning his motive. In early New England sermons were two hours long, now we become impatient after twenty minutes. No person is so wearisome as the individual who appoints himself our mentor. The moral reformer, like the temperance advocate of old, can secure a hearing only by some subterfuge, because his name is not on the program or because music is offered as a solace. With good reason we have classified many reformers as lacking appreciation of what constitutes the fullness of life, or as unbalanced, if not bigots or sheer conservatives. Meanwhile, certain books on moral philosophy are accumulating dust on library shelves. Was the trouble with the reformers or with the moral theory?

The fact is that moral philosophy of a certain stamp is out of date even among earnest students of ethics. Such philosophy began either with an elaborate theory of the universe, which had to be carefully considered before its application to moral matters could be made plain; or with an equally dry system of theology implying in great detail a theory of the moral government of the world, a scheme of salvation, and an analysis of various principles based on prior belief in revelation. There was little reference to history, oftentimes no reference to current moral issues. The moral philosopher apparently did his part by making the foundations of his science secure. The prime result was a forbidding intellectual structure which only scholars could understand. This kind of moral philosophy went out of date with the coming in of the historical method in the various sciences.

Moralizing.—Those who adopted the old moral systems were decidedly rigid in attitude, and the moral ideal which was upheld was emphatically austere. It was a serious matter to pursue the straight and narrow way, found by so few in a world of sinners. Moral indignation was emphatic too, and condemnation in the name of righteousness utterly severe. The moral system was imposed like an instrument from above or without, intended to produce righteous conduct within, whatever the conditions. It was

imposed with august authority which was to be maintained at all costs.

The failure of such moral instruction was partly due to over-seriousness, but more to the fact that its precepts were put in negative form: thou shalt not. With an excessive number of prohibitions went too much management, an exacting attitude, often wholly unsympathetic. The moral life was made as unattractive as possible. Under the auspices of the old system people were brought up in knowledge of what they were *forbidden* to do, rather than in terms of what is *right* because it brings satisfaction to all sides of our nature. Instead of appeals to self-knowledge, there was rigid exclusion of a part of our nature as the source of evil; hence with prohibitions came inner conflict, and the life that was meant to be a joy became a dirge.

The Moral Reaction.—Only by understanding the reaction against this attitude, with its Puritanism, allied with Calvinism as a rigid system of doctrine, supported by the authority of the Church as an institution, is the student likely to appreciate the wholly different spirit which now prevails. The reaction was a protest against that particular type of moralizing, not an objection to morality as such; a reaction against moral reformers who did not understand, not an objection to the study of human nature. It carried our generation too far the other way for a time and led to excesses both in theory and practice, such as the substitution of psycho-analysis (the study of repressed mental states and instincts) for moral theory; and the popular reaction against obedience, law and order, and against prohibitions in every form. But in the violence of the reaction there was a measure of reason, and a larger view of human nature makes a return to the old moralizing impossible. The failure was due both to defective theory, too elaborate and too dry, and to imperfect moralizing, imposing its authority without appreciation of the conditions under which the youth of a nation grow into manhood. It was assumed that because the system was true all its precepts were right, and because these were right therefore they ought to be obeyed, everybody ought to know them,

and everybody should be condemned who did not do what he ought. Our protest is in favor of a radically different view of the human mind, as we shall presently see.

True ethical teaching drives no one away. Morality was meant to be a thing of beauty, of eager zest and joy, an affair of the fullness of life. If it has not seemed so, the fault lay with those one-sided mortals who by mistaken views of human nature and a mistaken method made virtue unpleasant, neglectful as they were of both Greek and Christian ethics in their fullness. Our protest need not be regarded as a reversion to materialism, as if our age were less moral. Many of us are still far more acutely aware of the protest against Puritanism than of the real purport of the newer morality of our time. It is part of our interest as students of ethics to make explicit the tendencies implied in human conduct all about us, without too swiftly pronouncing judgment. Indeed, it is no easy matter to penetrate beneath the reactions of a rapidly changing social period, to determine whether our age is less or more moral than any other.

Morality.—The term “moral” is used in popular speech, frequently in literature, with a meaning not directly mentioned: to be moral is to be virtuous in one respect. But morality as ethics employs the term applies to the whole of life in so far as man strives between a better and a worse. Thus in a sense the whole sphere of custom belongs within the domain of morality; and in certain connections dancing, dress, manners, business, the theater, even the fine arts as a whole come within this domain, and personal habits of all sorts come before the bar of social judgment. There is however an un-moral or non-moral stage of development prior to the time when contrasts between higher and lower come into view, before man becomes self-conscious with regard to his instinctive tendencies and competing desires; and all along the line of his development as a child of nature there may be a simplicity which has never known contrast. The term “immoral” implies criticism of undesirable motives and modes of conduct, implies conduct actually approved of as moral and a lapse

from such conduct to a lower level. To be immoral is not simply to lapse in one respect, but a man is immoral whenever in the presence of a higher incentive bidding him do what his better selfhood judges to be right—to tell the truth, be just, kind, generous, loyal—he is guilty of deception, fraud, trickery, or anything else that bemeans him. By a moral man we mean one who is upright, true to his nobler selfhood, one who commands our respect. By morality we mean ethics in practice, and from the given morality of a people we infer the type of ethical theory. We do not judge a people by one virtue simply, such as respect for parents, nor by the whole moral code, or the entire social life abstracted from the moral theory. Deeds wrought in the name of morality differ so greatly from nation to nation that we must penetrate many appearances to discern what is morally real. So too each generation may begin anew to judge modes of conduct taken to be most distinctively moral. The conduct of today that is slurred over may be condemned as the immoral conduct of tomorrow. A generation in process of throwing aside customs that have concealed the social life of other ages may be more genuinely moral at heart, despite all appearances.

In an absolute sense morality is conduct which will lead toward the highest good. Relatively speaking, it is conduct approved by a given social group on the basis of group experience. We are apt to assume that there is a best method of conduct which if followed by all members of society would lead to the highest development, one standard being best for all stages of conduct. Hence we isolate moral deeds and leaders from their historical context, just as we pre-judge all virtues as better because they are known as Christian, and discount the virtues of other peoples accordingly. But it is no easy task to select what is absolute about morality, and reject whatever is relative.

In actual history we find the standards of morality changing with the levels of development, and in one nation as compared with others. Morality as a social product is intimately related to all other achievements, and is not intelligible apart from its history, in so far as habits imply

folkways, folkways lead to customs, customs receive formulation in codes, and moral systems give expression to standards in classic forms. With the increase of intelligence in a nation criticism of custom brings about changes in the actual morality, and so the morality of a nation becomes the expression of the highest attainments of the nation's experience through a long course of history. Individual leaders introduce changes which in modified form become accepted by society, while society on the whole endeavors to socialize the individual. But to make sure that we understand the morality of a people, for instance, the ancient Greeks, we do not consult the ethical philosophers only, but also the historians, dramatists, painters, sculptors, not neglecting to ascertain so far as possible the lot of the common people. So in endeavoring to verify the great ethical principles of the ages by reference to our own time, we try to understand present-day life in all its significant phases, as we mingle with the throng in places of amusement, observe manual laborers at work, listen to social groups discussing problems, join sympathetically with fellow-students; read varied types of magazines, the novels that people find most typical, also the works on economics, history and science which have the greatest influence; and while we do our part toward contributing to high standards of thought, speech, manners, service, the welfare of the community.

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CHAPTER II

THE IDEAL AND THE PRACTICAL

Moral Struggle.—The direct approach to knowledge of the moral life is found by drawing ever more close to the actual contrast between the ideal and its conditions. No fact is more characteristic of us than our longing for the fullness of life, for whatever we regard as ideal, whether in the fields of beauty, truth, or, still more truly, in the field of goodness. Yet nothing is more apparent than the besetting conditions which make all ideal attainments difficult, so that at times we almost despair. At one moment we appear to be creatures of dull circumstance, finding meagre satisfaction in things as they are. At another we are mindful of our ideals, intent upon attaining certain ends despite any setback. The demands of practical life compel us to devote most of our time to the adjustment of conduct to conditions, and so existence seems to be definable by such adjustments. Yet we live in a realm of values to which we contribute by every effort to break with mere routine and the disappointing past. Thus we anticipate better forms of government, a free field for the arts, an improved system of education, something like equality of opportunity, the overcoming of religious hatreds, and the supremacy of peace and reason where war and passion now prevail.

At first thought this emphasis on values seems to imply a certain alienation from the world of affairs. Indeed, moral leaders appear to have been characterized by their remoteness as much as by their idealism. The prophet is apt to be the one who cares least for things as they are. He seems to be preparing for eternity. As a prophet of righteousness he advocates a standard of thought which seems too ideal for this world. Hence he is likely to be

regarded as theoretical. Meanwhile, this mundane order is so definitely practical that the average man appears to have no interest in anything beyond economics and politics, and these interests seem to center about the struggle for selfish existence.

The World Crisis.—Yet we need look no further back in history than the World War to discover the fact that there is the most intimate relation between events and the ideals for which man is all the while contending. A world crisis is indeed a reminder of the truth that we are participating in moral experience even when, to all appearances, we are in complete subjection to material conditions.

Some idealists had indeed been dwelling apart from the actualities of the world. They had espoused the cause of peace with such zeal, there was such a quickening interest in arbitration, in a world court, in brotherhoods instead of petty nationalism, that another war seemed impossible. The coming of the war was a reminder that when a crisis comes it is the ideals which have been grounded in the actual social situation that are effective; hence that we are known by the lowest level of civilization, not by the highest ends to which we have aspired. The war dispelled many illusions for those who thought the *idea* of peace was enough. In the first moment of bitter disappointment it was said that even Christianity was a failure. But the second moment raised the question whether Christianity had ever been tried out among nations. With increasing disappointments came the discovery that the war itself was accompanied by a moral impetus which once more proved how near to man's heart is his ethical ideal.

Apparently, no event in all history was further removed from the moral sphere. For was not the war a result of mechanism carried to the limit, crushing every obstacle in its path, throwing aside every obligation? Not so at all. For the summons to the colors in each nation was a call to a moral standard as never before. Each nation had to decide between loyalties, and within the nation individuals

found themselves facing the issues of unionism or patriotism, socialism or nationalism, ties of intellectual brotherhood or ties of blood. To try to be neutral was as definitely to wrestle with moral issues as to become an aggressive conscientious objector. The more intense the conflict, however great the lapse into barbarism, the more the war was regarded as a moral struggle to end war, to insure peace and prosperity. In fact, more questions pertaining to right and wrong among nations were raised than could be settled in time to yield a treaty of peace of which all nations should approve. Secret diplomacy, the struggle for balance of power and the private political quarrel once more intervened, and the actual world seemed remote indeed from an ethical league of nations. But not even the most violently selfish partisanship kept the struggle from being essentially a moral contest in which there was vitally stimulating intimacy between the ideal and the practical.

Moral Benefits.—The moral lapse after the armistice was similar to that which visits the individual who is overstimulated for a time by an idealism which can not yet be put into permanent practice. The actual world had not by any means attained the moral level assumed in order to maintain the armies, secure coöperation at home, and sustain unified military command. But it had come face to face with reality as seldom in all history. The prime result was knowledge of the point really attained by civilization, and such knowledge is moral power. After the war, the moral idealist knew where to start to help men learn the real causes of the war among the nations, not alone among those most at fault. For the inner causes were plainly very much deeper than the overt causes, the moral issues of greater significance than the external lust for power, the insidious commercialism, or the economic determinism so emphasized that it appeared to be the only actual cause. And whenever the cause of war is thus forced home to the inner life we learn that in large measure it involves the passions and selfishness of the individual.

The Larger Problems.—The war so greatly enlarged

our horizon that the moral situation became international. So again, whatever people said and did was affected by the moral trend of things. To some it seemed possible to attain moral unity at a bound by means of the League of Nations, despite the fact that the nations had not grown up to the idealism put on for the sake of winning the war. To decline to adopt the larger responsibilities which events had put upon us was to try to return to a state of isolation which the world had outgrown. Although the United States officially declined to join the League, individual representatives naturally proceeded on the assumption that American leadership was a moral fact. Hence it was to the United States that the nations looked for a settlement of the difficulties pertaining to reparations, as indeed Americans had taken the lead in the far-reaching work of reconstruction. One of the lessons of the war may then be called the discovery that we had progressed further in moral development than we knew. We saw that the moral spirit, operating in and through nations, had brought us where we were, despite the secret scheming of politicians and diplomats. We saw, too, that the war came about for the most part because we had made so little effort to secure conscious moral coöperation among nations, because we had failed to find a moral equivalent for war. International problems show on a great scale what is true of the individual. We behold our own lust for power writ large. We see the consequences of selfishness in all its realistic horrors. We realize to what an extent the individual, the small social group is coerced by hard necessities imposed by dominant groups of demagogues and war-lords. Thus we are able to put in striking relief what are called "moral forces" as contrasted with political and economic forces when used for selfish ends.

The natural result was a demand for more knowledge of moral forces, and many of us had to admit that we had only a vague idea what moral forces are, or how such forces are to be controlled so that war will not be resorted to or civilization be imperiled.¹ Some writers on ethics have

¹ Cf. B. M. Laing, *A Study of Moral Problems*, 1922, p. 22.

been in favor of passing by all matters pertaining directly to the individual, and putting all the effort into a plan for uniting the nations under protection of an international force.² The objection is that the nation is composed of individuals, each individual is in process of moral development, and the issues which the individual faces can not be slighted or hurried over. It would also call for the acceptance of a certain type of ethical theory, such as utilitarianism, when many have not even considered the alternatives. While these international issues best illustrate the intimate relation between the forces involved, the permanent solution is not likely to be found by beginning with the largest problems. Moral reform begins with the individual and in the inner life. With the individual as in the nation it proceeds in so far as the ideal becomes grounded in the things of daily life precisely where the individual stands.

The Individual Problem.—When we consider the efforts of those who have so ardently worked for the abolition of war we come to the same conclusions. To single out war and ask that it be abolished by itself is to forget that it has always been tied in with everything else and is not to be sundered from the problems of justice and a hundred other issues which pertain to the level of civilization on which we live. To demand that the youth of the nation sign a pledge never to participate in war under any conditions for any reason whatsoever, is to neglect the fact that our knowledge does not permit us to see far ahead, that life is not so simple as such an agreement would imply. The significant fact is that the great moral issues involved in war have been raised at last, that we need to think them out and find a solution which touches to the heart of the matter. The real lesson taught by the war was similar to that taught by the contest over prohibition: it taught the individual how far-reaching is his own thought and his own life, how very much depends on what goes forth from within in behalf of good citizenship or obedience to law.

² See, for example, W. McDougall, *Ethics and Modern World Problems*, 1924.

It is out of the question to make the whole moral situation depend upon a single issue. Ethical matters always begin, when they start seriously, with the individual, with a profounder study of human nature, with the activities which take place in small groups. And the individual can not long ignore the fact that a single issue which strikes home, such as the peace of the community, the welfare of the family, security in religious belief, involves other issues no less vital. The great thing is not to unite upon a single prohibition, but to acquire a group of principles which apply to those issues which are most fundamental. Not even the Church can abstain and say that in the future it will have nothing whatever to do with war. For the Church was partly responsible for the moral ideals which identified many of the virtues with war. The martial virtues have been in many respects supreme. It is for the individual as for our moral institutions to find a complete substitute which shall organize itself into what we call civilization.

The Sphere of the Ideal.—There is indeed a certain attitude of remoteness which some have maintained by regarding themselves as moral beings living in an alien world but free to act according to ideal standards, as if the moral order were a domain apart. Plato has been regarded as the prophet of this attitude, in his analysis of the laws and conditions of the ideal state. When the question arose whether anywhere on earth such a state as his Republic existed, the answer was that probably it did not but that one could already begin to conform one's conduct to the standard laid up in heaven. Thus a moral ideal seemed to be a pattern to put before the eye of the mind. It would be a misconception however to suppose that therefore moral ideals are remote and impractical. It by no means follows that moral ideals exist in a realm by themselves, interesting only to those who think too much or who seem more righteous than we are. To entertain high ideals is indeed in a measure to dedicate ourselves to an eternal order of reality, and there may be respects in which natural law and moral law are in conflict. Hence there is a certain independence of attitude which befits the ethical idealist. We

rightly object when an ideal is adversely criticized before we have had opportunity to show its value. It is never solely a question of ideals that can be directly applied. We live for ideals in so far as outward conditions fall short. We also drop the cares of daily life to enter this or that ideal world of poetry, music, friendly coöperation, truth, religion; hence we often protest that the Beautiful, the True, and the Good exist for their own sake. Yet the ideal is so related to the practical that no science more directly considers what we value most in either sphere than the science of ethics. The idealist is sometimes the most practical man in the community. We appeal to him whenever a calamity comes, dispensing for the time with sordid commercialism and partisan politics, as in case of the flood in Galveston, when the commission form of government was put into effect and five men of principle ruled the city. In war-time at least "the man of the hour" enjoys the kind of supremacy of wisdom over politics for which moral idealists have so often pleaded.

We may well remind ourselves that there have been many Utopian schemes since Plato's time, dreams of an ideal order, a city of God, a kingdom of heaven which might have been founded on earth had men not been so worldly. To dwell on an ideal seems to be to enter an ethereal atmosphere, as if one were to find consolation for one's loneliness in the fact that others have beheld a vision of a better state of things too perfect for earth. But it is always a wholly practical question to ask just what it would mean, for instance, to carry into realization the Christian ideal in all its integrity as a system applicable to the social order in which we live. In a later chapter we shall consider the relation of ethics to religion, and find that religion gives scope, adds beauty, supplies requisite incentives for the moral situation.

The Practical.—The question what constitutes utility is not to be answered offhand. Among other things, man is a being whose relationships in the world center about economic conditions, and it is natural to urge that education should prepare our youth to compete with people who do

not stop to ask whether existing methods are right or wrong. Hence we find a tendency to drop the classics, and put purely "practical" subjects in their stead. It is also true that man is a biological creature, and to be practical is to compete with those whose patterns of behavior may be more subtle than our own. The philosophy of evolution is sometimes invoked to sustain this struggle of brute force to survive. But to be practical is also to know human nature better, to apply in its totality what science has taught us concerning man, notably the results of psychology chastened by ethical criticism. Thus our science may lead us to reconsider the entire question concerning the practical.

Recent Tendencies.—However closely we observe the tendencies of our age we find the same intimate relationship between the ideal and the practical which was forced home to us during the World War. From one point of view this age of mechanical invention and discovery, with its evolutionism, is the age of the triumph of matter over spirit, of inordinate love of pleasure encouraged by a wealth of resources far surpassing those of the age which witnessed the degradation of Rome. We note the excessive fondness for display, the unlimited love of the dance, of joy-riding, the film-play, the daring adventure; with a reaction against much that is best in manners, dress, music, in favor of the absurdly novel and strange. Worse than that, after the war, with the coming of prohibition, came increased disregard for law, and failure to execute justice. In other lands there has been a tendency to revert to the epoch of the dictator, while in our own the demagogue has vied with paternalism in the struggle for power.

In doctrinal fields there came a partial reversion to the days of the Inquisition. New organizations sprang up to make capital out of race-hatreds, to coerce people into their views of Americanism, to intimidate or ostracize if need be. After ages of work for tolerance, we found ourselves dropping back to the intolerance of the darkest generations. Although our forefathers came to establish freedom of speech and liberty of worship, we had to prove afresh that free self-expression is a value.

Yet it might be said that these excesses are no more strange than those which history records along the entire pathway of the moral life. Each generation finds itself anew, while new situations enable moral leaders to make explicit once more the eternal truths of the ages. Why indeed are we restless, dissatisfied amidst these social changes? Why so many cries that we must have a new social order? Every judgment we pass has another side. We first heard that our youth had become immoral, that the new woman had gone to excess, that love of pleasure was leading us straight to the destruction which fell upon the Roman Empire; then we heard about the more splendid morality making its influence felt amid these appearances. The criticism in behalf of social justice and freedom of speech, the reaction against paternalism, the issues rising around unionism in the industries, the contests over radicalism in its varied forms, the question of recognizing a radical government threatening us with world revolution if we did not yield—all these and many other protests implied the distinctions which have made ethics as a science imperative. Everywhere we have heard anew judgments regarding what exists, in favor of what *ought to be*, what might be if we would work together with a will in times of peace as we worked unitedly during the war.

Sources of Idealism.—We also find any number of people actually trying to do what Plato suggested: to begin with ourselves, to set our own houses in order, to approximate the standard here and now, without waiting for the ideal state. The things that concern us are so rich that we need the poet's vision, the musician's art, the painter's portrayal, the dramatist's symbols; what the film objectifies, what the novel describes, and all as part of that marvelous whole which we call human life, which we seek more abundantly. Our reactions are toward that greater reality which the moral reformer saw only in part in his over-seriousness. Incidentally, we might remark that sometimes we rebel against moralizing because in our heart of hearts we already realize how strong is the call toward the ideal.

In order then to make sure that we apprehend the heart

of the moral world we need to keep close to the throbbing life of humanity, and we must constantly appeal to personal sentiment, to the profound activity which stirs within us when injustice is done. We must insist that it is this present situation which we are eager to understand, by appeal to which we may avoid the pitfalls of the old moralizing. And yet we shall be compelled to confess that we make no headway save so far as we pass beyond this first stage of the moral life, by questioning our instincts, examining our desires and volitions in the light of various standards, that we may in turn advance beyond the surfaces of our age in quest of the permanent basis of morals.

One side of our nature gives us the problems; the other makes clear the goal. It is not that we lack the energies which make for ideal ends, but that our life is not sufficiently organized in accord with moral understanding; not that the universe is lacking in moral efficiency, but that we do not grasp its basic principle. Hence the need of considering anew the old distinction between the eternal and the temporal: we must begin to live more fully and courageously as denizens of the divine order. If this means that our allegiance is to be transferred from many of the customs, institutions and beliefs of our day, the implication is that we believe that this inner, ideal principle is the determining principle in the world of current events.

Life as an Art.—Havelock Ellis has recently reminded us anew that life is one of the fine arts.³ Man, he tells us, has always found it difficult to conceive of life in this way, but a new vision dawns on us when we regard life, as the dance, under the guise of rhythm and measure and order, the controlling influence of form, and the subordination of parts to the whole. Indeed, the whole universe may be seen as a work of art, created by some Supreme Artist. By art in its fundamental sense is meant all practice, and even the sciences were once arts of the mind: science is measurable knowledge at its growing point, “the organization of an intellectual relationship to the world we live in adequate to give us some degree of power over that

³ *The Dance of Life*, 1923.

world.”⁴ To penetrate back to life and art in this way is to see what morality might be for us all.

Our difficulty is that morality has been discipline. Among the Chinese indeed there has long existed an art of morality, arising out of a temperament in which the art-impulse is all-embracing: “Chinese life is always the art of balancing an æsthetic temperament and guarding against its excesses. . . . Chinese civilization has borne witness to the great fact that all human life is an art.”⁵ So too among the ancient Greeks virtue was beautiful action. But for the Romans it was honorable action simply, while the Hebrews never dreamed of a fine art of the moral life. Our modern view is derived from the Mosaic conception of morality as a code of rigid and inflexible rules, ordained, and to be blindly obeyed; abstract moral speculations culminating in rigid maxims, sterile, vain. But the valid rule is a creative impulse that is one with the illuminative power of intelligence.

The Creative Art.—It does not follow, as Mr. Ellis holds, that morality is in the strict sense a matter of taste; for we shall find that this is only one of several elements of the moral ideal. But we may agree that man is an artist, his civilization a complex of arts. If art in this sense can not be defined because it is infinite, we may at least say that art is the molding force of every culture, the reality we mean by the imperfect term “morality.”⁶ It is the creative art of morality which was especially lacking in the old-time moralizer who was given over to introspective analysis when the great resource would have been action. For him there was no “dance of life,” and there were probably many repressions. For us, who have caught the newer spirit, there is an endeavor toward an art of life which will, we hope, enable us to achieve in our way the beauty of form and spirit in which the ancient Greeks excelled.

The Larger Moral Analysis.—To understand this ele-

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 30.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 192.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

ment of creativeness by means of energizing beauty, is to attain a broader vision and to realize that we need not only to carry on an acute study of the times in which we live, by appeal to the most direct experience, observing how people live; but we need to examine the evidences of what they believe or pretend to believe, verifying in ourselves the great contrasts between (1) consciousness of ideals and (2) consciousness of what is actual. It may become apparent that people demand that one play shall rapidly succeed another on the screen of life because they have not yet seen that the self from which they try to escape is precisely the self which in another aspect implies the truth they seek, the good for which they yearn.

Our consciences have reached a point where we detect a hundred shortcomings instead of the dozen evils which perplexed moral theorists of old. We manifest great interest in things mechanical, such as the film-play and the radio, and forthwith consider how to utilize it to greatest advantage. We are no doubt unduly absorbed in externals, but consider how sane is our reaction from the old moral self-analysis with its serious pretences to virtue, its long-faced manners, its self-righteous emphasis on the gravity of the situation. Youth has protested so many times that we know youth is mostly right. The man of affairs, with his uprightness in dealing with customers and competitors, teaches a far nobler lesson than the half-completed mortal who goes about reforming the world. Religion too has been made too serious and sad. Many of our doctrines have been sustained by an artificial psychology. The joy of life has often been lost amid stern judgments.

The Need for Criticism.—It is no less important however to remind ourselves that while we should keep close to life in its fullness and look for clues to moral values amid daily interests in the world at large, our science is not by any means elementary but calls for deepening experience and thought. Sometimes we must be almost too precise, searchingly analytical, highly systematic, and critical of ourselves and our neighbors. Every tendency we see about us in society has been brought into relation to ethi-

cal ideals at sometime in the past, and the lessons of history have become even more significant than when historians wrote history and moralized in the same paragraph. Many who are eagerly seeking to bring about social justice have scarcely begun the needed preliminary inquiries. We must be fundamental or we will be unable to coördinate. Under the head of "values" we shall need to restore that which was forbidding in what was called "goodness."

Admitting then, with a recent critic, that much that has been called morality is now regarded as idle sentimentality; and that patriotism, duty, glory, honor, loyalty, good faith no longer irresistibly attract, but are regarded with cynicism if not contempt—we still face the old-time issues. If sympathy, self-sacrifice, or any other moral ideal we once argued for is now being called in question, what then is the more rational standard? Although we engaged in a war for civilization and found ourselves in a measure "straining after illusions,"⁷ we are more concerned than ever to find those values which are permanently worth while. Although the war brought a moral relapse, we are no less interested in that knowledge which gives genuine satisfaction; we are convinced that there is a right among nations, all the more so since treaties were declared scraps of paper. How shall we contribute our part toward international ethics unless we look more deeply into the sources and ideals of our own democracy? Although the representative form of government may have so signally failed that we are prompted to ask whether democracy is feasible, we really believe no less that it is. Side by side with the greatest moral failures have come the strongest incentives to renewed action, for instance, (1) in the case of marriage with its attendant divorces and the growing conviction that marriage calls for profounder knowledge of our whole nature; or (2) the demand for "equality of opportunity" with its need for knowledge of human types and limitations of capacity, in contrast with the sheer assertion of old that "all men were born free and equal." We have scarcely begun as yet to consider how to ground moral forces by aid

⁷ Laing, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

of applied psychology, so that we may remake human nature, utilizing the latest insights into man's deeper self.

Summary.—The productive clue then is not in theory or practice alone, not in ideals apart from the state or in mere realism of things as we find them; but in a larger view which puts new life into our daily situation. Man first has experience, then seeks explanations, proposes theories, adopts codes, conventions, formulas and patterns. Every code presupposes moral experience. All moral goodness implies natural goodness, yielding content, giving subject-matter. Creatures of habit or routine, forgetting that our conventions or patterns, our creeds and codes were meant to represent life and keep us close to it, we have put our stereotypes in place of reality and have actually waged wars for them. The resource is to go back to the experiences to see what ideas are worthy of survival, or, better, to regard the age in which we live as an ethical laboratory where as hardly ever before in all history every sort of plan is being tried out. So too each student's inner life is a clue to the drama he is witnessing. To be ethical philosophers in earnest is to make explicit in as dynamic terms as we can find what is being enacted, especially by partisans of a bygone age who insist upon ancient stereotypes. There are "eternal values" which have persisted since Plato's time, but there are also transient values which men have struggled over as if they were eternal. Since ideals of some sort are what make life worth while, is it not also worth while to make the science of values as vital and inspiring as we can? If so, our ethics will not be a thing apart from the natural and social sciences in general, will not involve hostility toward economics, history, religion or any other interest; but will regard all these interests as intimately akin.

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CHAPTER III

THE REALM OF VALUES

Ethical Judgments.—We have noted the fact that ethics implies judgments of value or worth, a quest for what ought to be in contrast with what is. Ethics is much more than descriptive of the course of history, the appearance and disappearance of customs, or even the comparison of moral systems. Its judgments involve estimates with a scale of values in view, not measurements in terms of quantitative or mechanical systems. These judgments are concerned with content rather than origin, with “meanings” rather than causal sequences. Hence, as we have seen, conduct with its bearing on character is put over against behavior. Ethical judgments involve a certain penetration beneath surfaces to determine what is real in the light of the eternal values.

The Descriptive Sciences.—We are now in a position to see the relation of ethics to other sciences, beginning with the descriptive. A descriptive science, for example, geology or biology, involves (1) observation and recording of phenomena; (2) classification of phenomena into groups and series; (3) formulation of the laws and conditions under which the phenomena occur; (4) discovery of an explanatory principle or formula which will enable us to account for the phenomena. A descriptive science is concerned with causal explanation, and is limited in scope, as in the case of chemistry, which starts with the data of its special field but is not called on to account for the ultimate nature of the various elements which it investigates. A thing or event has been explained when (1) it has been accurately described so that trained observers would be able to verify the facts and their conditions, and (2) causes have been assigned so that the law-exemplifying processes in

question are understood as having produced the effects described. Thus a striated ledge breaking through the surface of a New England field is explained, so far as its peculiar markings are concerned, with reference to the force of the ice-sheet making its way across the field in the glacial period. It is not the province of the natural or positive sciences to show why the physical forces function as they do. Even in the case of psychology, as now regarded, science describes the processes which take place in a specific connection only, in relation with conditions of brain and nervous system; psychology does not interpret mental life, to show the value of this or that type of activity or the superiority of one element over others. The normal mental life of man is indeed the standard implied. So too physiology describes the bodily organism with reference to perfect health, and medicine as an art has the normally developed organism in view as its standard. In a number of sciences there is a passing over into the realm of values. But not until it is a question of ethics does science fully enter the sphere of judgments concerning what ought to be.

Interpretation.—The difference between a descriptive and a normative science becomes clear when we consider the limits of explanation. An explanation of the spiritual life would involve an enumeration of the forces which have left their impress on character, so that we should have the exhaustive description of contemplation, worship, prayer, service. But men of science with vision know that explanation is not interpretation. Human love might be explained, so far as its bodily and mental conditions are concerned, but no one of us would say the description of love is complete. We value explanation less the higher we ascend the scale. Some matters we leave as they are. We would rather have a loved person near than explain him. Some music we would rather enjoy than know technically how it is composed and rendered. Lovers of the Bible would say that some passages, even whole chapters, surpass in value, as they read, any explanation of them. To a certain extent we permit literal events to be symbolized, and we see the place of parable; but even the most intelligible exegesis has

its limits. If there is a spiritual sense in life, it is a matter of interpretation due to insight; and insight, with fine discrimination, permits personality to stand forth in its own right. Interpretations differ and fall short. Eternal truth is greater than the systems of all schools. Reality surpasses all prose. There remains the beauty, the zest, the joy which reaches on into the infinite.

Ethical Interpretations.—Ethics compasses this whole field. It is in part a natural science. It tells what customs have prevailed, how men chanced to group themselves and adopt moral codes, and describes actual quests for pleasure as a standard of judgment. The literature of the natural history of morais is a branch of the subject of increasing interest, and recent works have greatly contributed to our knowledge of the sources of moral experience.¹ Uninspired or realistic ethics remains on the level of primitive fact. Yet the central questions of ethics begin where even the most suggestive description ends, and move forward to the problem of interpretation. There is, we have seen, new moral content in each age. How are we to place this content in its setting in relation to permanent principles? How are we to pass from nation to nation, from age to age, to discover the losses and the gains, if not through a science which at times passes beyond history?

The Position of Ethics.—Ethics occupies a somewhat peculiar position between the historical sciences and religions, the natural sciences and metaphysical systems; in certain of its types it tends to be naturalistic, is based on a conception of organic evolution, but in other types it is idealistic, reacting against atomism, fathoming skepticism, depending upon rather than rejecting religion, and adopting a criterion which marks it off as a distinct discipline. Its "world of appreciation" or "realm of eternal values" is very far from being a world in space and time. In a similar manner the artist seeks beauty and endeavors to represent it, praising yet disparaging all visible forms, for-

¹ See especially, L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 2 vols., 1906; E. Westermarck, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Ideas*, 2 vols., 1906; P. V. N. Myers, *History as Past Ethics*, 1913.

ever dissatisfied but as persistently going forth in quest of perfection.

Moral Necessity.—A more precise contrast between description and an intellectual standard is seen in the case of logic and mathematics. When the investigation of thought processes passes from an analytic account of what takes place in the human mind to a study of the way man ought to think in order to think correctly, science passes from psychology to logic and is concerned with the laws of thought, the comparison of propositions, and the norms of reasoning. Hence there is a resemblance between logic and ethics, which in its turn considers how man ought to act in order to act rightly, what the moral law is, what is the form of goodness. So too in mathematics we are concerned with principles which assure right results, apart from any particular reference to the concrete facts which give us our practical problems. We are accustomed to such abstraction in mathematics and we think nothing of it, interested as we are in developing the implications of the given proposition, for instance, the existence of the triangle with the consequences that follow from its precise nature. Mathematics with its absolute precision sets the standard which all sciences seek to attain, and in alliance with mathematics the natural sciences, such as physics and chemistry, advance toward the quantitative ideal.

Ethical philosophers have also responded to this tendency, and an effort has been made to discover a calculus of pleasures, to compare virtue with the qualities of geometrical figures. But the further the relation between mathematics and ethics is pressed the more clear it becomes that ethical necessity differs from mathematical necessity. There is a respect in which the results of man's conduct follow with logical, almost with mathematical precision: "as a man soweth, so shall he also reap."

There is an ethical theory which undertakes to generalize all moral deeds as due to necessary sequences of cause and effect. But a moral cause is unlike a cause which physics or chemistry describes with mathematical precision. The moral law is a mandate or imperative, in contrast with a

law of nature which, as in the case of gravitation, shows how a force invariably acts. It sets up a standard which indicates what would be best, and we esteem a moral law no less highly when human conduct falls short of it. A moral law can be broken, despite its universality. We do not find in the actual world of human affairs that justice is being bestowed upon man automatically. Nor do we find it intelligible to judge human character as if man's moral deeds were mechanical resultants of his conduct.

Goodness and Beauty.—So too in the realm of the fine arts there are differences which are not shared by ethics. The æsthetic object pertains to the eternal values, and there is direct relationship between the Beautiful and the Good. But beauty is realized in considerable measure in the painting, the statue, the cathedral, the symphony as a completed work of fine art; whereas in the ethical sphere it is rather a question of progress toward an ideal, never attained, changing amidst the pursuit of it, inviting pursuit into the infinite. Goodness is a thing of life or activity, made objective to a degree, but also involving criticism and the imperfections of everything finite. The judgments which are passed in its name or spirit look beyond separate deeds, and completed structures, however great the logical or descriptive value of the fact. This is particularly true in the case of virtues which pass over into the sphere of religion, where we come nearer the perfect example and realize the shortcomings of any conduct of our own.

Sources of Value.—Nonetheless the standard of ethics is to be sought for by reference to actual history, by appeal to literature, through the inspiration coming from contemplation of objects of beauty, and by incentives based on the natural sciences. The imperative in fact has its meaning in our ability to respond to it and do our utmost to attain it. It is by making explicit what events have already bestowed upon us, as in case of the moral values of the World War, that we come to realize the significance of the moral law. We are to look back into given history, for instance, in ancient Greece, to find the classic types of ethical theory. All the material out of which our science

has been constructed is present in moral experience and can be derived from it anew. Ethics quickens us to realize what is potential in the moral self. Hence the quest for values is also essentially a process of self-realization. But we all stand in need of the science which discloses to us what are the essential elements of value.² So in a measure the distinction between the normative and the descriptive breaks down, and we learn that the ideal element for which we seek is already immanent in the actual life passing within and around us day by day.

Reasons for Values.—From Plato's time down it has been noted that there is a certain inability of natural things to manifest beauty, a falling short which leaves us with a vision of beauty as a surpassing or transcendent value. So too, justice as such is more than justice done, wisdom is an archetype toward which we strive. We are aware of imperfections both in the substances with which we work and in the products of our hands, in the worker and in his method, in all merely temporal attainment. "Ever not quite." There is always a something more, "the flying perfect," as Emerson calls it, the larger circle presently to be drawn around the circle of our greatest achievement.³ The "dance of life," more than all the finalities of our systems, is related to the dynamic element, is creative; never static, unless it be in mathematics.

Human Basis of Values.—Yet values grow out of human experience. Man lives to a large extent in his feelings and emotions, his sensibilities rather than his intellects. Matters of taste are often paramount for him. He is not a "colorless and passive knower." The self or spirit in man is the center of values. The "mind of the flesh" leaves us in the domain of things to be eaten and done, the wherewithal to clothe and preserve us as physical beings; with problems and struggles, with bare facts that imprison, processes which enslave, conditions that check, a sluggishness that impedes. The "mind of the spirit" lifts us above conditions and processes. We forget

² Cf. Everett, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

³ *Essays*, First Series.

time and space, lose impeding self-consciousness, and plunge into action. We attain creativity not only in the fine arts but in invention, through creative reason in the sciences, corresponding to poetic creation in its varied forms. Our creativity extends in fact into prayer and conduct, and there should be such a thing as creative morality if there is to be a fine art of morals. In this sense ethics is the science of creative values on their moral side.

Lower and Higher Values.—More specifically, the mind of the spirit yields awareness of lower and higher. Under the first we put servitude to appetites, greed for money, the lust of ambition, and lust in all its forms. In contrast with these desires we put the whole series of ideal interests which make life worth while. The life of the flesh makes for ends of its own. These we are able to group or classify with regard to ends which call for prudence, or bodily well-being; and we are well aware that without certain instincts of the flesh we would not continue to survive, to propagate our kind, or to congregate with our fellows as natural beings. But above them we put other groups of values involving the pursuit of culture in society, in literature, in the arts, the sciences, and in religion. So the virtues stand forth as goals of pursuit in the moral region which we contrast in a measure with the whole sphere of lower values. The self in the greater sense is the locus or center of all values, with its outlook upon things and affairs, the struggle for physical existence, perpetuity, and well-being in one direction; and its outlook upon the intellectual life, friendship, service, and creative ideality in the other. Values exist for the self. It is the self that produces by discovering and formulating them, as well as by responding to the sensibility or emotion which gives them their initial life. The self is in its turn a value, most of all through character. And so the self, as we shall see more fully in another chapter, is in a way an ideal construction or conception.

The Moral Order.—Implied in the effort to produce values and to hold to them above all else is the conviction that the structure and function of the universe is such as

to render the production of values possible. That is, the World-Ground is, we believe, moral. In religious terms this would be taken to mean that morality is the God-given destiny of man, and in Christian terms the conviction that the Christian ideal will triumph. But for many thinkers there would still be the question of contrast all along the line between the world of description (nature in space and time, "red in tooth and claw,") and the world of appreciation (the moral order opposing its ideals to the law of brute struggle). It would not be said to follow that man's moral destiny means that moral supremacy is a necessity of the universe: it is for men to work together *to bring morality to triumph*. The moral order is the sphere of conduct in which ideals or values are developed and sustained, in which the highest ends may be striven for and realized; and it is for each of us to persist in our endeavors.

The Supreme Values.—It is an intellectual necessity then to distinguish between what is and what ought to be. Some of man's interests are almost purely matters of higher value, as in religion. The higher we ascend the scale the more we believe that values qualify reality itself. We find a clue in the fact that as values spring from experience, and enrich the life of feeling and thought, so they progressively qualify the self. We need a system of values to complete our thinking. So too we see an infinite system growing out of the structure of society and the universe, pointing forward to an advancing ideal limit. Even our smaller values aim in the ideal direction. Worship is for values which we never think of defining in terms of bare precision, but always as pointing forward. Our idealizations have an element that persists, whatever the illusions of our progress toward enlightenment. We idealize not only our loved ones, teachers, leaders, but also "things," nature, our country, institutions, the Church, supremely certain biblical teachings and characters; and, whatever else we attribute to God, the Father is for us the supreme value in thought and conduct, as yielding the test of the total scale. The self feels, enjoys, suffers, strives and wins in the sense of the progressiveness of which we are speak-

ing, while in its insights the self constantly surpasses its own ideal. And so valuation becomes an *attitude*, which Leighton calls "the most persistent and characteristic attitude in human nature."⁴

The Need for a Practical Scale.—In practical experience we find that values range all along the scale from transitory interests to those pointing forward to the future life. Every crucial choice—when we decide on a plan for further education, select a subject for research, choose a vocation or profession, reject a career or marriage—involves a test of values. Day by day questions arise which bring our scale into operation. Shall I continue at work in my study, or leave my books and go to the assistance of a widow in distress? Ought I to respond at once to the letter from some one in mental distress? Shall I leave my regular work to participate in a controversy for truth's sake? How shall I divide my time, my days and months to accomplish my chief purpose but also attain other ends that will keep me "human," give me opportunities to forget myself, bring recreation and change?

Some have thought it possible to arrange a table or scale, for the sake of the unity of life, for instance, the table proposed by Everett: economic values, bodily values, values of recreation, values of association, character values, æsthetic values, intellectual values, religious values.⁵ In such a scale no value is separate or independent, but each may be tested by the ideal of the unity of life as a standard. Again, values may be tested by their relation to the process of exchange in the market, the standard of economic valuation; in relation to bodily well-being, to the moral life, or by the interrelationship of their various fields. "Each of the special groups of values," says Everett, "constitutes an independent field for scientific investigation where the facts and principles are freely treated without interference. Ethics does not dictate the laws of physiology, of logic, of æsthetics, or of any other science; it accepts them. But the special values thus treated, while final within their re-

⁴ J. A. Leighton, *The Field of Philosophy*, 1923, p. 471.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 182.

spective fields, are not final for conduct because they are only parts, not the whole, of life.”⁶

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Values.—A simpler scheme of classification is with reference to values that are (1) instrumental, mediate, or extrinsic; and (2) those that are immediate or intrinsic. Under the first belong external things which have value for consciousness, as means to ends, such as wealth, position, manual skill, tools, knowledge of language. Intrinsic values, those realized within the self, those which have the coherence of inner constitution, include all those things which we pursue without looking for their direct practical or external application, such as knowledge for its own sake, beauty (its own excuse for being).⁷ To love and be loved is the supreme instance of such values. For the fundamental valuation is with regard to human beings, as persons, as individuals, social beings: the normal human being desires the companionship, esteem, friendship or love of some other human being; desires the respect of others; and desires to satisfy the fundamental interests of his being, to feel and act in the ways that express what he esteems his true selfhood: hence the ethical ideal of self-realization which we are to consider in another chapter. Indeed, the science of ethics may be re-defined, in Leighton’s terms, as “the systematic study of these fundamental types of human value and of the principles of social organization by which the achievement and permanence of these values are furthered.”⁸ Within the moral field there is then a gradation of virtues, and near the top of the scale such values as honesty, integrity, justice, fair-mindedness, active sympathy, kindness, conscientiousness, the spirit of service. Granted these as ends to be pursued, all movements aiming at social justice, at the bettering of the economic, industrial, educational, and political conditions of man’s social life, may be judged as means or extrinsic values.

Values Spring from the Deed in the Given Situation.—The *Titanic*, striking an iceberg at sea, brought opportu-

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

⁷ See Leighton, *op. cit.*, p. 471.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 473.

ities for heroism or self-sacrifice to which individuals could respond, each in his way. The causes of moral failure are not found within the individual alone, but may often lie in the conditions. Man is in process of discovering the conditions amidst which values may be realized so that each individual shall attain fullness of life. The events which history discloses may often be in utter contrast to the conditions which we take to be ethically most favorable, as in the World War. Man may have little present power over the given social conditions. And so in the conflict between the higher values and the duties exacted of him he must create the best values he can. These, by common consent, always fall into two groups: they pertain either to the moral efficiency of deeds well done in line with what is externally required, or to the group of external values to which man contributes even when his outward life is apparently a failure. Some find virtue almost solely through conformity. Others find it almost wholly by abstaining, meanwhile doing their bit to add to the values of inner peace, the supremacy of a higher right. A man can indeed live in considerable measure as a citizen of the ideal state, true to the standard "laid up in heaven," although externally adapting himself in secondary fashion to the conditions which social life imposes. And so the solution of the conflict is found by conduct in two world-orders, temporal and eternal. The great problem is to bring the ideal and the practical into closer unity. Involved in this question, as we shall see, is the conception of goodness to be adopted, the ideal or standard of duty, and the possibility of conflict of duties.

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CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

Psychology and Ethics.—The relation of ethics to psychology is very intimate at a critical point. Many of the prevalent ideas of goodness and conscience depend to a large extent on prior conceptions of mental life, carried over bodily into ethics. This is noticeably the case in the theory that the good is pleasure, as the object of all our desires, also in conceptions of the good turning upon belief in conscience as a mental faculty. Moreover, the field of psychology is very extensive, there is less agreement than between types of ethical theory; and it is possible to be well informed concerning a type of psychology without being aware that a profounder view of mental life is called for as a basis for ethics. In psychology the effort often is to keep as close as possible to the surer facts of relationship between mind and body, to the neglect of data of primary significance in the understanding of the self. Thus psychology may be limited to a study of behavior, with little reference to the nature of consciousness. Again, new conceptions are introduced from time to time, and these may seem more important than the classic principles. Popular thought frequently turns upon psychological matters, rather than upon ethical, and these ideas find expression in ethical theory. There is reason for being very much on guard, lest a perplexity in ethics prove to be an unsettled issue in psychology.

Human Nature.—Current ideas concerning human nature illustrate the need for psychological scrutiny. It is often said that the difficulty in all endeavor toward moral reform is in human nature itself. It is human to desire reform, but no less human to resist social changes. We

are assured that socialism, for instance, could be established if it were not for human nature, or that the kingdom of heaven could be founded on earth. But as "human nature can not be changed," social conditions would be as unfortunate as now. But what is human nature? How well do we understand those elements of it which we call "unruly" in relation to those classified as "conservative," involving habit, subject to analysis, and open to possible improvement? If we define psychology as the science of human nature, how far have we an explanation of traits which are said to be unregenerate? Ethics is also a science of human nature, but in a more promising sense. Religion turns upon our view of human characteristics, and we are as likely to borrow our ideas of the human self from our religious creed as from some type of psychology. In any event, no view of mental qualities or powers is worthy of being made the basis of ethics until the presupposition has been inquired into that "human nature can not be changed."

At least three meanings are involved in the term human nature as ordinarily used. We note a tendency to err for which we commonly make allowances under the head of "the personal equation," as we allow for the possible commingling of a foreign substance with known ingredients when performing a chemical experiment. There is also a general assumption that frailty involves obstinacy, willfulness; hence something more than a tendency to make mistakes. Accordingly, we attribute "sin" to this unregeneracy of our nature, without analysis to show what are the elements of this frailty. In the second place, we are in the habit of classifying human nature as eccentric, with saving references now and then to the ludicrous, to traits which make people both peculiar and interesting. In extreme form eccentricity involves duality, this duality in a way gives us the whole moral problem, and if in ethics we did not expect to gain unity or self-consistency where duality now reigns there would be little ground for hope of any sort. But there is also a reference to the ideal element in our use of the term. We find in people

a more approachable side, and as we come to know them better, perhaps to admire and love them, we realize that scarcely do we understand people at all till we appreciate their dominant purpose or aspiration. The first view of human traits implies the notion that disposition or character is unalterable; the second is at least promising, for in knowledge of duality there is hope; while the third involves the possibility that our characteristics may be in part plastic, hence a hope that the ideal element may become dominant. It has been said that our nature can be brutalized beneath the brutes, but that it can rise into companionship with angels. Within this wide range we all somewhere fall. The ethical view to be made clear in later chapters will show that the chief interests in the moral life center about self-realization.

The Social View.—Again, it has been easy to generalize human nature as “selfish,” and to fall back on the assumption that this is because man originally was egoistic or self-seeking. Social psychology has undermined this assumption.¹ It is no longer customary to start with the notion that self-love or self-assertiveness is the original characteristic, that the great problem is to know how to introduce altruistic motives where only egoistic motives prevail. When man first appears in the arena of human experience he is already a social being, as much prompted by instincts which draw him to his kind as by tendencies to assert himself in isolation. Promptings making for sympathy, love in its more social meanings, exist side by side but with egoistic dispositions and the so-called instinct of self-preservation. It is not, as we shall see in another chapter, a question of making the difficult transition from self-regarding to other-regarding tendencies; but a question of following the two in their long development in relation to the social forces known on another level as moral. We may then avoid all such generalities as the one implied in “selfishness,” a term which usually involves a half-truth only.

¹ See H. W. Dresser, *Psychology in Theory and Application*, 1924, Chap. XXIV.

Social Consciousness.—Some psychologists overdo the social conception of human nature and refer to the group mind as if there were a social consciousness other than that of individuals constituting a group. But others regard this as a fallacy, and show that the only conduct is the conduct of individuals in various relations.² The phenomena of the group most certainly exist. Men often behave very differently in a crowd, especially when dominated by a leader capable of appealing to disruptive emotions; and in so far as people respond to imitation, suggestion, public opinion, class-consciousness, social unrest.³ But the social consciousness by which people are actuated is the consciousness or attitude, the inner response in general of *the individual in a social situation*.⁴ This is an important conclusion, for it sends us all home to ourselves as essentially moral beings, each with his incentives, interests, habits, beliefs, ideals, intermingling with social responses of various kinds.

The Unconscious.—The most recent conception which some of us have uncritically taken over is the notion that the ruling elements in mental life are “unconscious,” or that there is a “subconscious mind” which in reality dominates most of our processes, the extreme form of this view being the assumption that the soul is subconscious. It is wise in ethical theory to avoid these conceptions altogether save so far as the unconscious, specifically defined and kept within its limits, may throw light on the problem of repressions.⁵ Our deeper nature thus regarded does indeed exhibit tendencies toward internal conflict. The psychical “complex,” or assemblage of repressed desires and associated mental states, implies a struggle against social restrictions known as taboos. The complex has an ascertainable cause, to be found by the special technique developed by Freud and others of the psycho-analytic school. By discovering this cause and making clear its meaning and its consequences to the victim of inner repression, the

² See F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924, p. 4.

³ Dresser, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXX.

⁴ Cf. Allport, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XIII, XIV.

⁵ Dresser, *op. cit.*, Chap. XV.

analyst endeavors to overcome both the inner conflict and the perplexing duality resulting from it.⁶ The resource is the substitution of a higher, more closely unified mode of conduct for the lower activity. The extent to which this process of "sublimation" can be carried, and its bearing on morality as a means of developing character remains to be determined. But knowledge of the causes of duality means a possibility of attaining freedom, with subsequent benefits on the moral life in general. If unity can be gained where the unconscious and the conscious were disjoined, the implication is that what was needed all along the line was harmonious development of personality. The situation becomes *moral* when it becomes conscious. Man as moral is a conscious being. He must see for himself, understand. Unity or consistency is a conscious achievement, however much one may depend on knowledge of activities classified as "unconscious."

Temperament.—Increasing light on human nature is being thrown by the study of mental types. Every student of men in public life is interested to note signs of the strenuous type, the well-balanced or judicial, the single-tracked mind, the more silent or thoughtful type, the emotional type, and various forms of the will-type.⁷ A new classification enables us to place people as by nature either "introverts" or "extroverts," that is, those who tend introspectively to undue interest in their own states in typical ways; and those who are free from habits of introspection, and more readily engage in social interests.⁸ The old-time morally zealous person, given over to highly conscientious examination of motives, morbidly aware of shortcomings, indulging in self-condemnation to the extreme, hesitating to act, was a type of introversion. In our age, with its telephones, automobiles, the telegraph, the radio, and other devices making for speed or calling for great skill, it is far easier to develop in the direction of extroversion. But in our extreme externality we tend to lose the supreme value of the inward-looking tendency

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

at its best, namely, its profound reflectiveness or acute analytical power. The introvert has something to teach the far more common extrovert. One may indulge in a measure of self-examination without making such analysis an end in itself. The correctives of the old-time habit of introspection are today obvious. The ideal moral type involves a synthesis of tendencies toward the inner life and tendencies to be objective. What one needs is to know one's self, with reference to inherited disposition, temperament, and character, regarded as "in the making." To know one's type is to be prepared to achieve the type.

Efficiency.—Again, the effort to know men better in relation to all the occupations in which they now engage, to place them according to standards of intelligence and mental type, to foster functional service or membership in a kind of social organism, is highly suggestive.⁹ It has been said that if all mental types were known, and if we were all rightly placed, there probably would be no inner conflicts or complexes. Much of our trouble is due to the fact that we are misfits, that we did not discover till rather late in life what we could best do. Where there are unexpressed ambitions, creative abilities seeking new fields of exercise but checked or discouraged, there is an inner struggle more or less mysterious and likely to be misunderstood. Industrial efficiency might not be a solution of the problem. Human nature would still exert its love of rule. Yet efficiency lifted to the higher levels of human activity in all its phases, efficiency regarded in the light of quality, worth or value might succeed where quantitative or mechanical standards have failed.

Mental Levels.—Implied in the former disparagement of human nature was the assumption that the human mind was divided into compartments, in one of which belonged all evil desires and tendencies to sin. Hence it was a simple matter to classify human nature as "fallen" or sinful, that is, human nature was regarded as an abstraction from our total selfhood. Modern psychology has cut the ground from under all such assumptions so far as dis-

⁹ *Ibid.*, Chap. XVI.

inctive faculties are concerned. No instincts, desires, or other proclivities are found which, taken by themselves, are describable as evil. Man has no "lower" nature as such. Instead, there is a complexity of traits, tendencies or dispositions, desires in conflict or in process of change; levels of development manifesting successive strivings, emotional periods, will-supremacies, and later, in some of us, reason-supremacy. If we look forward to the rule of reason in our nature, it is with the realization that *the same selfhood* is manifested when we pray, dance, drive a car, thrill at the movies, love or hate, serve or scheme, seek reason or give our minds over to what we call pure pleasure. In the long run it is a question of our prevailing love or moral purpose. Will achieves unity: we are not born with it. Reason seeks or attains consistency: system or order is not natively given. How shall we condemn human nature, until we have tried out to the full this modern view of the human self as in process?

Fullness of Life.—Light is also thrown by experiences, in war-time especially, which have summoned people out of idleness, luxury, ennui, inefficiency, into self-forgetting service for men at the front. Under such conditions it became easily possible to transcend or overcome habit, drop class-distinctions, and work as human beings at large for humanity in need. So, too, the soldier at the front, aroused by patriotism, rose above his accustomed selfhood and did what was to be done with a unification of courage and energy which showed the possibilities of human nature. The situation in the case of the individual was paralleled by that of the peoples who put aside even politics and national prejudices for the time being, to attain unity of military command adequate to meet the need of the hour. The psychological implication is that we have great reserves, that we have seldom made the effort we might have made had we experienced a sufficient incentive. We may then be nearer unity than we suspect. What we have needed has been a motive in times of peace equal in unifying power to the possibility of utter disaster which faced us on every side.

Conversion.—While the problem of conversion lies outside of psychology and ethics, it is significant that when the experience of religious conversion is described apart from any creed which the description is meant to confirm, there are indications that the adverse tendencies of the converted person's nature run out, while latent tendencies are brought into play.¹⁰ The implication is that certain potentialities awaited an occasion to become actual, that the duality or inner struggle was not understood; hence the inward strivings, and finally the outcry for help which brought response on the part of religious workers. There is, of course, much more to be said than this. But conversion psychologically speaking may throw light on the possibility of attaining unity within the self, by emphasizing certain traits and permitting others to wane, by learning the temperament or type and developing it to the full. Emphasis belongs on the dynamic tendencies of the self which may be won over to a higher prevailing love; it belongs on the *use* to which a person's powers are put, not on the power itself. Neither the flesh nor the desires which are said to spring from it need be singled out for condemnation. What is needed is adequate description of all sides of our nature, then moral *interpretation* in terms of an ideal of goodness. It is the finer synthesis of traits which constitutes "the new will."

Value of Psychology.—Bringing together these clues from recent descriptions of human nature, it would seem probable that increase of knowledge of our total inner nature will mean increased powers of moral reform and development. But granted adequate description of our many-sidedness, with emphasis on a central tendency making for unity, does psychology discover any reason why we should strive for this high degree of coördination? Does it give us a good ground for achieving the type? At its best psychology may be said to supply subject-matter for moral criticism; it does not show why we should be moral, what is the basis of moral obligation. Psy-

¹⁰ See, for example, Harold Begbie, *Twice Born Men*, 1909; *Souls in Action*, 1911.

chology does not in fact tell us what the real self is, or even describe values or endeavor to explain our consciousness of the ideal. Nevertheless, the former disparagement of human nature was partly due to imperfect psychology, and the more adequate psychology of today enables us to correct misapprehensions before we enter the field of ethics. Uncriticized psychology might leave us with the impression that psycho-physical determinism, or the complete dependence of the mind on the body, is beyond dispute, that mental life is a mere part of the mechanical behavior of the organism. But there are types of modern psychology, as there are types of ethical theory. A mechanical philosophy of the universe might in either case slip in unawares. Whatever the conclusions of any type of psychology, these must be closely scrutinized, lest we prejudice issues which belong to the realm of valuation rather than to the domain of description. Our present interest is to note that description of human nature is a task so great that not until recent times has its importance been recognized. What our deeper nature is in all its hidden recesses psychology is now undertaking to tell us, also the way in which it may be tested from the point of view of intelligence. But a moral test is very different from an intelligence test founded on a prevailing type of psychology. The higher the grade of mentality, the more difficult it is to rate it by a quantitative scale. Morality is qualitative, its judgments begin in all seriousness where psychological interests end.

Need of Criticism.—The standards and conclusions which prevail in the ethical field which depend upon previous analyses of mental life may involve faulty definition, or be due either to survivals of the old-time intellectualism, with its neglect of mental experience recently classified as “unconscious,” or to the adoption of a psychology chiefly limited to the study of sensations and desires, to the neglect of the finer discriminations of the life of reason. Ethics should be the corrective of psychology, faithful above all to the highest phases of the inner life, never hesitating to regard the self as real, as the basis of

real experience. If psychology is unable to tell us what the nature of man is in its fullness, it is the province of ethics to do so, and by drawing on any sphere of thought which shows the function of values.

The primary difficulty in the usual study of mental life lies in the fact that psychology of a prevailing type begins with the lower levels of mentality, and is so greatly concerned to determine the number of original elements, that the description is never likely to reach man's higher nature. For ethics it is imperative to know the higher nature, whatever is said concerning irrational or sensuous elements. But the higher selfhood should never be an abstraction, reason should not be divorced from the irrational, or conscience from the activities which it judges. Will presupposes impulse, desire, feeling, emotion, as well as thought; since it must not only have a natural history, but tendencies to select from and to coördinate if it shall be explicitly moral. So, too, the conscious presupposes even more than the activities which many are now pleased to call the unconscious.

Activity.—The greatest warning to ethics from a psychological point of view is with regard to the tendency to build a theory on the assumption that a mental element is a "faculty." Language still persistently plays us false here, notably in the case of such terms as will, conscience, intuition. Any starting-point we may make is likely to be questioned by those who point out that we have assumed the theory by adopting the term which for us is the favorite, endeared as it is by idealistic association. But we may avoid difficulties and the habit of judging by a name, such as reason or will, if we begin with the term "activity," whatever the prior psychological analysis. By this term we mean whatever is dynamic in mental life or inner experience as *given, found*; whatever life is implied in those processes which people have in mind when they speak of mental powers or forces, when they refer uncritically to a sense of effort, to will-power or efficient reason. Activity includes the energy which functions in man's instincts, original impulses or reflexes, dispositions,

passions, desires; in his affections of pleasure and pain; in his love, his aspiration, his critical thought or reason. As spontaneity, life as "given," sends man forth to have experience and accomplish, to be curious, analyze, construct, understand. Regarded in the light of its goals, the modes of life which make for highly intelligible ends, it discloses reason, in contrast with its initial stages as unreason or the irrational. As will it is selective, intervenes, checks or inhibits, and adopts means to ends. It is not necessarily lacking in purpose at the outset, since it may include an element of striving or desire, as well as an element of feeling and of cognition which, taken in connection, tend toward ends or goals. But our activities pass through instinctive stages before self-consciousness is manifested. Our volitional and rational activities presuppose prior experiences in which will and reason were implicit rather than explicit. As children we begin to be curious and to construct without any intention. As adults we find ourselves intent upon what we take to be spiritual activities with a highly discriminative purpose.

Mental Elements.—It is less important for ethics than for psychology to know the precise sources of mental elements formerly known as the irrational. Moral activity in general presupposes the non-moral. We find ourselves in motion, desiring ends, actuated by instincts or impulses; which, of course, have had a bodily and racial history. Awareness of conflict between incentives becomes emphatic in time, and reflective morality supervenes upon custom. We are not so much concerned with the fact that our impulses and undisciplined emotions and desires have a bodily basis as with the possibility of wise selection and control. We may well be cautious about reading into any original activity what is not required by sound ethical insight. If every activity within the organism has its appropriate place, it is for ethics to see *what is fitting or good in our activities as a system*, when by comparison we have agreed upon a theory of the highest good. If temptations appear, if there is lassitude, there is a natural basis for this inertia or opposition, and this natural basis is to

be distinguished from any judgments concerning what is called "lower" or "higher." The will as actually analyzed may not then prove to be "depraved," whatever theology may say. The study of our nature from the point of view of activity shows it to be *in process*, as disclosing manifold competing tendencies; hence the later problems of self-assertiveness or self-love, problems of egoism and altruism. Psychology ascertains the facts. It is our own judgment which sees in these facts two natures struggling within us, each toward its own goal. Knowledge of inner conflict is power. The better we know our activities in their total connection the more wisely we should be able to judge. Meanwhile, we may be most inclined to summarize this surging, desiring, achieving activity in us as "will."

Instinct.—From a prevailing point of view in social psychology, the instincts are the chief sources of both the activity and the specific tendencies of our habits, dispositions, and desires.¹¹ An instinct is a relatively unchanging fact of mental structure which endures as a self-identical whole. Hence it is that man is by nature social, with tendencies later manifesting themselves in parental love, despite the fact that man is also by nature self-seeking. It is this native equipment with its implied tendencies to varied action or expression which makes possible man's multiform development. These native impulses must exist, and must tend toward ends, or habits would not be formed, and customs would not come about. For our habits are not necessarily impulsive. They do not supply the ends or purposes for which they exist. But granted actuating instincts, and later emotional trends by which they are best known, for example, through our sympathies, we are able to see how habits and dispositions have come to be. All our well-known activities, such as desire, will, and even reason, began on the impulsive level. By an instinct is meant an activity which functions without experience or foresight on our part. Thus a child begins to play, to construct, without first being aware of spontaneity seeking

¹¹ See W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 14th Ed., 1921, Chap. II.

expression in play and without intending to construct. Thus man finds himself tending toward both lower and higher directions of conduct. When instinct reaches the moral level, man is discoverable as a moral being; and a typical ethical theory has been developed out of an analysis of the so-called moral instinct.

Desire.—Our instinctive impulses in more specific forms are known as desires. It is consciousness added to impulse which leads us actively to desire the implied end and to take steps to achieve it. Hence desires are distinguished as faint and fugitive, intense and persistent, or by other terms to denote relationship of interest to object, and the voluntary release of energy which works toward the desired end.¹² Awareness of desire becomes the more intense with its frustration, with the vividness of the accompanying tension, the striving to win the goal. Desire may become an obsession or a torment which fills the horizon, or it may be moderated in connection with other desires and directed to a wiser end. Desires too greatly restrained cause much misery; organized and harmonized they gain strength, and can be directed so as to overcome adverse or erratic impulses. It is plain then that our desires have relative values. Sensuous desires tend to inordinate excess, as in our unbridled liking for food, drink. Intellectual desires are known by the ends they pursue rather than by their bodily conditions.

Desire becomes significant when admitted as a good in contrast with animal appetites which know no limit. Thus desire for food, exercise, rest, pleasure, is recognized in its appropriate place. Judged by its goal it may involve what we call a point of view. Thus desire for pleasure may be taken as the end for which all our activities exist. Seen in relation, it is clear that a man's desires are not isolated but belong to what Mackenzie calls the universe of desire, a term which we shall use in various connections.¹³ Thus desires may dominate a person in various moods, under different conditions and in a different order,

¹² Cf. G. S. Fullerton, *Handbook of Ethical Theory*, p. 79.

¹³ *Manual of Ethics*, p. 47.

subject to change with passing events and sudden occurrences.

This terminology is very useful in the study of conflicting desires, for as Mackenzie shows clearly the real strength of a desire does not depend on its own liveliness but on the group or system to which it belongs.¹⁴ For instance, when war is declared, a man may experience a violent conflict between desires making for peace and those likely to be set free in great force in favor of war in case hatred toward a foreign power be permitted to rule. While one of these groups of desires may of itself tend to become dominant, the explanation of these tendencies being psychological, the other may be made dominant because on a moral basis a higher motive is introduced. Thus reason may become either reconciler or arbiter. Morally speaking, there is every reason for coördinating the desires which may best constitute an eligible system. It is to be noted that although desires arise at different levels, no desire is in itself necessarily unclean or selfish. It is in combination with other desires, and an inferior motive permitted to rule, that desires assume adverse forms. Hence as Everett says, "from the dictation of uncriticized desires we must appeal to a more inclusive purpose, to an ideal of spiritual wholeness which comprehends and dominates all the interests of life."¹⁵

Wish and Will.—Although desire and wish are often used as synonymous, wish may be more intelligibly regarded as an effective desire.¹⁶ Desires may be transient, or may relate to bodily needs, while a wish may pertain to an ideal for which we are striving, for which we need more favoring conditions. But again wish may be less profound or permanent than will. A dominant desire does not necessarily eventuate in an act of will, although it may break into action in contest with will. We do not proceed to carry out all that we wish. It is self-consciousness intervening with its more decisive considerations which

¹⁴ *Op., cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁵ *Moral Values*, p. 220.

¹⁶ Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

makes the action of desire effective, when character is given to desires so that they form a worthy system. Hence in Green's careful analysis "the objects of a man's various desires form a system, connected by memory and anticipation, in which each is qualified by the rest."¹⁷

Will.—The will then is not a separate power which intervenes between desires and wishes, but is a more developed activity present among other activities, including those we classify as intellectual, and is not to be understood apart from its content and origin. The concrete act of will is a coördination of various activities, sometimes deciding or apparently intervening just because other activities are numerous and perplexing. It may, as Mackenzie says, "include many elements that are not in themselves wished, and even elements to which the agent's wishes are strenuously opposed."¹⁸ Thus one decides between political parties, because a decision is a practical need, or one settles upon some person to love more than others who are no doubt equally attractive.

In part will is selective attention, and as attention it may give heed to an uncertain alternative so as to reinforce it at a critical moment. Again, a decision may correspond to the release of nervous energy which relieves the tension of desire.¹⁹ Impulse and desire may then lead the way to volition which comes either as a culmination or as a rejection. So too a man's habits are expressions of his will, although will may set itself against habits later judged to be ineligible. The "settled trend of the will" is a higher term than the "dominant desire."

Again, as *resolution* will refers to the future, near or remote, and implies adaptation of means to ends. We modify our resolutions to meet changed conditions, but all the while giving expression to the settled trend of the will.²⁰ A resolution is far from being an act. However difficult it may be to speak of acts of will without calling

¹⁷ T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 3d ed., 1890, p. 133.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹⁹ Fullerton, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

²⁰ Note the examples cited by Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

will a faculty, we must be true to the fact of experience, namely, that what is uncritically called a fiat of will, or force of will in the moment of decision, is a real item or incident, on occasion decisive beyond all dispute. The more accurate statement is that such a decisive moment, in which perhaps a weaker desire or motive may become the stronger, is the expression of a single principle, is the self in action; or what Green calls "the spirit which desires in all a man's experiences of desire, understands in all operations of his intelligence, wills in all his acts of willing." ²¹

Will is seen then in the coördinating activity now described as deliberation, attention, choice; again as resolution followed by act in the energizing which makes it effective. Will may set itself against desires in their trend, and may ally itself with an ideal almost beyond attainment. It may be "the will to believe" where all is doubtful, the will to courage, to success, to make a venture come out as it should, even the will to love in instances where fidelity to an ethical standard calls for such effort. In relation to the end at which it aims will is purpose, and this word "purpose" more than any other term may be understood to imply will as essentially *dynamic*. The authority of will over desire, popularly called self-control, is for the sake of purpose. Such control means regulation by the self of the competing systems of desire, so that no impulse shall break forth unexamined into action, no desire shall be permitted expression without a measure of deliberation.

Habit.—We have distinguished between instinctive forces and their regular trends or modes of activity by which they become more specifically known. Man awakens to the realization that he is a creature of habit, but also to the fact that his habits undergo modification to fit other needs and purposes. Desires seek habitual modes of expression, but some desires may be selected while others are permitted to wane. An effective universe of desire is one in which habits are well coördinated. The more wisely

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

our activities are selected and organized the more effectively we may use habits instead of being used by them. There is then a scale of values in habits for the sake of a moral goal. Virtue in this sense is indeed a habit, as Aristotle long ago maintained. Habits do not constitute moral purpose, nor is mere organization of habit with an end in view necessarily moral. Yet purpose grounds itself in habit to achieve results that would not be attainable if it were necessary to perform each act consciously. The freest, most morally efficient man may have mechanized his life in highest degree, and may be thus free just because he has turned over as many matters as possible to habit. To have moral insight is to see the value of the most complete adjustment of means to ends. Virtue then is both a kind of knowledge implying insight and a habit of willing which carries this insight into realization. Deliberate choice is not all we expect of ourselves. We will that conduct shall follow regularly and persistently from prior choices. Our conduct takes on incentives from instincts, that is, from our native equipment. Our attention is called to modes of conduct subject to change and needing to be more wisely directed. So our selected habits make our advance toward our ideal. Even the highest habits need to be controlled, that we may preserve spontaneity, seek ideal ends with renewed vigor, avoid being too formal or over-precise.

Intuition.—Very important for ethics is the psychological conclusion that there is no separate or distinctive "faculty" which, ethically regarded, may be called the moral faculty, "moral sense," or intuition. Moral sensitivity as surely exists as æsthetic taste or feeling. The same is true of conscience, which is what we usually mean by a special faculty or "sense." But neither moral experience nor moral insight implies a power functioning independently of other activities. What is called moral intuition is an instance of intuition in general. There is no ground for assuming that intuition discloses knowledge of a different type when functioning in the ethical field. Here as elsewhere the mind functions in rapid flashes of

thought, by synthetic insight as well as by deliberate processes of induction; and some people greatly excel others in this respect. By intuition the mind discerns, appreciates, while in the realm of the descriptive sciences it starts with matters of fact and often limits itself to what is dull or prosaic. There is no difference in kind between intuition as (1) concrete, in the immediacies of sensation, memory, imagination, or any other instance of immediate apprehension and as (2) yielding what Sorley calls "synoptic views of reality." In this its synthetic stage intuition is immediately correlated with the life of reason. Whether perceptive in the simpler sense, or productive in the case of insight, its activities are subject to the usual processes of thought. What we mean by knowledge given by intuition, in contrast with conclusions arrived at by self-conscious analyses and comparisons, item by item with painstaking thoroughness, is that intuition is what Bergson calls "intellectual sympathy by which one places one's self within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."²² That is, by intuition we gain the actual self, real time, other selves, the new, the creative, the ultimate cosmic principle; wholes, where another type of thought yields parts.

It is needful to guard against the assumption that we possess "an inborn sense of what is reasonable and just," as if there were a normal human reason immediately discoverable as the same in all of us, to be appealed to as to an immutable standard. What is innate is a group of tendencies which by exercise and development, through criticism, yield insights and eventually a standard which may be compared with other standards. Our alleged immediate judgment telling us out of hand what should be done and what ought to be aimed at is likely to be a result of custom or habit. If by intuition we come to see as in a flash what kinds of action are prescribed without regard to consequences, it is because our minds have arrived at such discernment, and we are no longer

²² *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans., p. 7.

aware of the stages of our thought. We are in the habit of falling back on what we take to be intuition to justify our actions.²³ But when we compare the judgments of men in terms of their intuitions we find that intuition is a variable, does not yield a standard requiring no criticism.

When disagreements arise intuition is put on the same basis as judgment. Intuition does not yield infallible knowledge of the motives and intentions of others. It may not have been consciously derived from other judgments, yet analysis makes it explicit. In any case it is dependent on the immanent operation of ideas.

To explain intuition is not however to discredit it. For intuition is a guide in the moral life, indispensable in fact; since without the insights which it yields we become immersed in processes, lose our sense of values. What is subject to question is the so-called axiom regarding what is right and wrong which is taken on authority, as if all men agreed or should agree in the adoption of a given moral code. Intuitive certainty when claimed as proof of a principle which we assume to be final is indeed subject to question. But intuition as a process yielding insights, creative, inspiriting, surpassing bare prosaic fact, is the source of moral idealism. When our analytical processes fall short, we supplement them by intuitions beckoning us on; and among people who are temperamentally more intuitive than others moral leaders are prominent. We conclude then in general that psychological principles essential to ethics are to be understood in the light of both psychological and ethical criticism, and that those mental powers which involve the highest degree of consciousness are the ones which are most significant for ethics.

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²³ See Fullerton, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

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CHAPTER V

CONDUCT AND CHARACTER

Moral Integration.—Looking back over mental life, we have noted that our activities pass from an involuntary to a voluntary stage, as conduct exhibits habit, selective control, and self-direction. There are animal wants, appetites, impulsive tendencies, desires, emotions; there is random imagery, association between objects, habit in native sequences; later there is inhibition, efficiency secured by productive imagination, a controlled sequence of actions, ordered emotions, moderated desires, and eventually a dominant universe of desire. Judgment enables us to form estimates, discern values. Conscience makes itself known. Thus there is a working together of activities toward a desired end.

This process has been called moral integration. It implies, not deliberation or reflection alone, not mere judgment or reason, but actual effort toward a goal as in "mustering courage." Fixing our eyes on the goal with determination to succeed however great the effort, we launch ourselves into action despite cautions to the contrary, adverse criticism from friends, or downright interference.

Feeling.—In the processes of intuition and integration there is, of course, an element of feeling. But the term feeling popularly used as a synonym for knowing, judging, making effort; for pleasure and pain; for all the emotions, and much more, indiscriminately grouped, has a more specific meaning in ethics. Our motives combine feelings, that is, anticipated pleasure in contrast with rejected experiences associated with pain. We seek satisfaction in our moral choices. We aim at happiness, which has a higher meaning than pleasure. Feeling gives content, adds zest, expresses life. Our moral judgments become more

effective in so far as we are stirred, notably when we feel resentment, when we are deeply impressed, aroused by realization that injustice has been done. Thus moral sentiment or feeling is in some sense a guide to conduct, a clue to character; and when prompted by it we are likely to proceed more quickly in the investigation called for or toward the needed action. Feeling coördinated with desire for satisfaction is indeed a safer guide than the mere emotions, unstable as they are likely to be. Most emotions, such as anger, hatred, jealousy, are impulsive; only the few, such as patriotism, loyalty, love, are eligible. But feeling has a permanent place in an ethical scale. Regarded as the test of what is agreeable it is a direct clue to moral values. Our problem is to find that ethical ideal which bids fair to yield satisfaction. Moral feeling in this its eligible sense is not indeed to be sought for its own sake. Yet secondarily the presence or absence of satisfaction is always a test.

Motives.—No analysis is likely to make a person more keenly aware of the contrast between motives than that direct appeal to experience by which we know the difference between a prompting to self-interest, and a prompting to service, involving love to the neighbor. Indeed, most of us know our motives so well that we hardly permit even a friend to mention them, if we seem to be less true to our higher motives than we ought. But by actual experience we do not so well know wherein motive differs from intention, and the distinction might seem futile at first glance. Yet an entire ethical system has been founded on the assumption that the moral value of a man's act is solely determined by the rectitude of his inner disposition or motive, and has nothing to do with circumstances or results. When the good is defined without regard to consequences to which conduct leads, the will is judged to be wholly good in itself, the sole motive is found in the good will. It would then be necessary to distinguish in sharpest fashion between inclination or desire in all its forms and will. Reverence for law as such would be regarded as the central principle.

But we have seen that will must have content, that it

reacts upon and utilizes desire or inclination, and is describable in terms of its prevailing trend and favoring universe of desire. Oftentimes the best way to estimate desire is not by its origin but in the light of the ends at which it aims and the actual results as known by experience to which it leads. The moral life is not so simple that one "all-controlling temper of mind" or love is brought into play to settle all perplexities, and set the mind free from all consideration of circumstances.

Intention and Motive.—In both theory and practice it is essential to distinguish between *intention*, which is regarded as embracing the whole end chosen, and *motive*, that which influences the choice. Intention is almost the equivalent of purpose or the end in view. By contrast the motive embraces only a part of the act, although it may be the vital part without which the object would not have been willed. We may understand a deed in part by reference to its results. But oftentimes we scarcely understand the deed at all till we search out the motive and relate this to the character from which it sprang. For, among other matters, we are concerned with the problem of responsibility. Motives embrace native impulses which have been directed toward specialized ends or goals. They may be hidden, almost unknown till disclosed by a special technique, as in psycho-analysis. Meanwhile the reasons given pass as an explanation, or pretended reasons may be put forth as actual intentions.

It is well known that many extenuating circumstances enter to complicate our motives. In so far as emotions play a part a motive may be transitory, difficult to classify with reference to values. A man may be influenced by anger, jealousy, hatred, fear, pity, and so his motive may be highly impulsive. The passions of the mad man or drunkard may complicate the motive so that the man is no longer responsible for his actions. By a motive in the ethical sense is meant the assignable reason which makes a man responsible for his deed. Again, we distinguish between an emotion which, occurring just then, is adopted as a prompting to action, and the reasoning by which a man

relates his emotions to his mode of life. Our emotions become intellectualized as we advance in rational development. We are often influenced more by the *idea* of an emotion as a motive than by the actual emotion. Thus pity may become an actuating principle when coupled with other incentives, and pity has been made the basis of an ethical theory.

The Basis of Motives.—A rationalized motive passes over into an intention. The interpretation of a man's motives and intentions depends on our knowledge of his character. It is impossible to *explain* a deed merely by its motives, avowed or unavowed, as if a motive could be defined as "that which *made* a man do his deed"; for it is through character that the combination of incentives is produced. A motive is not merely mechanical, as if motives could be accounted for by reference to bodily behavior alone. Motives are grounded in both mind and body, but our interest is in relating them to conduct and character. A man's motives may seem complex in the extreme till we grasp their inner meaning, notably where self-interest combines with a prompting to serve. In each case we would pass almost insensibly from a man's motives to his intentions, discriminating with Mackenzie immediate and remote intentions, outer and inner, direct and indirect, conscious and unconscious.¹ In each case the motive might be regarded as what *causes* the action to occur in a particular way. But we shall find reason to avoid the conception of causality which implies that a man is always pushed as it were from behind and is never drawn toward an ideal or end. Our motives partake also of higher values. We are drawn or led as surely as we are impelled or induced. Desire for pleasure is not always the incentive to action. Nor are we always actuated by egoistic impulses. Impulse in altruistic form may prompt a man to a swift deed of self-sacrifice which all observers commend, but such an impulse may also lead to an action which all will condemn because it took place without reflection. A man may check or modify his impulsive motive by consid-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 60.

eration of another's good in the long run. And so again a motive may pass over into intention. Anticipating the wisest remote results, man moderates his promptings, unmindful of what may be said in regard to immediate results, if assured that despite these his ideal will be attained. Once more we see that the motive is a part only of the intention.

Dynamic Motives.—The moral quality of a deed lies partly in the motive, partly in the intention. The motive yields the dynamic element, while the intention is the teleological or purposive element. The one is the spring of action, while the other indicates its direction. Both are grounded in character, in which the two have a concrete unity of impulsive force and ideal content.² Much depends on our conclusions regarding the motives which we take to be eligible, notably in the case of the moralists who hold that pleasure is the only object of desire. Much too turns on consequences which we take to be good. As time goes on we are more likely to judge one another with regard to consequences foreseen and intended than by motives alone. Unforeseen results follow some of our motives. We are all the while tracing back consequences which were unforeseen and unintended to prior acts which we did not at first understand. Thus we grow in self-knowledge, trying to discriminate more wisely, that we may come nearer our goal. We are less inclined to excuse any one on the ground that his intention was good. We no longer look for motives of "pure benevolence," sheer avarice or revenge, unqualified gratitude or utter disinterestedness. We seldom meet either a complete rogue or a paragon of virtue. All our motives are mixed. The moral agent may be said to intend or will all consequences which his prevailing motive makes him willing under the conditions to accept.³ The solution of the difficulty, when motives and intentions seem inextricably confused, may be found by contrasting the forces which impel us to act with what Everett calls the total value which we assign to an act when performed.⁴

² Seth, *Ethical Principles*, p. 74.

³ See Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, pp. 251, 257.

⁴ *Moral Values*, p. 106.

Character.—We have already had occasion to contrast conduct with behavior, and to point out that man the individual as a “person” is known with reference to the values attributed to his conduct. The interests of human personality center about what we call character as the finest product of experience, the end for which we exist, that part of our nature which persists, as many of us believe, even into the future life. Through self-consciousness man becomes progressively a person, thus making more and more explicit ideals of character as distinguished from mere behavior. Taken as it comes, behavior yields conflicting impulses, more or less random or chaotic emotions, besetting desires which tend to drive all opposition before them. Hence behavior requires the scrutiny of reason and the offsetting constancy of will, which is thus another name for character. Conduct includes the whole sphere of voluntary life. It reacts on the so-called unconscious, on native activities, such as an angry temper, an emotion of hatred, an indolent disposition; and in the guise of will its reaction is selective, it organizes, achieves. Conduct, as “the organization of impulses into rational ends,” has a unifying principle, some central end or comprehensive ideal of the total meaning of life.⁵ Character is the prime reason as well as the prime result, the peculiar connection and trend of the mental and moral activities by which the individual is distinguished. Conduct is active in the direction taken by the self, that is, self-forming tendencies which respond to and assimilate the elements out of which character is constituted. Thus character includes modifications of disposition and temperament, sex-differences, intellectual equipment, family types, race peculiarities, differences in development and expression of emotion and will. Through the growth of character one may, for example, become aware of a tendency toward undue subjectivity or introversion, and, by cultivating appropriate objective interests, become gradually more sociable, out-going or expressive.

There is also a sense in which conduct may be said to produce character unwittingly. Character is produced

⁵ Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

even though a man does not decide upon all the results which conduct is permitted to express. That is to say, conduct is to some extent without self-consciousness, is not always attended by a watchful eye. So too character results from the influence of events upon us in ways of which we are unaware at the time. In this sense conduct and character are practically identical. But character is inner, while conduct by contrast is outer, manifests character. By his conduct, regarded as resulting from prior actions, man may all the while learn more intimately how character has fashioned conduct, and how conduct has reacted upon character. Man identifies his character with himself, but he sometimes refuses to admit that his conduct is what he wishes to call his own.

Elements of Character.—An act of conduct comprises an event and its immediate mental cause or occasion. It may be described with reference to (1) the springs of action or motive, the intention with which it is done, or (2) the consequences to which it has actually led as a given deed. It may be an act of heroism in the presence of danger, an act which wins approval from onlookers. Constancy of conduct in behalf of principles or ideals is looked for from those whose impulses are so organized that rational ends take the place of mere promptings without order or system. Hence character as thus manifesting itself in conduct has been called “a completely fashioned will.” It is more accurately a union of opposites, an intermixture of habits,⁶ tendencies, impulses, courage and cowardice, nobility and meanness, sincerity and deceit, open-mindedness and constraint, such that courage or nobility, and sincerity or open-mindedness prevails on the whole.

If a man's character is relatively fixed, that is, dependent on heredity, education, his type of belief, mode of life, it may also be dynamic, in process, subject to change in meeting new occasions. Hence character has been defined as “that body of active tendencies and interests in the individual which make him open, ready, warm to cer-

⁶ On habit and character, see Dresser, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

tain aims, and callous, cold, blind to others.”⁷ Habit is one of its chief constituents.⁸ The dominance of a purpose is another element. But it is more specifically the moral self in action toward a significant end, and we commonly mean by a man of character one whose moral purpose stands out above all tendencies to dissuade him. A fanatic or miser is a man of character, but we do not praise such a man for his consistency. In the strong man singled out as an example of virtue there is habitual concentration towards the realization of a purpose such that secondary tendencies are utilized to maintain a wise balance. Strength of will is not necessarily good in its results, despite the fact that it implies resoluteness or persistence. A bad character may possess concentration of will. By a man of good character we mean one whose purpose is worthy and constructive, as in the case of a statesman whose work for his country we approve. Character is acquired by reactions upon circumstances and through modification of disposition and temperament.⁹ The man of weak character permits both disposition or temperament and circumstances to mold him; while the man of strong character refashions his native abilities and either selects circumstances or regards any circumstances he may face as an opportunity.

Unity of Character.—The strong character of a worthy sort is highly integrated. We do not expect such coördination from the strong but “bad” or evil character, because evil involves inner conflict, lack of integrating purpose, as well as excess. As “a completely fashioned will” character exists in behalf of purpose. It has a dominant motive of a worthy type. Character as a culminating achievement is to a large extent triumphant over disposition, temperament, the conflict between self-love and love of what is noble and true. It may indeed be described in terms of the successive victories from the lower level of desire and emotion to the higher one of moral coherence in which the

⁷ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 255.

⁸ Dewey has defined character as “the interpenetration of habits,” *Human Nature and Conduct*, Chap. II.

⁹ These terms are distinguished elsewhere, Dresser, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

ideal element is paramount. There is less emphasis on the mere prompting and more on the integration of all desirable promptings. A man may be hindered or helped by each of the factors which he eventually learns to integrate, that is, his memory, his habits, his scheme of life. Thus in time a man can utilize an activity which was once a mere temper, can advance without being hindered by his punctuality, precision or thoroughness, acquired in the interests of efficiency; can be intent upon his task without being over-serious in its pursuit. Many of our ethical terms readily suggest either the lack or the presence of coördination. The debased, lawless, malicious person shows by his conduct that this integrating standard is lacking, at least so far as actual life is concerned. But such terms as uprightness, integrity, fidelity, honesty, readily suggest the dominance of this coördination. The upright man is the *whole* man, one whose integrity bespeaks honor, virtue, purity. Indeed, virtue as thus approached is integration on the moral level, is inner command.

The Self.—For ethics the self must be real or moral judgment, choice, decision, responsibility is a delusion. Conduct must have a basis, character must actually attain personal reality, control must be for an end. Indeed, each of the terms we have been using implies meaning or worth for a self, with actual desires, motives, feelings, habits that serve an end, volitions that may be coördinated, intuitions which yield values.

The self is known by the criticisms it passes, by its endeavors to acquire system or order. It is known by its ideals, its aspiration to be a law unto itself. Moreover, it is in some sense free, is in a supreme way *will*, and we shall later regard it from the point of view of conscience. The self figures in successive terms all along the line, for example, the clan or tribal self, the self known as "self-regarding" or as "other-regarding," viewed in relation to self-denial or self-sacrifice. The whole moral aim may be described as self-realization. Obviously, everything depends on our conception of the self. Hence the foregoing emphasis on moral integration and purpose as clues.

The Self as Ideal.—The self is discoverable amidst experience, by reflection on processes of experience which imply interest, selective attention, effort to control conduct for ends. It is a conception rather than an object of perception; not a substance or monad apart from the experience and thought of which it consists. Noting the fact that there are two voices or natures competing within us, we infer that however sharply contrasted they may be both belong to a single self, although we prefer to identify the self with the ideal which we will to realize. The self in the more eligible sense then is the element of our nature to which we attribute persistent identity, and individuality. The self may indeed undergo manifold changes, may overcome its dualities and become constant where unity was lacking. But within and through its changes a core or basis of character persists. Hence the self that wrought the moral deed of yesteryear is the same as the self which is held responsible to-day, and anticipates a bettered future.

Man begins life as a creature of impulse, instinct, vague feelings, emotions, tendencies to acquire habits which make him their creature; and the natural man would say the self is what "feels." Hence the good or the supreme value would appear to be akin to sensibility. Looking more deeply, man notes a change from sensibility through varying emotions to rational thought and control. So the self comes to be envisaged as reason or will, arbiter and master. But unity of mental life is an ideal. So the self is always in some respects an achievement, integrative, constructing and reconstructing. We know the self as a moral being by what we find ourselves doing: passing judgments in the name of conscience, aware of alternatives, conscious of responsibility, under obligation, in the presence of duty, in need of choosing, and held accountable on any theory of determinism that has ever been proposed. The self seems imperatively real when it passes judgments of approval or disapproval, facing many matters on which the future will depend.

The Self as Conscious.—The moral self then is very far

from being unconscious or subconscious. A man might like to evade responsibility by turning over his moral processes to something vaguely called "the subconscious mind," which is said to work out his problems while he sleeps. Or he might like to attribute to the unconscious the major realities of his being, awaiting the fruitions of his complexes in their struggle to survive. In either case he would be falling back on mechanisms. But it is of the very nature of moral experience to become in high degree conscious, to demand increasing consciousness, not less; greater alertness where "watchful waiting" might be a temptation; greater precision in place of mystic faith that the better element will somehow triumph; and more acute analysis where dependence on after-processes welling up out of the subconscious would bring no definite result.

If the unconscious exist, it must be brought out into the light, notably in the case of half-concealed motives, hidden self-interest masquerading as altruism or as sincerity of purpose. There may indeed be subconscious after-effects, and a man needs every help that can come from activities set in motion in the direction of his ideals, and continuing, while he is otherwise absorbed. But everything turns upon *conscious* beginnings that are worth while, on giving assent, accepting or rejecting, passing judgment on activities that survive, reacting on motives which have been repressed. The moral self is the whole self, not a hidden fragment. Its alternatives may involve utter contrast between (1) unity with a divine purpose, and (2) a temptation to reject such a purpose and cease to be moral. In the light of the ideal, emphasis always belongs on the hierarchy of activities under the control of conscience. The realities of the self can not be described in terms of mere origins, present events, unconscious or subconscious fragments, or even with regard to ideals unless allowance be made for the fact that our ideals advance with our integrating progress. We may indeed will to make the self one with divine purpose. And so by the "self" we may more and more mean the self we will to realize, the self as person, as a distinctive rational individual.

The Self as Person.—Ethical philosophers put the term “person” in direct contrast with the term “thing.” A thing lacks consciousness, is purely objective, physical, spatial; a person has that remarkable quality which we call consciousness whereby its own activity as subjective is put over against the objectivities of the world, vigorously “out there” in space, more or less remote in time. Animals possess consciousness and their behavior anticipates in some respects what we call conduct, but we do not attribute self-consciousness to them. Human beings begin life in a distinctive sense by becoming conscious; self-consciousness enters in with awareness of shame, regret, remorse, criticism of mere behavior with a sense of dissatisfaction. One part of the self begins to pass judgment on another part, impulses are condemned, passions regretted; and the self is compared favorably or unfavorably with others. We know that certain acts spring more from the self than other acts. In some experiences we feel more free. In others we are not only constrained but actually overwhelmed by influences, processes, conditions.

To be a person is to be self-conscious, self-directive, capable of moral choice and improvement. As a creature of impulse or habit, man accurately describes himself as a product of heredity and environment. But as a person he finds himself in the presence of alternatives, able in a measure to rise and fall with heredity, reacting with or against environment. As a creature he responds to custom, takes on tradition, is enslaved by fashion, yields to imitation or suggestion; as a person he scrutinizes custom, questions even the most sacred traditions, and initiates where he once imitated. The moral command in brief is: Be a person, be moral in fullness of life; in the presence of alternatives choose the one adjudged higher, making of yourself a moral being in greater reality through constancy of character.

As self-directive man is capable of sin, evil, wickedness, vice, or he may choose their opposites. Indeed, he is able to sink below the level of personality and become a brute, a term of reproach which we hesitate to apply to the higher

animals. Hence we employ a group of terms, such as degradation, dishonor, guilt, criminality. We find man in the higher stages of what we are pleased to call civilization more capable of sin, more skillful and cunning in his moral evasions and his crimes than in less developed periods. History leads us to expect these lapses into barbarism, as we call them. Not until the coming of the philosophy of evolution was a scientific effort made to describe and explain what we sometimes call our animal inheritance. Recent science has narrowed the issues so that we are beginning to understand criminality in so far as it appears to be hereditary or a disease, and to consider possibilities of higher selection. Every advance made by science prepares the way for more intelligent judgment concerning that part of our nature which may still be regarded as accountable. Every great calamity, notably the World War, is likely to disclose human nature as it actually is, and so by contrast to show what is needed to make man truly civilized, in very truth a person.

Spontaneity.—We have already referred to the life which makes itself known in us instinctively as *spontaneity*. The life that is native to us tends to express itself freely, as in children at play. We are spontaneously prompted to produce long before we consciously direct our forces by rejecting some, redirecting others, curbing, reorganizing. There are incentives discoverable in us which tend toward sympathy, coöperation through division of labor, recognition of individual abilities and rights. If we were more wisely reared, with intimate knowledge of human nature, never unduly restrained, we might keep this spontaneity, unimpeded, we might retain our intuitions straight on into the fullness of life. Rare people do this in part, showing us what man as a racial being might have been. In them we see what we might be. The moral life might have been spontaneous all along the line of development from within outward, without loss of Greek ideals, without Puritanism, without war, and without bondage to mechanisms in which spirit is subject to flesh. But we are able to say what might

have been only by our growing knowledge of what exists in the conflict between the ideal and the actual.

Creative Intuition.—Again, we may restate our results in the light of our conclusions concerning intuition and creativity. Intuition is a real activity despite the fact that it does not spring from a separate faculty, and although it has had a history and is partly intellectual. Intellectual analysis is apt to leave the mind amid parts, dull or prosaic. Inductive reasoning falls short. Intuition advances to a culminating insight and discloses values, yields a vision of the Beautiful, the True, and the Good. It not only discerns values but creates or contributes them as the greatest gift of the larger self.

The Spirit.—Intuition is thus expressive of what we call “the spirit,” when we use that term to mean a higher element of the self than we understand by the term “mind.” By the spirit we mean what is most real or enduring in man, that which is intrinsically the man as the highest unifying principle of human nature, the principle which persists through all the vicissitudes of character. The spirit is at once will and reason, love and understanding, heart and head; the center of productive activity in all its forms. We think of the spirit as capable of endless development. Intuition at its best is the highest moment of self-disclosure in the one direction, and the finest insight into the eternal values in the other. Thus the self-activity of the human spirit gives us our standpoint and starting-point. In the native promptings, impulses and inclinations which form the earlier content of character, wherein no norm or limit appears, it is latent or potential rather than apparent. In the higher volitional life, the life of reason, it yields character as conscious purpose, conscience as intelligent awareness of moral obligation, personality as an achievement, and discovers increasing tendencies toward the fullness of life. Thus the human spirit comes to itself as criticizing, imposing limits, selecting, and organizing anew all the constituents of the self. In brief, the spirit is seen as the locus of all values, yielding what has been

called the greatest problem of the universe: the relation of mechanism and personality, causality and value.

As thus regarded, the spirit is not to be described as either too intellectual or too sentimental. The term "moral reason" might be used in this connection. By "reason" as more enlightened than mere understanding, more quickened than intellect, we mean the understanding or intellect chastened by experience, characterized by wisdom, and purified by the heart. The finer products of moral reason are enlightened motives and wise deeds, conduct guided by insight. The implied self or spirit is the self one means when summing up the moral ideal as "self-realization." Such realization is plainly no mere expression of the self which we originally find ourselves to be. All the above-mentioned terms imply the idea of chastening or criticism. Hence we may say, in brief, that the self to be realized is the ideal self, the true social individual.

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CHAPTER VI

THE DAWN OF MORALITY

Man and Nature.—There are several approaches to the decidedly complex situation in which we find the moral life. We may adopt the traditional view that conscience is a supernatural gift, the moral law a product of revelation, its authority absolute over the pronouncements of history. Man as a moral being may then seem utterly alien to nature, his life in this world one long series of combats with forces within and without which can never be reconciled with the moral standard. Or, we may find the origin of the moral in the non-moral, tracing its development from the partly sympathetic, partly altruistic instincts of higher animals and savage men through the dawning of custom in the earlier stages of civilization. Man will then be looked on as a child of the world-order in which he lives, cosmic forces and moral forces will not be regarded as irreconcilable, conscience will not be set apart as a spiritual gift which requires no natural content. From a third point of view the moral standard may be sought analytically by study of man's so-called moral instinct, his moral intuition, his authoritative mode of judgment. We shall adopt a fourth point of approach: that the moral standard is based on the character and spirit of man, however his nature has been acquired. This view will not keep us from assimilating the truth in the other positions.

Whatever may be said in behalf of man's moral selfhood as akin to a higher order of the universe, his nature not only requires but actually receives the content which his history as a whole gives it. Conduct or character, as we have seen, involves the organization of impulses, desires, dispositions, previously given; motives, intentions, purposes; emotion, feeling, thought, will; choice eventuating in

actions; values, a unifying ideal. All these, including intuition, have had a history in relation to nature and human society. Man's moral selfhood arises into power through interaction between the inner world and the outer. The outer, with its mechanisms, tends to determine the inner. But conduct also involves a dynamic or transforming element, a spontaneity which at its best is creative.

The Original Motives.—Although goodness may be taken to be in some sense more than natural, yet the spring of goodness is also found within the activities which send men forth in their long quest for the fullness of life.¹ As Hobhouse puts it, human morality rests on "the antagonisms as well as the sympathies, the corruptions and foibles as well as on the excellencies of human nature."² To try to base morality upon instinct would be to find that instinct varies with the individual, that it is fallible, far from perfect, and is dependent on reason for its standards. Hobhouse's investigation shows indeed that the instinctive element in morality is far from being an unfailing power implanted by nature in all men to distinguish right from wrong: it is rather a name for human character as it develops under conditions of heredity, human morality being as blind and imperfect as man himself. Nor is self-interest the only primary and genuine motive. We shall find both genetic and analytic reasons for holding that man is by nature not alone self-seeking but also altruistic, that all phases of goodness have a natural basis subject to the conditions of history.

The First Problems.—We have only to revert to our own childhood and youth, to find a clue to the succession of changes which bring men to the dawn of morality. As little children we were under subjection to bodily impulses, circumstances, parents and nurses, compelled to obey or submit to punishment, and our first moral instruction was by rules admitting no exception. Later, came an autocratic assertion of the will on our part; then a highly emotional period, succeeded by increasing self-consciousness and a

¹ Cf. Everett, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

² L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. I, p. 17.

fuller awakening of reason. Conscience as a process able to interpret its struggles in a measure came rather late. We were not by any means ready for moral philosophy in our youth. Yet we may have begun rather early to rebel against if not to question authority, put off by our parents as we probably were when we asked for reasons why we should do what is right. At some point in our rational development, if we were decidedly reflective in type, it naturally occurred to us to seek the basis for the rules we were taught to obey: On what authority do they depend? By what sanctions are they sustained? What is to prevent disobedience, save the fear of physical punishment in case we do what is contrary to precept? Is there such a thing as moral penalty? What is the ultimate ground of the moral order? We ask these questions so late that we realize how long must have been the history of man before he began seriously to question the moral precepts to which he became subject as a matter of course.

Group Morality.—As our own rights and duties were very far from being self-imposed in the period when we were acquiring sufficient moral experience to begin to understand, so in racial history rights and duties were not attached to the individual as such but as a member of a group whose mandates he had to obey. Students of man's moral history find that in origin all morality involves relationships with groups. The human character it presupposes is not that of the individual as we like to think of him in his fine independence. If there is criticism it is of one tribe by another. Moral obligation in its earliest form is a matter of the community. The typical primitive community has been likened to an island in a sea of strangers and enemies. Man is by nature gregarious, as are the animals in which the herd instinct is notably strong. So the basis for morality is laid in his social nature long before he emerges from the most primitive state. The non-moral impulses to secure food, shelter, clothing, which are said to arise from purely animal impulses, such as hunger and cold, are already social in expression. Man's first interests are in closest relation with his group. These are to

be followed into their moral stage by keeping in mind all that constitutes social life, in the family in its manifold relationships, between chieftans, medicine men, or priests, and their followers, including the rivalries or animosities as well as the love or sympathy.

In the kinship group one blood circulates in all members, the individual acts as a member of a kindred; and it is membership in the group which gives the individual his rights, which yields the accepted standards, the praise or blame, the punishment or reward.³ It is in the social instincts, reinforced by sympathy and sentiments growing out of a common life, common work, common danger, common religion, that morality is implicit. As we pass in imagination from folkways, becoming in a measure moral because *approved*, to custom implying judgments of the group, an implied authority, that is, primitive conscience as self-judgment in the name of the tribe, to the dawn of conscious and personal morality, we may then carry in mind something like the full context of the moral life, with its affinities in hates and loves, sorrows and joys, gentleness and wrath, timidity and boldness, and all other dispositions attributed to man's inherited structure.⁴ Man's whole instinctive life is seen as the natural basis of morals, not a certain instinct singled out as "moral," with an air of mystery, and as if this instinct were a faculty.

The First Virtues.—Thus "the true starting-point of the moral evolution of mankind is to be sought in the altruistic sentiments nourished in the atmosphere of the kinship group."⁵ That is to say, the maternal virtues of patience, tenderness, and self-denial are seen springing up amid the most sacred and intimate relationships of the group, also the filial virtues of love, obedience, and reverence, just as the fellowships of men in hunting and war disclose the manly virtues of courage, self-control, and devotion to the common good. The hearth worship of ancestors and the sacrificial meal shared with the gods and spirits

³ Cf. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 21.

⁴ See Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁵ Myers, *History as Past Ethics*, p. 17.

are also relationships yielding virtues which are to be of great moment in the moral development of the race. Customs and practices of the kinship group not regarded as primarily moral take on moral values. Thus tribal influences favored modes of conduct which later became known as "right," the opposing conduct as "wrong." Tradition presupposes the storing up of patterns of conduct and modes of accompanying belief which have persisted through long periods of time. For example, ancestor worship in China implied the shaping of customs into a national pattern, the typical racial morality.

The Function of Custom.—Custom, sometimes defined as public habits of a certain community or class of society, involves frequent repetition of a certain mode of conduct, and so at first thought it appears to be merely social habit. But it is not merely a habit of action. As an expression of social will it stands for public habits approved by the community, and is sometimes accepted as the ultimate standard of obligation. It thus implies a judgment on action, is regarded as necessary, has a binding force on the individual, and involves prohibitions. Custom "commands" or "demands," as we still sometimes say. It becomes strict, inexorable, decides what is taboo, what is right and wrong, what conduct is immoral, as present-day dancing and dress are sometimes judged.

These judgments therefore imply rules of conduct which are taken to be universal. Guidance of conduct by rule is universal in human society. In impersonal terms it seems to imply a bystander or third party. The conduct of the virtuous, crystallized as custom, is handed down in regular succession. Thus the conduct of the individual leader becomes generalized, and generality becomes the most salient feature of custom.⁶ The conceptions handed down become social tradition, the dominant factor in the regulation of human conduct; custom makes mutual understanding possible, that is, reciprocity, which Hobhouse terms "the vital principle of society." The two poles between which we

⁶ See Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Vol. II, p. 120.

move are then, individual impulse and social tradition. To transgress custom is to call forth public indignation, and so the breach of custom brings its own penalty, and a direct connection is seen between an evil influence and its resultant misdeed. In relation to such influences the trespass may be held to offend a certain spirit. Later, the notion of "an inherent retribution following as an automatic consequence of the wrong act" still further generalizes the deed.⁷ Thus is seen the dawning of moral feeling in a simple way, namely, by attributing malefic quality to the bad act itself. Hobhouse thinks that in considerable measure wrong-doing is still conceived magically rather than ethically, for example, when a deed is marked by a taboo, as in the case of a woman stamped once for all by the scarlet letter, or the prison-taint in the case of a man.

Levels of Development.—It is the generality implied that concerns us, since we here find the beginnings of recognition of law, and, in the self-judgments in the name of the tribe, dawnings of conscience. Externally this recognition of conscience may mean little more than the preservation of modes of conduct favorable to the welfare of the tribe. But awareness of authority is also there. Implicitly actions are judged by character. Positive law becomes the moral standard, and then more specifically *moral* law. Dewey and Tufts distinguish three levels in the process: (1) conduct arising from instincts and fundamental needs; (2) conduct regulated by standards of society, for some more or less conscious end involving the social welfare (custom); (3) conduct regulated by a standard which is both social and rational, examined and criticized (conscience).⁸ Experience on the level of conscience means: (1) collision between the authority and interests of the group, and the independence and private interests of the individual; (2) collision between order and progress, habit and reformation.⁹ Hence come about the problems of individualism, of personal morality in relation to group-morality, the stage

⁷ See Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 53.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

in which we still find ourselves to a great extent; since "we do not any of us think out all of our standards, weigh independently our values, make all our choices in a rational manner, or form our characters by following a clearly conceived purpose."¹⁰

Conventionality.—That this is so we realize when we consider to what a large extent we are still ruled by conventions. The basis of most of the customs we observe is public opinion within our social class or organization. "Good form" observed in a certain grade of society admits us to that grade, if we possess the other qualifications. The individual, known as "well-bred," as a gentleman or lady, maintains standards of etiquette, politeness, or kindness. Wealth is sometimes the standard. Sometimes it is intellectual ability or rank. Ostracism is feared if one seriously fail to maintain the standard. We well know that standards vary with groups, as with races or nations. The conventions may be in high degree formal, even superficial or external. They are not necessarily moral. Yet many of the customs which we regard lightly were once matters of moral importance in the stage of society in which manners and morals were not distinguished. We now see that fashion dictates, imitation influences habit, suggestion enters in, custom decrees or taboos, conventionality insists, and conscience accepts or rejects, where once simple custom reigned supreme. The change came about with the questioning of the authority attributed to custom, the word of the chieftan, the decision of the priest or the command of the king. When conscience is substituted for custom, and moral principles for external rules, human conduct becomes reflective, attains the moral level. Man questions, seeks the whys and wherefores to the extent that he becomes individual. Custom, with its tendency to be static or conservative, is imposed by external authority, that of a person, book, or system; and it is thus put beyond question. But conscience is at its best dynamic or creative; it ventures to question any authority whatsoever, seeking the higher

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

law which we call moral, not dependent on creed, time, place, institution, or book.

Development of Authority.—It is important to note the coming in of authority as a factor, for we then see the place of experience in relation to the creeds, formulas, systems, which have imposed themselves on experience. The process appears at first as perfectly simple and desirable. The customary experiences of the tribe, yielding patterns of conduct, naturally lead to tradition; precepts are handed down, patterns are conserved, and persist through long periods of time. Then a moral leader appears who gives the accumulated precepts the classic forms which hold for centuries. Thus Confucius established moral types for the Chinese, and among other nations the types were given formulation in the Laws of Manu, the Code of Hammurabi, the moral systems of Zoroaster and other national leaders. Thus too Moses was known as law-giver among the Hebrews. The merely civil traditional precept, hitherto subject to the mutations of time, not yet static, or possessing authority attributed to one person or enclosed in a definite system, becomes the revealed or divine principle, with its heavenly sanction. The formulated code of morals is then the object of reverence rather than the moral spirit which had more or less freely expressed itself according to need. Crystallization in the form of traditional laws to which special authority is attributed leads in time to written records for the preservation of the sacred formulas, to the appointment of officials to care for the records, to expound and defend the system. Eventually the formulas are likely to be revered above either the moral experiences of the race through which they have been developed or the present experiences of society in its effort to be true to tradition. Thus conservatism comes into full power. The authority which might have been attributed to moral reason is vested in the system. It then becomes extremely difficult even for the highly enlightened to distinguish authority from its sources, to see in what sense morality is a matter of life or art instead of a matter of creed or institution. It is through the formal element that the given type of morality

comes to exercise authority over the elements of feeling or experience, and through the persistence of this formal element the nation maintains its authority through successive generations, and prepares the way for its decline when the national life becomes wholly limited by vested authority.

Moral Evolution.—Among peoples where priestly rule was not predominant moral ideas had a freer development. In China and India philosophical systems appeared. In Greece the period of moral maxims, traditional teachings, and myths concerning the gods gave place to a philosophical period which culminated in the idealism of Plato. Aristotle, to whom we owe the idea of ethics as a science, whose *Ethics* is still one of the greatest works on the subject, is free from the traditions and authorities which imposed their forms on morality. It is among the Hebrews that we find the typical instance of dogma taking the place of free development. In modern times we have all types: conventionality ruling over all, traditional morality separated from religion, moral codes in utter subjection to ecclesiastical authority, naturalistic ethics, and ethics founded on philosophical idealism. A comparison of moral systems and codes discloses the fact that moral experience gets itself summarized after a time in the form of maxims, many of which persist and are highly revered to-day; in commandments containing precepts or prohibitions; and in theories of the good which tend to fall into a few prevailing types. It is possible to separate out the ethical element, especially in the case of the great peoples, and discern its laws and tendencies. This element is remarkably persistent, and manages to survive through a long succession of changes in custom, rulership, priest-craft, and dogma. Hobhouse notes, for example, certain stages through which man's ideas passed with regard to sin.¹¹ In an early period people washed away their sins with magic purges or swore them off with incantations and formulas. Later they bargained with the gods and offered a bull or a ram. Then, with the coming in of the ethical stage, God is conceived of as caring neither for gifts nor for cere-

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 123.

monial adulation, but for repentance and change of heart; and so ceremonies lose their magical effect. This brings the development of thought to the period of ethical monotheism.

So too Myers, in tracing the causes which determine and modify the moral type, follows the development of corporate consciousness from the stage of the kinship group, noting the effect of ancestor worship, the moralizing of the character of the gods, the period of custom as law-giver, the influence of ideas of revenge and the blood feud, the beginnings of inter-tribal morality, the results of changes in civilization, the power of the moral exemplar, the part played by feudalism (in Japan), the effect of class morality (in India), of dualism in Persia, and the idea of God among the Hebrews.¹² The command, "Thou shalt not kill," means at one period that the savage shall not slay a kinsman. So too lying depends on tribal or social conditions, for the prevalence of a double moral standard, which we know as a survival, is very ancient. It may be a praiseworthy exploit to steal from strangers, but a crime to steal from the members of one's own group. Confucius had entire confidence in the goodness of human nature, and so the moral doctrines which were made classic by him took their clue from this belief in the natural goodness of man. Mencius, his greatest disciple, said, "The tendency of man's nature to good is like the tendency of water to flow downwards."¹³

Prevailing Conceptions.—In the world of Christian thought moral teachings were for centuries dominated by the view that man's nature is by heredity corrupt, with proneness to evil. If man believes that all the instincts or tendencies of his nature are inclined toward virtue, the moral life takes its clue from the doctrine of "the just medium," as in China, or the conception of "the golden mean" ("nothing to excess"), as in ancient Greece. Again, one may find practically the same precept, known by us as the Golden Rule, formulated in the same language in China, in India, and in Palestine, but in very different con-

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 7, foll.

¹³ Quoted by Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

nections in each case. The tendency toward ethical idealism may take the form of idealizing the divine, and so there may arise a conception of a spiritual being embodying all that man can dream of perfection.¹⁴ Or, reflection upon life and man's place in it, upon human nature and its potentialities, on human action and its ends, may lead to closer examination of human experience to determine where man's true purpose lies, and the formulation of an ideal of conduct to be pursued for man and humanity. In the latter case the implied ethical system is conceived as the basis of a conscious ordering of human life by the deliberate efforts of the best and wisest members of the human race. That is, man is dependent on his own excellence, not on any religious sanction. So the principle may come into general recognition that for the individual "virtue is its own reward," in contrast with the idea of rewards bestowed by God or during the future life. The basis of morals is then taken to be the intrinsic desirability of that which accords with the true principle of man's nature, brought to its proper development by education. Thus come into view such virtues as justice and benevolence implying the idea of impartiality, or reciprocity.

The Universal Element.—The law-giver does not create the precepts or maxims to which he gives expression, but lifts them to the level of moral principle regarded as holding true for all men, whatever their rank or station. In ancient Greece the transition from custom to moral principle came about through the protests of Socrates against the teachings of Sophists who undertook to raise the opinions of individual men to the rank of law. With Socrates morality became disinterested. When morality reaches this high stage, a certain ideal of character becomes the goal of all endeavor; and man undertakes to cultivate what is best in himself and to aid others in the same process, as in the case of the wise man's ideal, so long the standard during the prevalence of Greek and Roman Stoicism.¹⁵

¹⁴ See Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 161.

¹⁵ See W. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, tr. by Tufts, 2d ed., 1901, p. 163.

Reflective Morality.—In place of the idea of the tribe, imposing its customs upon the individual and granting no rights of protest to the individual, we now have the individual attaining the level of reflective morality in freedom. The individual thus finds himself, his character typical of man universally as a moral being. He looks out upon society as a sort of extension of himself, treating all men as he would himself. Hence the significance of the Golden Rule. From these results we may pass to a conception of the moral order as a coherent whole. This whole is differently conceived by the various typical peoples, such as the Chinese, the Greeks, and Hindoos. So too the conception of goodness differs, as among the Greeks, to whom we owe the first formulations of ideas of the good which have prevailed throughout the Christian era. But for our present purposes the most significant consideration is this change to the inner world of recognition of moral principles. The idea of the moral law or obligation or conscience now becomes objective in contrast with its given history in the case of any of the great peoples. Any one of us, examining his inner experience, may take himself as typical, testing the classic analyses anew. So each may penetrate back of the formulas, to the experiences which led to them, discriminating between the habit and the spirit for which it existed. So doing, we may also penetrate beneath all authority imposed from without to the authority of the moral law within.

Emotional Origins.—The question of the side of human nature most active in the dawn of morality is not to be readily answered by appeal to historical studies. Westermarck holds that moral concepts are ultimately based on emotions either of indignation or approval.¹⁶ He finds that men pronounce certain acts to be good or bad because of the emotions which those acts have aroused in their minds. Because good acts generally produce pleasure and bad acts pain, goodness and badness have become identified with the tendency of acts to produce pleasure or pain. An act is also called good because approved of, and this judg-

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 4.

ment in turn involves conformity to a general rule. But Westermarck firmly believes that the accepted rule has an emotional sanction in the person's own mind; also that the first moral judgments are passed by public opinion because of emotions of indignation. Even when acts are spoken of as involving greater or lesser degrees of badness or goodness, these quantitative differences are due to the emotional origin of all moral concepts.¹⁷ Public opinion and law judge by detected acts, seldom by an exhaustive examination of the case. A judgment may refer feelingly to some great teacher whose words have become sacred, for example, Confucius or Buddha. The intensity of a moral emotion tends to make the person objectify his judgment, to give it universal validity. So our moral consciousness belongs to our mental constitution, which we can not change as we please: we approve and we disapprove because we can not do otherwise, as we can not help feeling pain when the fire burns, as we can not help sympathizing with our friends.

The objection to this view is that it neglects the rationalistic side of our nature. Westermarck makes very widespread studies of savage life, but gives little heed to ethical idealism and passes by Greek philosophy. At best the emotions of approval and disapproval are assigned an adequate place, in contrast with a former tendency to ignore them. But the thesis concerning moral emotions is not proved. The result is a tissue of relativities. Westermarck finds no general moral truths. His assertion that our moral judgments spring from our own consciousness leaves the discussion at the point attained by the Sophists prior to Socrates, namely, that individual opinion is moral law. His investigation yields no basis for moral obligation as a truth of the moral experience of the race. He discloses no adequate conception of the self. There is no ground of appeal beyond the bare fact that my moral consciousness yields moral judgments because it is my nature. In fact, Westermarck scouts the idea of moral obligation in the sense of a standard as a vulgar idea.¹⁸ There is, he be-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

lieves, no right to which the individual has to adjust his opinions, but only that "right" which has its existence in each individual mind. If our moral emotions are tacitly felt to be impartial, this disinterestedness is an assumption. Moral disapproval is a form of resentment, while moral approval is retributive kindly feeling. The implied judgments refer back, to be sure, to society at large, prior to merely private emotions; but for Westermarek this reference is always to emotions felt in relation to tribal custom, which, in his terms, was the earliest rule of duty.¹⁹

Reason as Origin.—Hobhouse reaches a very different result by studies in the same field, in which he finds morality tending toward a rationalistic conception of the moral order as a coherent whole. From such a point of view, the manifold judgments must not only tolerate but actively support one another. We do not expect to find perfect coherence in any given society, for actual morality grows up amid the imperfections of human character, influenced by the accidents of historical development; hence the moral consciousness has all the characteristics of mind in growth, not of mind that has attained.²⁰ The germ of such an idea of moral coherence has been found by moral teachers, with singular consistency, in the Golden Rule of Confucius. Viewing all morality from primitive custom upwards, the same principle is implied in the recognition of rules of conduct of general application, namely, that the individual is a member of a spiritual whole with a common life and a general interest. This principle gives the needed coherence to the multitudinous sympathies, susceptibilities, and reluctances that guide the moral life of unreflective man. So the problem of moral obligation passes into that of the moral *standard*, "whereby all the lines of conduct laid down by the moral order may be viewed as starting from the same basis and pointing to the same result," the good as right or objective.²¹ Obligation is then seen to rest on the altruism of which the love-rela-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 218.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

tion is the perfect type. The obligation can not be resolved away. It underlies all ethical thought. Each man is a member of a spiritual whole to which he owes service, man is bound by spiritual ties to a community with a life and purpose of its own. It is not necessary then to assume an original egoism or self-regard out of which altruism was developed in a secondary way: egoism is at once too deliberate and too limited to be primitive.²² It is modified impulse which later becomes desire and aversion: desire for things that are pleasant rather than desire for pleasure. It is the inherited psycho-physical structure of the gregarious instinct which makes experience pleasant or painful.

Whether or not we can see as much as Hobbouse does in the inherited structure which marks out the main lines of behavior, social and self-regarding, in accordance with the conditions of race-maintenance, his conception of the primitive life out of which morality has appeared leaves abundant room for the qualifying play of intelligence and will, and the growth of moral purpose. According to his view of will, for instance, will is distinguished from desire "because in it the whole personality tends to be involved rather than a single sense or single emotion."²³ Will does not set to work in "a kind of vacuum of pure reason," but finds itself guided and limited from the first by social rules which form the standard by which the conduct of each man is judged. Granted these rules embodying tradition, and the individual responding to his impulses within the limits of life lived in groups, the conditions are then ready for the development of ethical conceptions and for the growth of human character. The individual finds himself a responsible agent standing under certain obligations. whether to himself, to others, or to society as a whole, as defined by the requirements of the common good. Those moral ideas are valid which correspond to the permanent conditions of human progress. Hobbouse urges the claims of duty on the ground that when man thoroughly under-

²² *Ibid.*, p. 259.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

stands its nature and its bearings on our own life and that of humanity, man is compelled on rational grounds to recognize its validity, and admit that the ends to which it points are wider and greater than any private good that may conflict with it. Thus for rationalism the moral basis lies in the unfolding of the full meaning of the moral order, as that through which the human spirit grows.

Summary.—Adopting the rationalistic point of view, we may assimilate the results reached by Westermarck and others without placing undue stress on emotions or instincts. Paulsen is right in maintaining that “custom forms the original content of duty,” that is, originally duty enjoined a life in accordance with custom.²⁴ For custom was once “purposive modes of behavior for solving the various problems of life,” and so custom aimed at the preservation and welfare of the collective body, while duty was invested with the authority of custom. But we shall find increasing reason to believe that duty is higher in authority than custom, although what is prescribed in the name of duty may be matter of custom. In subsequent chapters we shall develop rationalism in contrast with conceptions of the good founded on sensibility, and we shall find objections to the idea of duty for duty’s sake, and similar approaches to the moral ideal. For the present our interest centers about the conclusions that (1) moral goodness presupposes natural goodness and is dependent on it; (2) natural goodness presupposes conditions under which it has been attained; (3) there is a native “urge” stirring man to advance, produce, create; (4) natural experience precedes ideas of its meaning, and moral experience precedes its formulation in terms of maxims, precepts, laws; (5) moral ideas are *worked* out, achieved amid more or less adverse conditions by men whose characters are imperfect; (6) there is a *dynamic*, achieving element, in contrast with the formal or *static*: it is the latter which receives recognition in types of authority impeding ethical progress; (7) while moral precepts apply to specific situations, to time, place, nation, moral laws imply universal

²⁴ F. Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*, tr. by Thilly, 1899, p. 345.

principles applicable to the moral sphere as a whole: it is the *moral universal*, attained through reflective morality, rather than custom, that is significant for ethics.

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CHAPTER VII

MORAL OBLIGATION

Generalization.—When human thought enters the period of scientific study of events occurring in the world round about, interest changes from what merely happens in a detached way to what conceivably takes place universally. If the facts of life were to remain single, discontinuous, unrepeatd even in memory, it would be impossible to describe them so as to determine what a fact is, namely, an event which can be identified with other occurrences in universal terms, with reference to the uniformity of nature and the reign of law. So too in the field of ethics, thought passes from the single deed, detached maxim, tribal custom prevailing as matter of habit to reflection on the moral principle conceived as universal. Mere custom may be as detached from any assignable principle as fashions which come and go, or may imply as much servitude on the part of the individual as matters of etiquette in this or that country which we observe merely while traveling in the country in question. But when morality reaches the reflective stage the individual becomes typical of the moral order, and his deeds may be generalized to determine what a moral action is specifically.

Moral Action.—Conduct, we have seen, is more than mere behavior: it involves motives, intentions, and volitions. A moral act is a particular instance of such activity, intelligible to others in terms of their own conduct. A moral action is (1) subjective in relation to the motive, which may intimately involve the personal life; (2) objective in relation to the conduct and welfare of others. The moral deed reacts upon the agent, and it may be fraught with heavy consequences for others. Subjectively it is an event in the life of the individual, implying rela-

tionship between his impulses, emotions, desires, and the measure of self-control or reason he possesses. It also involves his philosophy or attitude toward life; his moral principles in contrast with expediency or prudence. Objectively it becomes part of the moral history of the race, as in heroic deeds done during the World War.

A moral action is a deed known as right or wrong, good or bad when judged by a standard such that the good deed "ought" to be done, the bad deed *ought not* to be done. The good act is approved the bad disapproved. By approving of an action we associate it implicitly at least with an ethical ideal. We also see in a moral deed, choice or volition which narrows ambiguous alternatives to the certain result achieved. The action may seem to express the dominion of the strongest motive, and so it may be taken to imply determinism. Suffice it for the present to say that a moral action involves voluntary activity: the agent knows what he is about, has some preference implying relation to character; and so a moral action is one that manifests character.¹ The alternatives appear not only to be ambiguous but incompatible. The higher alternative having been chosen and acted upon, we signalize the deed as a value, indicating its worth, for example, if it is a deed involving heroism, by putting it in relation to similar deeds springing from commendable motives. Given the moral deed, we analyze and make explicit its motive, noting the implied ideal, the relationship to moral law and obligation.

Moral Judgment.—The significant consideration on the inner side is what Martineau calls the "irresistible tendency to *approve and disapprove*, to pass judgments of right and wrong."² When approbation falls we recognize merit, with disapprobation, demerit. We do not raise the wrong deed, a falsehood, for example, to the universal level; we do exalt the right deed and commend it to the race. Observing the behavior of men, we single out those deeds which to us are typical of their morals, and from the deeds pass judgment to the sources from which they sprang.

¹ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 202, foll. *

² J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, 1891, Vol. II, p. 18.

It is clear then that the object of moral judgment is voluntary action, involving a certain direction of the will which we characterize as the motive. The will is called good in the sense of a determined effort to produce a good result: a good will issues in good action, and from the point of view of a type of ethical theory there can be no good action without a good will.³ The subject of the moral judgment is the point of view from which an action is judged good or bad. We judge our own actions by doing them, learning in time to take up the viewpoint of the impartial spectator.

Judgments and Intentions.—We also pass judgment on a man's *intentions*, and we note that actions intended to be good may lead to undesirable consequences. Some moralists have passed by motives as if these made no difference, and have confined attention to the results. Others have shown that it is the end in view which shows the character of the deed, hence that our actions can be classified in terms of their intentions. As the motive is what induced the man to do his deed in a particular manner, it directs attention to the doer, whom we thereby judge. We can not however pass intelligent judgment without discriminating between motives and results in instances where the motives may be excellent but the action subject to condemnation. We do not judge with approval the tribes which sacrifice the first-born, or the Spartans who sacrificed their weaklings. We pass from sweeping judgments regarding the World War to the leaders of a party in a given nation most directly responsible, and from atrocities to the policy of frightfulness from whence they sprang. We think of an action as part of a system of life, for example, deeds wrought by the Soviet government whereby tyranny was supplanted by tyranny. We perhaps approved of Mussolini's *coup*, and set him down as a "good" dictator, just as we hear about a "good" trust and a "bad" trust. Finding the result good or bad on the whole, we turn from the deed to the person or persons who

³ See Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

wrought it; and so we find it almost impossible to separate the elements of the judgment.

Objects of Moral Judgment.—Westermarck holds that it is only from want of due reflection that moral judgments are influenced by outward deeds: the will is the only proper object of moral disapproval or moral praise.⁴ Martineau maintains that we judge persons exclusively, the inner spring of an action, as distinguished from its outward operation.⁵ For the dynamic source of a moral action is in the mind, and a verdict is pronounced accordingly. No moral value is to be attributed to external benefits save as outward deeds are signs and exponents of the goodness from which they spring. It is therefore clear to Martineau *whom* we first judge, namely, ourselves. Since the moral quality consists in the inner spring of action, and since this is not apprehensible by any external observation but is knowable in the first instance only by internal self-consciousness, it follows that we judge ourselves: the external sign would be unmeaning to us were not the thing signified already familiar to us by our own experience.⁶

Martineau's account of moral judgments is far more true however of man today than of man in his early history. Reflective morality probably began in judgments passed on other people, with reference to consequences and appearances, and only gradually became subjective. Our judgments are arrived at by interaction between the objective and the subjective. The man who suspects underhanded dealings on the part of his neighbor may later realize that it is through his own underhandedness that he comes to attribute hidden motives to others. The individual gradually disengages himself from his social group. At first he may seem to act from sheer spontaneity, but later he discovers alternatives and by contrast comes to see the meaning of his volitions.

Moral judgment then implies both social relationships and dualities or alternatives. Its elements being under-

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 247.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

stood, we may say in brief that what we judge is conduct, and we have seen that conduct involves character. The more highly intelligible the more moral it may be. Moral judgment is passed on those who may be held responsible, as in the World War. We are all the while growing in scientific knowledge of human conduct, and so we are approaching the period of righteous judgment. In practice we find it impossible to settle all cases of conflict by considering, with Martineau, the springs of action; but must, with other moralists, consider the ends in view, and sometimes estimate the probable results.⁷ So in time we arrive at surer knowledge of moral values.

Moral Law.—We have noted that many laws are first discoverable in the guise of custom.⁸ The Greek term *Nomos* signified both custom and law, the deep-rooted idea that law was the outcome of custom. So too among other peoples law expressed the customs of the majority, customs expressly formulated, enforced by more definite sanctions, either through appeal to social utility or an increasing sense of justice. Customs may at first have been simply counsels of prudence on the basis of experience. Hence arise the maxims such as, "Honesty is the best policy," in which customs are summarized prior to the coming of the law-giver who reduces the prevailing precepts to a code or system. The first interest is the welfare of the tribe. Later, when the interest becomes universal the law-giver may set a standard which becomes classic. Later still, the reflective moralist may see that in this standard is involved a law of morality applicable to humanity without regard to nation or race.

The law then is first recognized as a formulation of experience or rule of action based on previous experiences in which a relation is seen between right motives and deeds, in the light of social well-being. With the incoming of authority, due to the acceptance of a code as binding upon the whole people, moral rules are regarded as constant, and so the absolute element of morality seems to have been

⁷ Martineau's theory will be considered in another chapter.

⁸ See Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 165.

gained. But the moral laws are still relative: they are the formulas which establish the given morality according to the stage of knowledge attained, as in China in the age of Confucius. It is essential to distinguish between (1) the formulas of a given people, involving modes of conduct wherein they may differ from other peoples; and (2) the moral law as a constant or principle exemplified in human morality as a whole.

Moral and Civil Laws.—Civil law is differentiated after a time with reference to overt acts, transgressions which may be treated in the light of fixed penalties; inner conduct is thrown out of account, and much discretion is left to judges. A civil law may even enjoin or forbid acts regarded as indifferent from a moral point of view.⁹ When we contrast deeds looked upon as wrong because they are illegal with moral deeds, judged as they are in relation to conduct, whether the agent is detected or not, we turn more specifically to moral law as dependent neither on statute-books nor on courts, but as recognized from within. And this inner life of ours, with its awareness of responsibility, is not, as we have before noted, a mere life according to rule but an experience involving spontaneity. Our rules may have been convenient summaries in the first place, as reminders of the realities of experience. Referring to those realities we note that our rules of conduct did not counsel us concerning something to *do* merely, but something to become.¹⁰ That is, they pertained to character, to an ideal. Moral life involves something to be fulfilled, rather than a negation and restraint, or an overt act subject to legal judgment. If we are to leave room for the plastic element, and regard ethics as "the living expression of the changing life of man," as Seth puts it, we must put ourselves back into the sources to determine, if we can, the ultimate basis of moral obligation.

Origin of Moral Law.—If we hold that the moral law is ultimately due to revelation, we naturally ask, Is it then

⁹ For other contrasts, see G. H. Palmer, *The Field of Ethics*, Chap. II.

¹⁰ See J. Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

fixed beyond debate, absolute, apart from all experience, from time, place, and law-giver? It would be difficult to support this thesis today. If not above reason but identical in essence with it, we may pass by the question of revelation and concern ourselves with the rational content of the moral law as given: revelation because true is rational, we possess in our own natures the direct clue to the moral order. What we are concerned with is the moral ideal as we find men striving for it. If the moral law were purely external, it would be a mere question of commandments to be obeyed, in contrast with the imperative to realize an ideal of human character. Whatever the sources of moral goodness in divine goodness, we are concerned with the moral law as given from within.

Instead of setting the moral law apart as due to a revelation to be accepted without question, the modern believer in divine revelation in the light of its bearing on the moral law is likely to point out that the moral law as a divine command is compatible with the view that the commandments existed in civic forms before the giving of the revelation, also that there was a social development gradually leading to the time when the divine sanction was added to the civil. This view accords with the fact of history that there is a genesis or development of all moral ideas, a given historical content, with a gradual emergence of the distinction between custom and conscience. The question of the divine sanction, is therefore one that is to be considered in its proper connection.

Authority of Moral Law.—Whatever conclusion may be arrived at regarding the added authority attributed to the moral law by appeal to revelation, the significant fact is that in any case the law was given through the moral self. The individual who accepts moral law has had a natural experience, as well as a spiritual endowment. It is as a child of nature as well as a child of God that he is seen in process of recognizing the moral law. So, too, in human history at large we find the long preliminary experience which eventually leads to the period of law-giving. As essentially the same principles are put in universal

terms by different law-givers in different lands, including those of the Ten Commandments as attributed to the mediation of Moses, the moral law has come to be regarded as we would any rational principle. What is absolute in it is not a given series of commandments, for these were formulated at a certain period, in view of certain needs, and probably amid various social limitations; it is the principle implied in all moral systems at all times, namely, the law that there shall be law, the ultimate value on which all other values depend. Granted this insight, we understand how there can be moral progress, for instance, the change from outward observance to recognition of purity of heart, and from the Ten Commandments to the simpler two of the New Testament: love toward God and the neighbor as inclusive of all the rest.

The Sanctions.—The precise position occupied by the moral law becomes more clear when we note that various sanctions or reasons have been advocated for observing laws. 1. *Physical* sanctions enjoin observance of natural conditions making for health, freedom, peace. These pertain to prudence and efficiency: we owe it to society to keep fit, to train ourselves to do our best work. Prudence is a means to self-realization. 2. *Civil* sanctions involve regard for laws of the community, state, and nation imposed for the good of all. We not only endeavor to observe regulations of the community subject to penalties in case of disobedience, but to maintain “unwritten laws,” as in driving an automobile, also the usual objective proprieties, what is deemed right in bodily behavior. Thus far the sanctions are external. 3. *Internal* sanctions may involve exceptions taken to civil law on the part of the individual; sometimes a conflict, as in case of conscientious objectors, people who claim freedom of speech whatever the objection, rights of worship, reactions against paternalism. 4. *Social* sanctions may involve closer accord between the individual and current regulations than in case of civil law. Thus honor, reputation, and other social benefits are regarded as of great moment. Such sanctions may either sustain or conflict with moral ideals. 5. *Re-*

ligious sanctions seem to many the only real commands. Unable to change what we take to be divine laws, we realize it to be our privilege to grow in responsiveness to them. We look up to such laws with respect, as having great power over us. Civil and social laws, given divine sanction, become absolute for those who place emphasis on "the religion of authority" in contrast with what Sabatier calls "the religion of the Spirit." The law does not punish selfishness. Public opinion does not require self-sacrifice. But religion condemns the one and usually enjoins the other. Thus many moral matters receive what we take to be their ultimate authority when we attach the religious sanction to them.

We are apt to lose sight of the fact that acceptance of any sanction as *right* involves judgment on our part. All regulations adopted by social groups may become ethical when moral judgment is passed upon them. In athletics, for instance, it becomes a question of "fair play," "clean sport": hence it becomes a duty to keep out professionalism, to sustain contracts, avoid bribery. So, too, all matters dealt with in the courts may receive moral sanction, and maintenance of civil law becomes a question of moral integrity. The judge must arrive at decisions which accord with the statute-books, must take precedent into account; but every decision may also be a moral matter, and the reasons assigned may be moral. In commercial relations, the question constantly arises whether or not a man is upright. In politics honesty is less frequently expected, and it is not even customary to consider whether partisanship involving attacks on candidates, misrepresentation, and bitterness, is right. When other sanctions receive moral support, it becomes a question of obligation, a fundamental issue involving the realm of values, hence a type of existence which often seems intangible in contrast with either natural law or civil law.

The Nature of Moral Obligation.—It would be difficult to make the idea of moral obligation intelligible if we were to start with a period in human society when no recognition of it existed, then try to establish obligation on a

secure basis by showing the stages of development. For the attempt to prove it would involve the consciousness of it, which is the convincing evidence that it is real. We need not try to show how and why isolated individuals came by it and then extended the idea of obligation to include a whole social group; since, as we have seen, man regarded as a moral being is also a social being from the first, and his consciousness of obligation is one of the strongest ties which bind him to his group. The individual is a member of a family, a tribe, and later finds himself a member of a race or nation. He discovers himself in various relations, domestic and political, and all these imply moral relations involving obligations.¹¹

Evidences from Experience.—Finding ourselves with awareness of such obligation we can indeed discover good reasons. Experience shows that motives influence conduct, that virtue brings results, and we realize that it is incumbent upon us to select our motives more carefully, to have higher aims, and adjust our conduct that we may steadily approximate the highest ideal we know. We also learn from experience that evil deeds bring consequences in kind, and we realize that we should avoid them. Good deeds imply the existence of the moral order, each individual as a moral being is part of that order, and has full opportunity to contribute his share toward the good of the whole; whereas evil deeds are destructive of moral order. Each man is a recipient of goods through membership in this moral solidarity of the race, and realization that one receives benefits, leads to realization that one should give one's share.

Moral Law and Obligation.—Such reflections lead to recognition of the moral law as above yet within and through the whole structure of the human self and human society. To see that the law is over and above me is to realize that I am under obligation to obey, and this obligation is very different from my immature passing thoughts about law. In my youth I may have thought that if I did wrong and was not "caught in the act" the misdeed did not

¹¹ See Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

matter. But radically different was my later thought of right and wrong, when I learned that misdeeds bring their consequences whether these deeds are ever found out or not; when I saw that punishment through one's own sense of shame, remorse, sense of guilt, and the degrading consequences of wrong-doing is often far greater and much more persistent than punishment inflicted externally by parents or teachers, or by civil law. Punishment inflicted by others may be unjust. A person's real guilt may never be discovered. It is possible to be endlessly evasive. But the moral law is unescapable. It plainly is not of human invention. Man is totally unable to legislate it out of being. Yet by recognizing its august authority over him he may see how to fulfill his obligation.

Law as Necessary.—In the world of nature around we find it necessary to adapt our behavior to certain conditions in order to obtain desired results, and man's life as a physical being is one long series of adaptations. Nature has no favorites. She never bestows even slight gifts for nothing. She imposes conditions, and we may either accept these, adjusting means to ends, or forego what we have attempted. Thus there are certain conditions which make for bodily health and development, involving adjustment between hours for work, rest, recreation, and sleep. In this sense obligation has been defined as "the necessity of modifying any particular expression of impulse by the whole system of which it is a part."¹²

Obligations and Values.—Necessities of this sort extend through the whole sphere of conduct: impulse and emotion, desire and its expression must be regulated, feeling must be curbed by, yet should contribute to reason, will is dependent on native promptings, and so mental life is organic. Man does not create the needs, he does not generate the strivings toward freedom and the fullness of life; and even his capacities and his energies, also his powers of initiative are given. Life yields the incentive, suggests the end: it is for man to adjust his conduct if he wills to attain the end. But his obligations in the sphere of self-

¹² Ten Broeke, *The Moral Life and Religion*, p. 23.

expression are surpassed by the greater obligations of self-realization as a productive member of the social order in which he lives as a participant moral being. Thus the sense of moral obligation is cumulative. With the consciousness of wider relations the sense of obligation increases till one sees that its basis is different from that of our dependence on natural law. The higher may be implicit in the lower or earlier, and there certainly is no chasm between natural goodness and moral goodness. But moral obligation is normative, it yields the standard by which we judge, is universal or objective—the basis of values and principles on which we render intelligible our judgments of right and wrong. And yet obligation can not be forced. Obligation is recognized, and it may be accepted; it is a principle rather than a fact or element; it is interpretative rather than explanatory. To ask “why” it exists would be asking why any values come into being.

The answer to the typical question then, What makes all right acts right, and all wrong acts wrong: why *ought* I to obey the moral law? is to be found by arriving at a conception of goodness, with its claims upon the individual who becomes aware of its value.¹³ We *see into* the individual, intuitively realizing the unity of character and conduct. We see that moral integrity is essential to character, that conduct needs to become consistent. Virtue is essential to integrity and consistency. Hence, we sometimes summarize the whole moral situation by reference to a single virtue, such as sincerity, honesty, or justice, as the basis of all other virtues. The virtues, we realize, must belong together. Somehow there is a scale of excellence culminating in the life of complete self-realization. This unity of virtue implies law, and as we become aware of law we increase our sense of obligation.

Law and the Self.—This appears to be reasoning in a circle, and some have tried to break out of the circle by assuming some central or all-containing good, with an unconditional imperative assigned by man's own nature, dis-

¹³ Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

covered through the life of reason. There is a tendency however to make the sense of obligation too subjective, when we try to rationalize it as a law imposed by one part of the self on other parts. Martineau objects that the sense of authority which we set up for ourselves we could assuredly put down for ourselves.¹⁴ The sense of authority is not an egoistic peculiarity, affording no rational ground of expectation from others; rights and duties are reciprocal. One lone man in an atheistic world would have no sense of moral authority. For if the sense of authority means anything at all it means "discernment of something *higher than we*, having claims on our *self* . . . hovering over and transcending our personality, though also mingling with our consciousness and manifested through its intimations."¹⁵ Even in the absence of human companionship, we are "still held in the presence of One having moral affinity with us." Truly to retire into ourselves is to find that we are transported out of ourselves, and "placed beneath the light of a diviner countenance." The awareness of moral obligation then is more than part and parcel of myself: "it is the communion of God's guiding life and guiding love entering and abiding with an apprehensive capacity in myself." It is here then that we meet the objective authority which has its seat in eternal reality, and any man having this insight is discerning what is valid for all. One sees that it takes two to establish an obligation. Without the objective conditions the idea of duty would involve a contradiction.¹⁶ Nothing can be *binding* to us that is not higher than we, and to speak of one part of the self imposing an obligation on another part is to trifle with the real significance of our moral consciousness.

Inner Obligation.—The account which Martineau gives of this consciousness has never been surpassed. He makes it clear that conscience does not *frame* the law, it *reveals* it as holding us, discloses its reality. It is not our mere feeling or sentiment that yields the obligation. The reality

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

of duty is not contingent upon our apprehension of it. But because the law exists and is real, because there is duty and there is conscience our sentiments and reasons are in accord, have a permanent basis. Conscience yields the conditions under which we make the discovery. Conscience is supreme in its sphere. It gives awareness of a something which I *owe*, which is *due* from me, which I *ought* to do.¹⁷ There is within me an awareness of that which is binding, while externally there is opportunity to carry into expression what I have recognized as my duty. The inner obligation is more than a sense of outer constraint. But "the felt inner binding" on ourselves and "the enacted outer constraint" upon our fellows are "parallel and concurrent expressions of the same nature; neither is before nor after the other."¹⁸ We are not then simply reasoning in a circle, but making explicit a series of fundamental relations. The self as law-giver is typical, social, and representative of the moral solidarity of the race. Looking toward the past, the self sees the force of the maxims, rules, and precepts which have guided people in their emergence from custom into morality, and so our thought makes explicit the principle or universal implied all along. Looking toward God, the self finds the eternal Other or One which is the ground of all selves. Looking toward present society throughout the world, the self sees humanity in process of achieving reciprocity as an actual fact.

The Ultimate Basis.—To rest the implied moral obligation on God in the sense of mere might or mere will, would not be to find an adequate basis.¹⁹ God as ground of moral obligation is also intelligence or reason. We may say then that the ultimate basis of moral obligation is in the World-Ground or Universal Reason, however we may develop this conception. The significant consideration is that the reality which imposes the obligation is not alien to the self which recognizes it. The same Moral Reason is discover-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁹ See Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

able by all. Conscience is a universal. We discern it, not in precisely the same way that we come to admit the force of mathematical necessity, as dependent neither on the will of God nor on any book or any particular demonstration; but with an equally sure conviction in the region of our thought which yields awareness of values. The moral reason or principle of the existence in which we find ourselves is more akin to us than the mechanical necessity which science assumes as the basis of explanation of things in space and time. Indeed, there is a sense in which we intimately participate in the moral law, free as we are to accept it, also free to reject the given alternative which would put us more in accord with it.

Right.—Inadvertently, we identify rights, which are particular, with moral obligation or duty as universal; and so we arrive at the conclusion that rights are absolute. Hence the idea that the right is as fixed as mathematical law: it is absolutely right to tell the truth, do justice; absolutely wrong to steal, to lie, to slay. But we shall find increasing evidence that rights pertain to given social situations. In practice it is found extremely difficult to determine what the right is. The world is in quest of justice. We are learning what is truth. There is a difference between stealing as a conscious scheming pursuit, and stealing done by a mother, who, abandoned with her child, pilfers vegetables from gardens to sustain life. The world is still in process of deciding whether under any conditions it is right to kill. Is capital punishment wrong? Is war always wrong? Should a violently insane person be slain to save a person from being murdered? Is self-sacrifice absolutely right? To answer such questions we need a conception of the good which will enable us to see whether there is a gradation of rights. It is indeed absolutely right to do our duty, but what is our duty when there is a conflict of values, as in war-time? It is the good implied in the obligations we are under which gives right its claim upon the agent.²⁰ The rightness of an act consists in its value, and if there are greater and lesser

²⁰ See Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

rights it is because in goodness itself there is a gradation of values.

The Nature of Rights.—The membership we enjoy in the social or moral order involves rights granted to us, and rights which we should grant. Some of these rights are cared for under civil law, and society undertakes to enforce certain rights. But underneath all is the moral obligation which prompts us to do even more than what is conventionally right, and to further the process of discovering what the greater rights are which have not yet been included in civil law. It is for the sake of the general good that we possess rights in the moral sense of the term.²¹ Before we can say with the positiveness which society demands what are the rights of individuals, nations, and races whose status is still in dispute in the world, we need to grow in ethical knowledge of the social whole according to our conception of the good. Meanwhile, we have already come to certain conclusions regarding such rights as life, freedom, property, contract, and education.²² As civilization advances in moral reflectiveness the individual more emphatically claims the right to do what to him is his duty, even if, as a conscientious objector, he refuses to participate in slightest degree in war. But we find endless conflict of opinion regarding rights wherever the modern man has not yet made up his mind. We expect individuals with their conflicting views to conform for the public good. And so rights with their corresponding obligations have been defined as "specific forms of personal freedom with an ethical significance."²³ Rights may then become expressions of the obligation which we recognize as binding us to society: it is our right as well as our privilege to use our powers at their best for the welfare of society at its best.

Our rights are limited or organic. We are in process of learning them, while society too is learning. Right in a

²¹ See Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

²² Discussed by Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 314, foll. Dewey and Tufts trace the development of rights: *Ethics*, pp. 83, 151, 186.

²³ Ten Broeke, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

universal sense is identical with moral law and moral obligation. But rights are instrumental, and it is impossible to throw out of account the educational process through which we come to recognize rights, one by one.²⁴ Martineau suggests that among the various terms, such as dutifulness, rightness, it is best to choose the term "moral worth" as the most eligible; since this term is applicable with reference to gradations of value, relative intensities of excellence running through the whole system of motives.²⁵ There is proportionate worth among right things, and proportionate heinousness in what is wrong.²⁶ It is out of the question to draw absolute dividing lines. Our very nature suggests a graduated scale of actions. We may at times rebel at this situation, puzzled as we are to determine what we ought to do. We would like to be told what is right, and then do it. But moral obligation brings us face to face with the uncertainties which it is our privilege to resolve. Meanwhile, we may make use of Martineau's rule in so far as we are already able to put one alternative over against another as right or wrong, higher or lower: "every action is *right*, which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher: every action is *wrong*, which, in the presence of a higher principle, follows a lower."²⁷

The Absolute Element.—We are now in a position to see the force of the more modern answers given to the questions: Is there anything absolute about morality? For the moment the certainty of moral law and obligation seems to have gone. We are dreadfully sophisticated in these days of relativism, amid skepticism bred by the war, decay of authority, loss of faith in the absoluteness of revelation. But the element of the ideal has not lost its reality or power. The absoluteness is no longer attributed to a code, system of rules, or group of formulas. The decisive power is in the persistent life and what it produces. In this moral spirit persisting through all changes there is a

²⁴ On rights and obligations, see Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, p. 440, foll.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 270.

far surer basis of moral obligation than in any crystallized system. The absolute is progressively attained through the relative, as we approach nearer the perfect scientific truth about the universe. Consciousness of this element yields a vitalizing realization. My whole selfhood may then be called into activity in its behalf. I now discern the truth that morality is absolutely essential to the fullness of life which I am eager to attain. The moral law is the principle or constant which persists through all types, implied in all efforts at generalization.

The objection that, if revealed authority is questioned there will then be as many laws as persons, each with his idea of "right" or truth, is readily met by the realization that morality as an end in itself is one of the eternal values. We do not underestimate mathematical truth when we learn that each man must demonstrate it for himself, that its authority is not dependent on book, teacher, or any other consideration; it still holds true of the universe in all the totality of quantitative conceptions, the order, the balance, the law of the nature of things, yes, of the Ground of the universe conceived under "the aspect of eternity." This holds true of the eternal values implying quality rather than quantity. These values are not psychological, not created by the processes of thought and experience wherethrough they are discovered, but are discerned intuitively as archetypes of thought. What we contribute is the conduct which manifests the moral ideal and draws nearer the perfect type. That there is a right, a good, a moral law, and that we owe unqualified allegiance to it, is indeed a remarkably persistent human conviction. Wherein we differ is in our progress toward it by means of rights, various ideas of the good, different formulations. These are relative to the given moral situation. And so the account given above of moral obligation will remain incomplete until we have considered the nature of goodness, duty, and conscience in Part Two. The whole ethical structure is organic. The relativity is a question of the dependence of its parts. The real revelation is the discovery of this surpassing truth of mutual dependence.

Questions.—What do we need to know about a man to judge him righteously?

Does history explain uncharitableness, intolerance, race-hatred, and prejudice?

What kind of human nature is most desirable? What types of men should prevail more and more? How should human nature be remade by forces now within our power?

Is it ever right to lie? Is there a higher or greater good than that of a given precept? Should every law be upheld? Is a moral precept right because included in a moral code? Why should we obey the Ten Commandments?

To what extent are our present moral ideals of Greek rather than of Christian origin?

Is it a duty to sustain a religious creed although we make mental reservations when repeating it as a mere "value for worship"?

Should one person in a group "tell" on another when the authorities are seeking a culprit?

Is capital punishment wrong?

What is the best argument against war?

Is moral obligation disclosed to the individual by conscience as an "inner voice," by intuition as "infallible," or by reason?

Does any moral code exist which is superior in all respects to any other?

Is a deed guaranteed as right or good because it involves self-sacrifice?

Comment on the proposition: "The principles of true politics are but those of morals enlarged."

Is conscience a hard taskmaster?

Is there a complete "moral equivalent for war"?

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PART TWO

GOODNESS AND FREEDOM

CHAPTER VIII

PLEASURE AS THE GOOD

Ethical Types.—When, with Aristotle, we say that every activity aims at some good, and that the good in general is the end at which all things aim, we find that there are various approaches to a conception of this greatest good. If emphasis is put on the desires, the good is regarded in terms of sensibility. To start with will as the decisive element is to find the clue in the good will. When reason is taken to be paramount, the conception of goodness turns upon reason as the form of unity which brings the desires into subjection. Again, the clue may be found in intuition, or conscience. The good may seem to consist in the end to be sought rather than in values attainable along the way, or it may be identified with present values. Or, the good may be sought through a unifying view with emphasis on personality; hence the good may be said to consist in self-realization or perfection.

Classification of Theories.—The various theories of the good have been classified with reference to (1) content and (2) form; as (1) teleological (emphasis on *end*) and (2) jural (from *jus*, law);¹ again, as (1) teleological and (2) formalistic.² Warner Fite narrows the theories down to (1) hedonism (from Hedone, pleasure), the pleasure-theory which ignores ideal considerations, and seeks conformity

¹ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 224.

² F. Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*, tr. by F. Thilly, p. 222.

with conditions; and (2) idealism, which urges us to ignore the conditions and devote ourselves to the pursuit of ideal ends.³

The classification we shall adopt draws distinctions between (1) *realistic* or naturalistic theories; under this head belong all conceptions of the good which take man to be primarily sentient, or try to interpret the higher by the lower, including hedonism, utilitarianism, and various empirical or evolutionary theories; and (2) *idealistic* theories, including (a) views which put emphasis on a single principle—reason, intuition, conscience, moral law, the good will, and (b) synthetic conceptions of the good, such as the ethics of self-realization. The distinction is chiefly a matter of convenience, for later realistic theories tend towards rationalism, while idealists assimilate the truth of realism.

Prevailing Attitudes.—The significant fact is that there are two prevailing types which appear and reappear during the whole history of ethics. The one is concerned with activities close at hand, and often lacks vision; the other, assimilating the wisdom of experience, yields a vision of ends to be striven for, and seeks virtue by aid of will and reason. External conditions appear at times paramount; again, the end or ideal in view becomes more prominent. Each of us tends naturally to adopt one of these attitudes, but inquiry may convince us that neither is complete. Hence the problem of ethical theory is to find a reconciling view, although in relation to daily life we may still tend to be either realists or idealists, as we are in our other interests, for example, in economics, politics, literature, art, science, even in our religion.

If, as Dewey and Tufts suggest, there is a common error running through these types of ethical theory, it is due to defective psychology, to the splitting of a voluntary act into two unrelated parts known as “inner” and “outer” when, in reality, a voluntary act should be described in its process of “*passing into an overt act.*”⁴ There is no mere

³ *An Introductory Study of Ethics*, 1903, p. 324.

⁴ *Ethics*, p. 237.

motive and no mere consequence. The moral quality of an act lies in the relation of inner-outer, the one earlier and the other later. It is because of the abstraction of "inner" from "outer" that so much time has been devoted to the mere formulation of the good, as if it were sufficient to have the *idea* of the *summum bonum* without the life. The good should inspire, there should be an art of goodness whereby the individual verifies the theory. If in our quest for the greatest good we conclude that it is pleasure, the ensuing conduct should involve exclusion of other goods save as means to this one. But practice is likely to be the corrective of theory and to show that what we implicitly aim at is satisfaction of all sides of our nature. There is no argument in favor of a reconciling view so effective as the actual history of attempts to define the good as mere sentiency or as mere reason.

Pleasure-seeking.—It has long been customary for idealists to contend that pleasure is not the good, and the objections are so familiar that it seems hardly worth while to summarize them. But in actual life the masses have continued to pursue pleasure as if nothing adverse had ever been said. Every now and then an epoch has appeared in which love of pleasure has reigned above other motives. New devices have been invented to foster pleasure-seeking ever since the dawn of mechanical discoveries. Epochs of misery, as in war-time, are followed by reactions in favor of pleasure. New arguments for pleasure as the good follow hard upon the latest refutation. There must be a profound reason for this persistence. The arguments are indeed of perennial value. The study of the question is in reality a study of human nature. It is still a problem for most of us to assign pleasure to its proper place in the scale, to determine the relation of pleasure to happiness, and to know how to limit our sensibility in general without curbing our desires too much.

The Scope of Pleasure.—No very acute observation is needed to show that the majority of people live in the realm of vague feelings, with an inter-play of highly contrasted emotions, and surging desires of varied sorts. It

is natural that our desires should find recognition in the view that pleasure is the good. The first evidence is found in the fact that as children of nature we desire pleasure and seek pleasurable objects, and avoid pain. Many of our choices as the hours and days pass are made on this basis. Pleasure is the implicit end for which we strive in many activities not yet self-conscious, and we are confessedly eager to complete our tasks as soon as possible that we may resume the round of pleasures for which we seem chiefly to exist. It does not follow that because we thus seek pleasure therefore we *ought* to seek it by identifying it with the good. But tacitly our thought of the good is greatly influenced by what we do, and by what we find our fellowmen doing.

Man seeks self-satisfaction, and in all experiences yielding satisfaction pleasure is unmistakably present. There is an urge which prompts us to attain such satisfaction. We are happiest when responding in some way to this prompting, notably in the case of creative work. It is natural to infer that as pleasure is the sign of satisfaction, pleasure as the object of all our desires is the good. Again, realizing that we take pleasure even in the idea of pleasure, we assume that (1) taking pleasure in an idea, (2) desiring a thing and (3) finding it pleasant are one and the same. Convinced that we must attain satisfaction in order to achieve goodness, we once more identify the idea with the experience, finding pleasure to be the test. Escape from the pains of remorse or shame, from undesirable experiences in general, has seemed to many to be the same as taking pleasure in doing good. We may indeed pretend that we do good from love of humanity, but self-interest is the lurking motive, and where self-interest lurks there is love of pleasure. Pleasure is not only the sign of bodily well-being and mental health, but consciousness at its height in any direction is experience of pleasure. Indeed, we resort to all devices to increase this experience. The pleasure we take in eating, for example, is typical, and we know that matters are never quite right with us unless we take pleasure in what we are doing. We not

only seek contentment as a general state or quality but expect occasional "thrills" to make assurance doubly sure. The art of life seems to resolve itself into increasing our ability to procure pleasure, to keep strong our zest, prolong our thrills, and supplement our natural powers by the aid of manifold inventions calculated to multiply and intensify our pleasures.

Characteristics of Pleasure.—Pleasure involves various contrasts to be reckoned with, before we declare that it is eligible. As contrasted with knowledge or science, pleasure is my own, and only indirectly am I able to indicate what I really feel when witnessing an absorbing play, for instance, or reading a thrilling story. If I doubted the possibility of objective knowledge, I should still be sure of my feelings as pleasurable. We remark that "there is no accounting for tastes," noting how personal are the preferences which involve pleasure. As with love, to know it you must feel it. Yet because pleasure is personal, it involves the peculiarities of the whole subjective life. It is often elusive, hollow, evanescent, disappointing. Again, because personal, it is likely to become intense by running into excessive emotions and passing over into pain. Trying to possess it to the full, avoiding pains, we find ourselves meeting defeat; having paid a great price. We rest after a round of pleasures, to launch forth on another round. A part of the scheme of life consists in pursuing pleasure to escape not alone from ennui but from thought, and pleasure-seeking is the favorite device of the disappointed or unsuccessful. (Pleasure is far too often at the expense of others. It readily runs into malicious delight, and as easily passes over into selfishness. How then shall pleasure be the test of goodness?

Pleasure and Pain.—Thrown back in disappointment, we may be forced to admit that pleasure as a positive reality is indeed elusive, and that what we mean is absence from pain. Hence we try to make ourselves as comfortable as possible under the circumstances. But pleasure is persistently connected with its opposite. It seems to be mixed with annoyances however skillfully we adjust our-

selves. Tedious delays and disturbing conditions beset us, as in foreign travel, and our best conceived plans fall short of anticipations. Then too people are so stupid, unintelligent, slow; or so baffling, perverse, obstinate. We never seem sure that the pleasures will exceed the pains. We elect certain activities, such as mountain-climbing, or the severer athletic contests, only in case we think the hardships may be minimized. We remember that what stays with us is the pleasure, for instance, in the case of a vacation or a social affair, mainly dull at the time; and so we keep on doing things in which pleasure may predominate. Then, too, we aid one another to soften down the tribulations, forget the pains, idealize the past, and substitute pleasant ideas of remembered past experiences. In reality we put up with admixtures of pleasure and pain, unable as we are either to plan life without results we would have avoided, or wholly to displace unpleasant memories by present ideas of pleasure interspersed as substitutes.

It is out of the question to determine the precise difference between pleasure and pain by looking within. Pleasures wane when we try to seize their essence. Pains increase with attention. The two are known by contrast, come together, persist in memory together, so that what we actually experience is the feeling known as pleasure-pain. It might seem possible to distinguish the pleasure element of the compound as "good," the pain as "bad." But pain is not necessarily a sign of what is evil or bad. It is often a sign of some bodily process needing attention. Increase of pain accompanies our persistence in disregarding nature's promptings, and so our prudence increases as we learn the meaning of pain. Pain teaches us to avoid excess. What we seek is a balance between the extremes of pleasure and pain by wise adaptation to nature's conditions, that we may preserve our health, maintain our sanity. When enjoyment runs into rapture or ecstasy it readily gives way to pain. Even what we call spiritual enjoyment may pass into sensuous excess. We seek conditions which we hope are likely to be free from misery, torment, agony. We tolerate conditions if we ex-

pect to be measurably comfortable. So we pass insensibly from attempted analyses of pleasure and pain to the consideration of values which we hope to attain by wiser adjustment. This is a tacit confession of disappointment in the effort to separate pleasure from pain and make it the criterion.

Simple Hedonism.—The attempt to make pleasure the good is more clearly understood by disengaging our thought as far as possible from the complexities and enticements of modern life, and trying out the theory in simpler forms. Among the Greeks, just after the time of Socrates, the pleasure-theory appeared in the form commonly known as Hedonism, the theory that pleasure (*Hedone*) is the end or good which human beings normally seek. One would expect that among the Greeks, lovers of the beautiful in sense-forms as they were, this doctrine would appear, and that it would be in a measure idealistic, not the materialism of those who avowedly desire only sensuous delights.⁵ Indeed, Socrates had already put a measure of emphasis on pleasure and utility in his conception of the good. Aristippus, of Cyrene, leader of these early hedonists, meant by pleasure that of the individual; since the individual knows only the impressions produced on himself. Bodily pleasures, being most intense, might have afforded the clue. But Aristippus gave recognition to mental pleasures, also to the fact that pleasures are transitory and must be realized in successive experiences. The pleasures compatible with self-command amid the enticements of sense, the tendencies to immoderate indulgence, are those which the wise man seeks; for a man should possess, not be possessed by pleasure. Some pleasures are to be rejected because of painful consequences, and the goal is the attainment of lasting joys, a state of moral content.

Later Forms of Hedonism.—The difficulty in the formulation of this theory is in avoiding distinctions between kinds of pleasure, the pleasures of the moment and those that endure. If mental pleasures, such as friendship,

⁵ Cf. F. A. Lange, *History of Materialism*, tr. by E. C. Thomas, 1892, Vol. I, p. 44.

paternal and filial love, art, and literature, are to be preferred to fleeting sensuous pleasures; and if a permanent state of satisfaction is to be attained through wisdom or control only, then the good would seem to be definable in rationalistic terms. There was conflict in the Cyrenaic school between a plea for the pleasure of the moment and the argument for permanent pleasure or happiness. With the teaching of Hegesias (the "persuader to die,") the doctrine passed over into pessimism; since life was said to yield more pain than pleasure, unalloyed happiness is a dream, and the end of life can not be realized.⁶

This pessimistic conclusion, however, despite its force, was not the end of the matter; for the effort to identify pleasure with the good reappeared in the theory of Epicurus that pleasure as the highest good or goal of existence is not the pleasure of passing sensations but that of a permanent state of peace and contentment, not that of the flesh but of the mind. There must then be a way to avoid excess, lest pleasure run into its opposite; and we should not exclude painful operations which lead to health and pleasure as results. The good as happiness therefore includes tact or prudence by which the wise man is to attain his end. Epicureanism thus became a philosophy of life and continued through ages as a typical point of view. It was associated historically with an ideal of friendship in a philosophic community, and is not to be judged by the voluptuousness of its later expression in Rome.

Objections to Hedonism.—It has been objected that as pure pleasure is seldom if ever found, pleasure can not be the standard. The nearest approach to pure pleasure is in some pleasure of the moment; one minute being more full of pleasure than another, intensity of pleasure seems to be the test, and bodily are obviously more intense than mental pleasures. But intellectual pleasures may last longer, and as life advances pleasures of the body wane. Knowledge that all men desire pleasure is of no avail unless we know what things will give pleasure to this

⁶ A. Weber, *History of Philosophy*, tr. by F. Thilly, 5th ed., 1902, p. 72.

or that individual.⁷ What gives pleasure to one does not to another. Every choice may be pleasant, but this does not prove that it is a choice of pleasure. There is a difference between (1) taking pleasure in an idea, and (2) actual experience anticipated and aimed at as pleasure. From the fact that there is an element of pleasure in all self-satisfaction it would be an erroneous inference that pleasure is the only object of desire. The satisfaction comes amidst various conditions, and pleasure is an accompaniment of these. Other things besides pleasure have been both desired and striven for. The fact that pleasure is an accompaniment or sign is no proof that pleasure constitutes the end sought. When satisfaction results some universe of desire has been preferred to others, and in the reasons for preferring this group of desires as higher the real reason is found.⁸ While the hedonist does indeed strive to attain pure pleasure (as the absence of pain) on the assumption that all pleasures are alike in kind and differ only in intensity or degree, he immediately qualifies in favor of the pleasure of the moment, of the body, of the mind, of states selected because they endure longer, of the greater or higher good, and so his theory undergoes changes as it passes from the egoistic to the universalistic form. In brief, pleasure as a test is inseparable from other values, and so it becomes a question of elements other than those of our sensibility through which the satisfaction of our desires is to be obtained.⁹

Hedonistic Calculus.—Partisans of pleasure as the good have long sought to find a calculus of pleasures. The difficulties are already apparent from what we have said about the elusive character of pleasure and its intimate relationship with pain. To try to adopt such a calculus it would be necessary to ignore differences of kind, and insist, with Bentham, that pleasures differ only in intensity and

⁷ Cf. G. S. Fullerton, *A Handbook of Ethical Theory*, 1922, p. 116.

⁸ See T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 3d ed., pp. 165, 232.

⁹ See objections by J. S. Mackenzie, *A Manual of Ethics*, 4th ed., 1901, p. 208, foll.; J. Seth, *Ethical Principles*, 4th ed., 1898, pp. 63, 83, foll.

duration.¹⁰ We would then seek out pleasures that are "intense, long, speedy, certain, fruitful, pure." But granted that some pleasures are clung to because intense or long, it is clear that only in retrospect are we able to discern pleasures which we then take to have been "fruitful" or "pure." But the purity would remain a value assigned to pleasure because of its quality, not a matter of precise judgment quantitatively to be compared with other pleasures and as precisely contrasted with pains. We estimate neither pains nor pleasures apart from their qualities. Even when we try to compare pleasures of the body with pleasures of the mind, we find it impossible to hold to questions of quantity; for there are higher and lower pleasures of both mind and body, and when we select pleasures from one group or the other we choose them because *on the whole* those selected accord with our preferences. We do not judge by units of pleasure, or reject an experience because of so many units of pain. Pleasures group themselves, but their sum is not precise. Nor does it follow that the summation of pleasures is the equivalent of pleasure as such generalized as the greatest good. There is then no quantitative way to decide the issues, although duration and intensity enter into judgments in relation with the far more significant questions of quality. Pleasures are declared eligible, not because they can be measured or defined, but because we appreciate their worth in various connections.

The Calculus Defended.—Despite repeated objections to the idea of a calculus, the notion has persisted, as in Rashdall's critique.¹¹ Rashdall finds the truth in simple hedonism to be (1) the fact that the gratification of every desire necessarily gives pleasure, hence is conceived of as pleasant *in idea* before the desire is accomplished, and (2) this pictured pleasantness of the gratification of a desire greatly adds to its strength.¹² Critics of hedonism admit that pleasure is *a* good, a possible object of desire, that there

¹⁰ See L. A. Selby-Bigge, *British Moralists*, 1897, Vol. I, pp. 349, 356.

¹¹ H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, 1907, Vol. II, Chap. I.

¹² *Op cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 31, 33.

are disinterested desires; it is not true that *all* pleasure arises from satisfaction of desire for something else: every pleasure has a content, and it is legitimate to desire the content merely on account of its pleasantness.¹³ The objection that we can not *enjoy* a sum of pleasures does not hold; for all pleasure is in *time*, and if we could not enjoy pleasure without having it all at once no pleasure could be enjoyed at all. All that the argument requires is that one whole state of consciousness may be pronounced more pleasant than another, that the total pleasure is made up of successive moments; and that a certain degree of intensity is judged equivalent to a certain duration. It is psychologically possible then to compare various lots of pleasure, to say which is the greatest with regard to duration and intensity; it is intelligible to aim at the greatest pleasure on the whole.

Still Rashdall's argument passes beyond hedonism, with the admission that pleasure is *a* good rather than *the* good,¹⁴ and so the discussion turns to a study of "the commensurability of all values,"¹⁵ on the ground that other goods—intellectual cultivation and activity, æsthetic cultivation, emotions of various kinds—are of more intrinsic value. Pleasure remains as one element of consciousness to which we can assign ultimate value, although we may not attach value *in proportion* to pleasantness. It then becomes a question how to choose between different goods.

Pleasure and Happiness.—Unable to maintain that pleasure is simply pleasure, always of the same kind, the hedonist modifies his terminology by identifying pleasure with happiness, sometimes regarded as the more dignified term. Happiness is said to refer to the whole experience, while pleasure is particular; and so Bentham's phrase is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Happiness is also classified as permanent, pleasure as transient; Paley calls it a state, and pleasure a feeling; while Janet holds that happiness is the organization of pleasures.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 7, foll.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Book II, Chap. II.

Pleasure is said to relate to the sensuous, in contrast with happiness as more interior, dependent on what is nearest the self, for example, the family and its welfare; and so happiness has been described as personal feeling plus an objective basis or social ground. Happiness ranges up and down the scale of experience, and is not easily placed; it is the end to be sought, pleasure being incidental. Or, more generally speaking, happiness is an end, *a* good.

The question then is, Is pleasure the test of conduct which aims at happiness? Is there any way to attain the permanent state by choosing the various transitory pleasures said to be incidental to it? The difficulty is as great as before, for while pleasure may be a sign of a normal process making toward the good, the repetition of the process because it was pleasurable may not mean that the experience is equally beneficial. Pleasure is not established as the criterion, because exercise of a function brought pleasure. This does not appear to have been the test in primitive life. Pleasure-loving comes in with civilization, and its increase involves excess rather than that moderation of life which makes for happiness. The pursuit of happiness as a good has meant a departure from pleasure as the test and adoption of the wise man's ideal, instead.

Another qualification has also entered in, namely, the change from egoistic hedonism to universalistic. Thus according to Bentham each man is to count for one only, it is the greatest pleasure *of all* that is to be sought; and instead of seeking pleasure for one's self one should give pleasure to others. The greatest happiness of the greatest number therefore means giving up personal pleasure in response to an altruistic motive. And so hedonism passes from the fact that man does pursue pleasure to the affirmation that he *ought* to aim at pleasure.

Happiness as the Test.—Critics have pointed out however that if the happiness of others is to be made the test we would still need a calculus of pleasures to make sure that a certain act will give greater pleasure than other deeds with which it is to be compared. We lack the objective standard by which pleasures and pains can be gradu-

ated as we would contrast heat and cold. The conditions under which an experience occurs are essential to it and inseparable from it, and at best we can merely compare the *memory* of a past experience with a present experience at present. To make the comparison precise we would need to make allowances for the romantic glow which gathers about past experiences, and re-estimate the pains which have lessened with time. Even then it is impossible to put one's self back into the same conditions. Comparing notes with other people, we find that their experiences seem no less variable, in the case, for instance, of experiences in foreign lands or service at home, where so very much depends on the attitude toward the given conditions, the work to be done, the associates with whom one works. It seems impossible that pleasure shall be the standard by which to make the decisive comparison. Experience shows that we are more likely to win pleasure while aiming at something else. Indeed, we must not only forget self but forget pleasure, and aim at the sort of welfare for others which may bring happiness as an accompaniment; since the direct pursuit of happiness is likely to end in disappointment.

Happiness as a Motive.—We conclude then that pleasure is not the prompter, and happiness is not the exclusive goal of human action making toward the good. What discloses itself originally is an activity manifesting various tendencies, as in case of the infant throwing its arms and legs about, the child manifesting curiosity, the youth showing signs of inventiveness. The creative instinct begins to function prior to the pleasure taken in its activity and development. In general, man begins life on the instinctive level, pleasure becomes associated with certain functions *after a time*, and pleasure is one of various associates which influence function, as indeed desire for pleasure is one of various desires effective in leading toward action. The satisfaction of desire accompanies successful efforts in behalf of knowledge and other ends pursued with increasing interest as life advances, but these ends are sought for their own sake or for what they will bring, not alone for

the satisfaction which hedonists identify with pleasure. Again, the admission of an altruistic motive in the quest for the happiness of the greatest number implies the enlargement of the whole sphere of interests in the welfare of others; hence pity, sympathy, kindness, love of service enter into the account, also disinterestedness. The altruistic motive once admitted, there is no road back to the position that pursuit of pleasure is the real motive. The presence of an element of personal satisfaction in service for others is not proof that this was the predominant motive. Experience shows that we can not have the satisfactions of service unless we actually serve. The true hero is not the one who goes forth in quest of glory, but the one who, forgetting all else, gives himself to the deed to be wrought.

The Element of Satisfaction.—So too in any field where success comes, in the fine arts, in business, in teaching, varied aims find expression in downright effort, no one of these aims being entirely separable from the others, no aim being complete. It is these aims working together which lead to satisfaction. The life which yields satisfaction realizes the larger self, and the resulting happiness is a sign, not because it fulfills the pleasures experienced along the way, but because the self-realization is many-sided. If then by self-realization we mean the concrete and harmonious expression of all the eligible sides of our nature, we may assign to pleasure, not a precise place in the scale, but the place attributable to an added element, not directly sought, not directly pursued, sometimes thought of, again forgotten, but appearing and re-appearing as an accompaniment. In this progress toward satisfaction, no aim, such as truth, is complete in itself, but all belong together in what we call an ideal. One aim, such as truth or service, may be central, and this we call by the term "purpose" to dignify it in contrast with allied or contributory aims.

Signs of Well-being.—In such a relationship pleasure is plainly contributory, while happiness is a sign of the harmony between the various aims and activities through which the moral purpose is realized. The pleasure experi-

enced by the man who is doing well the work he can best do in the world, such as teaching, adds to the effectiveness of his work day by day; and absence of pleasure is an indication that adjustment to life is not complete. Happiness becomes a permanent possession crowning life month by month and year by year as evidence that the various activities allied with the central aim or purpose is the right one. It is a sign of "the dance of life," the preservation of freedom of spirit. In this sense it is not only highly desirable but a necessity, a direct sign that one is making progress toward fullness of life. Hence we use the term "joy" as a test in the last analysis: unless a man finds joy in his work he is not giving his best. Joy surpasses all calculation. It comes as pure gift, full measure running over. It is quiet, deeply interior, yielding inspiration even when outwardly life is disappointing and the conditions of life hard in the extreme.

Need of a Scale.—Pleasure, then is *a* good, a good "in relation to," good *for* the results to which it contributes; as a sign, indicating physical and mental health; as a function productive in coöperation with other functions; and as in part a value in itself, for instance, in the pleasures of relaxation or pure recreation. Happiness is no mere sum of pleasures, but is the higher term, signifying pleasures which have undergone the test and are attainable when not directly pursued. While then there is no calculus of pleasures, there is an art of life involving the cultivation of favoring conditions. Just what the essentials are is a matter of opinion. But they are commonly said to include (1) a means of livelihood, (2) friends, (3) a home, (4) a fair degree of health, (5) occasional rest, recreation or change, (6) increasing knowledge or skill, (7) opportunities to serve or opportunities for self-expression corresponding to the state of development. While the study of pleasure might lead to pessimism, as indeed pleasure-loving often leads to misery, knowledge of the constituents of happiness may lead to optimism. Pleasure is apt to be mere appearance, while happiness is reality. Pleasure is purely relative, and although happiness is not absolute it

may be constant: it involves a triumphant attitude. Our working faith generates optimism despite appearances which dishearten. In terms of faith as in behalf of service for others we throw ourselves into our work, and so the interest we take, is once more a sign. Devotion to a purpose means subordination of pleasures, especially those that are intense and exhausting; hence a scale of values is imperative.

Questions.—To what extent is love of pleasure the same as selfishness?

What is the chief reason why the belief that pleasure is the good appears and reappears throughout history?

Does love of pleasure invariably decrease with the development of the intellectual life?

What practical inference is to be drawn in behalf of the art of life, from the conclusions that desires tend toward excess, that pleasures run into pain, and that happiness is at best a sign of well-being, not the sole standard?

What light is thrown on prudence, self-control, temperance (as a virtue), and wisdom (as a test of virtue)?

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CHAPTER IX

UTILITARIANISM AND EVOLUTION

Utility as the Good.—It is significant that in the later development of the doctrine that pleasure is the good the theory is constantly undergoing change. Hedonism in its simple form is sometimes called psychological hedonism, to distinguish it from ethical hedonism, the theory that pleasure ought to be pursued as the good. Ethical hedonism, emphasizing the pleasure or happiness of others (universalistic hedonism) is usually known as Utilitarianism, the theory that utility rather than sympathy, or any other test that might be used is the test of the good. As applied by Bentham, this term is the equivalent of “the greatest happiness principle.” The title of Bentham’s chief work, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*,¹ is in itself significant. Bentham does not find in the promptings to happiness within the individual a sufficient incentive. Consequently he turns to various objective or social considerations, and seeks to enforce the happiness principle by appeal to various sanctions—physical, political, moral or popular, and religious—which bring pressure to bear upon the individual, that his conduct may be won over to the general good.²

Mill’s Doctrine.—John Stuart Mill, with whose name utilitarianism is more directly associated, adopted Bentham’s conception of happiness and developed it still further in the social direction. The good, he maintained, can not be proved good, but is admitted to be so, and what is needed is a comprehensive formula: happiness is the only thing desirable as an end, that is, pleasure, with exemption from pain; the useful, including the agreeable.³ Actions

¹ 1780. See Selby-Bigge, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 349, for selections.

² Cf. Everett, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

³ *Utilitarianism*, 1863, p. 9.

are *right* in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, *wrong* in so far as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. Mill is quite ready to admit that the pleasures of the intellect, the feelings, and the imagination are higher in value; he also admits that there are *kinds* of pleasure, quality as well as quantity, the standard being the competent judgments of those well formed. Mill finds that people really prefer the higher pleasures, despite their susceptibility to the lower. Since the end to be pursued is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the happiness of all concerned, and this in the greatest amount, there is need of the impartiality of the disinterested observer: the Golden Rule expresses the principle of utility. To do to others as you would have them do to you, and to love your neighbor as yourself is to realize the ideal of utilitarian morality. For each person's happiness is to count for as much as another's, and our *social* nature is the ultimate sanction of the good. The individual is subject to both external and internal sanctions. The internal sanction is feeling, that is, conscience, which involves a shrinking from wrong action, and is supported by the conscientious feelings of mankind in general: conscience binds those who have these feelings, and conscience is as binding as if the basis of morality were some superior order of reality.

Social Utility.—Great emphasis belongs on "the feeling of unity with our fellow-creatures." Utility involves justice, keeping faith, impartiality, equality; and duty differentiates justice, morality, or worthiness from expediency.⁴ Justice is derived from the social, sympathetic promptings of mankind; it implies a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. To have "a right" means that society must guarantee it, general utility being the reason. Social utility then is more fundamental than justice. Yet justice remains the name for the most important social utilities, those which are more absolute or imperative, guarded as they are by a sentiment different both in kind and degree.

Objections to Mill's Doctrine.—In thus passing almost

⁴ See *op. cit.*, Chap. V.

unwittingly from the consideration of pleasure as an individual experience to matters of general utility, justice, and the Golden Rule, Mill surrenders the utilitarian principle. He (1) admits quality as well as quantity of pleasure, and so gives up the traditional assumption that pleasure is simply pleasure, and is all of one sort; (2) puts justice in a superior position as essential to social utility; (3) argues for happiness so as to show at best that happiness is a constituent, not the essence of the good; (4) makes a leap from each person's desire for happiness to that of the greatest happiness of all; (5) appeals to the fact that men *desire* happiness, that will is produced by desire, that virtue *becomes* an end, moral feelings are acquired, justice is derived by social experience; but offers no central principle of moral obligation; (6) his idea of the self passes beyond utilitarianism to a conception of conscience as the binding principle. To unify the principles which Mill introduces would be to *start* with the conception of man as social, possessing conscience, seeking happiness as well as justice; and to see that man's progress depends, not on desire for pleasure, but on desire for action, which later yields desire for happiness. The sum of pleasures might have remained the same for centuries, and yet there may have been moral advancement.⁵ What is needed is a conception of appropriate objects of activity through which self-realization is to be attained, a conception which includes Mill's constructive results.

Evolutionary Hedonism.—Mill partly anticipated the evolutionary view of morality as derived from social experience, from the sympathetic instincts of the race. Herbert Spencer undertook to explain the whole fact of man's moral conduct by appeal to the evolution of conduct in general from simple to complex.⁶ Conduct, conceived as a whole, is defined as "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; it gains moral sanction as

⁵ For other criticisms, see J. Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, 1885, p. 164; J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 325.

⁶ *Data of Ethics*, 1879.

the activities become less militant, more industrial, with a view to coöperation and mutual aid. Man's other-regarding desires usually need moral enforcement. The test is this: man's conduct is good if its total effects are pleasurable, if it is conducive to life; the ultimate test of perfection itself would be conduciveness to happiness. Moral principles must conform to physical necessities. Evolution in conduct is toward a balance of internal actions in the face of external forces tending to overthrow it; in the moral life this balance approaches most nearly to completeness. But the individual can not advance beyond society; complete life in a complete society would mean complete equilibrium between the coördinated activities. Biologically, this moving equilibrium is balance of functions: every pleasure increases vitality, every pain decreases it. Psychologically, it is a question of complexes of feeling; sensations are often to be obeyed rather than sentiments; the lower promptings are not always inferior. The essential trait in moral consciousness is the control of feelings by feelings; obligation arises with the notion of restraint: lower restraints come first, to make possible the moral intuitions which result from accumulated experience or utility, gradually organized and inherited. The sentiment of duty is generated through the compounding of feelings, the idea of authority, and the element of coerciveness. The social organism ranks higher than its units. The universal basis of coöperation is the proportioning of benefits received to services rendered, sympathy being the root of both justice and benevolence. Egoism is prior to altruism, and must take precedence over it: the pursuit of individual happiness is the first requisite to attainment of the greatest general happiness. But altruism has been essential from the start, and self-sacrifice is no less primordial than self-preservation, and altruism grows with social evolution.

Criticism of Spencer's Ethics.—In Spencer's doctrine the pleasure-theory finds support in the philosophy of evolution, and evolutionary hedonism in various forms has persisted as an ethical type since Spencer's time. The general objection is that made respecting any theory which under-

takes to judge the higher by the lower, internal conduct by external behavior, mental life by pleasure biologically interpreted, with pain identified with evil, and pleasure uncritically accepted as the test of goodness. No adequate basis of union between the individual and society is proposed. Spencer's hedonism is open to the same objections which we have already considered. His other ethical principles, such as justice, point forward to a higher type of theory than his evolutionism is able to supply.⁷

The Organic View.—Leslie Stephen develops essentially the same point of view by contributing a conception of society as an organic growth, a whole whose laws can be studied, morality being a product of the social factor.⁸ The individual is said to be moralized through his identification with the social organism; the conditions of the security of morality are the conditions of the persistence of society. Stephen's theory is a modified universalistic hedonism in terms of the inner life, and an internal moral law, which in the last analysis relates to the moral agent, to the character which conforms to a certain type. This view enables him to approximate the truths of ethical idealism. Emphasis falls on feeling, however, not on reason: it is feeling which is said to determine conduct. This feeling is not due to a judgment, but is a simple unanalyzable fact. Love and hate, desire and aversion are said to determine our conduct as physical forces determine the movements of a body. The subjective unity of sentiment corresponds to the objective unity of organization. The painfulness of a state is a sufficient, ultimate and sole reason for avoiding it.⁹ Social motives represent the survival of an instinct determined by its utility.¹⁰ The development of society as an organism implies *custom* in the race, *habit* in the individual. Morality represents the sum of the preservative instincts of a society. Sympathy is not an additional instinct, but it is implied in the structure of knowl-

⁷ For other objections, see Royce, *op. cit.*, pp. 70, 177; Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

⁸ *The Science of Ethics*, 1882.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

edge: to know that a man has certain feelings is to have representative feelings not equal in intensity but identical in kind. Sympathy and reason have so far an identical factor, each implies the other.¹¹ Conscience means the pain felt by the wrong-doer, or the sensibility implied by that pain, and is neither a distinct emotion nor a purely intellectual judgment.¹² As the moral law is, in brief, conformity to the conditions of social welfare, conscience is the name of the intrinsic motives to such conformity, the utterance of the public spirit of the race.¹³ No hedonistic calculus is possible or necessary. The utilitarianism of the past failed because it took on an external view of morality, judged from consequences exclusively, without regard to the motives of the agent.

For Stephen a law becomes truly moral when it takes an internal form. While utilitarianism denied the possibility of virtue for its own sake, Stephen holds that in a sense there is no other real virtue. The moral law then is to be stated unconditionally in the form *Be this*, not in the form *Do this*. Morality is essentially a determination of character.¹⁴ Stephen advances still further toward an idealistic position by maintaining that there are times for self-sacrifice when one must choose between happiness and duty; hence happiness and duty do not coincide. There is indeed no absolute coincidence between virtue and happiness. Stephen is quite willing to admit the unsolved problems of this position. In his treatise happiness as the test gives way to the health of the social organism or social tissue, although he holds that health and happiness coincide.¹⁵

Sidgwick's View.—Sidgwick shows that there is a great difference between saying that virtue is always productive of happiness, and saying that the right action under all circumstances is the one which will produce the greatest

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 315.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

¹⁵ See Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 105; Martineau, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

possible happiness on the whole.¹⁶ There are no adequate grounds for holding that if we aim exclusively at the preservation of the organism we shall secure the maximum attainable happiness of its individual members.¹⁷ Utilitarianism can not become a morality *de novo*, either for man as he is or as he ought to be. The utilitarian must start with the existing social order. The implied rules and machinery are not precisely or completely adapted to the production of the greatest possible happiness for sentient beings. It is impossible on empirical grounds to demonstrate the inseparable connection between utilitarian duty and the greatest happiness of the individual who conforms to such duty.¹⁸ Hence Sidgwick modifies his position in part in favor of the intuitive principles, prudence and justice: the latter provides a basis for the distribution of the means of happiness. But Sidgwick also finds difficulties in intuitionism, and his results as a whole are not positive.

Ideal Utilitarianism.—Rashdall, who adopts the term “ideal utilitarianism,” and who seems to give up with reluctance the view that pleasure is the good, is led by his discussion to the conclusion that pleasure and value can not be identified; since all the fallacies of hedonism would then follow, and there are other elements in the supremely valuable kind of conscious life.¹⁹ All goods can indeed be compared, and when we can not have both we may choose between the higher and lower.²⁰ But he inclines toward sensibility rather than reason, that is, toward immediate feeling as something which the lower sources of satisfaction have in common with the higher. Happiness is definable as “satisfaction with one’s existence as a whole.”²¹ It can not be identified even with the higher or more refined kinds of pleasure; there may be many pleasures and yet one may be unhappy, also much hardship and yet happiness. Still the final statement is, “A happy life must

¹⁶ H. Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, 4th ed., 1890, p. 424.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 424.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 501.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 55.

²⁰ See discussion of cases, *ibid.*, p. 43.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

include some pleasure: all happiness is pleasurable, though not all pleasure is happiness." On the whole goodness tends to make people happy, though men are not happy in proportion to their goodness.

Once more the theory that tries to keep pleasure or happiness to the fore falls short of positive results. Rashdall finds that true good is not in knowledge, in pleasure, or in virtue alone; yet that "no amount of good can compensate for the absence or deficiency of the other."²² It is "for the purpose of choosing between goods" that they are commensurable, the value of an act being dependent on its consequences taken together. We can not say that the ideal is either perfect happiness or perfect well-being. The ideal life or the good is an ultimate conception not to be further defined.²³ We leave the matter thus: "the morality of our actions is to be ultimately determined by its tendency to promote a universal end, which end itself consists of many ends, and in particular two—morality and pleasure."²⁴ The content is to be expressed by enumerating various aspects of the ultimate conception and then explaining how they are to be combined. Rashdall declines to adopt the view that self-realization is the ideal which best coördinates the several elements, and he is not satisfied with self-sacrifice as the standard. We shall find reason to agree with him in so far as he emphasizes the wealthiness of content of the ideal life. When utilitarianism becomes "ideal" it readily passes into idealism.

Rashdall finds nothing in his theory inconsistent with fullest admission that morality has been gradually evolved,²⁵ and in this most of the later moralists would agree. Yet particular theories of evolution fall short, as when Spencer, for example, fails to justify moral maxims, to explain the idea of moral obligation, to assign natural selection to its proper place, and to supply a practical guide to his pleasure-theory.²⁶ Darwinism made a perma-

²² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 219.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 356.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 368, foll.

ment contribution by excluding the cruder intuitionism, emphasizing the influence of physical conditions and the physiological truth that race maintenance requires the elimination of the unfit. Dewey and Tufts, analyzing the evolutionary view of self-assertion for which scientific sanction is claimed by appeal to Darwin, criticize the naturalistic school of moralists by pointing out that (1) the theory exaggerates the rôle of antagonistic competitive struggle in the Darwinian theory; (2) while the idea of power, efficiency, or achievement is perverse.²⁷ We shall return to the question of self-assertion in a later chapter.

The Value of Utilitarianism.—We find then that hedonism can be best understood apart from the theory of evolution. The objections to it in the foregoing chapter are conclusive. Had these objections been raised prior to the adoption of evolutionism, it would not have been worth while to try the venture once more. So too utilitarianism may be considered apart from the attempt to establish the theory on evolutionary grounds. The significant thing about it, notably in the case of John Stuart Mill, is that when arguing for utility one is contending for much more than for happiness; and so Mill's book, still very readable and persuasive, helps to foster broader conceptions essential to a rationalistic theory. For if we agree that (1) there are both lower and higher moral states, (2) that conscience exists as a standard, (3) that justice is to be assigned a high place in the scale, and (4) that it is essentially a question of the Golden Rule, there is no road back to the position which utilitarians sought to maintain in their allegiance to happiness as the good. The appeal to evolution as an explanation is not convincing. What it accomplishes, in Spencer's case, is the introduction of biological evidences that pleasure has played its part in the whole process. But the fact that pleasure is of biological significance is not an argument in favor of pleasure as the test. It is still a question what *ought* to be pursued as the good, and when this question is raised we have Mill's large-

²⁷ *Ethics*, p. 368. See, also, Muirhead, *Elements of Ethics*, p. 136.

mind ed answer in favor of conscience, justice, and the Golden Rule.

Estimate of Evolution.—The effort to account for our whole moral life in terms of evolution is to be distinguished from the attempt to prove that pleasure is the good by identifying pleasure with well-being as the goal of man's whole conduct. The philosophy of evolution once before us as a program, it becomes a question of tracing the development of instincts and emotions, especially those with an altruistic trend, from the level of development attained by the higher animals to the beginnings of morality in man. We have then the problem of the origin of the so-called moral instinct, the moral sentiments, the sense of moral obligation, the function of conscience; also the question whether, on the whole, nature in the struggle of the strongest or fittest to survive, favors the moral life, or whether there is such an antagonism as that to which Huxley called attention. The roads lead in various directions. One might identify Darwinism with emphasis on brute force and arrive at conclusions very remote from idealism in ethics. Or one might use the philosophy of evolution with discretion and consider the problem of moral progress from the point of view of successive ideals tending toward the conservation of values, as in Alexander's *Moral Order and Progress*; to which we shall refer in another chapter. Again, one might make extensive studies of the whole field of moral evolution without attempting to prove either realism or idealism, letting the facts speak for themselves, as in Myers' *History as Past Ethics* and Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution*. The theory of evolution finds its proper place in such studies. It yields the total natural environment. The wealth of results is so great that there is no road to identification between the lower levels of mental life and the moral ideal, no hope of accounting for the higher in terms of the lower. But the fact is established that morals have had an evolution, that the moral life thus evolved is rich in possibilities, and that no criterion of moral progress can be satisfactory which does not find its clues in this abundant wealth of our evolutionary history.

Westermarck brings to his exhaustive studies, summed up in his *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, an imperfect psychology and a thesis to defend. Hence his work has limited value. But granted an adequate psychology, one which gives full place to will and reason, as well as to the desires and emotions, it becomes a question of the gradual acquisition and conservation of the total content of the moral life, including the highest contributions of the greatest nations.

We are not then concerned with the mere attempt to explain the beginnings of morality, as if the whole thesis in favor of evolution were proved by accounting for the conscience of primitive tribes. We no longer capitulate in favor of merely biological forces. Instead, we are interested in special problems. Granted conscience at its best, what has been its history through the ages, disclosing as they do change amidst persistence, varied judgments yet a certain constancy of moral conviction? Granted moral intuition at its best, how have we come by these fine intuitions of today, with their Greek and Christian elements? Granted the conservation of moral values, what is the later history of our moral idealism? And so as we turn, in the next chapter, to a study of rationalism our interest is not in the possible derivation of reason from an instinct, from the non-rational or the irrational; we are concerned with reason in full estate, as that principle of our nature which yields universals, discerns the permanent amidst the transient, the significant amid the commonplace.

Moral Reason and Evolution.—Evolutionists who have beaten reason down to the thinnest level have met with little success in their efforts to account for what was left. So too pragmatists who have reduced reason or truth to what "works," to mere utility, have signally failed. Reason, too, has had its history. It has grown up in closest alliance with practice. We all use reason in behalf of utility. But the profounder fact is that by aid of reason we rise above mere ideas accepted as true because they work; we generalize, arrive at knowledge of law, order, a conception of the nature of things. The advance from cus-

tom to morality, from precepts to a conception of moral law is in brief the advance to moral reason. To minimize reason, identify it with habit or practice, or to ideas found to possess utility in a given tribe, would be to miss the significance of one of the greatest moments in human history, signalized in part by the insights of Confucius and other law-givers, but witnessing its really decisive instance in the profound meditations of Socrates.

An adequate theory of rational evolution must account for Socrates, and with Socrates for Plato and Aristotle, hence for ethics as a science, for all science, and philosophy as the science of sciences. Granted Socrates, our method can no longer be merely genetic. Socrates arrived at moral conviction by profound analysis, without regard for the decrees of custom; living out what he believed, discerning the moral law in actual moral conduct, and helping others to see the moral universal. So too each student who, arriving at the stage of insight, comes to understand the significance of the moral law, finds that he possesses the essentials in his own selfhood, and must verify the classic distinctions and principles—however the race may have come by its moral convictions.

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CHAPTER X

STOICISM AND SELF-SACRIFICE

Discipline.—In our study of hedonism we have found that emphasis falls on the feelings and desires, but with an increasing tendency to introduce reason as the clue to happiness. It is natural that reason in its turn should be regarded as the standard, and that the effort should be made to exclude the sensibilities as nearly as possible. Rationalism has assumed a number of typical forms, beginning with Cynicism, which offered an alternative to the hedonism of the Cyrenaics by seeking the good through training or discipline rather than through the pursuit of pleasure.

Socrates had placed much emphasis on discipline. He was described by Xenophon as “the most sober and chaste of all mankind, supporting with equal cheerfulness the extreme, whether of heat or cold . . . [he] shrank at no hardships, declined no labor, and knew so perfectly how to moderate his desires as to make the little he possessed altogether sufficient.” He is said to have reclaimed many from vices. He put stress on exercise, moderate eating, and keeping the body in health. He was so moderate in his wants that any one willing to work could have supported him. Xenophon assures us that Socrates’ whole life was characterized by temperance. He loved anything genuine, honest, sincere. He exposed vanity and ostentation. Yet he was ever practical, emphasized the useful, and seemed at times almost to identify the good and the useful.

The Cynics.—It was this uncertainty concerning the content of the good which led one group of his followers to conclude that the good is pleasure, while the Cynics,

taking the clue directly from the life of Socrates, found the central principle in the sterner side of Socrates' teaching. Antisthenes (440-323), who founded the Cynic school, taught in the gymnasium of Kynosarges, a kind of soldier's field in Athens, hence the name Cynic. Diogenes of this school speaks of himself as one of the dogs, and others were said to lead a sort of animal existence, wandering and begging, jeering at the refinements of life, snarling at society, as critics do who react against pleasures.

The Simple Life.—Like Aristippus, Antisthenes was skeptical about the knowledge of other peoples' mental states, and so he sought, not universal good, but the good of the individual, which is to be found in freedom or self-sufficiency. He declared that virtue is sufficient for happiness, and all that it requires is the Socratic vigor. Hence he rejected the claims of society on man, heralded a return to nature as an escape from bondage, reacted against the pleasures of the senses, even looking upon pleasure as an evil to be shunned by the wise man. This view involved a reaction against *custom*, with emphasis on *nature* as the clue for the individual to follow. A blanket, for instance, is as good as a dress, and a house is scarcely needed. Since wants and needs are to be reduced, one should not be in bondage to home, friends, town, state, country, or property: rich and poor are alike *men*, the slave is as good as his master. Luxuries are to be discarded. A temple is no more sacred than any other place. There is no higher or lower.

Whatever may be said about the narrowness of this view, it implies one of the great typical attitudes found in human history as a whole. It stands for freedom of thought as well as freedom of life, has the beginnings of humanitarianism, and is akin to asceticism, to the severer type of ethical thought wherever found. The Cynics have been called the first monks in the Western world. They contributed the ideal of perfect self-control, sublime independence of circumstances; excellence of character attainable through the life of reason or wisdom, which is essentially passionless, indifferent to the claims of sensibility,

emancipated from the demands of external life, with wants reduced to the minimum, and self-denial as the direct clue to goodness. This clue may seem as short-sighted as pleasure, and as likely to run into pessimism. The "return to nature" involved too great a reaction against society, to the neglect of what was good in custom and in national life in general. Such an extreme reaction is destined to be short-lived. Yet virtue confessedly demands a measure of discipline or self-control. The life of reason is a more direct clue than the expression of desires. The Cynics made a permanent contribution to the idea of the good and the true method of its pursuit.

Stoicism.—What was profoundest or best in Cynicism found more persuasive expression in Stoicism, a very important ethical system, which passed through two extensive periods, Greek and Roman, the Greek period beginning with Zeno the Stoic, and the Roman extending from 150 B.C. to A.D. 200. It is interesting to note that the founder, Zeno, was not a Greek, but a Hellenist from a Greek colony on the Isle of Cyprus, and probably a Semite, hence of more religious stock. Going to Athens and learning of the various schools of philosophy, Zeno studied first under Crates, the Cynic, and Stilpo, the Megarian. From the latter he acquired a typical emphasis on the abstract Good as the ideal principle. By his earnestness, moral strictness, the simplicity of his life, and the dignity and affability of his conduct, he won universal respect; and by the unusual moderation of his life he reached an advanced age untouched by disease.

With Zeno the doctrine of independence which he acquired from the Cynics ceased to be a revolt against society and became positive belief in the worth of man as a rational being, while the Megarian principle showed him that reason, which makes man a true individual or independent self, is also the universal principle of a life in common with the rational order of being. For him ethics was of supreme importance. Its basis was found in an identification of the universe with the reason or Logos which is also discovered in the heart of our own nature.

The Rational Standard.—The wise man's ideal is a life of conformity within and without to this universal or cosmic Reason, the wise man lives in the world of sensibilities or appearances by passing beyond it in his fidelity to reason.¹ There is in the universe itself a norm or law which becomes for all men the guide to rightness of conduct. True thought reveals what *ought* to be, discloses the purpose in things; hence makes clear our responsibility, our duty, which is to be realized through obedience to the moral law or principle of the cosmos. Duty, which receives its first clear enunciation in Stoic terms, and is one of the great contributions of this school, is regarded as a law to which man is to be subject in contrast with sensuous inclination in all forms. The ruling part of our nature is reason, espoused with such vigor by the Stoics that with them dedication to it becomes the religion of consecration to duty. The Stoic was deeply reverential, for he found the divine in all things, and every house was to him a temple. Where the Cynics had emphasized separateness and had leveled customary and even religious distinctions, the Stoics put stress on *oneness* with both things and persons, and systems of beliefs; and to them the various names for deity signified so many approaches to the one Providence or Reason of the world, the inner Power discerned by the life of reason.

Divine Law.—Reverence for man and everything pertaining to him at its best naturally followed. This attitude implied respect for human rights, hence in its Roman form Stoicism had great influence in developing the idea of *law*, regarded in its civic as well as in its moral aspects. This organization of thought and life in terms of law is indeed the gist of Stoicism as a constructive faith. The one law, seen as reason, order, system, in the universe, was regarded ethically as justice, the divine law which yielded the principle for man's conduct in relation to his fellows, man's duty being to make of himself an embodiment of this law: life in accordance with nature is life in accord-

¹ W. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, tr. by Tufts, 2d ed., p. 163.

ance with this law, and for the Stoic human and physical law were one. Hence the wise man puts aside his own will, that is, any emotion or caprice which may rise in contrast or antagonism, and he accepts the universal will or reason.

Independence.—It is in this harmony with the rational nature of things that freedom is to be found. So far as wrong-doing or sin may exist in the world, it implies life contrary to the world-reason or law. The man who is thus out of adjustment with the nature of things is so far separate, is asserting the part over against the whole; and the point of view of *the whole* is the corrective of this maladjustment. Man's separateness is merely apparent and temporary. It is the whole that is real. As a part of this whole man has no real freedom, in the sense in which Christians came later to believe in the freedom of the will. Yet although freedom in the latter sense is in Stoic terms an illusion, there is every reason for urging rational adjustment upon the individual. Indeed, the Stoics have been called the first great moral forces of the world. Just how this appeal to the individual is to be justified, as if the individual were free, is not made clear. Professor Palmer calls this one of "the superb paradoxes" of Stoicism. With them the appeal to righteousness was exceedingly strong.

Equanimity.—Despite the element of fatalism in their faith, the Stoics put stress on harmony with nature as attainable. It is within man's power, they reasoned, to overcome the emotions, passions, excitements, and other adverse mental states implying excess, and by conquering these to attain equanimity, freedom from circumstance through abstention from any activity which would break in upon this inward repose or serenity which is yielded by true knowledge of the nature of things. Hence the many wise precepts which have come down to us from Stoic times, and have made Stoicism a classic contribution to the eternal wisdom of life. It has been said that Stoicism has never gone from the world and probably never will go: it is deeply rooted in human nature, and the Stoic is almost the type of the philosopher, incapable of being disturbed by

the events of the world, the representative of an ideal attitude toward life.

Self-consistency.—Whatever the inconsistencies of this faith, the central interest, as Caird has shown, is *to give unity to man's life*, a unity into which nothing can come from without to disturb.² The self-seeking impulse, as it becomes self-conscious, must recognize its own universal character; the impulse of a rational being as such is not to seek the gratification of his particular impulses but to seek to satisfy the self. There is no hostile element in the cosmos to limit self-realization: the world is one world, and the idea of escaping from the unity on which its existence rests is futile. There is no real separation between reason and the will: the same soul thinks and wills, perceives and desires. Man's passions are indeed irrational, but this unreason does not imply the existence in the universe of a principle indifferent to reason or directly opposed to it: passion is the division of *one*, that is, one individual, nature against itself, not a separation in nature as universal. Every man tends to realize his nature as a rational being. Hence the good for the Stoic is the realization of the self as a whole rather than the realization of a phase or special desire, and so Stoicism corrects hedonism by its critique of desire as *particular* in contrast with the good as *universal*. The principle of order, unity, or self-consistency which we carry with us is that which makes us selves or moral beings. The idea of the systematic ordering of the whole nature of man is to be found by each of us through philosophic reaction on the world.

Whether this ideal, carried out in practice, means, as Caird holds, that the particular deed is so subordinated that the wise man becomes "a mere bundle of negations," with nothing left except "the formal self-consistency of a will of which nothing can be said,"³ save that it is at one with itself, will depend upon one's interpretation of the life of reason. While Palmer emphasizes the religious de-

² E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 82.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

votion of the Stoics to duty, their emphasis on organization in terms of law; Caird points to the great work done by the Stoics negatively, to wit, by lifting moral and religious ideas out of their national setting, by completing the work of Socrates in emancipating the individual from tradition and throwing him back on himself: every man, from lowest to highest, was shown to be a law unto himself, with the same universal right, the same universal duty.

Roman Stoicism.—Panætius (born about 180, B.C.), who led the Stoic school in Athens prior to 110 B.C. was the chief founder of Roman Stoicism. He was mainly interested in the teaching on its practical side, and so he sought to make Stoicism more attractive, to rid it of secondary teachings to which objections had been raised. His work on *Duty* formed the basis of Cicero's *De Officiis*. With Seneca (A.D. 4-65), Stoicism becomes more explicitly a philosophy of deliverance or redemption. Epictetus, who lived at the time of Domitian, taught that philosophy makes explicit the universal moral principles which are innate in all men: man can become free and happy by restricting his life to his moral nature, by bearing all external events with unconditional submission, renouncing all appetites and wishes directed toward external things. Hence the importance of discriminating between what is in our power and what is not in our power: only our will is in our power, for example, in adjustment to the unavoidable, in keeping one's self cheerful, in checking desire.

Marcus Aurelius.—In the teaching of Marcus Aurelius, Roman Stoicism reaches its great height as a well-rounded doctrine of practical life implying a universal attitude. Marcus Aurelius had the advantage of knowing many Stoics, with opportunity for seizing upon what to him was best in the life and thought of each. His first effort was to live by what he came thus to accept, then to write about it in his meditations; hence he is in many respects the ideal ethical teacher. His teaching expresses a surpassing peace of mind or beauty of spirit. Greatly conscious of his dependence on those who have given him the various elements of his faith, he realizes that it is through what has come

to him from nature, gods, and men that he is made free. He is content with the part assigned to him. Amidst the changes which time discloses he sees the immutable law, hence the duty which becomes to him a religion. Reverence for and trust in the ruling power or providence of the universe is the ruling sentiment through which, passing beyond the pantheism of earlier forms of Stoicism, he approximates Christian theism. This attitude of adjustment involves (1) acquiescence in the present condition; (2) checking bodily persuasions; (3) freedom from error and deception, with emphasis on *looking within*, where the source of what is good and what is ill is to be found.

Reason as Arbiter.—Study of Cynicism and Stoicism readily leads to the conclusion that it is *reason* that criticizes, organizes; hence discloses a conception of law and duty. Through reason we compare the results of various activities, noting the relationship, for instance, between eating a moderate amount of food and sensuous appetite, the value of intellectual pleasures, the wear and tear and exhaustion in many forms of social life, and thus the importance of a scale of values. Reason is not independent of experience, but formulates in terms of *ends* the activities which otherwise remain mere desires, incentives, or pleasures; it supplies the form, while sensibility contributes the content. The knowledge it gives reveals the power required to attain self-mastery and tranquillity, which in turn becomes the basis for further regulation of the desires and emotions. Stoic knowledge is *power*, especially its teaching concerning the integrity or consistency of our rational selfhood as a principle of unity. Such knowledge involves increasing discovery of our powers and their mutual adjustment. In this process reason is not disclosed as an end in itself, in itself it is not completely ethical.

Rationalism, taken in entire seriousness, would call for the closest scrutiny of every incentive in our nature, lest the desires and emotions win ascendancy; and to adopt the moral rigorism of extreme rationalists would be to attempt to exclude our sensibility altogether from participation in moral conduct. It is not strange that partisans of hedon-

ism have risen in renewed protest throughout history. Even in the case of more liberal forms of rationalism, assimilating in part the wisdom of Plato and Aristotle, the element of careful discrimination has been so emphasized that critics have discounted such a view as a highly refined scheme for self-culture. The limitations of this view have been frequently made manifest by contrast with the Christian ideal, the Greek virtues have been disparaged as "splendid vices," in opposition to which the Christian standard of self-denial has been brought forward as the very essence of virtue. The Christian standard has therefore been offered as an alternative form of rationalism, as the view indeed which develops the asceticism of the Cynics to the full. Self-denial rather than Stoic self-control appears then to be the complete corrective of the one-sidedness of prior theories of the good. This view has the support of the Christian system as a whole, and so it seems to have the advantage over the teaching of an individual, such as Marcus Aurelius.

Self-sacrifice.—It has been customary to assume that Christianity and self-sacrifice are identical, and to accept self-sacrifice as good without criticism. Recent instances are cited every now and then in the press in confirmation of the standard so long assumed as supreme. The implication is that the man who gives up all, is an exemplification of the ideal which we should realize. Self-sacrifice has been advocated unqualifiedly, despite the fact that men and women of a certain type tend to yield over-much, while the majority dedicate too little of themselves and their possessions. It is universally celebrated in fiction, the drama, and more recently in the film-play. It is praised from the pulpit by some who do not practice it. Self-sacrifice seems to be incumbent upon us because Jesus is said to have set the example once for all for Christians of all types. This tacit adoption of a moral pattern, without reference to the virtues which should sustain self-sacrifice, is not likely to be inquired into till we examine the doctrine of sacrificial atonement, to see if we have really understood. If it should turn out that Christian theology is too nega-

tive at this point, there would doubtless be fresh study of Christian morals as a whole. Again, praise of self-sacrifice has kept pace with glorification of war; and until another attitude toward war has become well established, with new estimates of the martial virtues, the assumption that men should sacrifice themselves will continue to be made.

Asceticism.—Most Christians would now object that the asceticism of the early ages of our era was not representative of Christianity. Jesus did not by word or example inculcate the narrowly ascetic ideal. The mortification of the flesh seems remote indeed from the spirit of the Gospel, with its sanction of the natural joys of life.⁴ The man who mortifies the flesh may in reality be seeking individual salvation. The practice of self-denial through renunciation of the world does not carry far, and we are today decidedly skeptical concerning ascetic practices wherever found in the world. Both in India and in Europe we have seen to what results asceticism leads, and in this instance we judge almost wholly by the consequences, however high the motives may be. We have learned too that the sharp dualism of flesh and spirit which led to the disparagement of the body, was of alien origin. The usual judgment on asceticism is not that it only emphasizes one aspect of Christianity but makes the negative aspect of morality final.⁵ If the monasteries were a refuge for the mystic, the pious recluse, and the disappointed, they in any event made no real provision for the ordinary life of humanity. Nowadays we know deeper reasons why the suppression of fleshly desires led to inner conflict, hence to sensuous reactions. Any view involving practices which distort human nature is so far beyond the pale of reason. It is "dishonor, not honor, to the moral life to conceive it as mere negative subjection of the flesh, mere holding under control, the lust of desire and the temptations of appetite. All positive content, all liberal achievement, is cut out and morality is reduced to the mere struggle *against* solicitations to

⁴ Cf. Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

⁵ Cf. Muirhead, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

sin.”⁶ So too the moral ideal is made exceedingly narrow in scope if confined to the virtues of chastity, poverty, and obedience; if life is judged to be a mere pilgrimage towards the goal of a future state of bliss. Nowadays we insist on social service as a test of sanity in moral matters.

Self-denial.—Nevertheless, the Gospel was taught with great rigor, as the demand for that righteousness of heart which was to exceed conventional morality. It was to involve walking through the narrow gate and along the straight highway of the life of self-denial. As lived out by the first followers, this ideal almost immediately involved persecution and suffering, if not martyrdom. The conviction has persisted that in such consecration is true spirituality. Only through the death of the natural man shall the spiritual self be born. This seems to call for utter self-sacrifice, and the implied ideal survived the ascetic practices by which the ideal was formerly sustained. Christianity has kept self-denial as a pattern, and new expressions of it have appeared from time to time, notably in the case of the Salvation Army, whose members often deny themselves even the necessities of life. The modern devotee of self-sacrifice also finds a field in home and foreign missions, in various forms of philanthropy, in times of great calamities, and especially in war-time, when the doctrine is preached with new vigor.

Self-sacrifice is not to be identified with any age or with any theological system, although it has gained a stronger hold in Oriental lands, notably in India, and it might be called an Oriental ideal, one which we would never have developed independently in the Western world. Its origin is also partly due to the tendency to identify the self with certain of its elements, especially the emotions of pity, sympathy, compassion; hence all impulses are disparaged which lead either toward pleasure or toward the intellectual life. Since all vice is selfishness, the evil must be attacked at its roots: the self must be denied, chastened, and there must be no listening to incentives toward rounded self-development. All goodness is assigned to some outside

⁶ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 366.

source, while all that is evil is attributed to the corrupted self. Promptings toward benevolence do indeed exist, but the self deserves no credit for these, and of itself would tend toward hell. Vice is easy, virtue extremely difficult. Hence the need of utmost vigilance and resistance. Self-denial is not a standard to be reasoned out because it best sustains itself in a comparative study of the virtues: it is to be accepted, doubts are to be suppressed, and sacrificial service is to be the actual rule in daily life.

Uncertainties of Self-sacrifice.—Popular belief in self-sacrifice has been sustained to some extent by appeal to the fact of widespread struggle in the animal world, on the assumption that sacrifice and struggle belong together. The human family is said to be founded on self-sacrifice, and the mother is always regarded as the ideal example. So strong is the conviction that self-sacrifice is the true ideal that the son or daughter, in turn, is expected to make an equivalent sacrifice for the parent. Thus the talented young woman, who has attended college and is competent to teach school and become a progressively useful member of the community, must give up her career, devote all her time to the widowed mother in the home. The mother, who has perhaps retired from active life far too soon, demands her daughter's time, whether or not the sacrifice is worthy: *because* it is a sacrifice it is assumed to be worthy. Again, it is the young man who must support both father and mother, whatever his talents may be. Nobody is supposed to ask whether the greater good to society is being attained, or whether there is perchance some other way. It is understood that the call to personal duty stands first, although sometimes the young person is sacrificed to sustain the selfishness of a parent who should be in active service in the world.

The difficulty is that one is unable to deduce the principle from particular cases, to show that the greater good has been achieved. The one who foregoes a career, makes the decision without assurance that the one for whom he is giving up so much will be truly benefited. In many instances there is not time to consider alternatives or weigh

consequences. For example, take the case of the youth from the slums, of slight promise, who falls overboard and who would be drowned were it not for the sudden deed of the young man of splendid parts and fine training, of the greatest promise, who impulsively throws himself into the water, is drowned, but saves the young fellow whom society must educate, with doubtful results. If the would-be rescuer hesitates, is he selfish? If he refuses to risk his life when there is every probability that he will be drowned, is his character weakened? Shall the public official, greatly needed, take the same risks as any other? Is it right even for the President to run great risks that he may visit the distant territory of Alaska, in addition to his manifold duties at the White House? Where shall we draw the line, as we descend the scale from greater to lesser public officials and people who are needed by the state? In endeavoring to answer these questions, it is well to bear in mind the fact that in the Christian world we have permitted multitudes of people to become dependent, while uncritically praising the philanthropic virtues. It has been customary till very recently to anticipate a declining old age, following upon early retirement from active life, with the expectation that the young ought to take care of the aged. Self-sacrifice has indeed been eulogized by reasoning in a circle, to the neglect of the fact that in actual life it abounds in uncertainties.

Self-sacrifice as Instrumental.—Self-sacrifice has been called a glorious madness.⁷ Oftentimes the uncertainties are so great that it seems merely impulsive, and if advice were asked we would counsel against it. We try to justify it on the ground that sacrifice is a law of life, so in our uncertainty we question whether we could make headway without it. Every great advance has involved sacrifice. It has abounded in the lives of those we praise. Through it salvation has come into the world. Vicarious sacrifice seems essential to our spiritual welfare. It appears to follow that sacrifice is universal good. Yet when we try to elicit from believers in it the best reasons they can give,

⁷ Cf. Palmer, *The Nature of Goodness*, p. 158.

self-sacrifice turns out to be a negative term. Even as instrumental, sacrifice is praised for what is given up, more than for what is attained. The hero is the one who died. Death seems then to be a good. It is glorious to suffer and to die; hence those things which yield opportunities for heroism are noble. We are not in the habit of considering whether some other means to virtue might have been found.

Devotion.—Granted that self-sacrifice is at least *a* good, that it has often been instrumental in the past, what we now need is a term to express the positive values which may still be regarded as worthy. As long as negative terminology is used, people will justify their moral ideal and conduct by uncritical appeal to self-sacrifice. It is not what is given up, not suffering as such, not death that avails. Life is positive. Love is positive. It is the fullness of life that we want, and it is possible that we have misapprehended Christianity from first to last in so far as we have taken it to be a gospel of sacrifice.

The way of the cross was not the full way of life as Jesus lived and taught it. His life abounded in works all along the way. His power was positive. His attitude was strong. From the deeds done and the words uttered, words which were spirit and were life, virtue went forth. This was supremely true of the culminating events of the Gospel history. The ideal of the fullness of life is, in brief, devotion, dedication to a purpose: the things given up, the sufferings involved are secondary to the end in view, and are to be understood in connection with other instrumental matters. It is not he who loses his life alone, who takes up his cross and follows, who is assured of the goal in view; but he who by his love toward God and the neighbor consecrates himself to his purpose with such earnestness that he is willing to meet the conditions, whatever they may be. It is this full dedication of the self which opens the soul to power. Complete consecration is never attained by "the negative way."

The more ethically thoughtful and morally consecrated of Jesus' followers have realized that no atoning sacrifice

could relieve them of the responsibility of "living the life." The ideal life discloses the way to follow: it does not take from us the necessity of coming to judgment, learning the moral lesson of the social situation we are in, reacting against our own past, and treading the road toward our own better future. Not until we give up once for all the notion that some one has done our work for us are we in a position to see what our real work is, and whatever our work may be the true method of doing it can never be found by imitating the negative phases of the life which has set us the example. From first to last it is *what is done* that avails. Moreover, salvation ceases to be the end in view when one espouses a moral ideal, substituting positive terms, becoming devoted to a purpose with determination to achieve it, where once there seemed to be no reason for making effort. And if one is most likely to serve by dedication to a purpose calling for the use of one's higher powers to the full, there is every reason for knowledge and realization of the self, where once there was neglect, weakness, one-sidedness due to notions of self-sacrifice.

Limitations of Self-sacrifice.—Whatever the arguments against self-sacrifice—that it is impossible, a sign of degradation, needless, irrational, and that the failures of Christianity are due to the weaker virtues allied with it⁸—the significant fact is that we continue to believe in what it stands for. We can not rationally make it the end of life. We can not indulge in self-sacrifice for its own sake and be assured of virtue. But we must admit that the moral life involves struggle, that sometimes the sacrifice of the individual has been needed for the good of the whole, and that consecration to a moral purpose inevitably involves giving up lesser values for greater. What we are constrained to keep in all this wealth of experience implying self-sacrifice in human history is *the moral dynamic*, or moving power of the life dedicated to the highest purpose. The terms devotion, consecration to duty, service, express for us in our modern way of looking at things

⁸ See Palmer, *op. cit.*, Chap. VI.

those constructive values which have survived the long ages of controversy over ideals of discipline, asceticism, self-denial, heroism, the martial virtues. We have come to see that there should not be too much calculation, to the neglect of the impulses which prompt to deeds of self-sacrifice; but that far more depends on the goal in view than on the mere prompting to pity or sympathy. Hence we grant the privileges of extended preparation for a life of service in the world. We expect every one to participate as he can serve best. And with due caution we should be able to preserve the values of the ideal of self-sacrifice without permitting these to take expression in negative forms.

Meanwhile, it is to be observed that a few exceptional people tend to give of themselves, their time, their possessions to the full; while the majority give too little, hence that there is need of reconsideration of the question of self-sacrifice with reference to our increasing knowledge of human types. Leaders in public welfare have sometimes been so absorbed in their work that watchful friends have been needed to see that these consecrated souls had sufficient rest, enough to eat, and money in their purses. Self-sacrifice has been advocated, because so few manifest it. But the sacrifice has been accepted because the few were willing to make it. The man or woman, especially the woman, who is strongly inclined toward self-sacrifice need never be encouraged to adopt self-sacrifice as a good, but needs rather to be held back, in behalf of the best service that can be rendered during the passage of the years. We who look on, conscientiously, are not minded to go out and imitate these exceptional people in their self-sacrifice, but to give what we can give best, so that the leaders shall no longer need to give more than their share. One can not then accept the argument that the extreme self-sacrifice of the few is needed to offset the extreme self-assertion of the many. It is a sad fact indeed that in philanthropic organizations the major part of the work is done by two or three leaders. It is a fact, too, that vampires and parasites abound in the world, also

ungrateful adults, and forgetful children. The world is cold and unmindful, and will let the few sacrifice themselves for the many. But the inference to be drawn from this is that there should be more knowledge, not only of the way others live, but of the way the few have lived who have done the nobler share of the world's work.

Then there is always the question of the other's good. In general we conclude that what is right for one to receive is right for another to give, and that with ethical readjustment there will be no place for extreme self-sacrifice. It has been frequently noted that extremes beget extremes in self-sacrifice. The mother who gives too much to her children may in turn exact too much, may condemn her children because they do not devote themselves to her *in her way*, instead of granting them the privilege of living the devoted life in their way. Self-sacrifice has ceased to be a virtue when made so emphatic. The positive values come into view once more in the lives of people so given over to their work that no one thinks of their conduct as involving sacrifice. It is the *life* within and behind then, that signifies, that gives the moral quality.

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CHAPTER XI

FORMALISM AND INTUITION

The Good Will.—The tendency of thought toward emphasis on the universal principle rather than the particular deed, to which the Stoics made permanent contributions, reached its culmination in the ethical system of Immanuel Kant, notable for its doctrine of the Categorical Imperative. Kant defines morality without regard to any of the consequences or ends of action. For him the only thing which can “possibly be conceived, in the world or out of it, which can be called good without qualification” is the Good Will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, resolution, perseverance, and other talents might, he thinks, be regarded as good and desirable in right connections. But these qualities might be extremely bad and mischievous “if the will which is to make use of them and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. Even power, riches, honor, health might inspire pride and presumption if there were not a good will to correct their influence. So, too, moderation of the affections and passions, self-control and calm deliberation may be essential to the intrinsic worth of a person. But not one of the above qualities is good in itself.¹ The will is good, not because it wills something good, but because through unquestioning obedience to the moral law, prescribed for it by the practical reason, it is good without reference to what is done. Even if no results should follow, or if the will should lack all power of accomplishment, the will would still be good. In contrast, no act wrought by means of inclination or desire is morally good. A moral deed is a deed wrought, not alone as duty requires, but *because* duty requires it. If duty and inclination happened to

¹ *Theory of Ethics*, tr. by Abbott, p. 9.

point to the same end, we would not know that our act was morally good; since we could not be sure that the deed was wrought through reverence for the law rather than through inclination. Never has the good will received such emphasis.

Kant's Aim.—To see the force of this argument, it is important to understand Kant's purpose in what to some has seemed to be an exceedingly narrow doctrine. Kant does not set out to prove that morality exists. He is not in search of a preceptive system. He does not even undertake theoretically to prove that the will is free, that a moral self exists, or that there is a future life, a divine Being: these are postulates of our thinking in the moral sphere. There is a vast region in the practical world with which he has no concern. But granted all that morality is ordinarily supposed to imply, the question is, How is morality possible? What are the pure principles or elements, in contrast with the empirical elements? Is there a central imperative of morality, and if so, how is it possible? In the answer to this question the *matter* of moral experience is not involved, but the form or general principle. That there are various goods, is not to be questioned. That men act from a sense of duty, out of respect for the moral law, Kant by no means doubts. It is not for him to guarantee that men will be able to carry out his rigorous moral teaching. Kant is quite willing to admit the frailty of human nature. He carefully qualifies his statements concerning the will, and confesses that much that he puts forward is still mainly an ideal. But that men *ought* to will and act out of pure respect for the law, he is firmly convinced. He proposes then to inquire into the ground of the highest ideal. Hence, he is concerned to abstract all empirical elements by considering what is good in and for itself, without regard to results. Thus Kant succeeds as no one else has succeeded in directing attention to *the law of morality* as the ultimate principle. Experience does not tell what is universal or necessary: it is reason that makes known the universal. Here alone is the unconditional to be found, the categorical rather than the hypo-

thetical. Above all, here is the ground of duty, the universally valid moral *command*, in contrast with rules of skill or mere counsels and inclinations. Here, too, is moral consistency, the basis of the kingdom of moral ends.

Moral Reason.—Kant defines ethics therefore as the science of the laws of freedom, the universal laws given to man as a rational being.² This is the reason for being concerned with the idea of a possible *pure* will, not the will in its admixture. It is not possible to begin by defining duties. The term “will” means something different from will used in the ordinary psychological sense: it is superior to all inclination, governed by reason, the condition of all other goods. The will is included in the notion of duty, it is the seat of practical love; it is objectively determined by law, subjectively determined by pure respect; and it is the form of all volition. In other words, it chooses only that which reason, independent of inclination, recognizes as practically necessary. It is universally legislative, autonomous, self-consistent; and is to be regarded as an end in itself because, primarily, it is the law-giver, because it is universal moral reason. To see it, to grasp it is to see that there is no alternative, that reason is absolute in its own sphere; hence, that there is no need to penetrate farther back.

The Categorical Imperative.—To understand Kant’s central principle then it is essential for the time being to make the utmost abstraction, as if it were not a question of moral experience at all; and yet presently to realize that the universal principle thus brought sharply into view is the ground of all moral experience. By instinct, through his inclinations and sensibilities, man would tend to express himself as do the animals, and so man would seek pleasure. But in his higher selfhood man gives to himself the law of reason, above all other laws of his being. Hence, this demand of moral reason is a categorical imperative, an absolute or unconditional command. A hypothetical action would be good as a means to something else. In the case then of ordinary imperatives we would say, “Do

² See *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans.

this *if* you would achieve that," namely, the end which you have in view. But the moral law commands, "Thou shalt." Its imperative is not directed towards any particular end, but is the basis of moral conduct when we are engaged in attaining particular ends. It is this inner form of moral deeds which constitutes the principle which needs no demonstration but is itself the basis of all demonstrations. Furthermore, man as a moral being is an end in himself, and moral beings belong together in a kingdom of ends. Hence, man is bidden always to act so as to fulfill this, his moral nature, never using his reason as a means of attaining non-rational ends. The imperative, therefore, is, "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it shall become a universal law."³ The whole standard is thus summarized: "So act as to regard humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, always as an end, never as a means." This, says Kant, is the sole condition under which a will can never contradict itself. One ought so to choose that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of one's choice as a universal law.⁴ In thus choosing maxims or rules of conduct which belong together according to a single principle, each one of us is employing his moral nature as any man thus fundamentally would act; and in so stating the principle which is a law for all one is referring to all men as no less truly ends in themselves. What applies to the moral person applies to the kingdom of ends. Thus the categorical act has multiform significance. Although the same laws are implied in the action of the numerous moral agents, the maxims of those agents may be very different. The maxim shows how the agent chooses to act, and here there is room for liberty of action. But the principle of duty is commanded by reason absolutely; hence in this regard there is no alternative or variation from person to person.

If it be objected that moral reason as thus conceived is purely formal, Kant would be willing to admit it; but this

³ Abbott's trans., p. 47.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

principle is necessary in order to establish the universal basis of morals. To consider specific deeds to be wrought would be to turn to the realm of experience, which involves change. The moral test must underlie all particular cases by considering whether in the various deeds one is unqualifiedly ready to will that the motive shall become a permanent or regular law in the moral constitution of things. Thus, one would escape from the limitations of desire and emotion, testing conduct to the full by asking whether one would will that all others shall be committed to the typical principle in question. The welfare of others would then count no less emphatically than one's own well-being. In fact, the categorical imperative is a more explicit formulation of the Golden Rule.

Rational Freedom.—There is then no liberty to will anything one likes, on the assumption that as no specific action is commanded by the law one deed may as well be chosen as another. For although man's will is autonomous, as a law-giver he is sovereign, hence he is not subject to the will of any other man: this is man in the *universal* sense. Man possesses the power to carry out what moral reason decrees, humanity is "capable" of morality, and this was what Kant proposed to show. Man is in brief, a rational being possessing an efficient will, and if reason completely determined the will moral conduct would be perfect. It is because man is in a measure imperfect that there is reason for obligation. The command of reason being unconditional, the will has no liberty to choose the opposite, and this is why it was necessary for the time being to throw all particular deeds out of account, realizing with utter fidelity the truth that duty is a law for all human beings.

Estimate of Kant's Ethics.—The whole history of ethics since Kant's day discloses his profound influence. To some his doctrine has seemed so rigorous indeed that the higher and lower principles of our nature appear to be completely separated. Psychology does not confirm this rigid distinction between will and reason, and the desires and sensibilities which constitute the irrational. Ethics does not

require this sharp division. The problem of morals is not to eliminate but to enlist the lower principle. Kant's formalism appears to exclude even happiness; overlooks the incentives, spontaneities, and sentiments which contribute both the content and the opportunities of the moral life. His principle resolves itself into duty for duty's sake, whereas duty is to be expressed through particular deeds. The moral agent, capable of obeying the imperative, actuated as he is by contrasted impulses, must consider what the good will is good for. If duty stood wholly unrelated to inclination, it would lose the alternatives which through specific duties take shape and are forced home as problems to be solved. The feelings and emotions are essential.⁵ To adopt the good will alone would be to make out a wholly new table of virtues, incapable of natural adjustment in terms of praise and blame; it would no longer be the good will of the good workman, the good father, the good citizen.⁶

Our estimate of Kant should turn, however, on sure knowledge of precisely what he sought to do, and his central principle once recognized, it is chiefly a question of carrying it into application. Kant admits all the way along that experience can alone settle many matters which do not now concern him, in his explicitly limited inquiry. Experience can alone decide, for example, what conforms to the feeling of pleasure.⁷ Kant holds that the happiness of others may very well be the object of the will of a rational being, but the point is that happiness can not be the determining principle.⁸ A very high place is to be assigned to love as an ideal, and so the Kantian system may be very directly connected with Christianity. The *summum bonum* may be the whole object of our practical reason, but not even this can be the determining principle. The first essential to morality having been ascertained,

⁵ Cf. Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

⁶ See Green, *Prolegomena*, 3rd ed., p. 266. For other objections, see W. Fite, *Introd. Study of Ethics*, 1903, p. 180; A. K. Rogers, *The Theory of Ethics*, p. 60.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 184.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

Christianity supplies the second indispensable element of the highest good, by representing the world in which rational beings devote themselves with all their souls to the moral law as a kingdom of God, in which nature and morality are brought into a harmony foreign to each by itself, by a holy Author who makes the derived *summum bonum* possible.⁹ Thus Kant opens the door into the world of religion at the point where the moral law needs its spiritual incentive or sanction.

Intuitionism.—Intuition is usually defined as immediate judgment regarding what ought to be done, or what ought to be the goal of conduct. Intuitionism, assuming the existence of intuition as a faculty, holds that certain kinds of actions are unconditionally prescribed, that is, without regard to results. It appeals to the fact that we know what we ought to do, know the actions which are right in themselves, although we do not know what conduct will secure happiness. The existence of moral intuitions is the central fact.¹⁰ If by any chance we know at all that happiness is the only rational end of action, we must know it intuitively; for the method of experience has failed. Intuition is said therefore to disclose the needed rules of action, to yield convincing maxims which show what is right. In brief, intuition is supposed to guarantee the intrinsic nature of values, for example, the value of truth-speaking. The apprehension of the quality of an act is held to be a sufficient test of its worth.

Objections to Intuitionism.—The psychological objection to intuitionism is that separation into faculties is no longer regarded as intelligible; moral intuition, as we have before noted, is a form of intuition in general, and this in turn has had a history, it does not yield a different kind of knowledge. To sunder intuition from the intellectual life and attribute special authority to it, would be to separate it from the very sources which yield its content. In reply, it might be argued that intuition, like Kant's "good will" or practical reason, is not psychological; but

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

¹⁰ See Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

that the priority and superiority of intuition are logically demanded in order to make the basis of ethics secure. The universal basis has, however, been made far more secure in Kant's rationalism than by any appeal to intuition discriminated as a moral faculty. Moral intuition is indeed real, it yields values, is the recipient of insights, and so it is to be revered as one of the processes by which the mind works, that is, by contrast with slow processes of induction. But this its moral and spiritual value is to be distinguished from the attempt to find a basis of moral theory in the pronouncements of common sense, tacitly assumed, and vested with authority on the assumption that these principles have had a peculiar origin. It may indeed be necessary to make various postulates of moral reason—God, freedom, and immortality—but these assumptions are made on the basis of profound insight into the realm of values, namely, the conclusion that there is an ultimate value which does not need to be demonstrated.

Ambiguities of the Term.—The term intuition is sometimes used with reference to the implied "faculty," but again it signifies authoritative utterance. Sometimes it is practically a synonym for "conscience," as the tribunal beyond which there is no appeal; and conscience in turn may either be a direct form of intellectual perception, or an intuitive conviction involving a reference to maxims accepted as "self-evident laws." Again, it may mean the assumed existence of a moral "sense" or moral "taste" in which there is less emphasis on formal elements. Intuitive utterances are said to be products of "moral reason" and yet it is not supposed to be rational to consider the results of moral conduct.¹¹

In the Kantian doctrine of "practical reason" intuition is infallible, an "erring conscience" is a chimera. For Shaftesbury and Hutcheson,¹² conscience or intuition was similar in function to æsthetic perception of the distinction between beauty and its opposite. That is, morality was made to rest on a specific "feeling," but without yielding

¹¹ Cf. Rashdall, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Chap. IV.

¹² See Selby-Bigge, *op. cit.*, Vol. I.

a standard sufficient to show the authority of this feeling over all others. Here, too, faulty psychology was certainly the original difficulty; for feeling is not thus separable from the judgments which assign to it its authority and distinctiveness, it lacks the universal validity required of an ethical standard. Critics have shown that the implied moral reaction or integration is due, not to a single specific feeling or emotion, but to a whole complex of feelings and emotions, together with various judgments.¹³

However great the difficulty in defining what intuition as "conscience" is said to be, it has been assumed that there is latent in the self either a power which becomes explicit as universal conscience, the ultimate principle of morals; or principles of common sense in the entire race, and sufficient to show what man ought to do, what actions are right in themselves. Experience would not then be necessary in order to produce moral laws or rules, nor would it be necessary to try out moral deeds in the light of consequences before choice could be made of those that are most eligible. In popular form, such a view of intuition or conscience would mean that each individual could put matters to the test by awaiting the dictates of intuitive reason or moral feeling. We shall return to the question of conscience in its popular form in another chapter.

Self-evident Truths.—However the theory is stated, the objection is that we have no evidence to prove either that innate moral principles exist, to guide all men in the same way, as if moral truth were "self-evident," or that we have a faculty or "sense" to which we can appeal for infallible decisions. The alleged intuitive truths by which we are to judge differ with individuals and groups, at various periods in the world's history, and it is out of the question to convince one group of the "common sense" truths of another group. Self-evident truths bear evidence of having gradually won recognition through the experiences of those who have adopted them as authoritative. Whatever the value of principles adopted because our "moral sense" approves of them, this intuitive approval

¹³ Cf. Rashdall, *ibid.*, p. 144.

does not put them in a category by themselves. Custom, habit, tradition, and ideas of authority or moral sanctions have all played a part in producing our moral convictions; it is as impossible to isolate the rationalistic element of intuition from the rest of our nature as to single out moral sensibility and oppose "taste" to "reason" as the criterion. We bring judgment and experience to bear when comparing the principles which various moral leaders have advocated. The test is not to take such truths as they read, but to regard them as we would any other propositions which we analyze and interpret by reference to the conditions under which they were produced. Principles which can be rationally justified or explained are not to be regarded as innate or infallible, as independent or absolute; but are to be brought out into the open and tested, proved by reason and experience, without any claims which, if accepted on authority, would involve pre-judgments and a blind appeal to conscience as final. The greatest diversity of opinion is found in the history of morality, where unanimity has been assumed.¹⁴ The assumed self-evident morality put forward as objective is likely to prove dogmatic, subjective, lacking a single all-comprehensive imperative by which conduct is to be determined.¹⁵ And if we were finally to agree upon a set of principles drawn up on an intuitive basis four conditions would be needed, according to Sidgwick, to establish a given proposition:¹⁶ The maxims of common sense do not fulfill these conditions.

On the basis of these conclusions, critics have come to see that the morality of common sense can not be raised into a system of intuitive ethics, nor can intuitionism be established by appeal to reason as if it alone constituted both the authority and the content of morality. And so rationalism has been enriched. For some moralists, the sense of duty is identical with rational love of persons, involving also love for God; and Kant's "kingdom of

¹⁴ Cf. Everett, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

¹⁵ See Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 180, foll.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 337.

ends" finds recognition in the social application of rationalism. The "autonomy of the will" gives place to the larger autonomy of the moral self, recognized as in the profoundest sense law-giver, or at least as creative participant in the moral law. Granted the enriched content, due to Hegel, English and American idealists, Kant's rules of action have added value as workable guides:

"So act as if the law of thine action were to become by thy will universal law.

"Regard humanity whether in thine own person or in that of any one else always as an end and never as a means only.

"Act as a member of a kingdom of ends."

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CHAPTER XII

IDEALISM

Socrates.—The difficulties encountered by the two types of moralists we have been considering, the hedonists and rationalists, might have been surmounted for the most part had ethical development taken its clue more directly from Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Socrates did not sunder the good from pleasure, the useful, or particular; but sought the universal needed to coördinate man's various activities by disclosing a standard of action. Right action seemed to him impossible without right knowledge. When right knowledge is gained, good conduct will follow; since knowledge is the strongest factor in our nature. That man is just, who knows what is right. If then we would find what is permanently or universally good, we must know ourselves fundamentally. Socrates sought to awaken men to realization of what they are, what they should seek to be and to do in order to make the best out of life. For the virtuous life, a life internally at unity, is a work of art in which every part is determined by its relation to the whole, as the ideal. Such a life is characterized by Eudæmonia (happiness), which Socrates did not limit either to activities or feelings by themselves, or to the pleasure or satisfaction which results from fortunate expression. He did not limit the good to a single virtue, although he put great stress on temperance (his own life was an ideal example) as the basis of the virtues. In his own personality he possessed great power to quicken others to recognition of large-minded virtue.

Plato.—It is possible to give only a suggestion of the surpassing idealism of Plato, in the space at our disposal. For him the desires and pleasures, the irrational elements

of our nature are indeed inferior to the life of reason. But Plato is a rationalist without being too formal. He recognizes, for example, the quickening power of love, with the tendency of people to do things together; our sense of dependence, our ideals of friendship growing out of mutuality, and our yearning for completeness. While love is the deep original prompting which sends us forth into experience, it is insight into the ends which love seeks that makes the good explicit, namely, in relation to Beauty, Truth, Reality or the ideal order of Being. Love is at first a sign of our low estate, our sense of limitation or inadequacy. We may indeed take ourselves to be complete. But no one is self-sufficient. Only through conjunction with others can we become complete. The desires and conflicts we become aware of are indications that two kinds of love are active in us, passion and ideal love. Love, indeed, in its awakening extends through the entire range of experience, from passion in its lowliest estate to pure love for the Eternal Ideas. The true lover is the philosopher. Hence the significance of Plato's fundamental inquiry into the nature of justice in his *Republic*.

The individual is first a citizen, the state being prior to the individual, who, existing for it, needs to find his organic place. Emphasis falls on harmony among the classes in the state, the powers of the self (desire, the spirited principle, reason), and the virtues (temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice or the organizing principle). Virtue as a whole is the right combination of these the cardinal virtues. Order in the inner life—balance, temperance, control—is the basis of order in the social life of the individual. *Reason is power* in achieving this order or unity: it is in command through the ruling class in the state; it yields the form or system of the virtues. The end or goal is what is significant, not the original prompting of our nature which sent us forth into experience. Knowledge is virtue for Plato, as for Socrates. But he assigns a definite content to it, as already indicated, and shows that our powers belong together in an ascending scale. The best element should lead in us and in the state, that

is, the ideal state to be organized by the few best minds, the men of power, who, without private property or love of gain, live for the sake of the good. There should be a careful gradation of vocations according to fitness, each man to fulfill a function. The element of pleasure or happiness finds place in Plato's scheme as welfare or well-being. Only through knowledge of the good as the highest end and essence is it possible to assign the lesser virtues to their respective levels. It is the philosopher who knows what real happiness is.

Aristotle.—With Aristotle ethics becomes for the first time in history a distinctive science, and his *Ethics*¹ is a study of the ultimate end of all striving, the highest Good which fulfills all other aims. This end is in brief Eudæmonia, but everything depends on our understanding of what constitutes happiness. The masses might define it as pleasure, wealth, honor, or something similar; cultivated people would define it as virtue and philosophy. It is not a state of subjective feeling, but an objective form of life, for the one who is blessed with a good lot in life.² Aristotle does not start with the uncritical assumption that we are by nature morally good. Man has various possibilities open to him, owing to the fact that he is actuated by both rational and irrational impulses. Among these is a possibility of virtue, or the good. One would not start then (with the Cyrenaics) with the proposition that the good is pleasure, as naturally sought by the individual. The good, defined as happiness, can only be attained through training, practice, the endeavor to acquire well-being through wise habits, the selection and coördination of desires, the adjustment between the rational and the irrational.

Virtue, moreover, is a *mean*, and this plainly is an attainment. Further still, man is a social being, and can attain to the good only through the state. The tests of virtue are not found in our sensibilities, but in our rationality as the coördinating principle. We must so train

¹ Tr. by Welldon, 1892.

² Cf. Paulsen, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

ourselves that virtue shall be habitual, so that we shall readily do the right.

Aristotle's ethical theory is essentially practical, adapted to this world, looking toward existing states as supplying the necessary fields of activity. The "master of those who know" keeps close to the actual facts of life as he finds it; he sees the difficulties in the way of carrying out Socrates' proposition that virtue is knowledge, on account of the probable conflict between desires and reason, and because he admits will as a factor. He is interested in the well-rounded life of the gentleman, the scholar; and hence holds that a fairly long life and many physical conditions are essential. He does not consider the problems of the individual who can not command these advantages, nor does he discuss self-denial. His crowning emphasis is on the intellectual virtues, on contemplation, or the life of reason in the scholar. Thus his ideal departs in a measure from the civic or social standard and becomes more individualistic. He sees the force of the argument for pleasure, and holds that pleasure is not rightfully the motive but rather the *result* of virtue, namely, as happiness, attained through reason. Virtue, in brief, is a state of deliberate moral purpose consisting in a "mean" relative to ourselves, the mean being determined by reason, as the wise man would determine it. The ideal or perfect man is the one who attains *self-realization*, as the rational standard or test of the good.

Nature and Spirit.—Aristotle's eudæmonism has been variously developed or modified to include elements of the moral life not adequately emphasized or in order to resolve the dualism in the nature and life of man. In behalf of Christianity Seth suggests the importance of making the antithesis and conflict between sensibility and reason as sharp as possible.³ While the Greek ideal was one of moderation or the mean, Christianity widens the breach between nature and spirit, the mind and the flesh, widens it to overcome it: self-sacrifice must precede and make possible self-fulfillment. Man, rising out of nature,

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 194.

as a superior or rational being, asserts his superiority to nature; hence follows the rebirth of the active being, which lives anew in the spiritual life, all becoming *organic* to the one central principle. Hence Seth dwells on the life of goodness as a transfiguration, everything being hallowed when it becomes the vehicle of the divine in man.

The Reconciling Principle.—For Seth then as for many others who have sought for the unity between Greek and Christian ideals, the reconciling principle is found in “the ethics of personality,” in *self-realization* as the standard.⁴ This involves, in the interpretation Seth gives it, neither mere self-sacrifice nor self-gratification, but the more complete development of both sides of our nature such that not even the rational self is dominant but rather the total self, rational and sentient. The ethical problem then is to define what self-realization shall mean, namely, that “the several changing desires, instead of being allowed to pursue their several ways, and to seek each its own good or satisfaction, are so correlated and organized that each becomes instrumental to the fuller and truer life of the rational human self.”⁵

True Autonomy.—It is this power of transcending the instinctive, impulsive, sentient life through will which constitutes man a moral being in the higher sense. Every natural tendency to activity is to come before the bar of reason’s higher insight. The triumphant life of the spirit is not smooth and easy. As in nature, so there is always opposition, with intractable elements to be subdued to spiritual form. The lower propensities are not to be cast out but sublimated into the life of reason, which makes the interests of sensibility its own. While nature is under law, man has wittingly to subject himself to law, the law or order in both cases being the expression of reason. It is moral reason, acting in accordance with its insights, which *makes* the various activities of our nature higher or lower, interpreting all by reference to its standard of self-realization. Thus we have the true autonomy

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

of the moral life. Thus regarded, virtue is not a spontaneous natural growth, but is constituted virtue by man's judgment and conduct as a moral person. For, as Aristotle has shown, nature gives only the *capacity* of acquiring virtue.

Whether one is able to follow Seth's view of self-realization to the last will depend on the conclusion concerning self-sacrifice, which he interprets to be "dying to live," with a losing of the lower life and crucifying of the flesh.⁶ Recent ethical thought seeks to avoid the terminology of "denial." Sublimation or the transforming of the self is not now understood as sacrifice of the lower self. But recent thought would agree with Seth's conclusion that the perfect moral integration includes happiness, carefully defined, not as the sum of pleasures, but as their harmony or system in which pleasure is a concomitant of activity, with egoism and altruism brought into closest relation.

Paulsen's Solution.—Paulsen arrives at his solution by contrasting the ideal of perfection of the Greeks with the Christian spirit of world-denial.⁷ The great truths engraven on the hearts of men by Christianity are that suffering, sin, and guilt are essential phases of human life, and that the world lives by the vicarious death of the just and innocent.⁸ Joined with these truths was a longing for the transcendent, the goal of life being in the blessedness of the hereafter, here enjoyed in anticipation. In any case the rule of reason, or the limitation and discipline of the sensuous desires is demanded as the pre-condition of perfection. Paulsen's solution puts emphasis on the "energistic" or will-element of the self, with an objective content of life found in definite concrete duties: "such modes of conduct and volition are good as tend to realize the highest goal of the will, which may be called *welfare*," the perfection of our being and the perfect exercise of life.⁹ The end or goal pursued by the will is not feeling (hedonism), but *action*. The real business of ethics is to

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, Bk. I.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

determine the objective value of the various modes of conduct, not to decide upon the subjective or personal value of the agent's prompting to action. Good always presupposes a relation: good *for* something. So, too, duty finds its content in custom, while conscience is the consciousness of custom, or knowledge of a higher will by which the individual will feels itself bound: conscience acts as an inhibition of particular will-impulses which deviate from the normal, its positive function being reflection on the ideal of the perfect life. The yearning of the will for perfection is then the root of morality, and that which is a demand in morals becomes a reality in religion.¹⁰ Responsibility is divided between the individual, the collective bodies which have molded him, his family, his social class, his nation, humanity at large, and the All-real. Impulses form the natural basis of the virtues; compassion or sympathy, for example, is not good in itself but is the natural foundation of the virtue of benevolence. Impulses are also the permanent basis of the virtues, fashioned into virtues by reason. Hence Paulsen puts much stress on self-control as the virtue which regulates conduct by rational will, independently of momentary feelings; as the capacity to govern life by purposes and ideals, the fundamental condition of all moral virtues, the pre-condition of all human worth.¹¹ Without self-control there would be no personality, no freedom. Hence, in a more practical way than by the traditional ethical method Paulsen considers the virtues in much detail, how they may be realized, for example, the Greek virtue of temperance, also the ideals of the economic life, culture, the spiritual life, with stress on compassion, benevolence, and justice.

Janet's Eudæmonism.—In Janet's unification of Greek and later ethics Kant and Aristotle are brought into close relation.¹² The term rational eudæmonism is used to distinguish this view from utilitarianism and from the too abstract formalism of Kant. The basis of moral science,

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 419.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 483.

¹² *The Theory of Morals*, tr., 1883.

Janet holds, is good anterior to duty, not duty anterior to good. Kant is right so far as moral good is concerned, but moral good presupposes natural goods, which are to be estimated by their excellence, independently of our feeling. Natural good is not limited to pleasure, as some have assumed, but includes industry, science, taste for the beautiful, the affections; the first promptings of kindness, moderation, modesty, sincerity, also various innate inclinations. Moral good signifies the good *use* of natural goods.¹³ To free moral action of all effective objects would be to destroy the action itself. Kant is right in his analysis of duty as universal law, obligatory for its own sake; for the sole legitimate root of morality springs from the idea of law. But Kant's morality should rest on that of Aristotle. Natural goods are *essentially good*. That is why they are of inestimable worth. The goodness of God is no less good because it is not for him a matter of duty. And natural good is not constituted by the pleasure it produces, is not to be sought for the sake of feeling.

It follows that the good will is not the only thing absolutely and unequivocally good: to say this would be to confound the objective and the subjective, to make conscience the absolute basis. Intelligence, resolution, self-control, and moderation, for instance, are essentially good, although they can be misused. By reducing good to a good will, Kant really changed his formal morality to a subjective morality. An exclusively formal morality would be arbitrary. Universality is an insufficient test, hence the force of Schleiermacher's criticism that the intrinsic hollowness of the law is to be remedied only by making one's self worthy of happiness. The principle of *humanity* corrects and completes but also controverts Kant's formal principle: humanity is an *object* to be respected or perfected, an *end* to be attained; and it yields the *matter* which is contrasted with the form, the reason and ground for the law, the object of choice.¹⁴ A will is good, in brief, in obedience to recognition of the ideal of humanity. The

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

good consists in perfection and pleasure indissolubly united, in the most excellent activity: the principle of perfection explains our duties towards others by tracing them back to our duties towards ourselves.¹⁵ We can not form a conception of good without feeling that it is our duty to perform it. Virtue may then indeed become "a creative act," and in its most sublime features free and individual. Thus to attain virtue the "intelligence" which Kant emphasizes should be added to by *love*: a pure will does good for the love of good. In a state of absolute purity the will is indeed simply the voluntary love of good, without effort, without struggle, and without obedience to a dry and abstract law.¹⁶ If there is respect for law why should there not be love, namely, for the sake of good, for moral beauty and moral purity, for humanity, and for God as found in all men?

Types of Goodness.—We find then that unifying ethical theories include an extensive variety of goods, and we are reminded of the fact that the term "good" compasses the whole field under such types as the following: (1) the political ideal of the welfare of society, including state and civic virtue, as in ancient Greece; (2) the individualistic ideal of the self-sufficient wise man inculcated by various Greek schools and transmitted to modern times as a part of our cultural conception; (3) the ascetic ideal of world-negation, connected with mysticism, Buddhism, medieval Christianity, and the philosophy of Schopenhauer; (4) the modern æsthetic ideal with its emphasis on individuality, as in romanticism; (5) the utilitarian ideal of the economic welfare of society, with emphasis on external conditions; (6) the larger-minded Christian ideal of membership in one another, a brotherhood of spiritual personalities, with reference to various Christian virtues, in contrast with the cardinal virtues of the Greeks. Each of these conceptions requires modification, if it is to become eligible in a complete system. The political ideal of Plato, for instance, tends to over-emphasis on the state. The wise

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

man's ideal has found its permanent place in modern views of the inner life, but as noble as this ideal may be it stands for a phase only of the complete life of goodness. Self-denial is one aspect only of self-realization. Natural good is not any longer to be contrasted with moral goodness in disparaging terms. The good is anything in daily life which ministers to our needs and fosters our welfare, natural good is constantly acquiring moral value; and things are not to be rejected as evil or immoral unless they work against human welfare.¹⁷ Good conduct in these terms is any conduct which tends to develop the best type of life. In this sense ideas of goodness enter into every moment of our conduct. We no longer think of a good thing or quality as possessing absolute power, as if, like Kant's "good will" it appeared to function by itself. But a term which has so many meanings is likely to obscure our inquiry. It is therefore imperative, with Professor Palmer, who has dwelt on the organic character of goodness with greater persuasiveness than other ethical idealists, to classify the meanings under two general heads.¹⁸

Extrinsic Goodness.—We speak, for example, of a good day (for our purposes), a serviceable instrument or machine, such as a lawn-mower, which cuts the grass evenly. A good thing of this type is always good *for*; some end is to be attained; the good is the useful. In extrinsic goodness there is always an adjustment of the object to something which lies outside itself. A good law is one that preserves peace and order. A good house-maid, clerk, policeman, ship captain, or mayor is efficient in the given social situation. The test is fitness to play a part, to fulfill a function in relation with other parts, for instance, the clerk who makes entries only. A satisfactory constitution is good for the state it serves. A servant is instrumental in the home, as the hand is instrumental to the body as a whole. Each part or member, fulfilling a function, is limited, aids and is aided, as in team-play.¹⁹

¹⁷ Everett, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 37, 45.

¹⁸ *The Nature of Goodness*, p. 11.

¹⁹ The term "goodness" is to be identified with the term "value," as used in our preceding chapters.

Intrinsic Goodness.—Transferring this idea of organic relatedness from the sphere of efficiency to the moral realm, we note that intrinsic goodness or value is not means but end. A man as a mere servant is organically efficient. As a "person" he is an end in himself, living in the realm of the ideal. But in the moral sphere there is both extrinsic and intrinsic goodness. No person is complete in himself, and his self-realization is essential to the higher welfare of the whole.

The Moral Organism.—This inter-relatedness of parts to a whole is brought out by the definition of an organism as "that assemblage of active and differing parts in which each part is both means and end."²⁰ Thus the father of a family serves and is served in the home, the community, the state, and the country. He is, let us say, a merchant; and so he serves and is served by any number of other dealers and producers within and without his own community. The same is true of those who contribute to public safety, the law, education, and the religious life of the town. No one, however important his service, is complete in himself, although each is strong in his incompleteness. This organic relatedness is first of all a fact, and thus far obvious. But with the realization of the dependence of any member of the community on the others, hence of the opportunity he has to participate in this social relationship to the full, the matter-of-fact interdependence becomes ethical. This great conception becomes indeed so important, when one begins to see its force and the incentive it affords for doing one's best, that only gradually does its significance dawn upon the mind. Even the figure of the organism proves to be entirely inadequate. Indeed, objections to it have repeatedly been raised.²¹ Yet no one has proposed any other symbol so rich in content. Running back in the history of ethics to Plato's conception of the order and organization of the virtues, and in Christian history to the Apostle Paul's ideal of corporate conscious-

²⁰ Palmer, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

²¹ See, for example, R. M. McConnell, *The Duty of Altruism*, 1910, p. 4.

ness through membership in one another, this idea has the richest meanings of any symbol in our language. It suggests both the division of labor, the diversification of function, and hence the efficiency which characterizes coöperation at its best, and the ideal of perfect goodness made possible in groups and in social life as a whole which transcends all finitude or limitation.²² It stands for goodness in its two-fold sense, for extrinsic goodness or serviceability, and for intrinsic goodness or fullness and adjustment of function. The implied ideal is the realization through the most productive life of that which is best in man. The remainder of this volume will be devoted to the working out of this conception of goodness, defined as *organic self-realization*. The idea of the self here understood has already been discussed in the preceding chapters. The implication on the social side is the solidarity of the race. The implication on the God-ward side is that in his life of participation with his fellowmen man shares the one Good which is eternal, the idea of the Good being supreme among the Eternal Values.

Interdependence.—The foregoing discussions have led up to this view from a number of directions. Psychologically speaking, we found every phase of the self dependent on other phases, for example, the will in its dependence on the involuntary, and the desires; reason with its dependence on the senses, on the primitive urge to become productive, on experience; and experience with its need of description, explanation, and interpretation, passing in turn to character and conduct. The various theories of goodness imply the need of this conception of *the form of personal goodness*, as an assemblage of varied activities requiring organization. The qualitative differences of function imply a distinction between higher and lower, greater and lesser goods; and eventually a scale of values. The *greater* good is more largely contributory, while a good is *higher* to the degree in which it is an end.²³ The more richly functional an activ-

²² Cf. Palmer, "The Glory of the Imperfect," in *The Teacher*, 1908.

²³ Cf. Palmer, *The Nature of Goodness*, p. 37.

ity is, the greater the goodness. Largeness of organization and order are thus the double traits of goodness. The inter-relatedness of the work of the teacher in the community, for example, illustrates the richly functional service combined with the ideals of character, the power of a quickening personality.

The Test of Goodness.—Comparing this conception of goodness—membership in an organism by reference to the greater and the higher—with other views, we find that the good regarded as that which satisfies desire is deficient because there is no standard by which to test desires in the light of their origins, levels, results, ends or value. For desires are not detachable. They come in a context. We desire other ends than pleasure, and even happiness or satisfaction needs its organizing form in relation to that which essential, is contributory to happiness. The theory that the good is adaptation to environment is defective because, as we shall see more and more conclusively, the inner world is neglected; and because there is no fixed environment, but environment is always plastic, derives its character in part from the environed object. Goodness as the expression of the largest organization aims everywhere to bring object and environment into fullest coöperation.²⁴ Again, the good might be regarded as the commendable, as worthy of approval, honorable, possessing good qualities, such as fine manners. The question would then be, Commendable for what? If we say that the good is that which approaches a goal, how then shall we relate the goal with the original prompting? So too the Kantian conception of the good as the unconditioned would be that this view, taken in its sheer universality and without the qualifications which other ethical philosophers have introduced into it, leaves us without knowledge of the content of the good, too greatly separates intrinsic from extrinsic values. The same objection would be made to any view of the good defined as the *summum bonum* in general, that is, if the view in question fails to show *how* this alleged supreme end is related to the various objects which are

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

somehow included.²⁵ Even the definition of the good as perfection, or the complete character, has been objected to by some ethical philosophers who ask, for example. Why just this pattern of perfection?²⁶ To read through Green's profound treatise, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, still one of the most complete works we possess, is to find that one must first reckon with the Greek and Christian conceptions of virtue before one is able to see what shall give appropriate content to Green's ideal. So too the Christian ideal of perfection as contained in the New Testament turns upon the content to be assigned to the self, to conduct, and to the life of devotedness. Or if we declare, with Socrates, that knowledge is virtue; or, with others, that altruistic love or service is the standard, the same questions arise concerning both the content and the organization, the relations between the virtues and their opposites, between self-love or development and service. The question of the order among the virtues is indeed paramount, as we shall see in Part Three, when we consider, first, the individual virtues, then the social, and finally the principles implied in their organization.

The Stages of Goodness.—We are sent back then to the organic view of goodness as social self-realization, with the implied conception of capacities progressively realized in various functions, with emphasis both on the activities which yield the dynamic and on the ends discerned; also on the ideals made explicit by knowledge of the content of goodness. The static conception of passive completeness would not satisfy our idea of perfection.²⁷ The moral life is a process, a becoming; conduct is an active term, the unity or complete integration of our moral powers is an achievement to be made by each individual. The individual verifies the conception of goodness as organic by considering (1) self-consciousness as essential but defective and needing coherence and unity; (2) self-direction, includ-

²⁵ Summarized by Mackenzie as wealth, independence, power, fame, knowledge, love, service, peace, and freedom; *op. cit.*, p. 3.

²⁶ Cf. Fullerton, *op. cit.*, p. 253. Mackenzie's answer is given, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

²⁷ Cf. Everett, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

ing intention and volition; self-development, with its contradictory terms; and (3) self-sacrifice, which is often jarring in character, leaving with us a paradox, and calling for reconsideration.²⁸ Any of these elements taken alone implies incompleteness, as we would reasonably expect; "nothing is fair or good alone."²⁹ For there are stages of goodness: relationships to both nature and spirit, the inner life and social life, together with the scale of values which the individual draws up for practical use. Any phase of the process of self-development tending to run to excess needs its corrective. For example, the good defined as excellence of character with reference to culture as "symmetrical," with beauty as a test, might seem to imply little more than the æsthetic ideal so often disparaged as "Greek" in comparison with the Christian conception of self-denial (eulogized without analysis). But the milder Christian virtues—humility, forgiveness, non-resistance—would in turn need to be put in relation with some of the more aggressive virtues, and those which, like justice, call for social organization. Some people tend too strongly, by nature, toward introspection or toward self-sacrifice; while others tend to be so objective that they need to learn the values of the life of thought.

Self-determination.—Self-realization might indeed be considered with relation to each of our prevailing traits or qualities and in each case it would be plain that any characteristic would call for all the others. The moralist with rationalistic bent is likely to see in this goal the full attainment of the life of reason, and if, with Aristotle, he meditates upon ultimate things, he will ask for abundant time and rich opportunities for the life of thought. But, voicing another group, Wright, for example, defines this view as "that form of life which is required to satisfy completely the will."³⁰ Reason may indeed impress itself upon us as a distinctive human power, as extending the view of man to include a world of objects around, and as

²⁸ See Palmer, *op. cit.*, Chaps. IV-VI.

²⁹ See Emerson's poem, "Each and All."

³⁰ H. W. Wright, *Self-realization*, 1913, p. 83.

enlarging the experience of man to embrace the lives and personalities of others.³¹ But volition is "the organizing agency," the synthetic activity comprehensive of feeling and thought, covering the whole sphere of the inner life, from the desires amidst which it appears, the actions from purpose with which it is very directly concerned, to action from ideals, and volition as creative of self-conscious personality. Complete self-organization and self-determination are essential. Hence Wright argues that even in the case of self-sacrifice, if a duty at all, the sacrifice must be of ultimate benefit to the individual, in the fulfillment of his own good.³² Moral experience seems to show that self-sacrifice is "a real surrender of personal interests, involving the pain of irretrievable loss and calling for genuine heroism." But the solution of the apparent fundamental conflict is found in the conception of organization, which involves the relation of the part to the whole. "Self-organization begins with a differentiation or diversification of conscious life. Volition first expresses itself in a differentiating out of a mass of tendencies a number of desires. . . . The differentiation of these desires is the first step in self-organization and the prerequisite of all further moral development."³³ This organization involves self-mastery, that is, the necessity of integrating all single desires and purposes within the unity of the individual, in contrast with self-sacrifice, which is in reality the surrender only of the narrower purposes and ambitions of the individual in favor of the social self. Hence it is one of the many adjustments of the parts to the whole. This conclusion brings us once more to Palmer's conception of higher and greater goods.

Coördination.—Again, we might start with the good as the ideal limit of the desirable, as the satisfaction of all sides of our nature, including especially the desire for happiness and the endeavor to bestow it; hence as calling for sublimation (profiting by the lessons of psycho-analysis),

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 239.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

transmutation, or substitution, instead of the old-time self-suppression. But the good would then differ as the goal from the good as the standard to be used as the means of testing incentives along the way, that is, by successive judgments, estimates, and practical adjustments. Order among the promptings, the organization of a worthy universe of desire is indeed the heart of the process. Any tendency then would be "fitting," "suitable," or "useful" in relation to the accepted standard, which would include service to others as a motive, to offset too great stress on self-development. Desire for self-expression would find an appropriate place according to the type of the individual, as in case of the man of science, the philanthropist, the teacher. Economic goods, friends, home, health, rest, recreation, avocation, opportunities for growing knowledge would find their respective places. A man's avocation, for instance, might be his means of preserving individuality, his productivity, creative freedom and power. The preservation of this life or spontaneity might then be the saving grace of the whole moral scheme, the element of our nature which keeps us from becoming crystallized in our views, static in our habits, too formal, over-precise, too calculative, too self-consciously æsthetic.

The Ideal Self.—Virtue as thus understood would be far more than "knowledge" in the Socratic sense, since knowledge has never been shown to be identical with virtue, although knowledge is essential to and may aid in the attainment of all the virtues. The self-knowledge for which Socrates pleaded would be a prime necessity. For inevitably the question frequently arises, What self is to be realized? Which one, among the possible selves, is the true or ideal self? ³⁴ Whatever may be said about perfection as the standard, with tendencies to prefer Greek or Christian types, a certain type of selfhood finds place in our thought as the ideal so worthy of our approval that we put all other types in a subordinate position. In a sense each man is, as Seth says, "his own measure of good,"

³⁴ Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Rashdall, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 62.

and so there appears to be no common standard.³⁵ But it is man, seeing his ideal self as an end, yet belonging with others in a kingdom of ends, who creatively finds his place. Hence, in *being* just himself, he *becomes* the social or conjunct self which is the true self to be realized. The character of each of us is to be developed toward rounded perfection *within the limits* essential to concentration on something supremely worth doing. There are various worthy pattern-types. The finite is necessarily incomplete.

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³⁵ For other difficulties, see Rashdall, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

CHAPTER XIII

DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITY

The Moral Constant.—We have seen that the idea of moral obligation implies a conception of the moral order regarded as universal, the moral law being the persistent principle implied in successive moral judgments. Morality in this sense points to the ideal as an eternal value, as moral reason beyond which there is nothing higher. Granted this insight, the implied obligation may be expressed as duty, with special reference to conduct, the call of the moral order as a whole to the parts to sustain it. The moral order makes its appeal as an “ought.” It calls for obedience, and so obedience becomes a duty.

Goodness and Duty.—We have found too that individual goodness means realization of our powers through organization of our many-sidedness, orderly development and expression through dominance of a purpose. Such goodness also implies duty, for goodness carries with it a sense of incompleteness. Hence we look beyond the individual to the ground of all goodness, with increasing awareness of our obligation. Goodness, regarded as inner or personal, is relative to the powers and the ideal of each individual as a member of social groups: the ought or duty as above us is the call to be true to the highest and best.

The term duty is more definite than the terms “moral obligation,” “right.” Duty is the specific expression of moral law and obligation. It pertains to my whole relationship to God and the neighbor, and includes manifold duties. When the term “right” is used, I think more of privileges accorded to me, and of struggles for rights on the part of social groups in antagonism. By “duty” I mean, among other things, what I give, not in return for rights granted to me, but as a moral agent in

the largest social sense, contributing or producing. The moral law obliges me by putting consequences upon me by way of suffering and benefits, intimately relates me to my fellows, discloses reciprocity; and yields the supreme opportunity. If I recognize its imperative, I realize that I owe not merely allegiance in the sense of what is demanded of me but the full measure of devotedness.

It is well to note what the term duty has meant in ethical history, even though we use other terms today and qualify its austerities. It has been said, "That only is a duty which I can not make." I find it and must submit to it. Anything self-prescribed I can abolish. "You can not choose your duty." If you owe it you can not change it. It is given, as in the call to duty for one's country, or to one's parents. And so in Palmer's terms it involves "tied-in-ness." Duty is the recognition of the tie. It involves a sentiment of reverence or respect, also the sort of conduct which accords with it. Hence the law of duty is universal, it does not derive its character from a particular case. Duty thus regarded knows no persons, that is, no partiality: "God is no respecter of persons." The divine mercy or justice descends on all. Hence the formulations of the moral law as the Golden Rule and the Categorical Imperative.

Duty and Inclination.—Again, the idea of duty has been made specific by contrasting it with our knowledge of inclination and the problems it involves. Inclination implies self-interest, impulses and desires which tend toward unlimited expression.¹ Control or coördination of desires, emotions, and other incentives is imperative. Self-interests tempt me to indulge myself, to take my ease and my time: but duty summons me to put self aside, forget it, at times to neglect even my weariness, that I may rise to the occasion. There are many frailties to be understood and overcome. My lesser self may tend toward selfishness, if not toward evil, vice, or crime. Civil law everywhere takes account of the manifestations of this lesser self, and prescribes obedience to law as a duty.

¹ See Paulsen's explanation, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

Hence it has long been usual in the sphere of personal conduct to put the self through a measure of discipline, to curb the lesser self in all its activities, and attain self-control. Such discipline has often entailed severe training in doing what is difficult, in facing what is hard and overcoming it because it is what one does not want to do. In fact, duty and difficulty have seemed synonymous. Self-sacrifice, because hard, has appeared to be duty in its essence. Duty has called not only for Stoic self-control but for Christian disciplinary obedience.

Objections to Duty.—It has been questioned whether good results have sprung from duty as an incentive. Duty as a motive may indeed be a necessity in war-time, but it has lost its appeal for the most part since men of the ranks questioned the right of leaders who do not fight to make war for their own political or other private interests. When self-sacrifice is praised as a duty in war-time, it is easy to fall into fallacies and to regard all sacrifice as a virtue. Meager results have attended the Christian appeal to duty in the long ages. Many creeds, institutions, and even churches have been maintained through a sense of duty, long after life had departed out of them. Precedent and familiarity have often played us false.

Life is not merely a discipline. It is also an art and may be a joy. The contrast between inclination and duty may be intelligible up to a certain point, but the ideal is to understand, enlist, coördinate rather than to condemn and curb. To repress is to suffer detrimental reaction. Morality has been greatly held back in lands where self-discipline, self-sacrifice and asceticism have been regarded as the chief means.

Duty does not necessarily involve a divided self. The lesser or lower self may be a means to an end. The struggle may be incidental. The hard or difficult stage is found in the formation of any habit, in so far as persistent effort is required: the severity is not a sign of virtue. The Greek ideal of harmony between parts, due proportion attained by practice in which beauty of soul in a beautiful body is the test, is more rational. It retains the element

of satisfaction. The value of an act is then seen in relation to the doer, the person to whom it is done, the time, the means, the motive; and so the deed is lifted above the level of a mere moral task.²

The Command of Duty.—In behalf of duty it should be noted that the severity which has been so long associated with it is partly due to the accompanying creed by which it has been sustained, the rigidity of people who have inculcated it, and the authority with which it has been enforced. Its authority should be that of the moral law which we respect because we recognize it as the basic principle of integrity of character, of the virtues; not that of a given code, not even the Ten Commandments. No code is complete or final. More is expected of us than our mere duty. The Sermon on the Mount, with its emphasis on giving, is recognized as surpassing the Commandments. Even though faithfully kept to all intents and purposes, there is a something more. So Jesus said to the model young man: "Go sell all thou hast and give to the poor." Duty is indeed far more than all external observances, however scrupulous. Outward observance may be chiefly a form. Forms long survive the life which gave them birth. We do many things as ostensible duties merely because we have done them. With great reason therefore Jesus reduced the commandments to two, both of which are internal, love being the test. Again, the Golden Rule is simpler than the Ten Commandments: it implies the underlying unity which, when thought out, we recognize as the moral law. The higher command, in brief, is to forget self in love to God and man.

Love and Duty.—It is not necessary then to dwell on the severities involved in the idea of duty. Love as well as duty involves tied-in-ness. Yet we think rather of the joy it brings. We do not feel or manifest love at its best from a sense of duty. We do not love because we ought. But because we love we do that for others which taken by itself might be regarded as a duty. We wish others to do whatever is done for us in time of need *willingly* rather

² Rashdall, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 43.

than because they ought. Duty might indeed lead one to be no respecter of persons. But the duties of parents to children, of children to parents, husband to wife, and wife to husband necessarily involve special regard for persons. Patriotism if a duty at all is toward one country in particular. Goodness must be specific. Usually it is love which makes it so. When we love, duty is assimilated and almost forgotten. Duty to humanity might become utterly vague. Particular needs call our altruism into expression. And so in modern terms the idea of "service" has with many entirely taken the place of duty. A moral act should befit its particular relationships in the given situation. What we need is knowledge of the situation, and wisdom in meeting the special call. There is likely to be fitness between what we have to give and what is needed. The service-motive may well include all that was once put under the head of duty.

Nevertheless, the idea of duty, seen in relation to the ought and to loyalty holds important meanings for us. Since duty is what I *owe*, it implies "the felt inner binding" of Martineau's phraseology, what I *ought* to do, and acceptance of or adaptation to some social usage whereby I carry my duty into expression. Hence the term is most intimately related to all terms that are central to the moral life. In Janet's statement of the situation, duty consists in doing good, good in doing one's duty.³ As Ten Broeke puts the matter, a specific duty is what is owed to the ideal of the highest good in a particular situation, while virtue is the habitual response to what is thus required.⁴ A present duty usually represents a state of the self to be realized. Hence the effort required, the sternness which sometimes enters in, also the painful character of some duties. And so a duty may be regarded as a form of "the conative life-impulse seeking fulfillment," as Ten Broeke calls it. Westermarck holds that first of all duty expresses a striving. "When I feel that I ought to do a thing, I experience an impulse to do it, even though some opposite impulse may

³ *Op. cit.*, p. vi.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 71.

finally determine my action.”⁵ Hence when we say to another, “You ought to do this,” there is implied a purpose to influence his action in a certain direction. But duty has its imperative aspect in addition to the striving, or the effort to induce action; and so duty implies a negation, the possibility of transgression: the ought is prohibitive, implies what will happen if duty is not done.

If we do our duty only we may not be as fully productive as when the chief incentive is self-realization. Ten Broeke suggests that “every sense of duty is also a confession of ignorance, for it implies the new and untried.”⁶ So too the sense of duty is “always a mark of limitations. God has no duties, but the free active possession of the perfect good.” Duty is also limited because the individual’s duties grow out of his relation to environment in a way in which no one else is obligated. This is usually referred to as “my station and its duties.”⁷

Duty for Duty’s Sake.—Because of this call of duty to meet a specific situation, objection is raised to the idea of “duty for duty’s sake.” This would be too formal and general, and in the end false and self-contradictory.⁸ The moral being does not exist in isolation. Duty would then be abstract, subjective, and a part of ourselves would be left out. Morality is always relative to situations in which there is opportunity for duty. And so Bradley defines duty in terms of the relation of the particular to the universal; just *my* will in its affirmative relation.⁹

Duty refers both to the far-off goal of goodness toward which we strive, which seems at times unattainable, and to the immediate situation, plainly imperfect and demanding that something be done.¹⁰ Hence we commit ourselves to various courses of action, as means to the great end and because of immediate good to be done; and having committed ourselves we realize that it is incumbent upon us

⁵ *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Vol. I, p. 134.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁷ See Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

⁸ See F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, Chap. IV.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 187.

¹⁰ See Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, Chap. XVII.

to remain constant. So it comes about that the hardest phase of duty is what we did not foresee, is what we are called on to do which we did not anticipate or will. By these socially established courses of action to which we become committed we are "tied-in" with people and the trend of events, bound by conditions which we would never voluntarily have chosen. The duties of the soldier who enlists in times of peace without anticipating war or knowing what it means are typical. Numerous social relationships involve contracts to be fulfilled, promises to be kept. And so duties are tied-in with one another endlessly and we find ourselves passing from duty to duty throughout our days and months and years. On the other hand there is a sense in which it is a sound principle to do our duty as an end in itself, namely, as yielding moral value apart from any reward, and not as mere means to an end. There are acts done for their own sake, deeds of the Good Samaritan, for instance, which are complete. We signalize deeds of valor and service as of great worth in themselves, whatever values they may also contribute in other connections, what ever part they may play in the self-realization of the one who does them. We owe it to society both to fulfill our regular obligations, meeting the new duties as they occur, and working for the unity of virtue; and to contribute those deeds from time to time which lie outside of our special field and may perchance exceed most other deeds in moral value.

The Conflict of Duties.—Is conflict possible? Not within duty as a principle. In the case of conflict between values or various calls to duty, it is my duty to choose one alternative, and so I may be able to do my duty despite this complexity. But duty involves deeds to be done, these are manifold and call for adjustment to social situations in relation to family, town, state, nation, profession, and to organizations or groups whose standards may conflict. Ordinarily these various duties may be compatible, so that I can serve my family, my neighborhood, and all else by the same modes of conduct. But war may break out and I may be under compulsion to serve. What is my duty as

regards patriotism in contrast with inter-nationalism? To what level shall I assign love of my fellowmen? When asked to fight, the question of the value of a human life arises in contrast with the end to be attained by fighting.¹¹ It is not an easy matter to see what is value and what is means. The unity of the good is not a given entity to be applied as one might a measuring-rod. It must be attained by thought, it must be created. As the unity is a need for action, so it must emerge as an attainment through action. New occasions suggest new duties. Fresh emergencies send us back to reconsider the whole situation anew. Hence we are led to ask, What values are really worth struggling for, and how shall we make effort in their behalf? When forced into fighting a man may find himself compelled to surrender for the time being, so far as external conduct is concerned, everything that constitutes the higher values; hence the ends that are primary become lowest in the scale. Half-forgotten values may rise into activity, notably blood-ties, courage, loyalty to disagreeable duty. But again the values for which vigorous action is taken may unexpectedly afford opportunity for the expression of self-control, patience, endurance, self-sacrifice, heroism. Thus the least favorable external conditions may be accompanied by exceptionally productive moral and spiritual states. The more objective and compelling the external situation, as in the case of a soldier exposed to greatest perils in the front-lines when volunteers for an act requiring utmost courage are called for, the more impressively the individual may rise to meet it. Opportunities for freedom of action may be reduced to the minimum, yet the opportunity for moral choice may be at its maximum.

Loyalty.—Sometimes the problem of choice between opportunities taken to mean a conflict of duties is stated with reference to various loyalties and in terms of Royce's conception of loyalty one is advised to choose that cause or movement which will most greatly increase loyalty in

¹¹ Cf. B. M. Laing, *A Study in Moral Problems*, p. 128.

the world.¹² Loyalty is surely higher than partisanship, and it is inseparable from duty. But loyalty for the sake of loyalty is too general, and it is open to all the objections to Kant's ethics. Loyalty is not so profound or central as duty. I may indeed do my part toward increasing it as a value in the world, but when it becomes a question of the cause for which I am to be loyal I find that I must be as nearly fundamental in my thinking as possible. Loyalty may be exacted of me when I am unable to give it. I may be one of those men who put love of truth above demands for fidelity to an institution. I may put love of goodness above loyalty to a party in political power. I may put love of my fellowmen above loyalty to country as conventional patriotism defines it. I may, in short, be disinterested. It is my duty then to weigh the several alternatives put before me, to estimate them in the light of their relative worth as contributory to the greater or lesser good.

By what deeds can I foster the greater good? Sometimes I am called on to display loyalty toward a person, whatever he has done, and such loyalty may coincide with the greater good. But again I may in the end contribute most to the welfare of society by disinterestedly manifesting my loyalty to truth, or the right. Loyalty must then be defined in terms of the values which we find near the top of our scale.¹³ Indeed, Everett maintains that value is the basal conception of ethics, more nearly final than duty, law, or right.¹⁴ Seth holds that the claims of individuals conflict, the claims of persons never.¹⁵ To sustain this thesis would be to distinguish in favor of that which is for the best good of a person, personality being understood in terms of rational selfhood. In religious terms this would be fidelity to the soul or spirit in contrast with the individual as externally known. And it is commonly rec-

¹² J. Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 1908; summarized and discussed in *Psychology in Theory and Application*, Dresser, Chap. XXIX.

¹³ Cf. Everett, *Moral Values*, p. 46.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁵ *Ethical Principles*, p. 212.

ognized that the self in this guise is a supreme value. Obviously there is a difference then between working for loyalty as conventional society may regard individuals and working for those goods which contribute to the development of character. We like to think that in the total working out of things what is for the best good of one will be for the best good of all others who are concerned, hence we conclude once more that there is no conflict within duty itself.

The Ought.—The ought is implied in duty: duties are what I *ought* to contribute for society's good. Ought then is another expression for the moral law, with its imperatives, which is over me. Moral consciousness makes me aware that there is a discrepancy between what *is* and what *ought* to be, and the ought involves judgments in terms of norms or values. The ought is to have practical consequences. An obligation is upon us not only to choose a type of conduct which we judge to be better but to take persistent steps toward its actualization. Something ought "to be done about it," we say, and we should work together to do it. We are all implicated. The end is social. We need a platform of activities, we need leaders and co-workers. The ought is not static or conservative, but has dynamic value.

The Ought as a Standard.—The ought has been characterized as "a rule of human relationship and conduct acknowledged to be unconditioned and universally valid." But this refers to its form, to the moral law; the ought also has content. The ought may be regarded as a uniform rule for similar cases, as a command or imperative, and so as a criterion. Thus I may say, "I ought to obey the law." But inquiring into the meanings of this obligation I note that it applies to (1) my conduct in relation to the civil law, imposed by the community, for the common safety and welfare, that is, its validity rests on external power and authority, the law is made and executed by the state, and punishment will follow infractions; and (2) my relationship to the moral law, the validity of which rests on inner grounds; the law is appealed to because it is right

in itself, is universal; and the result of an infraction is not outer punishment but consciousness of unworthiness. I accept the obligation of the civil law as contributory to my conduct as a moral being. I accept the obligation to the moral law by realizing that it stands above inclination, utility, custom, prudence, what is expedient.

The ought then is a standard for inner activity of will, for motive and intention. It involves my integrity as a person. It yields a strength not equaled by what I merely believe or feel. The "I ought" involves the "I can," that is, the conviction that as a moral agent I am free to take steps toward what I hold to be right: the self has the power to do what the ought impels. Conscience condemns me if I do not do what I ought, and so makes me aware of what I might have done. Involuntarily I revert to my failure. The ought holds me up to the standard of moral success. The alternative would be moral lapse, inner self-division, dissipation.

As a Basis of Judgment.—But while I thus insistently tend to judge my own conduct by the standard of perfection, I should be careful in my judgments of others, lest I hold them up to what I personally say they ought to have done without knowing all the besetting conditions. It is far too easy to condemn people for what we hold they ought to do, on the ground that as members of present society there are certain principles which they must have been taught, say by the Church, and that therefore they should not do thus and so. "I ought" does not mean "I can" without regard to the conditions of (1) my nature as a moral being in process, with inclinations to conquer, emotions and passions to sublimate, habits to change, volitions to become more effective; and (2) society, also in process, with forces that need to be better understood and more wisely controlled. It has been said that "to know all is to forgive all." I ought to be perfect even as my Father in heaven is perfect, but this is an ideal.

The Creative Ought.—The ought may appear to be simply a stern obligation over us, holding the self and society up to duty. But, we repeat, the moral ideal calls

for satisfaction. There is reason in the fact that we are not content with anything less. The fullness of life is what in reality or deepest truth we will to realize. I pass then from the thought that I ought to do my duty to the activity of *giving my best*, in the joy of doing, or achieving. In all creative work there is satisfaction, and while doing it we are likely to forget processes, conditions, time, even difficulties, in our endeavor to do the work as well as it can be done. There is no reason why this creativity should not enter into and transform the ought, so that there shall be "full measure, running over."

What I ought to do is not necessarily what is hardest and least pleasant, although there may be days, even weeks or months when I experience difficulty in keeping at my chosen work. The reaction against Puritanism has taught us to look beyond processes and conditions to an ideal able to lift our consciousness above means to ends. What I owe to others is what I am readily able to do with satisfaction. Self-development and duty coincide to the extent that I am absorbed in my work. If I limit and restrain myself by a severe sense of duty, or if I am greatly constrained by society, this suppression will interfere with my moral efficiency. It by no means follows that because society puts constraints upon us which involve interior repressions that therefore morality is a burden. The problem is to understand and utilize all elements of our nature, including the passions and self-centering emotions.

Duty as Adjustment.—Summarizing then we note that duty for duty's sake is an insufficient motive, as in the case of loyalty to loyalty: it leads to formalism or generality, and is likely to overlook the spontaneities and satisfactions which yield specific content and incentives. To be an effective moral being one must not only will to do right but will something of benefit to humanity amidst present conditions. It is essential to acknowledge various inclinations, or springs of action; and to aim at various ends. In actual practice there are conflicts between matters urged upon us in the name of duty, opportunities presented by our own consciousness. There is need of a criterion, a

scale of values. Duty in general is to be expressed concretely through what is wise under the conditions. The good will is seen at its best when prompted by the service-motive. It may be connected at large with God and humanity, but it pertains directly to the welfare of society close at hand, to the family in a specific way. It may be creative. At its best it is essentially productive, not inhibitory; it leads to the fullness of life.

Right and Wrong.—We find successive changes coming about in our views of right and wrong in relation to duty. As children, little concerned with right or wrong save so far as we are commanded to do this and abstain from that, we are apt to regard a deed as negligible if our conduct evades detection. So too in later life many people look upon civil regulations as negligible if there is fair chance of evading them, and the effort of our law-breaking generation is to “get by.” Even in the legal world there is sometimes a strange disregard for right and wrong as ethically defined. A judge in a Chicago court who sentenced two young men to life-imprisonment for committing murder, in an instance where no one in the community doubted the guilt of the culprits, made the amazing statement that these youths had “never before done a wrong act in their whole life,” that is, they had never been caught and arrested. But as evasive as our early conduct and uncritical thought may be, most of us eventually grow into the realization that a deed is wrong “because conscience tells us so.” Still later we come to see that the deed was wrong in itself, and we find that whatever the conflict of opinion concerning social deeds in general some deeds are judged to be wrong by moralists of all schools, for instance, cruelty, falsehood, intemperance. In contrast, other deeds are “right,” straight (*rectus*) and we hear about men who have decided to “go straight” whose previous ways were “crooked.” What is right or straight is according to rule, and eventually rectitude or righteousness becomes synonymous with justice itself as the culminating virtue, as in Plato’s scale. Arriving at a conception of duty, we see that the right in its ultimate sense is identical with it,

while the rights or privileges accorded us enable us to attend to our several duties.

Sin, which we are to consider in the next chapter, is typical of what we call wrong-doing, although we do not always connect what is wrong with any special conception of sin. We say that sin is "bad," a term applied to both conduct and character. Conduct is judged to be wrong with reference to both civil and moral law. The individual is commanded to do what is right, to obey the law; and one deed is right in relations inherent to it, where many other possible deeds would be wrong. "Right has no comparative." A duty is said to be either fulfilled or not. If not fulfilled the conduct is said to be wrong, and the wrong deed is traced to character. But while we say that character may be bad we do not command a person to have a certain character. We say he "ought" to have acted otherwise, he possesses traits which should have been overcome, and his bettered conduct would have started him in the direction of a desirable character. There are degrees of wrong-doing, as there are degrees of goodness. But we adhere to the right as ultimate standard, and expect a person to become of such a character that he will seek and obey the right as he would conform to a mathematical principle, which admits of no degrees of rightness. Thus we say it is perfectly right to pay a debt, to keep a promise, abstain from killing and robbing. The opposite in each case would be wrong. We do not praise a man for doing what is right in these cases. Praise and blame enter where there are degrees of goodness and wrongness. We hold that obedience to a moral code is right, while a breach is wrong.

Good and Bad.—Bad is best understood in contrast with good as membership in an organism. There is always something worth doing in behalf of self-realization; it is right to be efficiently active, to produce. By contrast with such activity, idleness, for example, is bad because it results in disorganization, if not degeneration; it is wrong because it results in failure, interferes with duty. Idleness tends to run into laziness. Inertia is strong in human nature

any way. In itself idleness is faithlessness. It is socialized in the case of the tramp, who becomes a virtual enemy to society. A tendency or condition is bad then which interferes with the coöperative life of moral beings, it is bad in relation. When a bad tendency is carried further we call it evil, as in the case of the consequences of laziness. A thing or tendency is evil which not only partly interferes, as in idleness, but which puts its forces against the factors which make for goodness. It does not merely imply imperfection but isolation, internal disorganization; for example, in the case of wrong-doers who, in a city, gamble, and persuade the police to enter into league with them, and who thus become a group set against the welfare of the body politic. A city employee who works for his own interest, who steals, deceives, and fails to perform his function, is a typical instance. Under the term "graft" much that is wrong in city governments is now briefly classified, and the term "corruption" readily suggests the results in the civic organism.

Responsibility.—There is so much current evasiveness regarding responsibility that it is difficult to approach the matter from the point of view of occurrences recorded day by day. In a popular sense, a person is responsible under certain conditions, and an effort is made to limit his accountability accordingly. One must be careful not to admit responsibility in case of an automobile accident, because this is a question for the claim agent in one's liability insurance company, although a man may believe himself morally at fault. Responsibility is often placed in a superficial way, because it is not customary to probe deeply and avoid all appearance of shirking. Readers of the press follow with eager interest a trial in court in which extenuating circumstances are being found, for instance, in the case of a murder by two young men of another young man where the crime is said to be "unique," namely, for the sake of a thrill. The youths having pleaded guilty, insanity not being alleged, the question then is: were these murderers "morally abnormal, as distinguished from insane, in a degree that rendered them not responsible for

their actions''? The ground for hearing evidence in such a case at all is said to lie in "a concession which to many lawyers must seem dubious, but which may be justified by the consideration that the whole legal theory as to criminal responsibility is nowadays in a highly uncertain state." In effect, the whole procedure may have been to secure a mitigation of sentence. Meanwhile, the culprits, whose guilt no one questioned, were reported in the case in question, to have adopted the attitude of amused spectators, an attitude calculated to bear out the theory of "a complete absence of moral sense in them . . . consistent with their self-centered egoism"; for they had declared that they believed in no God and recognized no law but the urge of their own appetites and desires, although they did believe in "the power of money to save them from the scaffold and plainly said so."¹⁶ Such a case is apt to confirm the multitude in the notion that accountability depends on one's power to evade responsibility by the aid of money.

Moral Responsibility.—On the other hand readers of the press are quick enough in their decisions as to moral responsibility, and while "the vulgar notion of responsibility," as Bradley calls it, offers no real explanation, it forcefully emphasizes crucial points.¹⁷ A man is responsible for what he has done or left undone for which he may be judged in the court of conscience imagined as a judge, divine or human, external or internal, this moral tribunal having a *right* over him. A man must answer, if called on, for *all* his deeds. He can disown none of his acts, nothing which in his heart or his will has ever been suffered to come into being. This implies self-sameness: I must be the very same person to whom the deed belonged. The deed, issuing from my will, must have been *mine*; I must have had a minimum of intelligence, so that, as responsible, I can be looked on as a *moral* agent: for where I am forced there I do nothing. In brief, the deed is attributable to me as possessing a certain character. It is

¹⁶ From editorial comments in the English press.

¹⁷ F. H. Bradley, *op. cit.*, Chap. I.

impossible to go behind this character and fix the blame on some one else, for only when a man is alienated from himself (insanity) are a man's acts not his own.¹⁸ Thus the matter is reduced to the psycho-physical causal relations as found in daily life.¹⁹ It would be evasive to try to make out that the mere cause is responsible for its effect, as when a man happens to disturb us because he is the bearer of bad news. It is the causal uniqueness that is the real consideration: man is conscious that in his responsible activity he introduces something new into his surroundings which would not be possible without that activity. Hence, although a man is free to act, he must stand the consequences, disagreeable as well as pleasant.²⁰ Man becomes a responsible person socially by his relationships to the community which affords him an opportunity to direct his desires and make his plans. Hence one who is aware of these relationships will hold himself responsible for the consequences of his acts, without waiting to be held liable by others.

Accountability.—To this position objection is sometimes made by the individual that he is simply what God or nature made him, and God or nature is at fault if he did not turn out well. He did not choose his native endowments, his parents, or the social group into which he was born and in which he was reared, or even his character as a product of hereditary dispositions and environment. Why then should blame be put upon him? But our moral judgments turn, not upon a man's origin, but on what he is, *on what he now does*, granted the character he has become.²¹ We accept it as no excuse that man judged as worthless and degenerate comes from a family that has been profligate for generations. The individual is accountable although we also judge the collective body which molded him, his family, his social class, his nation, and humanity at large. The individual remains "the es-

¹⁸ Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, p. 407.

¹⁹ W. Windelband, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, tr. by J. McCabe, 1921, p. 249.

²⁰ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 436.

²¹ Cf. Paulsen, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

sential precondition of the wider judgment.”²² We are responsible for good, as well as accountable for evil. We can rightfully be accused. And so our analysis drives us back to moral obligation as the basis of judgment. Our moral consciousness admits of no evasiveness, however many qualifying conditions may enter into our social or environmental relationships. We do not escape from our sense of responsibility by the conclusion that it is relative. Indeed, awareness of responsibility increases with relative knowledge. There may appear to be no ultimate or satisfactory solution of the problem. We may be unable to determine just how far we are responsible. But this indeterminateness yields no valid excuse. And a study of the problem of freedom affords further evidence of the persistence of this sense of responsibility. Meanwhile, we realize plainly enough that responsibility is essential to the moral order.

The existence of shame, remorse, guilt is evidence in point. A man may try to put aside the sufferings of guilt, with its remorse and humiliation, its cowardice and forebodings, by what Martineau calls “spasms of self-rallying, or artifices of self-forgetfulness,” yet he feels himself in the presence of elements which are not placed at his disposal, doubly incurred in the attempt to shun them.²³ One is unable in these days to fall back on the notion that guilt is hereditary, for, as critics of this view have pointed out, there would then need to be a unitary power of sin persisting through all the generations. Sin is guilt only in so far as it is subjective, that is, self-contradiction on the part of the person who is himself conscious of it. Fellowship of humanity in guilt does not excuse the one who has committed a deed which forces guilt home to the intimacies of self-struggle. There may be gradations of sin and guilt, but it is by participation in the series that one comes to feel his own shame and remorse, his own accountability, whatever he may say about those who failed to instruct and aid him as they should. By guilt I am made pain-

²² *Ibid.*, p. 463.

²³ *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 112.

fully aware of the fact that I have not been true to the promptings of my better self. I realize that not only could I have acted differently but that I ought to have acted otherwise. I am cast down. I am so far less than myself. I must then have a way of thinking about sin and evil, and having adopted this point of view, my chief concern will be: social self-realization. For, in the last analysis, our theory on all these points must be restated in affirmative terms.

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CHAPTER XIV

SIN AND EVIL

Theories of Evil.—The question of the nature of sin and evil lies outside of the ethical field in so far as its solution appears to turn upon a system of theology accepted on authority. A theological view of the redemption of man is apt to evolve a conception of man's fall, hence a theory of the original appearance of evil. There is a certain evasiveness in such a view, which throws the matter further and further back. So too there was evasiveness as long as man's temptations were attributed to an evil being or group of evil beings or a force operating outside of himself, or independently of present society. A theological view is apt to turn upon acceptance of a plan for the forgiveness of sins involving non-ethical reasoning. So too in the case of the view that matter belongs to the realm of darkness, as in Neo-Platonism; it was easy to infer that the flesh was the source of evil, and so bodily impulses were condemned unheard. While Augustinianism prevailed, it was no less readily assumed that things that had been called evil existed only with God's permission: because He could cause good to come out of them. The situation was greatly simplified when questions of origin were separated from theories of redemption, when the problem of evil was distinguished from belief in a creed. There was also a change for the better with the rejection of all views that attributed evil to a given element, impulse, or to an unregenerate will, a term as purely general as the term "flesh," opposed to spirit. Interest then began to turn upon survivals and misuses of heredity, akin to animal life, subject to intensification, but not in itself to be judged without careful analysis.

The ethical view of man's unregeneracy involves fewer assumptions, and leaves the matter of the remaking of human nature open to various possibilities. The present existence of evil and its consequences in terms of sin, vice, and crime is the fact with which ethics is concerned, whatever the first origin. Granted the fact, there is need for precise description, definition, and a theory of the significance of evil in moral experience. The current description is likely to imply a conception of human development from a simpler mode of life to the complexities of modern civilization. A merely evolutionary conception of the origin of baser traits akin to those of brutes would not carry far, however, since we are chiefly concerned with the subtler evils of the latest phases of civilization. Hence it is a question of psychological analysis rather than one of genesis, and to psychology we look for increasing knowledge of human nature in its present social types.

Evil in General.—Evil is variously defined by narrowing the question, as our interests become specifically ethical. In a metaphysical or very general sense, evil has been looked on as essential limitation, due to the fact that any being less than God is necessarily imperfect. According to Leibnitz, created beings derive their perfections from the influence of God, but their imperfections come from their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits.¹ In the physical sense of the word, evil is seen in the struggle of animals, preying on one another by brute force; in calamities such as the great floods which occur from time to time in China, the terrible earthquakes which have visited Mediterranean countries and Japan, the volcanic explosions which have destroyed whole cities; the destruction of crops by pests, and drouth; the spread of plagues and famines. Mental and physical suffering, whatever the cause, is regarded as an evil, and the infliction of pain is ordinarily the most direct result of evil attributed to human agency. The terrible consequences of war, with the suffering of non-combatants as well as of the soldiery, are typical of such evil. The sufferings of the world have

¹ *The Monadology*, Sec. 42, tr. by R. Latta, 1898.

increased as war has become more barbarous, until, in the World War, with its submarines, bombing planes, and poison gas, the evils became terrible beyond description.

There is plainly a difference between suffering of this sort which we condemn outright, and pain arising within the organism in bodily disturbances where the sensation is a sign of nature's remedial forces. Pain in its initial stage may indicate excess due to prolonged work, nervous strain, or over-eating, and in this respect pain if rightly explained is a clue to bodily well-being. So too when increase of pain implies failure on man's part to respond to the first warning symptoms: naturally pain is intensified with greater imprudence. There would seem to be no other way to bring man to his senses than by increase of painful results as evidences of his failure to respond to nature's promptings. So long as the results are confined to the person's own organism the consequences of riotous living may still be looked upon in the light of lessons they teach. But when the suffering of others is involved, and when through heredity children and successive generations are affected, such consequences are condemned outright as evil. Hereditary weaknesses and feeble-mindedness in its various forms, are remote results for which the sufferers themselves are not responsible. Instead of condemning people outright for these evils, the tendency today is to trace the evils to their sources, for instance, in the case of whole families of degenerates descended from a single pair. Then it is a question of specific evils, perhaps drunkenness and lust, as immediate causes. So too in the case of diseases, notably contagious and more serious diseases so long regarded as mysteries, the effort of science is to get at the root of the malady, the particular germ or the besetting condition; instead of attributing the disease to the existence of evil in general. It may well be that some evils from which we suffer are due to the animal existence which we share with the higher animals but which in man may become more brutal than in the brutes.

Moral Evil.—What we mean when we attribute evil to conscious human agency is moral evil, a deed and its

consequences which might have been avoided by those directly responsible for it. Moral evil may be said to involve the whole race, for when we begin to trace results back to a pair of degenerates whose evil life led to the most baneful results in whole families through generations, we find the investigation leading farther back till we come to the earliest evils of our civilization. But there is no advantage in mere generalizations. Headway has been made in these scientific times by separating evil into its types and limiting the inquiry to specific instances. In the case of war, for instance, effort is made to fix responsibility upon rulers and their ministers, or diplomats and politicians working in secret who gave the word to mobilize. Other nations, through concealed ambitions and rivalries, may be responsible too, but the decision may have rested with one nation, and in that one nation with the militaristic party or ambitious potentate. Our judgment concerning responsibility for war is likely to become the more severe if as a result of recent discussion we have come to regard war as an evil from first to last. War, long eulogized because of the good that comes out of it, the heroism, the self-sacrifice, the increase of patriotism, has more frequently been called murder since the World War. Efforts have accordingly been made to outlaw it without waiting for mastery over the allied evils of which it is in part an expression.

The Social Evil.—The nature of evil becomes clearer when we consider it in relation to a single deed wrought by one person, and undertake not only to establish guilt, as in the case of murder, but to determine the motive and analyze this in detail, tracing the motive to its sources. Moral evil then is seen in a deed and its results attributable to a person intelligibly regarded as responsible. Without the decisive activity in question, its motive, with the act of choice which made the motive effective, the deed would not have happened. So too we trace consequences of "the social evil" to inner activities involving real alternatives. In the presence of passions which might have been curbed or overcome, the responsible person is guilty of the initial

deed which led to the degradation or enslavement of others.

Society sometimes passes judgment upon the innocent girl who is led astray by a man who makes her the victim of his passions, and so society has a way of slurring over the social evil. The situation is usually more difficult for the woman. The question of a double moral standard complicates the issues. But whatever the effort to cloud the issue, the fact is not altered that he is responsible who knew life's typical situation in this field, who should as a member of a moral community have abstained. Although society is in a way responsible for crimes due to passion, individuals are originally responsible. Here again our changing views lead us to trace causes more directly to their sources than when a double standard of morals ruled without question.

By evil in bare simplicity we mean a deed done by an individual who, in the face of a higher alternative, chose the lower and did what implicated his moral nature and brought consequences which could have been prevented. The innocent suffer with the guilty, and so we endeavor all the more insistently to trace the deed to the one who wrought it. We no longer attribute evil to the frailties of human nature in general. Nor do we trace certain evils to the passions of the flesh, as if the body acted independently. We insist that account be taken of all the factors that participate in man's conduct, especially those activities which distinguish him from the brutes and give powers of control. Evils may begin with behavior which in origin is instinctive, as we find ourselves in process of acting according to customs which we have taken on merely because they existed. But it does not follow that the original behavior was evil.

Crime.—By crime is meant a breach of civil law, a deed for which responsibility may be determined so that a penalty can be attached. A deed not recognized under the law as a crime may be worse morally speaking. The term crime is often used as a synonym for the worst evils, especially those of war, although these evils have never been

outlawed. Some of the most fiendish evils popularly called crimes against society are not recognized by the statute books. Fixed penalties do not necessarily show the nature or extent of the wrong done. We habitually speak of deeds as morally wrong in instances where occurrences technically known as crimes are not judged as we believe they ought to be. Penalties are attached to crimes with a view to protecting society and reforming the individual. But a prisoner may emerge from confinement far more dangerous than when he entered, and so crime may increase from more to more. A crime is a deed not to be understood apart from its ultimate connection with social groups in relation to which it is seen as evil. Effort is sometimes made to attribute crimes committed by young offenders to our educational system, or to explain them by the theory of evolution as misunderstood, as consequences of the prohibition amendment, as reactions from the World War, or as traceable to the film-play. But these alleged causes are expressions of the mode of social life we live, and that in turn is conditioned in various ways according to type and place, as in the slums. Waves of crime do not spring out of a single source.

In sentencing four young men to be electrocuted, Justice Cropsey, as quoted in the press, commenting on their age, said: "Most of the criminals are boys and young men. To be exact, over eighty per cent of them are less than twenty-five years of age. If the people of Brooklyn ask why so many youths become criminals, I can tell them. A dozen years of investigation and experience in these matters have demonstrated that the vast majority of all youthful offenders committed crime because they had bad associates and were not under the proper influences in the years when boyhood was turning into manhood, between the ages of twelve and eighteen. That is the most important period in a boy's life. Then his ideals are acquired, his character formed. This condition is a challenge to the manhood of our community. . . . Tens of thousands of boys are nightly on the streets looking for amusements, seeking adventure, yearning for companionship. Many of

them have no fathers, and the parents give little or no heed to the places their boys visit or the companions they choose.”²

Our definition of crime will depend to some extent then on our view of its social origin and our solution of the problem of responsibility. A theory prevails that crime is due to a defect in the lower brain, affecting the emotional life. So a young criminal may have a high degree of intelligence but no sympathy, no adequate sense of wrong; knowledge of right and wrong, but no feeling about it; no adequate basis for emotional life, and so no adequate social test. But this theory affords only a physiological explanation of facts to be ethically interpreted.

The Reality of Evil.—Part of our difficulty then is due to the fact that we need light on many issues at once; we are unable to say what degree of evil is to be attributed to a certain individual in a given case. There is plainly a difference between a delinquency which is chiefly a misfortune in the life of one whose parentage is offered as the explanation; between “long-distance sins”—injuries done to people whom the wrong-doers never see and know—and wrong-doing as a direct injury to a man in his personal life which can be surely traced to one guilty person. Evils run through the whole gamut from the old-jungle sins of the flesh—murder, lust, and theft—to the sins of pride, avarice, slander, and spiritual self-sufficiency, and so intimately related to social life as a whole that a tendency sometimes appears to classify evil as “unreal” because relative. Evil is surely *real* from any ethical point of view that has prevailed in the Western world. It is real as a brute fact of actual injury done, for instance, by the man who builds a fire-trap in which people lose their lives, who leaves dangerous machinery unguarded, and in the case of reckless drivers of automobiles. It has been called unreal in the sense that it is bound to be overcome, and the activities involved in it transmuted into good. But as now present it is real so far as effort is required to understand, master, and transform it. The

² Quoted in *The Literary Digest*, Mar. 22, 1924.

evil deed remains a fact of history whatever good may be brought out of it. It does not follow that because good results may be brought out of it the deed was either unreal or that it was due to short-sightedness or mere social maladjustment.

Vice.—Whatever the responsibility assigned to those who have gone before, the given evil is definable with regard to the personality suffering from or inflicting it. Thus vice is evil consciously entered into, maintained personal evil involving self-indulgence of a sensuous kind, evil as a habit. It may arise through simple indulgences in eating, smoking, and drinking which in time becomes excessive, hence more sensuous. The vice may then become established, and may grow by what it feeds on, eventually leading to crime. It is a fine point of distinction to determine when an indulgence which seems harmless in a relatively prudent life reaches the point of excess and becomes a vice. Here too the original behavior may be instinctive in origin, or may involve instincts wholly good in their proper places; hence the initial behavior may not be wrong. Some of the unfortunate beginnings may have been due to native promptings and imaginings which were not understood. Environmental influences may foster tendencies which might never have led to vice apart from undesirable company. The sensitive, easily influenced youth may not at first realize that he is less truly himself when with certain associates in whom vice is already making headway. We judge a man's conduct more incisively when we see its consequences in his person after these have reached a crucial point, or when the results show in his conduct toward others. Vice is always attributed to the person, and whereas a criminal may be pardoned vice must be overcome by the individual. Society undertakes to punish the criminal, but it is often at a loss to persuade a man to recognize his vices and overcome them. We excuse in ourselves what we condemn in another man as a vice. Some of us seem unwilling to conclude that a man should have no vices. It has been readily assumed that a man will "settle down" after a while, hence vices have been

excused as if the situation were not dangerous. Meanwhile, the new age finds new approaches to the vices of the old, and vice spreads by imitation, by one sex emulating another, unmindful of what follows, and by confusion between what is manly and what is wrong.

Sin.—Sin is defined as conscious wrong-doing. Thus a vice which in origin was apparently harmless indulgence may reach a point where the person who fosters it becomes well aware of alternatives, and who possibly struggles for a while to overcome his vice. Persisting in his vice, however, going counter to the promptings of his better nature, disregarding moral and spiritual standards, he sins, in his wrong conduct he involves others. Religious people say a sin is not only against one's better self, against those who suffer from the individual's wrong-doing, but is against God. "Against thee only have I sinned." It is also said that sins can be pardoned by God alone—if the sinner repents of his sin as confessedly a sin against God and wills to reform. Morally speaking there is no repentance save in a change which the individual voluntarily strives for, not because he anticipates forgiveness, not because he expects God to overcome his sin on the ground that another has suffered for him and will wash his soul "white as snow," but because he realizes that there is no atonement save what each makes by leading the better life. Moral atonement for sin is moral life.

In contrast with the former tendency to revert to the idea of a Golden Age, and dwell on the supposed fall of man, the trend of thought is toward a Golden Age yet to come. That is, our view of evil turns upon the breach between the ideal and the actual, and our yearning after goodness. Thus Seth calls evil "the shadow cast by the moral ideal upon the actual life."³ Our thought of it depends on our view of much that is passing in civilization around us. Hence, very much depends on what comes up for response in a given epoch, on the standards that prevail; and so the question of origin plays a lessening rôle. In Mackenzie's terms, each man's moral life may be re-

³ *Ethical Principles*, p. 214.

garded as a universe, and the universe wherein evil is seen may be a broad or a narrow one, and its conflicts may vary with the individual.⁴ The evil sought is sought under particular circumstances. Again, evil may be regarded in contrast with the common good, as in the case of the workman who drinks away his wages, upsets the equilibrium of his inner nature, and deprives his trade of an efficient member.⁵ As the issues are narrowed by our modern knowledge, the outlook upon evil changes more rapidly. Evil is no longer attributed to a "force" which works against the good, that is, a merely general force. It is not an impure element getting itself intermixed with other elements, as a stream might be contaminated. It is neither a power in itself to be condemned outright nor in the agent as a whole. Instead it is insubordination among various traits and tendencies, it is in the motive and results; in the concrete relation, not in anything abstract. The existence of moral evil does not prove that man is inherently wicked. Evil is in the misuse of powers which in right proportions are good. Evil is indeed destructive, but not in the same way as a germ. Nor is evil in the mere will, for the same will can be used constructively. Evil is a hostile or destructive combination, with excessive emphasis on a certain tendency or deed, in contrast with goodness as integrity or wholeness. Evil is disruption, hence the expressions, "gone all to pieces," "dissipation," "duplicity." The outcome of the evil, if carried further, is crime, which becomes downright warfare upon society. In contrast with these terms implying disruption, are such terms as temperance, self-control, balance, suggesting integrity of character. Evil is in general the assertion of the part against the whole. Such a conception of evil affords hope of ultimate victory over it, that is, through the establishment of right adjustments or proportions.

Mistakes.—In the effort to place evil so that its reality is neither denied nor over-estimated, it may be compared with mistakes. From want of experience we may make

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 393.

⁵ See Muirhead, *Elements of Ethics*, p. 161.

mistakes or blunders, but as inadvertent such acts are to be distinguished from conscious wrong-doing. What is wrong is worthy of punishment, involves by contrast what is right. What is right we learn in the first place from the instruction of our elders. But a mistake may be a simple error of judgment into which we fall by ourselves. We excuse the mistakes of others. We explain our own as due to ignorance.

Is it possible to classify all sins, evils, and vices under the head of ignorance? That is, is it solely a question of the intellect with its tendencies to err, not of the will with its perversities? Socrates maintained, we have seen, that man never does wrong voluntarily, and the proposition, "knowledge is virtue," has frequently been defended as the basis of ethical theory. The merit of this view is that it implies faith in the natural goodness of man, and does not attribute evil to a depraved will. But it overlooks man's unruly desires. If the proposition were to be accepted in entire seriousness evil would never be regarded as anything more than a mistake which further knowledge would correct. Both in theory and in practice a distinction is made between mistakes and evils. We attribute mistakes to stupidity, lack of attention, or fatigue; we find that they can be overcome by alertness, practice, increased effort, concentrated attention. But we attribute motives to people whose deeds are evil—who are enemies to society, who steal, burn, make war—which put them in a class apart from people who make mistakes. A child or mental defective may make a mistake, or may pilfer and burn through undirected impulse, which therefore is not called evil.

Crime and Disease.—With the increase of knowledge of hereditary and environmental conditions there is an increasing tendency to discriminate between disease and feeble-mindedness, and evil. The more we learn about crime in relation to the state of the brain and nervous system, the grade of intelligence of criminals, the more probable it may seem that all crime is disease. Investigators find that many criminals have never had what is

called a fair chance, that they have come into being with strong tendencies to passion, abnormal in some respects, undeveloped, or have been left without enlightenment in a bad environment for which society, not the individuals, is responsible. Moreover, our prison systems have been bad from time immemorial. Stupid and harsh ways of dealing with prisoners have made enemies out of trivial offenders. There is abundant reason for saying that human passions have been dealt with blindly. Psychology is throwing much light in our day on intelligible methods of studying the criminal, and it will not be reasonable to generalize till our knowledge of disease and mental defectiveness in relation to crime is greatly increased. The individual at any rate should not be held responsible without careful qualification. His conduct, when wrong, is incomplete, and is to be judged in the light of ideals, not alone as society ordinarily judges the wrong-doer. Yet, we repeat, whatever may be said in behalf of the individual, the consequences of evil upon society still remain, evil as social wrong-doing is the significant fact.

Knowing and Doing.—Ignorance is not the sole trouble with us. Very few of us live faithfully by the best we know. Instead of saying that “we do as well as we know,” the truer statement would be that there is a discrepancy between what we know and would do, and what we find ourselves doing or seem to be at present able to do. In the face of the will to practice all the virtues of which we so ardently approve when we preach, the unruly desires stand forth, the impeding habits, inertias, and the laziness. Granted knowledge, we find that we must make effort, overcome, try, and try, and persist. It is easy to relapse. It is difficult to make headway. Sometimes we realize that we *ought*, that duty lies in a certain direction, yet we let the opportunity pass. Again, we may will to do right but find the will ineffective. A temptation arises, we assent, yield, aware that we are adopting a lower course in the presence of a possible higher. Sometimes indeed people grow weary of trying to do right, relax efforts, yield to subtle influences and drop back in the scale. All

this is evidence that virtue and knowledge are not synonymous.

If freedom to do right involves freedom to sin, we have at least a capacity to do wrong which may be said to continue throughout the whole series of our moral experiences. This capacity to choose the lower in the presence of a higher alternative is of course to be distinguished from an innate proclivity to a particular evil in the case of an individual born into a degenerate family. The capacity may be taken as a sign that man is a moral being. The particular proclivity shows that man is also subject through heredity to the level of development attained by his parents. Hence we do not take credit to ourselves for our freedom from such evils, but call it our good fortune. Again, we are constrained to recognize the part that intelligence plays, whatever the general capacity, the special proclivities, or the environment. Increasing knowledge of degeneracy leads us to the conclusion that every child has a right to be well-born. If we could decide we would doubtless ask for sufficient intelligence to use our abilities and opportunities to the fullest advantage.

Evil and Responsibility.—How far back can we trace evil, in the effort to distribute responsibility? Ethically speaking, not so far as to make one's theory a makeshift, as if we were personally exempt. The man who is honest with himself admits that his nature is such that, amid the social conditions of the day, he needs all possible enlightenment to put himself above temptation, guard against his frailties. For in and of himself he finds that he is capable of lapsing in the scale. Knowing his own situation intimately, he realizes how increase of weaknesses and temptations which he knows in part could lead into vice, into the malicious and malevolent in the case of other men.

Evil and sin are not to be wholly explained on deterministic grounds, that is, with reference to what heredity and environment produce or cause in us through the states of mind and brain in which our inner life consists. If our lesser nature compelled our greater to commit deeds called evil, if there were but one course we could pursue, there

would be no right and wrong. We could then make the universal affirmation: "whatever is, is right" in the sense of sheer necessity. But the fact of alternatives is unmistakable, as we shall see more fully when we come to the problem of freedom. With consciousness of right comes awareness of its opposite as possible.

Moral evil is not then to be driven back so that at last it is attributed to the morally perfect being, God. God has power, it has usually been argued, to over-rule evil, to cause it to contradict itself, to bring good out of its consequences; but God neither created it nor created us to produce it.

Sin is Irrational.—Evil is not indeed to be explained on rational grounds alone. Sin is not to be called rational because some of its results can be turned to account. The customary term is "enigma," that is, sin is irrational. To sin is to prefer the lower or lesser, while the higher or greater is rational. It is willful, not rational transgression of laws; is approval of one's own disorganization. Hence it has been put down as a mystery *why* we "know the right and still the wrong pursue." Since sin is irrational, there is no explanation in the sense in which we rationalize the universe. We find sin as a brute fact, a sad fact. Neither heredity nor environment, nor both combined, is a complete explanation. Nor can we fall back on the assumption that evil is essential to righteousness. Mistakes might have been inevitable, and we do not see how we could have learned without them. But we hold it to be possible to become good without sin. There is no reason or excuse for doing evil that good may come. The righteous man does not say, with Milton's Satan, "Evil, be thou my good." No argument in favor of a period of youthful vices as somehow necessary or permissible is ethically sound.

Our argument leaves us then in a unique position: no theory of its origin explains evil; God did not cause it; man is not inherently evil; on psychological grounds we do not find that there is an evil element, such as desire, will, or the "unconscious," not even as a native endowment. Although no one is willing to foster sin,

we find need of the terms wrong, vice, evil, sin, if we are to avoid confusion in theory and practice. The truth is that we are in process of learning enough about ourselves to understand why we do right. We already conclude unqualifiedly that sin should be condemned, whatever we may say about the whole self of the sinner. We see too that the consequences of sin as exhibited on the screen of life enable us to will that it shall be removed, and we know that so to will is to do something that is essential to its actual removal. Whatever our condemnations, it may still be true that there is no sinner so vile that love could not touch him, no one in such darkness that the light of heaven could not penetrate.

Evil is Disorganization.—It is also clear that the intellectual factor is not enough. Mere persuasion or enlightenment does not suffice: you must love the sinner if you would rescue him, touch his heart; realizing that his sin does not lie in his ignorance alone, nor in his will apart from his impulses and desires. Sin is an expression of a part of man's nature only. No man sins with his whole self, although the heart or inmost reason may indeed be submerged rather than in any sense active. Sin is not self-consistency but disorganization, the triumph of certain tendencies in combination, reinforced by external influences. It begins to disappear with the repudiation of those influences. Hence we expect the erstwhile sinner, however enlightened we help him to become, to look to himself, admit the sources and the consequences of sin, not putting upon others what belongs to himself, so that, having changed his attitude, he may become open to remaking influences. Complete enlightenment might indeed in some cases mean immediate full response of heart, so that there would be no distinguishable moment between clarifying understanding and decisive assent of will. But in actual experience we find that enlightenment comes gradually, and that response of will is distributed through successive efforts. Paul the Apostle groaned over his inability to do right even when he so willed with all the intensity of his being. Jesus, commonly regarded as the

sinless one, cried out as if forsaken and asked to have the cup removed. Involved in any complete view of the regenerative process is religious teaching in regard to good influences which overcome even our most persistent frailties, when there is the will; hence the conviction that it is not our own will alone that brings about our remaking. I am partly ready for the quickening process when constrained to admit my part. Ethically speaking, there is also an advantage in regarding myself as a child of God, created in the divine image and likeness, instead of deeming myself a poor miserable sinner, with no help in me. If all goodness is at last God's goodness, in this goodness man may share, by divine aid the ideal can be made to triumph.

Summary.—It might be said that sin is due to ignorance; hence that it is not real, does not imply an inherent element of wickedness in man. Or it might be attributed to the survival of animal traits and instincts, desires and passions, intensified and not understood; to bad heredity plus unfortunate environment; to disease, degeneracy springing from abnormal conditions, defective mentality. And so it might be said that sin, evil, and vice, will cease through enlightenment, self-knowledge, education, improvement in social conditions. But sin is also regarded as an enigma, always bad, always in conflict with reason, with righteousness, with God. It is pointed out that men do not do as well as they know. Temptation, vice, evil, crime, are sad facts, utterly dark in themselves. Sin may be largely due to perversity of will in some cases, to the frailties of human nature, to the subtler influences of environment which affect the less-conscious. But this does not explain it. Sin is inconsistency, disorganization; the sinner prefers himself to the community in its better estate, prefers himself to God. Sin is not overcome by ordinary human efforts alone but by regenerative influences. Evil as a social problem requires all the light that can be brought to bear upon it by psychological analysis, that its types may be recognized, that full account may be taken of every factor in mind and body, in the conscious and the uncon-

scious. In brief, evil is to be regarded in the light of the conditions under which it appears, the judgments passed in relation to it; for the higher of today may become the lower of tomorrow.

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CHAPTER XV,

CONSCIENCE

Scope of the Term.—The definition of the good as self-realization seems to mean the existence of some power in ourselves by which the implied activities are measured, criticized and coördinated. These tasks are said to be achieved by conscience, a term used with much greater precision in ethics than in popular thought, although moral philosophers have not always been careful to define the term. In fact, conscience has been made to cover the whole field of inner consciousness, from feeling to reason. As we have seen, it is now a “moral sense,” again, “intuition,” a distinctive “faculty” divine in authority, or a power of adjustment to the nature of things. An entire ethical theory may be founded upon it, if conscience is somehow set apart as exercising judicial power over all other activities within the human self. Or its authority may decrease to the minimum in terms of a theory of evolution.

Popular Conceptions.—It is important to note the various popular meanings, because these in each case underlie customary conduct, which passes unscrutinized until the implied view of conscience is called in question. Thus conscience is unreflectively regarded as “moral feeling,” the feeling that I ought to do this, or refrain from doing that, although no reason may be given. But no element of our inner nature is more vague than “feeling,” now identified with sentiment, now with varying emotions, or with inclinations toward mere comfort and the unthinking pursuit of happiness. Not until the judgment that I rationally ought to do this and refrain from that is made explicit does one begin to see the part which feeling plays. Again, conscience is supposed to be a voice, “the voice of God in the soul of man” telling him what to do, forbidding

him to do what is wrong. Thus regarded it is identified with the higher of the two voices in conflict within us, and problems arise in connection with the voice which tempts. Thus on the whole conscience is a perplexing monitor, causing us to weigh pros and cons till we are weary, to consider motives till it seems impossible to decide, unless perchance we stop deliberating and simply take a chance.

Although conscience is a human power, linking character with all our frailties, it is also taken to be infallible: man goes against it at his peril, and in the end realizes that it was absolutely right. But apparently, too, conscience is tribal or racial, has developed through habit, custom, and moral codes regarded as authoritative. Although absolute it is somehow relative. If we take it to be the voice of man's tribal self, conscience is plainly determined by a man's social universe; hence it may attach itself to whatever system is regarded as highest, in race or nation, church or state, or by any group within larger groups taking exception to what passes current under the name of the law, a moral code, or a religious system.

The Variability of Conscience.—It is deeply significant that what men do in the name of conscience differs greatly from age to age, in one country as compared with another in the same age, in one institution or by one individual who leads or counteracts an institution. The tendency among tribes to tell the truth within the tribe and to lie to neighboring tribes is noted among nations, too, and a different standard in regard to truth-speaking has been noted among Oriental peoples in contrast with nations in the Occident. The Spartans were not the only people in ancient times who judged it right to expose their weaker children to perish. In China the custom of abandoning female infants has seemed right for centuries. If we find Mohamedans committing what we call crimes in the name of the right, we are perhaps reminded of the Spanish inquisition and other barbarous practices carried on under the Christian name. It may seem strange to us that even the most enlightened leaders among the Greeks approved of slavery, but when slavery is mentioned we re-

member no doubt how difficult it was to reach a national decision in the name of conscience in our own land. We have tolerated methods, customs, barbarous practices and atrocities in the game of war which would have been condemned in China centuries before the dawn of the Christian era. We are scarcely able as yet to say precisely what the judgment of Christian peoples is concerning war. It seems out of the question to determine the nature of conscience by reference to deeds done with its sanction.

Conscience as a Faculty.—When we seek light from psychology, we find no reason to defend the popular assumption that conscience is a faculty, or even that it is a matter of either feeling or judgment exclusively. To regard it as intellectual, is to conclude that it is a mode of judgment or reflection of a certain quality rather than an activity which is sharply to be distinguished from the life of reason in general. It yields a characteristic feeling, and we commonly associate certain pangs with what we judge to be wrong-doing and anticipate a certain satisfaction when our conduct meets with the approval of those whose moral estimates we respect. Whatever value we may assign to its pronouncements, it is plain that it functions according to the well-known processes of conception, judgment, and reasoning; together with the desires which imply love of ideals, and the activities of will which express character. Conscience is not “intuition,” in the popular sense; for in this sense no account is taken of the way intuition derives its content, or of its relation to perception in general, to insight as a culmination of processes of reflection. It is not a “sense,” as if it were independent as the eye or the ear serves to differentiate sensation in terms of its organs, or as visual and auditory impressions enable us to discriminate. The moral-sense theory has to be judged in comparison with other views, *as a theory*, not because it assumes the existence of a faculty to account for moral judgments: it was a simple matter to postulate the existence of a faculty to substantiate that theory, in the days when psychology proceeded on a facultative basis in general.

As a Voice.—With reference to the idea that conscience is a voice, we note that in actual experience we are very far from being told precisely what to do, or what is wrong, although our consciousness may sometimes project certain words into our thought as if they were uttered by an inner voice, as if a voice were speaking with the authority of "revelation." We are frequently left in the dark, and must seek advice, read, ponder, delay, entertain doubts, let the matter rest and return to it after an interval of complete change. We find it impossible to eliminate the element of uncertainty, the realization that we must decide and act where faith is required; and we find ourselves plunging into action at last even though we can not clearly see what is right. Conscience is active in weighing or reflecting upon alternatives rather than in any phase of consciousness to be described in terms of a "sense." The supposed voice or guidance is personal, is an individual's experience making itself known as a sign, a check or warning. Reflection must still ensue, or a tentative effort to determine what is right, to see what eventuates if one departs on a course that might be judged as "wrong."

The Moral Constant.—It is plainly not a mere question of origin, in the sense of appeal to a part of our nature, or to social origins exclusively. A conscience supposedly made for us by custom would change with the mutations of custom, or cease with the tribe or nation that produced it. But conscience is regarded as universal, authoritative over and above customs and peoples: the law or obligation is over us all, implied in all our moral judgments. Conscience has authority rather than power. As a tribunal it does not reside in my inner sanctuary alone, but is fundamental to the moral life. Developing its implications, we realize that it demands consistency, a certain order or scale in all our activities, culminating in the performance of duty. It is the moral constant, while what is done in its name varies with the ages, among different peoples, with the religion, the sanctions by which it is supported, the prevailing psychology, the contingencies that arise, particularly in war-time. It varies too within the career

of a given individual who is progressing. It develops with the ages, and every now and then some fresh consideration is introduced which has not influenced the judgments of men before; with every marked social change new problems arise. Conscience persists as the universal moral *form*, while what we reflect on and do with respect to it is its *content*, always subject to variability, always relative.

The Evolutional View.—Conscience then is not essentially empirical. It is not a mere product of experience, as we see by examining the evolutionary view. Clifford endeavors to explain it as due to maxims derived from hereditary and other influences due to social experience, as in the tribe which, wishing to survive, seeking its own well-being, adopts pious customs that make for survival.¹ From this point of view, piety is encouraged for biological reasons, natural selection preserves the tribes which approve the right things. Right actions then are those that are liked by the tribe, wrong those disliked; a man is responsible so far only as he can be punished by the tribe with approval or disapproval. Self-adjustment in the name of the tribe would then be conscience, moral maxims are the precepts which the tribe learns, ethics is a matter of the community, that is, the increased efficiency of the tribe is the dominant motive. Conscience would then be the whole aggregate of our feelings in regard to actions deemed right or wrong.

A serious objection to this view is that there might then be as many consciences as tribes, conscience would be reduced to a tribal instinct, and we would have no principle or moral constant wherewith to bring together the consciences of peoples, the judgments of history. We find no real explanation of conscience today when we try to trace its authority to parents and teachers who impress customs and precepts on the child, or to our given order of society with its laws. The hereditary or traditional wisdom of a people may well supply content for conscience, on which the coming generation begins to pass judgment, which the

¹ Cf. Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

increasing generation judges more determinately. But this does not explain the deep conviction that conscience involves awareness of a law by which the moral person deems himself internally bound. It is this "felt internal binding," as Martineau terms it, which constitutes the heart of conscience, and this awareness of obligation persists throughout the successive changes. What we take to be the divine sanction sharply marks itself off from custom, from what the world, the nation, the political party, the ruler, or even the Church approves. Experience serves indeed to awaken conscience, to supply subject-matter; but conscience is that which measures and tests moral experiences, which sits in judgment on new and stirring events involving moral issues: conscience makes moral experience possible, it is potential in our nature.

As a Dictate.—Conscience has been described as a sort of dictate formed within us by spiritual teachings which have been impressed upon us, which we have acquired from the Bible, a perception from spiritual truth regarding what is right, or a perception implanted in the mind from infancy, "the law written in the heart." But if we say that conscience is formed with man from the religion in which he is reared, from that which the given religious group approves as true or the code accepted as right, we still have a problem due to the manner in which the individual interiorly receives what is disclosed with this sanction. Conscience is indeed active with those who speak and act from the heart, and to act against the heart is to act against conscience. But religion has its external as well as its internal bonds. A religious truth may be accepted because God is reported to have uttered it, because it is in the Bible, is taught by the Church, is in the creed as matter of tradition, or as implied in the ceremonials and charities in which the given group engages. Every sectarian individual will naturally hold that his own dogmas and observances are true. The truths of conscience will then be various, also the deeds done in the name of goodness; and there will be judgments concerning the false and the true, the external and the internal. The individual will need

to judge what is to be believed and what is to be done, what has divine sanction and what has not. The interior acknowledgment will be from a certain plane, and that plane will of course be lifted up with the implantation of higher truths, with the formation of what is known in religious circles as "a new will" and a new understanding, or with increase of what is taken to be the divine presence.

At best conscience in such terms would seem to be a "dictate" that a certain principle is true rather than a pronouncement concerning *what* is true, as if conscience could tell man outright without the conflicts which we all know. In any event the individual accepts, judges, makes the venture; each has his reasons, beliefs, feelings, or incentives. Sometimes the "dictate" simply means that one has been so taught, that one has faith in the accepted teaching. Some religious people appear to be devoid of spiritual perception or any direct apprehension of what is good and true. Such insight would naturally differ from judgments concerning what is right to be done, hence partisans of interior judgment would differ from those who see only what is done, hear only what is said, and put their conservative zeal into these externals.

Religious Sentiments.—It is a difficult matter for the zealous to go against conscience, yet religious consciences may be pitted against one another; and it may be difficult to show that conscience is "interior perception of good and truth," or that "they have no conscience who have no interior plane to receive the influx." Religious people are little likely to distinguish between the intellectual element taken on in the name of conscience—the truths accepted, the teachings given a certain interpretation, or adopted with reservations—and the volitional element by which the ventures of faith are made. There is plainly a difference between conscience as formed by acceptance of tradition and conscience as acquired through what the individual takes to be direct inner experience of spiritual realities, which he perhaps puts in contrast with the sentiments and values conserved by tradition. Each individual may stoutly protest that God rules him through what he believes is

right and true, each has his view of the inner dictate, of righteousness in relation to the neighbor, of what constitutes regeneration, of what things are fallacies or heresies. Conscience with each, empirically speaking, is the group of teachings and elements of conduct by which he judges; and each may be equally conscientious in living up to what his conscience approves. Meanwhile, some of us will continue to believe we have the right of it because we discriminate between externals and internals, and find in the latter a direct clue to spiritual perception, hence to immediate apprehension of the good and the true.

Conscience as Divine.—If then we ask whether conscience be divine, several questions will be involved. We may say that it is divine in the sense that we could not possess spiritual truth, without the mind of God, if we hold that our being as founded in God is moral. Perfectly to conceive our nature and our life, as made in the divine image and likeness, would then be to possess conscience in its rational fullness. Perfectly to will and to do in accordance with our moral selfhood as founded in God would be to manifest conscience in its fullness in conduct. We should then approximate conscience in its “infallibility.” Conscience as we know it is known only in part, as divine-human. We are in the throes. We are not in agreement as to the mode in which the divine sanctions have been established, whether immediately, through the Bible (however interpreted, however it was written, and by whom) or through the Church. Hence in religious connections, as in others, we must distinguish between ideal and actual, form and content, universal and particular, goal and process.

Practical Clues.—Conscience in its universality is the law, the expression of obligation or duty as incumbent upon all, constant. As manifesting its power in human experience it is moral reflection, reason engaged in weighing pros and cons. In a given case it may be accompanied by what the individual calls “impressions,” “leadings,” or guidances, a voice, with regard to the inner light, the presence of the divine in inner experience; or it may take tempera-

mental and social forms which lead to the classification of its possessor as progressive, conservative, or radical. To say that conscience is essentially rational is not then to discredit the aids to judgment which the individual adopts. The Quaker "leading" or "inner guidance" may be taken as a typical clue, while "the light of Christ in the soul" is the Quaker's ethical principle: to wait in silence for the leading is one of the methods pursued by the highly conscientious. Each individual is likely to idealize his particular mode of putting "guidance" over against inclination, wise advice against personal desire, a "vocation" in contrast with worldly ambition. To affirm that a voice is from God and then act upon it on faith is obviously to take a certain risk. Almost insensibly we add to and interpret whatever prompting, advice or principle may come to us, and so we give to it a sense of authority. We draw upon both experience and thought, desire and character, temperamental traits and reactions upon habit. What we take to be the divine element is at best the universal principle implied in all particular judgments. We sometimes accept a plan of action simply because we have no knowledge to offset it, but again we stand off and raise objections to the limit. In all instances conscience is the ethical principle or constant, implied, tacitly insisted upon when we adopt a scale of values.

Elements.—The intellectual element of conscience is implied in the act of moral judgment, which is plainly not a mere judgment of fact, but a judgment passed on a situation according to a standard. It is because of this judicial element that conscience is said to command, accuse, bear witness, acquit, or condemn.² The rational element can be distinguished from the empirical by taking pains not to attribute to moral intuition more than rightfully belongs to it. In Green's phraseology, it is the conscience of the individual which brings the principle of human equality, for example, into productive contact with the particular facts of human experience; there is "an immanent operation of ideas of reason in the process of social

² See Muirhead, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

organization" upon which the intuitions of the individual depend.³ The individual's conscience is "reason in him as informed by the work of reason without him in the structure and controlling sentiments of society." The individual, by higher nature moral, with an inherent principle of spiritual activity, contributes the ethical universal, on the basis of which he passes judgment upon particular matters said to involve right and wrong in his given age or social group, with its relative standards. Whatever his selfhood is potentially, he is dependent on knowledge gained through experience and reflection on what is judged right and wrong, through study of philosophic truth, instruction, insight into principles which withstand critical analysis.

Conscience also yields an element of feeling that the right is endangered, and that consequently we should do our part in its service. Hence people in its name feel that they should respond, accept a moral opportunity without too closely calculating gains and losses. It is the characteristic feeling of conscience which brings its judgments home to us with such conviction, both when conscience yields a pang if we do wrong and when it discloses enthusiasm for the right in connection with the cause to which we are loyal. The contrasted sentiments of conscience are indeed so pronounced that it is not strange to find some moral theorists insisting on conscience as moral feeling, in contrast with those who, emphasizing the intellectual element, have identified it with reason.

Conscience inspires and strengthens the will, gives courage to do right; and we realize that at times very much depends on our conduct. These three qualities then combine to give conscience authority, with the conviction that it is more than individual or personal, that it involves a power not ourselves which "makes for righteousness." Conscience is thus partly intuitive in the sense of being prior to moral judgments, and partly empirical in each of its constituent qualities. Sometimes its elements of judgment and feeling stand in contradiction to one another. Sometimes its judgments are emphatically relative, and,

³ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 228.

as Muirhead points out, we waver between the view that we know intuitively that there is a standard and the view that intuition is helpless to tell us what the standard is.⁴ The authority of conscience is in a sense internal, a part of our very nature; yet it is also objective or above us, while being dependent on what is external for the content which history and contact with the world supply.

Our account will keep close to the reality of the ethical situation, if we bear in mind the fact that conscience is a phase of consciousness (as awareness of our total selfhood), that phase, namely, which makes us acutely aware of the part which conduct plays in realizing the self.⁵ By aid of consciousness we test our views of reality, all the while endeavoring to make our knowledge both precise and complete, critical and thorough. By the aid of conscience, we test ourselves even more incisively, comparing our conduct with the highest standard yet given to the world. It thus becomes a principle of interpretation of the greatest importance, a means of determining what are the supreme values.

The Growth of Conscience.—The awareness which we call conscience may be very greatly dulled through disregard of its promptings, and it may be almost wholly buried in the habitual sinner. Superficially at least, people make light of its standards as if it had no more authority than passing opinion. Yet one may steadily grow in knowledge of its content and worth by successively noting these fluctuations and reducing them to their sources. The acutest student needs rationally progressive knowledge of conscience, and precise study brings investigators into closer agreement. The authority of conscience is thereby more an end to be striven for and attained despite all relativities than a principle on which we may agree at the outset. Our perplexities do not cease with our knowledge, for as we become more precise we raise new difficulties and dwell upon a hundred details where an earlier generation would have seen but one. We do not even wholly escape from the

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 76.

⁵ Cf. Muirhead, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

pangs and pains, or at least the doubts to which former difficulties gave rise. We need education in matters of conscience long after we have acquired a definite theory of its origin, authority, and constituents. We educate one another in a great number of ways, by refinements of doctrine, by niceties of taste, by insistence on our standards, by putting the individual over against society. The conservative sometimes helps us as much as the non-conformist. All these considerations prove that conscience is partly empirical, and only potentially "innate." No individual acquires anew all that conscience yields, although each must test for himself sufficiently to realize the intimate relationship between conscience and the individual, as well as the dependence of the individual on "the social universe which he inhabits," or the system of things which he regards as highest.⁶ And one of the tests is implied in the pain we feel when, in each case, we realize the inconsistency between our conduct and the standards which we adopt in relation to one level or group of society after another.

Conscience is a Synthesis.—It is out of the question then to adopt either a purely evolutionary theory of conscience or any view which neglects the empirical elements. Evolutionism by itself is unable to account for what has been called the august element of conscience, its high aim, its greater values. If the evolution of society were synonymous with moral progress we would look for a steady increase of sensitiveness to ethical considerations, but we do not find that this is the case. In the life of a given individual there may be neglect of moral values in later years, where increased interest would be expected. On the other hand the theory that nothing in the sphere of conscience is learned by experience is no less one-sided than the view that everything moral is acquired by evolution. Yet both theories contain a large measure of truth. The human self contains at least the form or possibility of morality, while the matter is given by experience, and this content differs with the individual. The obligation or

⁶ Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

moral law is the universal over us all and including us all as the condition of moral experience. This element is in the race, is founded in our nature as human beings, is in our moral constitution. The empirical element is given through individual and social experience.

It is plain that experiments in righteousness are still of value, that we are still in the throes of discovering what is right, both as nations and as individuals, and oftentimes we are sorely at a loss to decide. New situations not only teach new duties and make ancient usages uncouth, as the poet assures us, but disclose problems so new that we do not see our duty at first. In our progress toward a solution we find it important to avoid being too serious and unduly analytical. We must preserve our spontaneity. In the light of later insights we can return and judge experiences which were too close to be understood. Moral insight is the great ideal, in contrast with moral feeling, and such insight is an achievement which we make with the passage of time.

The Element of Authority.—Conscience is by common consent supreme in its sphere, the last court of appeal, after we have sought advice, consulted the wisest men, read the best books, weighed the pros and cons of differing ethical systems. Hence the importance of realizing that it contains intellectual, emotional and volitional elements, each of which comes into prominence at times, while all three are to be thought of as habitually present, not as appearing successively.⁷ On occasion one may discern the issues with great clearness and proceed to an analysis of the pros and cons to determine the highest principle involved. But, again, the element of will or of sentiment may be paramount, as in the case of any of our judgments concerning matters of value, whatever the department of life. Difficulties have entered in so far as, identifying conscience with the code or system prevailing in a given age or among a certain people, man has come to look upon conscience as infallible. Only the moral constant, as we have called it, persists, not the judgments passed in the

⁷ Cf. Everett, *Moral Values*, p. 274.

name of conscience, not the deeds regarded as right, or even the codes and systems. The latter are subject to change in proportion as our knowledge of moral history grows, and as we realize that the authority is not absolute but dependent on the social situation, with its prevailing system. The authority of conscience is that of universal moral reason; the insight of the spirit, which advances with our knowledge and experience, and through interaction among individuals, devotees of systems, or representatives of nations. Conscience itself, as form, ground, moral universal, yields the rationalizing element of authority; while the successive judgments supply the subject-matter, which is as likely to change as our convictions change on such questions as slavery, the rights of woman, the value of non-resistance, the relation of war to the Christian life, or the place of diplomacy among nations. Conscience in application needs no other authority than the sanctions wherewith we seek to make it as powerful as possible, according to the ethical or religious system which we adopt. It has the authority of moral obligation, the law that there shall be law.

The Ethical Scale.—The ideal of conscience is a graduated scale of excellencies involving centralization, self-consistency on our part, in our endeavor to classify our leading interests by the standard which we take to be supreme. Conscience is at once the sensitivity through which we test motives, their right to a place in the scale, and the principle of criticism through which we arrive at a standard or ideal, an ideal which is subject to development through our efforts to make it more precise. Conscience is concerned with right motives in relation to right judgments. Its occupation is with the entire series of inner springs of action, which vary from the lowest motive ever felt by the self to the most worthy ever discerned in supreme moments of moral and spiritual vision.

Martineau has undertaken thorough classification of the springs of action in relation to conscience.⁸ There is a prudential series and a moral. Prudence, in relation to

⁸ *Op cit.*, Book I, Chap. V.

the springs of action, implies self-surrender to the strongest impulse, duty is self-surrender to the highest. The prudential scale is variable, individual, egoistic; the moral is identical and constant for all men. Prudence is confined to secondary impulses; conscience has discrimination over the whole, considers differences of inherent excellence and authority cognizable prior to action, not learned by experiment but read off by insight, and discerns the intervals between the springs of action. Conscience, in fact, shows an unspeakably great interval between the two competing impulses, while prudence must await action, moral judgment anticipates it. Our conscience is an enduring reality of our nature, announces laws not of our own making but higher: one's own will bows in homage to the law, one can not put it down. Thus, Martineau shows that conscience is more than myself, has its seat in the eternal, its reality in God: a revelation of authority to one person, it is valid for all. Hence, in knowing our actions as better and worse, we know the divine will: the reverence or respect which conscience inspires is identical with devotion to God, is the apex or crown of human character.⁹

The springs of action as thus classified and estimated involve 1. A Psychological Order: (1) Primary, unreflecting instinct, natural expressiveness; (2) Secondary, that is, tendencies which supervene upon self-knowledge and experience, with preconceived ends in view. For example, among primary promptings to action are: (1) propensions (organic appetites, animal spontaneity); passions (antipathy, fear, anger); affections (parental, social, compassionate); sentiments (wonder, admiration, reverence). Among the secondary incentives belong such propensions as love of pleasure, money, power; such passions as malice, vindictiveness, suspiciousness; such an affection as sentimentality; and such sentiments as self-culture, æstheticism, and interest in religion. 2. A Moral Order.¹⁰ Here we come upon conscience in full exercise, passing judgment upon the entire series, excluding some of the secondary

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Chap. VI.

promptings, and looking forward to ulterior compounds. Reverence as the highest spring of action is noble and I admire it, a dictate of perfect mind and I revere it as looking through and past the act to the character which it expresses; it is the supreme form of the love of the right. The scale of relations which thus culminates in reverence as identical with devotion to God is intended to show the duty of the moral agent in each crisis of competing impulses. It might well be that some springs to action would be stirred more frequently than others, the superior on rare occasions. But Martineau holds that due allowances can be made for frequency, as for quantity and quality. Our real discipline enters with the clashing of the involuntary with the voluntary, and the management of the surprises which it brings. The resulting rule is: "Every action is right, which, in the presence of a lower principle, follows a higher; every action is wrong, which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower."¹¹

Objections to Martineau's Scale.—To this scheme it has been objected that the list of springs of action rests on a false psychological division, since modern psychology regards the mind as an organic unity, and sets aside any hard and fast distinction between faculties such as Martineau depends upon.¹² As the motives enumerated are not simple but highly complex, their merits would depend on their composition; and we should be guided rather by the *end* to be attained, not by the sources of our activity. Again, Sidgwick points out that, even granting that Martineau's scale corresponds to the judgments of men, it is paradoxical to lay down the principle that each class of motives is always to be preferred to the class below it, without regard to circumstances and consequences. As the moral agent advances the *higher* motives would be developed so that their normal sphere would be enlarged at the expense of the lower: the intervention of higher motives would then be the decisive factor, not the next higher in the scale. Hence, Sidgwick does not find the scale ap-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

¹² See Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

plicable to his own case, *the supreme regulative motive* is really the decisive one.¹³

So too, Professor Palmer, noting that Martineau regards his scale as pioneer work, asks why according to the whole principle on which the scale is founded there should be any doubt: we ought to be able to turn within and find the table there. It is clear that any mistake in the psychology of the scale would be a mistake in ethics too. Life as found is not so abstract. With all the effort put into it, the table is not complete, filial affection is omitted, also courage. It does not seem possible to determine by this scale what motives are superior. If true, the scale would abolish all moral insight.

Again, in actual efforts to live by it, students of ethics have found that it does not sufficiently settle problems where there are conflicts of values. The table is found of greater interest psychologically than ethically. Some have missed spontaneity, as if it had no ethical value or character. Again, the scale assumes too great uniformity among moral standards. The doubt arises whether we can know that others' judgments of motives are just. Not enough consideration is given to mixed motives, and it is these that are chiefly influential. Judgment by "the fruits" of moral action is still a sound means of testing our motives, in contrast with Martineau's extreme emphasis on promptings arising within the self and judged prior.¹⁴

Need of a Working Scale.—Nevertheless, the seriousness with which Martineau's scale has been considered is strong testimony in favor of a working scale of values. If Martineau gives too little attention to spontaneity, and the worth of results, the resource is to examine moral experience with fidelity to more recent psychology, avoiding any assumption that our springs of action are "innate" in the sense of a separateness between "faculties"; noting individual differences; and putting emphasis on purposes rather than on incentives. One may have in

¹³ H. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 369.

¹⁴ See, also, Rashdall, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, 110, foll.

mind a tentative scale concerning a few of the more frequent or the more eligible promptings, without attempting to draw up an exhaustive table and without being too precise. No two persons would draw up the same scale, and the scale proposed at twenty-five would differ from one formulated at fifty. Yet the existence of conscience implies a hierarchy both of incentives to action and of ends to be striven for. The difficulties experienced are the same we encounter everywhere when we try to put life or the dynamic element into a form, likely to become static. Conscience yields an imperative which we are strongly tempted to put forth in terms of finality. But the authority of conscience, its rule over us by practice of which we draw nearer the divine, is in the command to be true and loyal *to the highest we see today*, with the realization that as our insight increases we may discern the goal more clearly tomorrow.

As Leslie Stephen shows, conscience implies a judgment of the whole character;¹⁵ and we know that character is not only manifold in content but is in process of development. So, too, Dewey and Tufts maintain that conscience implies a knowledge of the whole act—purpose, motive, and deed.¹⁶ It is in this larger sense that conscience demands complete obedience: reflective morality is a sign of a progressive society, while customary morality is evidence that society has become stationary. By a progressive conscience we mean one that retains its sensitiveness to the mutations of the ethical spirit in the race. It is “the critical perception” we have not only of the relative authority of our “several springs of action,” the factor on which Martineau dwells,¹⁷ but also our perception of the issue which become vital in the social order in which we live, subject as it is to changes as marked as those wrought by the World War. What Martineau calls the *intervals* between the springs of action have changed in our day, with ideas of the unconscious; and conscience is now

¹⁵ *Science of Ethics*, p. 315.

¹⁶ *Ethics*, p. 183.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 54.

concerned with the task of coördinating the elements of our nature which have unwittingly played a great part in our motives. Conscience has a different sense of the relative values along the scale, since the emphasis shifted in favor of what is dynamic in our nature. If able to discern the ruling passion or prevailing love, we may concentrate upon this, lifting the whole scale by purifying our love. The function of conscience is to guide in this the crucial situation. Its function is positive, affirmative; not prohibitory, as if ever insisting "Thou shalt not." That which is "absolutely right" can not be stated in terms of negations, or in condemnations put upon our lower propensities. The perfect scale, could we possess it, would disclose the *use* of each prompting in its proper place, each incentive being contributory, each good, every one needed. There would then, in practice, be no excesses, either on the lower levels or near the top; but a joyous attainment of the abundant life.¹⁸

Summary.—Conscience then is that principle of our moral nature or combination of moral elements which sets the standard for all others; implies moral law, obligation, duty. It is the witness in ourselves of the right, a perception of moral distinctions accompanied by awareness that we ought to do what we take to be right. As involving knowledge of the good, it is a species of judgment. As implying the permanent basis of moral obligation, it persists through all moral changes, is the moral constant in all human history: conscience itself determines the natural history of moral distinctions, is the "higher" involved in judgments concerning the "lower." Thus conscience yields the ideal of moral worth in the long progress toward the highest standard. The moral variables of our nature become intelligible in the light of the constant which gives meaning to all relativities in our judgments. It is because of conscience that we come to need a scale of values.

¹⁸ The question of the social conscience will be considered in another chapter, after we have discussed some of the perplexities of conscience in daily life.

As involving a more or less painful awareness of past deeds, with a realization of what we ought to have done, it is a direct moral incentive to better conduct. The self-depreciation, the dishonoring of the self which is involved in the deed judged to be wrong, suggests by contrast self-realization. Conscience makes us aware that we are responsible, that the self that wills is decisive. But conscience is not merely negative or indirect; it involves positive certainty concerning the ideal, and, on occasion, yields a sense of joy in our productivity as making toward the ideal. Conscience gives stability, and so enables us to overcome the inner dividedness which is implied in all conduct that lowers the self. Although not a mere faculty, sense, intuition, or voice, and not even an inner light to be accepted without interpretation; each of these practical conceptions is a clue and should be retained by those who have found them of value. Conscience is of unlimited practical value, and a basis of guidance for all.

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CHAPTER XVI

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

Scope of the Question.—The question whether or not man possesses freedom of will appears to be exceptionally simple: man is either morally free or there is no moral order in the universe, consciousness yields direct assurance that we are free, and this unmistakable awareness of freedom on our part is more conclusive than any argument. Yet the subject has proved far from simple. However, many times the matter has been apparently settled, new considerations have been brought forward. Analysis of the perennial issues is highly profitable for all who are deeply concerned to know human nature and human life. It is well, therefore, to try out the possibilities as if the problem were far from solution, including a brief study of fatalism, and an analysis of arguments for and against determinism.

Fatalism.—There is little to be said about fatalism, which ordinarily means belief in a blind but fixed order of cosmic events, including all human deeds and their causes both internal and external, a series over which man has not the slightest power.¹ Or, in place of a blind force, the assumption may be that some Power has irrevocably decreed all events whatsoever, hence that there is one Will in the universe. The implication in either case is that events are foredoomed and connected in such a way that a certain occurrence will take place whatever one can do. From the Mahomedan point of view the explanation offered is as brief as possible: "It was written." Thus the Turkish soldier will inevitably die when fate has decreed. The practical result is a courage which is terrible

¹ Cf. Janet, *Theory of Morals*, trans., p. 365; Gizycki, *Introd. to the Study of Ethics*, trans., p. 197.

in execution, also an indifference to human suffering and human life. Fatalism in milder forms in ancient times involved superstition, an effort by means of auguries to discover and prepare for events that were imminent. In more recent times, belief in astrology, palmistry, and in other schemes for discovering what is popularly called "fate," involves a hope that one can discover the way to a fortune partly within control, or avert a predicted disaster. Mild belief in fatalism also lurks under unthinking resignation and pessimism. The ethical significance of any belief in fatalism is found in the fact that man usually shows by his conduct what he really believes, and in practice most men proceed on the assumption that their conduct will make a difference. Some advocates of free-will insist that determinism is always fatalism in disguise, but we shall find that determinism should be considered by itself. Science does not adopt fatalism, but formulates all its teachings in terms of the reign of law.²

Predestination.—The theological doctrine that God, possessing all foreknowledge and power, chose beforehand both the elect and the reprobate, concerns us in part; since it involves the assumption that even the volitions of moral agents were by a decisive disposal included in this plan. All things being perfectly and equally within the divine view from eternity, any alleged secondary cause would be incompatible with the First Cause; divine knowledge is absolute, and so does not depend either on experience or on the unfolding of events according to a plan laid down. Knowing what God is apart from the world, we know what he decrees for all human beings in any world he may create. As there is foreknowledge of all human possibilities in accordance with decrees for each man, virtue is in reality due to divine grace. Human freedom is utterly impossible, even on the supposition that God permits lesser events which can be brought to a point where the good is triumphant; for since God is the sole cause of all that he infallibly foresees, it would be futile to discriminate between

² For objections to fatalism, see G. S. Fullerton, *A System of Metaphysics*, 1904, p. 551.

what he decrees and what he permits.³ This may be taken to mean that there is no true creation at all, but simply God evolving in fixed necessary order; or the view that God founded the possibility of sin in the creative order, with the possibility of overcoming sin: "the *possibility* of a sinful decision . . . against God is the necessary presupposition of the kingdom of God as a kingdom of free moral persons."⁴

It has been objected that this view deprives man of true reality as a moral being. For moral philosophers, not bound to sustain a theological system, the *reality* of the moral self, and with it the fact of evil is the foundation. Hence, predestination becomes practically a dead letter. The relentless logic of Calvin in developing this doctrine to its last conclusion was the utter undoing of the whole system, so far as it concerns ethics.

Divine Omnipotence.—Yet there are certain implications of the argument as it has appeared in history since the days of the doctrine of the fall of man that are still significant. The chief issue has turned upon the assumption that God is unconditionally omnipotent. Then the question is, How shall evil be accounted for? What of sin and the doctrine of eternal punishment? To start with the conviction that God is good is to conclude that he can not be the author of evil. How then shall evil be reconciled with divine omnipotence? Two views have been maintained: (1) the denial of the reality of evil, on the assumption that it is not positive and substantial but merely a privation of good, or the dark color that throws up the light, as Augustine called it; (2) the assumption of the right of the Creator to do whatever he wills with his creatures.

Many have assumed that wrong-doing as related to the growth of human personalities is so distributed that a greater perfection exists as a result. So the attempt is made to reconcile evil with a view of the divine nature without pressing the argument far enough to see what it

³ Cf. James Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, 1911, p. 311.

⁴ G. B. Foster, *Christianity in its Modern Expression*, 1921, p. 134.

involves. The difficulty becomes more serious with the attempt to reconcile the theory of eternal punishment with the notion that evil is merely negative, incidental to the working out of a higher order. Or, again, admitting that evil is real, the attempt may be made to free God from responsibility on the ground that the salvation of man depends on his own choice, which in turn is not predetermined by God. The argument comes no nearer a solution in this direction, for free-will as thus understood limits divine omnipotence; and partisans of the implied theology have been more inclined to limit the responsibility of man than the knowledge and authority of God. So the problem becomes that of the evil will, and the argument reverts to Augustine's assumption that as a good God can not create a bad nature, and as the nature of wicked angels must then have been intrinsically good, the fall of the angels was due to an evil will whose cause can not be explained or even stated.

The Bad Will.—It is clear that either the bad will must have an origin somewhere in the nature of beings whom God has created or else it is a force arising out of nothing which God can not control. But, if God does not control evil but only permits it, despite an omnipotence which might prevent it, the situation is no better; and so the argument tends to reappear in favor of divine omnipotence and responsibility. If the difference between the good will and the bad will lies in the choice of good, and if this choice turns on the grace of God, the old-time conclusion follows that the good will is good because of a greater measure of divine grace, while the bad is such because this grace is lacking. The hypothesis of the uncaused bad will once abandoned, the position of the omnipotent God remains secure as ultimate author of the depravity of angels and men by predestination.

Calvinism.—Where some would have evaded the conclusion by dialectical compromise, Calvin drew the instructive logical consequence: "those whom God passes by, He reprobates, and from no other cause than His determination to exclude them." It seemed even to Calvin

"an awful decree," that a portion of the race was doomed to eternal torment. But on the assumption of divine foreknowledge this foreappointment by God's decree was inevitable. For Calvin there could be no distinction between will and permission on God's part. The human will was resolved into an instrument through which God worked. It mattered not that the world was ostensibly created for man's benefit. Man merited punishment because corrupted by sin, and even though it seemed clear that God must then have created him corrupt, the relentless reply was that the potter has power over the vessel. God as supreme judge of the world, from whom issue all law and all right, can do no injustice; that is just which God wills, and if he determined at the outset on the fall of man it was because he foresaw that it would tend to the justification and glory of his name. So, as Hobhouse has argued, to follow Calvin would be to pass outside the range of ethics into a region where ethics as we understand the term no longer applies.⁵

Ethics implies the conviction that the human will is no mere puppet of an overruling Power. If free-will means a limitation of divine power, there have been ethical thinkers in abundance as ready to be true to their logic as Calvin was to his. As no man can be justly rewarded or punished unless he recognizes himself as the doer, responsibility rests with man, and this in turn implies identity of character. In place of the divine omnipotence to be maintained at any cost, God is regarded in the light of limited foreknowledge and power; the doctrine of eternal punishment is relegated to the history of theology, and with it predestination, its implied notion of the human will, merit, justice, and the like. It is no longer customary to insist on a theory of the relation of God to man based on an assumed abstraction regarding the divine nature and the conclusions which follow from this abstraction. The effort, ethically speaking, is to explain and interpret the world of experience which we actually know. Moreover, it is out of the question to resolve so many matters

⁵ L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. II, p. 135.

at once. An artificial situation was created by the assumption of the fall of man. The idea of God can be developed to its full extent without the notion of eternal punishment, or indeed any consequence save those results which come from educative progress toward the realization of a moral ideal.

The Necessitarian View.—According to Spinoza all phenomena of the universe arise from the nature of things, as propositions concerning the triangle result from the nature of the triangle. This, the geometric view, involves a conception of God as Substance from whose nature are derived all attributes and all modes. Man's selfhood falls under the head of modes of the one Substance, under certain attributes, and so it is in every respect part of the *necessary* series. It is, indeed, possible for man to entertain illusory views concerning the sequences of events of which his life consists, but this is because of his ignorance. Thus arises the notion that men act with ends in view over which they seem to have power. Men deem themselves free because aware of their own volitions and desires, never even dreaming which, in their ignorance of the causes have led them to wish and desire as they do. But the notion of such causes, indeed the mere idea of final causes in general is a mere figment: God acts solely by the necessity of his nature, and all things are predetermined, not by free-will or absolute fiat, but through the nature of God as infinite power.⁶ The whole nature of man the individual is therefore absorbed by this essentially pantheistic conception in which only Substance, its attributes and modes remain, in the light of what Spinoza calls "adequate" knowledge.

Determinism.—The prime difficulty with speculative systems is that their advocates assume to tell us, on the basis of partial knowledge, what is absolutely true of God or of the total universe, as if they possessed complete knowledge. Thus the conception of predestination or of rigid geometrical necessity is theoretically imposed on the structure of life from above. But modern science, assuming

⁶ *Ethics*, Part I, Appendix.

less, works into the structure of the universe from below, and arrives at a conception of law and order. Determinism involves the idea of *the reign of law*. Law is relative to the facts and conditions to be explained. The problem of freedom pertains to a certain field of experience within the universe of law and order. Inquiry into its nature scarcely begins in earnest therefore until absolutistic systems, ignoring many facts and conditions of life as we find it, are classified for analysis in other connections, and the remaining problem is restated under the head of determinism. What is determined is not attributed to fate, blind necessity, an inscrutable Will that decrees all things, a Power which predestines, a Substance (as in Spinoza's system), or an Absolute (as in the Hegelian system), from which all things follow. It is described and explained in its own realm. If all determining causes are regarded as exterior to the agent, so that man is a sheer creature of circumstances, all of which are necessary, then indeed determinism passes over into fatalism. But there is a less severe determinism which places the emphasis on the agent as the determining cause and hence directs attention to circumstances in relation to character which when fully known involves personal inheritance, habits, instincts, defects, peculiarities, with the factors due to environment, the main consideration being conduct regarded as calculable, on which predictions may be founded. Conduct expresses character as it exists at a given moment in the individual's life, and character is determined by sequences which have gone before and which need to be investigated in detail from various points of view.

Cosmic Evidences.—The universe as a system manifests necessary sequences; every effect has its cause; nature is everywhere uniform, makes no "leaps," is without gaps or interruptions; the sum of energies is constant, hence in case of transmutation from one form to another there is neither diminution nor increase. As there are no breaks in the causal sequences, all changes are explicable by what went before. Man as part of nature is a product of these sequences: whatever activity he possesses belongs under the

same process, which goes on relentlessly without exception. A single real act of mind, breaking into the series of physical events would involve change in the sum of energies. Mind then is without real causality, and the notion of freedom has been called "man's grateful self-illusion."

The typical objection to this statement of man's place in the cosmos is that while the implied conception of nature holds in its own field, as described by the physical sciences, a complete philosophy would consider the moral order of the universe in its own right. It is a simple matter for advocates of the mechanical conception of nature to rule out mental life on the ground that admission of mental causality as real would disrupt the theory. But, granted that the sum-total of cosmical energies is constant, it has yet to be shown what that energy is, and how it is related to ultimate reality. Recent discoveries concerning radiant energy have brought the conception of physical forces nearer the mental field, but science is not in a position to define energy in its ultimate form. Mechanical knowledge of nature does not warrant a generalization concerning other types of activity; tells us nothing about the realm of values.

Evidences from Biology.—It is more usual to depend on facts from biology tending to show that man's history as well as his present character is explicable as a product of heredity plus environment by means of natural selection, use and disuse, and other evolutionary factors: man's nature is a collection of instincts or prepotent reflexes, dispositions, and habits. The functioning of these elements of his nature can be mechanically described with reference to reactions upon stimuli, acquired modes of behavior, that is, modes of the organism; and the inference seems wholly justifiable that mental life is determined by these reflexes and other modes of behavior. The power of heredity is seen, for example, in degenerate families, traceable to an original pair of defectives, in contrast with families derived from excellent stock.⁷ The power of environment is observable in the tenement, the sweat-shop, the prison; in

⁷ See H. H. Goddard, *The Kallikak Family*, 1920.

contrast with the farm, the estate, the well-situated home. When the issues are narrowed down to a study of the brain, the transition is easy to a mechanical view of life as a whole, which seems to preclude the possibility of freedom.⁸

The objection is that the argument that man is a product of heredity and environment, biologically speaking, does not reach far enough to apply to the question of moral freedom. The description of man as a behavior-being is but one approach to the study of human nature, and the type of psychology founded on or identified with biology, by which the argument is justified, is only one of several types. Mental life may still be regarded as having a value of its own, even from the point of view of biological considerations. Morally speaking, it is never a mere question of inherited tendencies which we actually possess, the environment in which we find ourselves; but a question of the *use* to which we put our powers, what we accomplish by aid of our capacities, the opportunities we select, the social changes in which we participate according to our standards of what ought to be. These are indeterminate factors. If on ethical grounds we conclude that man is in a measure free, the descriptive sciences must take human *conduct* as well as human "behavior" into account. All the factors of organic selection have not yet been determined. Psychical selection may be a factor, and the whole course of evolution may be ultimately psychical in origin.

Sociological Evidences.—Further support is given the deterministic argument by analysis of social influences singled out under the head of imitation, suggestion, custom, fashion, tradition, public opinion, and other factors; all these taken as a whole apparently account for man as produced by his social environment. Sometimes the argument takes the form of the assumption that man is a product of "the group mind." The prime result in any case is a collection of facts with regard to marriage, divorce, suicide, so classified that statistics show what types of phenomena are to be expected: conduct once attributed to

⁸ For a discussion of the intermediate field between biology and psychology, see, for example, S. Paton, *Human Behavior*, 1921.

free-will is explained by social laws, and the given social situation, in quantitative terms. Sociology apparently establishes determinism, although this is not its purpose. The phrase "economic determinism" passes current among observers of social groups who describe man as a product of the conditions under which he lives, in the given social order. The evidences seem to be cumulative and to warrant the generalization that man is not free. Sociologists, social psychologists, and economists may indeed be cautious in their generalizations: less cautious are those who anticipate the conclusion at which the social sciences as a whole may arrive.

So far, however, the social sciences do not reach the end. All that these sciences tell us about imitation, suggestion, and other factors of man's social life, including statistics about suicide and divorce, may be true in its own field; while the moral field remains to be considered in relation to the findings of social science. Through his conscience, his moral judgments, his moral conduct man is brought into contact with his total social environment. To substantiate determinism it would be necessary to show that all elements of the moral life—moral obligation, moral law, duty, conscience, the sense of responsibility, consciousness of freedom—are explained to the limit by social conditions, or social evolution as a whole. Social predictions are not far-reaching and exact enough to be conclusive, from an ethical point of view. Even if sociology could by its statistical method prove that all human choices are uniform, it would not follow that men are not free in the specific sense required by the facts of moral experience. The social sciences do not profess to take into full account the consciousness, the inner life which accompanies man's experience in relation to social conditions.

Physiological Determinism.—The evidences thus far considered regard man in too extensive a way to meet the direct issues. So in the transition from biology and the social sciences to psychology emphasis is sometimes placed more specifically on physiological data, such as the effect of the nervous system, the molecular structure of the

brain; the variations due to nutrition, blood-supply, glandular activity, accidents, diseases, abnormal behavior. Mental life seems to be a kind of passive accompaniment of brain-states, as if man were a mere automaton, his consciousness somehow running parallel with cerebral events but absolutely without power over so much as one of these events. On the hypothesis that our mental life merely accompanies cerebral activity without the slightest participation in it, the scientific view of the conservation of energy is confirmed, and so once more the evidence is cumulative.

As it seems inconceivable that consciousness should actuate a molecule the conclusion readily follows that mind is absolutely determined. Physicians and specialists in various types of abnormal mental life, psycho-analysts, and also many psychotherapists ordinarily agree in assuming determinism on physiological grounds; and the term "moral life" if used at all simply refers to a higher phase of conduct still regarded as determined in every respect by the bodily organism.⁹ Thus determinism is a practical postulate which medical practice supposedly confirms.

Evidence from Psychology.—Physiological psychology proceeds on the assumption that the normal and abnormal conditions to which the brain is subject are those under which consciousness is possible. Every mental process is said to be determined by a cerebral process, as there is "no psychosis without neurosis"; and so the various mental principles are accounted for by reference to habit as a cerebral law, by association, and in terms of products of bodily sensation. Theories divide at this point. Some psychologists maintain that mind is an automaton, others that it runs parallel in its activity with corresponding states in the brain, while a third point of view involves interaction between mind and brain.¹⁰ But on any of these hypotheses determinism appears to follow. Although brain and mind interact, the mental series must have a cause,

⁹ For example, see P. Dubois, *The Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders*, trans., 1906.

¹⁰ See C. A. Strong, *Why the Mind Has a Body*, 1903.

and this is said to be readily traceable to preceding psychophysical events and conditions.

A causeless act of will appears impossible: decisions involve motives, these have had a history, and if the motives are not supplied by the act of choice they must be due to some other source. There appears to be no psychological basis for what is called "the liberty of indifference." To fall back on the notion of absolute chance would be to evade the question. Again, as Horne has pointed out, "choice is likely to be in line with habit. This is the more true as time advances. It is possible to break a habit of long standing by effort, but it is not probable." Habit, as we well know, limits the ease and efficiency of our choice, and we readily follow in the line of least resistance. Again, choice is limited by the capacities supplied by heredity: these can be developed but not augmented, our capacities set limits to successful choices. Thus, every one chooses within the limits of his capacities, by what opportunity offers, the range of opportunities being very small with most of us. Even the genius is dependent on the opportunities which yield occasions for his selectiveness.

Psychology seems to offer no explanation of our choices and the conditions of choice except in terms of preceding events and circumstances, that is, those which have produced the given habits, capacities, and motives brought into relation with the opportunities which disclose what we take to be alternatives. The entire psychical process with its conations implying instinctive dispositions, impulses, tendencies to imitation, suggestion, dependence on habit, together with transitory influences due to fatigue, the interplay of varying experiences—this whole process enters into the account and determines the result. Psychological considerations readily sustain the view that choice always depends on the strongest motive, whether that motive be dependent on hereditary or environmental influences. It might be claimed that in acting upon a given motive we "feel ourselves to be free," but the determinist's reply is that a part of the causal chain lies

within our consciousness, and what we feel is the phase of experience (in itself determined) in which we *appear* to decide the course of action which follows. Psychology discloses no detachable ego, but only a collection of processes, the total train of thought: the mind and its contents are the same.

Ethical Evidences.—Bringing all these considerations together, the argument seems convincing beyond all question, especially when restated in ethical terms. The terms reward and blame, accountability, conscience, character, seem to imply moral freedom; but the determinist is ready to admit that man possesses character in contrast with disposition, and that acts attributable to character imply conscience and responsibility. A man's character determines his acts, he is responsible because the act is his own; he so acted because with such a character his deed would naturally be precisely what we find it to have been. If he were free, his conduct could not be depended on, he would be an irresponsible agent; society can depend on him precisely because he is a man of a certain character. Indeed, predictability of conduct is said to be the condition of man's association with his fellowmen. This does not deprive him of anything precious; the higher the development, the more sure and extensive the prediction. Conduct in the moment when it expresses character implies no ambiguous future. Our whole scheme of rewards and punishments turns upon this accountability. The more constancy of character we have the better, the higher our state of moral development the more surely people can depend on us; and we are to be congratulated on the possession of constancy. As matter of fact, people are pleased on the whole when onlookers make predictions implying constancy, honesty, fidelity, loyalty, and similar virtues. Given more enlightenment, it will be more and more sure that we will act in accordance with it.

Determinists also claim that there is abundant room for the feeling of remorse and shame: we feel remorse precisely because we are aware that an act condemned as wrong sprang from our character, and because in com-

parison with another standard it is inferior. The act did not spring from "some unmotivated freak of willing," but from one's very self, from an ignoble motive. In this as in all other cases deeds attributable to the self are wholly explicable. Our character, fully known, including hereditary traits, personal history to date, habits, proclivities, elements of weakness and of strength, defects and peculiarities, then our conduct would be predictable in minute detail. A being looking on and knowing all these factors would be able to foretell the total result. So-called chance is referred to only so far as knowledge of character and circumstance is incomplete. All the arguments in favor of determinism are reducible in fact to the causal argument: the world is a causal system in which all things, persons, events, belong together, although the conception of causality is enlarged to include not only physical heredity and environment, various social factors, physiological considerations, and psychological evidences, but also a view of final causes, for instance, a theological conception implying a plan for each human being. The ultimate reality in any case is sovereign over all, *all is given*, implied in the original elements or original energy, so that there is no novelty or chance in the universe, no individual initiative or any other factor breaking into the system.

The Psycho-physical Argument.—The argument in favor of automatism conflicts with what is known concerning the whole process of evolution, namely, that organs that are useful survive while those that are useless atrophy. The fact that consciousness appears to be efficacious is evidence that it really is so; if it had been useless it would long ago have been eliminated.¹¹ The truth is that consciousness has increased in scope and power, it is plainly useful to the organism in the biological sense of the word, it selects what is useful in the light of organic well-being, regarded as efficacious it is at least *one* of the causes of successful action. It has proved impossible to reduce all our activities to the reflex type of behavior. The contention that consciousness is a mere product of the brain is

¹¹ See W. James, *Psychology*, 1890, Vol. I, Chap. V.

offset, so some critics hold, by the fact that we are immediately sure of the existence of consciousness; whereas we know the nature of brain-events only by inference from the data of consciousness: it remains to be proved that the existence of which we are less directly certain causes those events of which we are immediately aware, notably in case of a moral decision.

Physiological and psychological results may then be accepted as far as they go, and yet the argument for determinism may fall short of certainty, when the corrections and additions are made. A given hypothesis, such as psycho-physical parallelism, is assumed for the sake of precise scientific description within a certain field; but it may be necessary to reject the notion that there is no interaction between mind and brain, when it is a question of real causes and moral values. Interactionist psychology puts the whole matter in a different light.¹² If we discover as a fact that conduct follows upon a moral decision and is carried out in an external deed, we are bound to accept the fact although unable as yet to square it with our theory of the physical universe. There is strong empirical evidence in favor of interaction between mind and brain. The contention that every act involves a motive would not be disconcerting to a partisan of free-will, since freedom obtains within very restricted limits. The determinist position should not be regarded as established unless it can be proved that not so much as *one* free volition can occur. Again, determinists must account in a perfectly satisfactory way for man's consciousness that he actually is free. From the point of view of one of the prevailing types of psychology freedom exists if involved in certain acts of attention (James), said to be the vital factor in mental life: this is as far as psychology may be expected to go.

If mental energy be a part of world-energy, the case would appear to be still stronger. The fact that we use our energy so as to seem to be efficient, as if we were

¹² Professor James, for example, firmly believed in freedom; see his *The Will to Believe*.

really deciding issues and accomplishing some end, is regarded by many as capital evidence that consciousness is actually efficacious. Consciousness can be thus useful to the organism without conflicting with the lesser functions, which may well be subservient to it. The habits and functions of the brain and nervous system may be in part resultants of the uses to which the mind has put the organism. It has not been proved that the brain influences the mind without in turn being influenced by it, for example, in the formation of habits with whose purposes the brain as such has nothing to do. It is at least a possibility that mind is a truly efficient cause. The contention that it is a mere spectator is based on an interpretation of events in the cosmos which at best is but one among several hypotheses in as good standing as the mechanical philosophy.

Ethical Objections.—It is difficult to persuade advocates of free-will that the sense of responsibility is accounted for by determinism. It may be granted that man is for the most part determined, and some would add that conduct can be mostly predicted, namely, the conduct of *others*. But one is unable to predict one's own conduct to the full: the consciousness persists that circumstances become our own by actual acceptance of them, and this consciousness is worthy of consideration in its own right. Again, determinists are unable to decide precisely what a man's character is as a determining cause in one's self or in another person, since "character" is in part at least a changing quantity. In any event, a person is likely to contend that deeds springing from character have *reasons*, not "causes" for being. Complete predictability in terms of causality would call for perfect, all-seeing intelligence. Determinism must then fall back on probability, which might be interpreted to imply freedom.

The Element of Attention.—In any event we are left with our practical consciousness, with the conviction that praise and blame have real meaning, that our conduct is rightly attributed to the self as responsible. We have the assurance, also which James' psychology gives us in

its emphasis on *attention* as the acme of mental life, the basis of will, the heart of one's self-conscious reflection. However limited our power, we are at least able to observe the play of thought and to exercise selective interest. Attention can not be long sustained, but an instant may suffice to emphasize one alternative, and by inclining toward this alternative one may cast the die, or by turning from its opposite one may remove it; then the results will follow according to deterministic description. In a possible instance the arguments pro and con might be so nicely balanced that it would not be from any point of view evident what is going to happen; yet the slightest act of attention might settle the issues. *After a decision has been made*, it is possible to reason back to the motive which is regarded as decisive and to argue that it was therefore the strongest motive. It might as easily follow, in view of considerations pertaining to one's mental history and one's character, that one could not have acted otherwise. But the case never looks so clear in advance, or from the point of view of the unforeseeable element of the situation.

Personal Acts.—The act as *mine* is a new one, a decisive combination of factors which as such might have been old. I may stand in the presence of alternatives, one of which is the stronger (the lower), under the probability that I shall act upon it; but I may *make* the higher alternative the stronger one by the act of attention where-with I identify it with my better self, my moral ideal. The ideal consciousness may thus become stronger than the present determining consciousness which psychology analyzes with such convincing precision. I select, I attend to the *moral* alternative by virtue of my own inner meaning or purpose. I may rise to the occasion even when everything points to the triumph of the lower motive, which, to all appearances, is the stronger up to the moment the die is cast. If causality may be said to enter in, it is ideal or creative causality: my moral endeavor is inspired by an ideal towards which I strive even when there seems no possibility of success. Although my act does indeed express my character, it is to be noted that my character is

partly the result of past choices, and that the creative activity of character is not expressed through a fixed mold, but is partly in process. I am partly in the making, endeavoring to remake myself in part. I may in time tend to act more and more uniformly, because of the selection of desirable traits and the lapsing of the undesirable, the triumph of my chosen universe of desire. But the more unity of character I possess the greater my free creative possibility, despite the fact that my character in general is more constant, hence more predictable (by others).

Thus the more persistently we follow up the psychological considerations by interpretation of which determinism is apparently established, the more light we gain on the development of character through the changing processes of attention which at least partly aid in producing it. If character is a collection of tendencies, some of which are being selectively accentuated because more acutely attended to, while others are waning because attention turns away from them as undesirable, then the possibility that through attention real freedom is exercised is established on excellent ground. Attention by increment appears to be the central factor in instances where on occasion one does the unexpected. The remarkable apparent changes in character recorded by those who have made an acute study of conversion imply acts of decisive attention, whether the regenerative experience seems to involve the creation of what is uncritically called a "new will" or simply to bring into the foreground possibilities of conduct previously held in abeyance. Again, it may be an instance of the faithful bank cashier who after long years of service turns thief.

Moral Decisions.—All that is needed to meet determinism at this the decisive point is a real possibility of either rising or falling in the scale in the face of given alternatives. Repentance, regeneration, virtue, and responsibility must be at least as real as sin, must be as surely attributable to the self, as emphatically human, even though man does little more in the presence of the highest alternatives than to *accept*, to give assent. Real meaning enters

human experience with such decisions, real opportunities are put before men to select possible lines of action neither foreknown nor decreed, also real coöperation with a divine purpose which leaves room for man to accomplish his part. What is lost in giving up the old conception, with its idea of the divine sovereignty and omnipotence, its determinate "plan" for each soul (as a fixed entity), is more than compensated for by an appeal to life as still in the making. This ethical pluralism of wills capable of doing their part is more nearly in accord with the facts regarding our relatively independent existence, amidst conflicts, surrounded by opportunities inviting decision, calling for real choice, contributory conduct, the acceptance of responsibility.

Heredity and Environment.—Summarizing the arguments for determinism, we note that prevailing views of heredity and environment are far from definite. If, with Cattell, we define heredity as "the resemblances among individuals due to their common origin or germ plasm," we have so far a conception of "the congenital equipment or original organization of the individual."¹³ But what of environment? How far does the term apply, as we trace influences said to be external and eventually come to the brain with its sphere of influences on the mind? There is plainly a third term between heredity and environment, sometimes referred to as "function," again as *travail*, i.e., (1) *famille*, (2) *travail*, (3) *lieu*. It is plain, as Cattell maintains, that experience, or this middle term, is not coöordinate with congenital equipment and environment, but dependent on them. If by the term "nature" we mean (with Galton) "the sum of inborn qualities" which includes also "those individual variations" which are due to causes other than heredity, and which act before birth; we then have other factors to classify under "nurture," and still need our third term to describe what the individual makes of nature plus nurture. The great difficulty consists in separating organism from environment. Cattell holds that if in the case of Darwin and Lincoln, born

¹³ *The Science Monthly*, May, 1924, p. 509.

on the same day, the two infants had been exchanged, there would have been no Darwin and no Lincoln. We may then say that "what a man can do is determined by his native equipment, what he does do by the circumstances of his life." It then becomes a question of that alertness, that ability which psychologists have recently been trying to estimate in terms of intelligence tests.

The Moral Situation.—The higher up in the scale we go, the less able we are to gauge what we call intelligence by quantitative tests. So too it might be said that the higher we ascend the less able we are to explain, deterministically, a man of genius like Darwin or Lincoln. The middle term for which we contend the more insistently, when our point of view becomes ethical, includes not merely "function," the ability to work, the alertness which enables a man to become highly efficient, but also *character* as partly created by the way in which a man exercises his ability. The deterministic element includes certain lines laid down for each man, his particular congenital equipment, native disposition, temperament plus the force of circumstances which we call "environment" in brief, including under that head a very wide classification of influences. These are the lines along which to develop character by the aid of opportunity. The sphere of moral development is then rather definitely marked out, and the more closely we analyze man's moral situation the more emphasis we are likely to put on evidences making for determinism. Yet as the physical individual varies in the combination worked out between congenital equipment and environment, so the moral task differs with each, the moral integration involves alternatives even within an extremely limited sphere. It is not a question of hereditary or environmental influences in general, but of the good and evil presented to the particular individual in question in a given situation. It is for the individual to create a character amidst this given situation.¹⁴ If the determining causes were wholly from without, due to constraint, violence, natural contingencies and necessities, there would

¹⁴ Cf. Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

plainly be no freedom, man would be at best a passive spectator. But the determining moral causes are looked upon as within the agent himself, in any given situation, that is, his instincts and tendencies, his dynamic abilities, his spontaneity.

The description of the elements that enter into our moral experience can not be regarded as complete till we have given full recognition both to the consciousness of freedom and to the experience of meeting moral issues. In the foregoing discussion we have tried to give determinism the fullest hearing, even at the risk of seeming to prove that man is without freedom. We have found the argument breaking down from one point of view after another, with increasing evidence that moral freedom is real. But thus far our discussion has been chiefly negative. It remains to consider the question more affirmatively, and to define if we can precisely what freedom means.

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CHAPTER XVII

THE NATURE OF FREEDOM

Freedom of the Self.—Although the question of freedom is one of the most famous of ethical inquiries, some writers merely assume moral freedom as the central postulate; while others, strange to relate hold that the subject is unimportant, or maintain that it is a metaphysical question to be taken up in a general study of first principles. Once it seemed solely a question of free-will, as if the will were separable from the rest of our nature. But will is now regarded as inseparable from the person willing, thinking, acting, paying attention, making effort; hence the issues turn upon the real nature of the self which attends, strives, selects, or casts the die. As it is the self that is somehow free, that is, free in one respect at least, it is well to try out the issues anew from various stand-points, even at the risk of complicating the whole problem.

To assert that the self is free is not to affirm that the will is without history or content in the shape of desires, or to deny that the contents of volition have had causes. Bearing in mind the results of the preceding chapter, we admit to the full the facts of body-mind relationship. The self faces the sequences of brain-events and mental events as if for the most part it were a passive spectator. The sources of its freedom are not to be found by looking for a possible break in these sequences from the point of view of ordinary causality. If the self is in some sense a free or efficient cause, this causality is of a higher type, and the ground of freedom is to be looked for within the self. Causal efficiency of this type is real if it occur once, if the single occurrence, however slight, is our own act, and although the occasion may never recur, the act never be repeated.

Meanings of the Term.—In connection with the effort

to think out the question of causality to the end, it is well to narrow down the meanings of the term freedom as persistently as possible. The term is used in general with reference to citizenship, birth, the rights of man as a physical being over plant and animal life. Freer than the airplane or any other mechanical invention of man in its movements is the flight of the bird. Freedom in this sense involves harmony with natural forces, adaptation to environment, with a power of unrestrained motion, subject to changes in wind and weather, conditions under which food is procured, attacks from other birds, results due to various physical contingencies. Man as an infant is most nearly helpless of any being possessing significant potentialities. As he grows older man depends more and more on alertness and skill, offsets the greater strength of animals, contends successfully with forces which might interfere with his freedom—forces as minute as germs, as massive as the cold in polar regions, as swift as the lightning, as capricious as currents of air threatening an airplane, as violent as storms at sea—and brings the sciences to play in his effort to make his command over nature the more secure. Freedom in the sense of adaptation to the nature of things is not however what we mean by moral freedom unless, with the Stoics, we extend the idea of “the nature of things” to include what we call the moral order, and carefully consider those conditions of the inner life which show conclusively what is within man’s power, and what is beyond his power.

Inner Freedom.—Moral freedom, pertaining to the inner life, plainly does not mean liberty to do anything one likes. It may be understood to mean either a power to act in and from one’s self, without restraint or compulsion due to a limiting power; or, liberty to choose between alternatives, not created by the self, but given to the self through experience from within and without. Moral conduct does not spring out of the air, without relation to character and circumstances, not even when most free. The choice may be in some cases merely a decisive moment in a process of quiet reflection, the act

of will may be almost indistinguishable from thought, since deliberation and decision are practically one. Introspection does not accompany our moral decisions, informing us when and how we cast the die; for consciousness is absorbed either in weighing the pros and cons or in contemplation of the end to be attained through adoption of certain means.

Ideal Freedom.—Through freedom as a capacity or power I may be free to choose between ethical self-realization and servitude to vicious impulses: "he who consents to passion, puts himself under the yoke," "a brute I might have been, but would not sink in the scale." But from the point of view of freedom as an ideal I am not as free to follow a vicious impulse as a moral incentive; since I am freest when I express my highest, best self: I am in servitude when I sin. Since sin is disorganization, it does not express the whole self, despite the fact that in giving himself to a sinful act man for the moment boldly asserts himself and apparently enjoys his freedom. I appear to be most free when I am most fully, that is, truly and consistently myself, howbeit when most free I most fully obey what I believe to be the moral law. Freedom in any lesser sense is not a capacity to exult in, but a power to exercise as little as possible.

The Element of Chance.—If we define freedom as power to choose between alternatives, one of which will, we hope, make for an ideal end, it is plain that freedom would have no meaning were there no judgment that one alternative is higher, the other lower. Nor would freedom mean anything unless there were duality, uncertainty, chance, that is, an ambiguous future. Chance exists at least relatively, despite the fact that all events are causally connected in nature, that is, chance as a negative term implying inability to forecast the falling of the dice, amid causal paths so numerous that we are unable to follow them. Chance in this its (1) subjective sense has been compared with what, to us, is (2) objective chance in the case of a stone thrown at a mark which hits a bird that unexpectedly flies across the field of vision and is killed:

chance being the concurrence of the flight of the bird and the flight of the stone. As neither line of events in such a case is premonitory of the other, so the coördination of activities combining to produce alternatives faced in the moment of moral reflection may lie outside each group, neither having been intentionally brought into relation with the other. Items of experience which we put under the head of chance, luck, accident, do not exclude ideal causality; a planless concurrence is compatible with a moral consciousness which turns the occasion to its own account. External events frequently coincide with what we regard as moral opportunities, but without any connection so far as we know, although a teleological relationship is sometimes claimed by those who uncritically assume a divine "plan" to cover such instances.

More cautious observers merely assert that lines of sequence concurring may be turned to account by those who are alert enough to "take the current when it serves," although moral opportunity has often been interpreted to mean an occasion for triumph where circumstance is not favorable but unfavorable, where there is not even an appearance of "luck." In actual life we often find one line of sequence following its own series of events without regard to any other, each making headway in its own direction, like a body continuing in motion unless brought to a standstill by another body in motion or at rest. Thus it has been remarked that lightning strikes a saint as readily as a sinner. Nature exhibits a law often brought in sharpest contrast with what we call moral values. Nature, "red in tooth and claw," exhibits stern necessity, struggle for existence on a level sometimes interpreted to be non-moral. From an ethical point of view our interest centers in coexistences which bear no discoverable causal relation with the events which physical science describes. Thus the *Titanic*, rushing to its destruction by severest contact with an iceberg in mid-Atlantic, is at the same time bearer of men and women who, swiftly selecting between their own safety and self-sacrifice or moral victory, add to the moral values of the world by their deeds of heroism.

Statistics based on probabilities do not take individual initiatives into account. The alleged strongest motive, determining a sequence, seems to imply that no other sequence is possible. To the question how it is known that this is the strongest motive, there is no positive answer, no answer at all save the one already suggested, namely, by seeing the action ensue and drawing an inference to the effect that *because* the deed was done "therefore" it followed hard upon the strongest motive. There is no means of rescuing the strongest motive from the context, and putting it to the test of actual experience.

Choice.—In the presence of alternatives, I judge that one will make for what I take to be right, and remove the ambiguous future. In behalf of this, the ideal, I choose. The resulting action carries my choice into execution. Although my sense of obligation to choose is strong, I realize that I was not compelled to make just that choice and no other. The action by which I commit myself to a choice is far from being capricious; it implies a real need for a solution, a contrast between my actual self as in part describable, hesitating it may be, where choice seems imperative but hazardous, and my ideal as attainable. Decision may seem so great a risk that I may for the moment procrastinate, yet my consciousness also yields the conviction that I should take the risk. In making the decision, I am striving toward an end, and this the present moment of my striving I identify with many other moments, all of which I hope may foster my central purpose in life. To all appearances then I am making a very genuine effort to settle a conflict. There are vital interests at heart. To declare that I really can not decide but must "let events take their course," as people uncritically say, is like affirming that I have no self at all, that motives simply conflict and the strongest decides, leaving the self a passive spectator. "To talk of motives conflicting of themselves is as absurd as to talk of commodities competing in the absence of traders," says Ward.¹

The direct appeal to consciousness discloses the convic-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 290.

tion that we can choose because we "ought" to decide. I feel myself free in the presence of alternatives, some of which must be cut off, that I may select one of two remaining in closest competition. If I try to be evasive by refusing to assume responsibility, I nonetheless become responsible by permitting events to follow what I call their course, tacitly yielding where I might have been more affirmative and more rational.

Awareness of Freedom.—Each man learns these vivid contrasts with their unmistakable implications from experience rather than by means of theory. In fact, the consciousness of freedom is unique, is a fact discovered by each moral agent, verifying what others before him have learned by direct observation and analysis of consciousness.² Even people who try to explain away freedom are constrained to admit what is called "the sense of freedom" as a fact to be accounted for. It is at least an illusion, or a delusion which we are all under and which, because we are all aware of it, is the equivalent of reality. The consciousness of freedom has proved to be a remarkably persistent fact through the ages. It looks forward into the dawning present, betokening a future which, so one is acutely aware, must in some respects be of one's own making; and into the past with its reminders that we might have acted differently. If this consciousness be merely apparent, it has been astonishingly persistent in the face of ever-increasing evidences for determinism. Moreover, belief in freedom fits in the facts of moral experience, by rational interpretation, far better than the hypothesis that freedom is self-illusion. This consciousness is involved in the whole working scheme of human society. We both feel and express regret even in the light of larger knowledge of all the factors, in the coolness of later reflection. We persistently feel guilt. We carry a sense of avoidable wrong. "Can you forgive yourself," asks Horne, "for the petulant word that escaped you yesterday on the ground that you couldn't have helped it? . . . On the

² Palmer, *The Problem of Freedom*, Chap. III.

basis of determinism one could well bewail his fate . . . but could not repent of his sin."

Our consciousness yields no less conclusively a sense of the irrevocable. We are well aware that we can not return to the same circumstances, either to act differently or to prove by a repetition of the deed in question what was possible or impossible. If there is no empirical proof of our freedom, there is also no final proof that our act was determined. Left once more with probability, we may still regard life as a challenge, with a balance in favor of belief in freedom. In fact, it is partly from our sense of moral freedom that our conceptions of freedom in other connections has arisen.

Ideal Causality.—It has frequently been pointed out that our perception of activity, with the implication that we can accomplish results, is the source of the widespread conviction that final causality exists, that action towards ends really takes place. "If," says Ward, "we ask a man why in a new and strange situation he acts as he does, it will hardly occur to him to explain his conduct by describing to us the immediately preceding situation. The answer he is likely to give, and that we naturally expect, will consist rather in describing the end at which he aims and the value that it has for him, as the reasons for his determination."³ Things, we know, have necessary connection according to law; what occurs today is the consequence of what went before, and the only way to explain natural events is by an appeal to such connection. Necessary connection as thus conceived implies uniformity, as our argument for determinism has shown, the results are calculable, and the mechanical philosophy readily follows. But this conception rests on an analogy between our own behavior and what we regard as the behavior of forces and objects. We observe the thunder-clap followed by the lightning-flash, and infer necessary connection between the events; we do not perceive the connection, but only that one event follows another, not that it must follow, as Hume long ago pointed out. But we proceed to an idea of a

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 278.

causal efficiency within and behind nature on the basis of a very different sort of experience observable within ourselves.

Moral Deeds.—Experience shows that in the inner world a moral deed implies selective attention, effort, at times an action which may be contrary to the line of least resistance: the strongest motive of presented alternatives may be overcome for *reasons*. Sometimes there is likeness between our moral deeds, sometimes not. The point is that there is no uniformity such that in all like circumstances a like moral deed occurs and always will recur—as if we could revert to the idea of causality as attributed to nature's sequences. Again, it is a noteworthy fact that moral deeds are not followed by decrease of energy, but by increase of moral values. There is conservation of values whatever the physical facts may be. The results are qualitative, not quantitative or purely calculable. It is a question of origins, not of ends. If it be a question of fact at all, it may be called one of spontaneity, the spontaneity of a purposive self possessing an effective "universe of desire."

Initiatives.—From this point of view motives are said to conflict because they diverge. Rejected motives testify to the strength of the one who discarded them. The strength of the motive depends also on the worth assigned to it, not on the mere strength of the desires or other incentives behind it. The sufficient reason is found then not in what is behind but what is before, teleologically interpreted. Professor Palmer calls this ante-sequential causation.⁴ The determinist, keenly aware of the reign of law, defends the conception of causality by which nature's sequences are explained; whereas the libertarian defends the idea of life, spontaneity, progress. Thus reason seems arrayed against itself. But we need both considerations, the alternatives of non-purposive and purposive action. Freedom is present, character looks toward the future, out of which the self draws power. The past has not locked up our future. Our ideals are operative with regard to

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

the dawning future, despite the fact that ideas also operate as past facts. It is through their representative character, depicting what may occur, through suggested possibilities, that ideas work ante-sequentially. Thus we aim at betterment through apprehension of some need, impoverishment or pain, as in the case of a boy going to college because aware of his ignorance. Whatever mere experience may contribute, we partly shape our ideals anew by our initiative and efforts.

Personal Action.—So, too, Ward argues that there is a contrast between our consciousness of effects produced on us by experience and our consciousness of effectuation. Both elements are present in our strivings, but our strivings are not caused by the situations in which they appear. Experience is always *owned*. Percepts and appetites that nobody has are not percepts and appetites at all. Our purposes conform to no general law save that of self-conservation and betterment. To deny these is to deny the reality of the self. If there is merely a bundle of presentations but no self to own and select between them, then there is no self to be determined and controlled.⁵ The determinist's argument tries to resolve me into the series of my mental states, but the self is more than the sum of its particular experiences. Freedom is not disproved unless the self can be resolved into its successive states. Determinism gives only the anatomy of action, not what Seth regards as the constitutive "synthetic principle." The action must be referred to a person. Without the "I" there could be no *me*: a state is not conscious of itself. There is a principle of unity involved in the fact that a single identical self watches, connects, compares, comments, feels, acts, possesses a duality of subject and object. Freedom lies in the combination between character and circumstances in which choice becomes manifest, that is, efficacy in behalf of ends, ideal causality. Through such moral integration a purpose is achieved, and steadiness of purpose, as one writer puts it, is no less a matter of fact than conservation of energy: my actions exhibit a qualitative

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 291, foll.

uniformity which can only be expressed in terms of a prevailing interest, the unit of life being a moral constant.

Indifference.—The type of theory known as “freedom of indifference,” or characterless choice, involves the idea of caprice.⁶ We are said to be free only when there is nothing to induce us to take one course or another, no causation of any sort. The objection is that the facts of heredity and environment, disposition, habit, character, and the influence of previous choices are disregarded. If I will nothing, if I take no more interest in one course than in another, my will is then inefficient. This would be libertarianism in the extreme.

Self-determination.—In the “freedom of self-determination” there is inner motivation.⁷ That is, persons are said to be autonomous or self-directed, while things are heteronomous, directed by something else. Man is said to be free to do anything which nothing save his own nature prevents him from doing. The first objection to this view is that it omits the salient character of freedom, the question whether it expresses a closed past or an open future. Another form of the theory is that freedom is an ability to act or not to act according as we choose or will, there is freedom only in the going forth of purpose.⁸ The objection to this view is that it puts forward as the point of importance “the obscurest feature of volition”—the connection between the inner and outer worlds—all inquiry about the origin of that which is to be sent forth into action is omitted.

Rational Freedom.—The view that man is not a creature of nature, but that there is a special type of causation open to him as a person (rational causation), involves the proposition that freedom and the rational life are identical. Rational freedom means freedom to do right. Writers from the time of the Stoics to the present time who have espoused this view have had little to say about sin, which, if it is said to exist at all, is regarded as an

⁶ Palmer, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

error of judgment, the cure for which is knowledge through broader contact with reality. The objection is that if this were the whole meaning of freedom dual possibilities would disappear, and sin as the power to become less than rational would be unaccounted for.⁹ Freedom applies "to the matter chosen, not to the manner of choosing."¹⁰ If we assume that because rationality is necessary in order that man shall be a person, we also assume that he can not cease to be rational. As matter of fact we find men ceasing to be rational, in some respects at least, becoming less than a person, dropping to the level of the brute, the villain, the confirmed criminal. Moreover, awareness of freedom in those of us who steadily will to do what is right is accompanied by the possibility of irrationality. We endeavor to become morally constant that we may make irrational deeds less and less likely. Further, rational freedom regarded by itself, proves to be determinism. If sin and evil, together with everything indicative of blind force or mechanical causality, are only temporary aspects of a universe which is through and through rational, no ground is left for real finite individuals possessing real freedom. This view, which regards disorder as impossible, is sometimes called idealistic determinism.¹¹ It goes with various theories of the Absolute.

Virtue as Knowledge.—The conviction that vice is ignorance, virtue knowledge, is, as we have seen, as old as Socrates' time. We have noted the fact that there is abundant evidence that with increase of knowledge concerning the nature and sources of wrong-doing in the world—knowledge of man's congenital equipment and knowledge of environment in all its details, including intimate psychological knowledge of abnormal mental life in all its forms—opportunities for moral integration and development increase. Hence there is a strong probability that knowledge will be virtue. This view is likely to have an increasing number of adherents. It is implied in most of

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

our educational efforts, and is highly persuasive. Our knowledge does not permit us to settle the question. We may well cherish the hope that increase of rational knowledge will mean wisdom, and that wisdom will mean virtue. Yet the doubt lingers whether freedom to do right in the presence of advancing knowledge covers the entire field of freedom. Our present incomplete knowledge, we know, is compatible with failure. We find fault with one another chiefly on the ground that we do not put into practice what we know, that what we most neglect at times is the best we know. Rational persuasion is not habitually followed by immediate effort to carry out what we are persuaded is in highest degree right. The essence of freedom still appears to be power to reject as well as ability to choose or act upon our knowledge.¹²

The field of freedom narrows down, when we realize that absolute freedom would be possible to one Absolute Being only; when we shift the point of emphasis from supposed freedom of action to freedom of choice between alternatives which the self does not generate; and then try to penetrate behind the fact of choice. At first thought the mere fact that we possess the ability to choose may seem sufficient evidence of freedom in a very complete sense of the word. But again we find ourselves limited, for we can not wait till all returns are in that we may know precisely how every decision will turn out: life is short, time is passing, a decision is imperative, and one ought to make the venture, even though one can not see except "in a glass darkly." It is normally a part of our moral selfhood, this willingness to plunge in when delays are dangerous, instead of putting off the decision in moral cowardice or weak-kneed hesitancy implying a New England conscience. At times we make a decision with full realization that it is momentous. Looking back, we may recall the precise consideration which, accepted as in a flash, was the turning-point.

The Element of Attention.—Shall we say that the act

¹² Note what Aristotle says about virtue and vice as voluntary, *Ethics*, Bk. III, Chap. VI.

of attention to this idea or prompting which we adopted as our motive was the essence of our freedom? If so, it would appear to involve self-activity as its efficiency; since our attention was not purely passive. An objection to the attempt to explain freedom in its entirety in this way is raised by those who hold that all attention is derived, and by those also who deny self-activity, on psychological grounds. The mere psychological analysis is never adequate. The self is never sufficiently real for psychology. The decisive act of attention, to be real enough to make a difference must spring from a self also real enough to shift its focusing attention from a higher to a lower alternative, not simply real enough to concentrate upon a higher in contrast with a lower. In my decisive shifting or concentration of attention there is an element of self-direction or self-realization, in contrast with a possible yielding to what in other connections would be called a temptation. I obviously have a motive, when I focus my thought upon the alternative which I judge to be in line with my purpose; as surely as there is also some sort of attributable motive implied in my heedless deed, in case I drop back in yielding to inertia, despair, or willful neglect. An element of indetermination enters in, although one can not agree with those who deem this a matter of absolute chance. My action is then said to be free inasmuch as my choice was not completely determined. Otherwise stated, there are motives prompting to different courses; in the actual choice there is freedom of the self, attending, deliberating, willing, almost unwittingly casting the die; while the voluntary *act* as described by psychology is determined.

Immediate Certainty.—If now I attempt to reduce my freedom to immediate certainty that I possess it, the difficulty will be as great as in case of the attempt to simplify the process to the act of attention. Not all men have this intuition in such convincing form, nor do all agree concerning what they take to be immediate certainty. It might be said that the judgment of moral obligation accompanying the volition is sufficient proof, but determinists also admit the fact of this judgment. To insist that unless

our choice makes a difference the whole question of the nature of a moral deed is reduced to absurdity is not to cover the whole point, for here again the determinist is ready to admit that what we call choice makes a difference. McTaggart argues that the determinist is quite consistent in this belief: the determinist holds the view he contends for just because he believes that, while the event may well be determined by his choice, his choice is in its turn completely determined.¹³

It is sometimes averred that there would be disastrous consequences if freedom were not true. But we do not find that people who become convinced of determinism giving themselves over to a life of indifference and self-indulgence. Freedom as a practical postulate remains. Even if, with Sidgwick, we try to give the whole matter up on the ground that the issues are insoluble, that they do not make any practical difference any way, we find that in actual life our views do make a describable difference. Although an uncritical determinism may be the usual creed of the vicious, the increase of vice does not turn upon any *argument* regarding determinism.

Kantian Freedom.—It might seem possible to escape from the whole complexity of our situation by holding, with Kant, that we are free in a superior world, which is transcendental, above time, a world of its own; while in the world of time everything is indeed determined, character is fixed. From this viewpoint it is the inner essence or ideal reality of a thing which determines its characteristic reaction. So man is said to be free as a cause which is not in its turn an effect, the resulting action being in the phenomenal world where necessity everywhere reigns. The objection to this view taken as it reads, without qualifications, is that there is no true freedom if the transcendental self (out of time) has no power over the empirical character (in time). Determinism on the level of conduct might still be absolute, there would be one vast predetermined empirical series. Real experience would then be

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

impossible.¹⁴ Our experience in the realm of time, where our moral deeds are done, is real for us, whatever else may be unreal. We find ourselves related to the temporal order, however free we may seem speculatively when we try to conceive of the self as an "essence" in a realm apart.

Bergson's View.—In contrast with the view that time is unreal, Bergson approaches the situation with the proposition that time is real, efficacious; we *live* real time. "Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present from its former states. For this purpose it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on the contrary, it would no longer *endure*."¹⁵ Something is always doing. Reality is a ceaseless springing up of something new, with an element of the unforeseeable.¹⁶ If our action is one that "involves the whole of our person and is truly ours, it could not have been foreseen." Bergson holds then that in reality we choose without ceasing, and without ceasing we also abandon many things. "Consciousness corresponds exactly to the living being's power of choice; it is coextensive with the fringe of possible action that surrounds the real action; consciousness is synonymous with invention and with freedom."¹⁷ Our real need then is to seek, within the depths of our experience, the moment wherein we feel ourselves most intimately within our own life. It is in this moment that we plunge into pure duration, "a duration in which the past, always moving on, is swelling unceasingly with a present that is absolutely new. . . . Rare indeed are the moments when we are self-possessed to this extent: it is then that our actions are truly free."¹⁸ Our consciousness is in truth distinct from the organ it animates, although it undergoes its vicissitudes; it is essentially free, is freedom itself; and the self as a living being is a center of action.

¹⁴ Cf. Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

¹⁵ *Time and Free Will*, tr. by F. L. Pogson, 1910, p. 100.

¹⁶ *Creative Evolution*, tr. by A. Mitchell, 1911, p. 6.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

Freedom Defined.—If from this vivid description, which has never been surpassed, we turn for a final narrowing down of the situation with respect to freedom, we may, with Palmer, define freedom as “that guidance through which, for purposes of our own, we narrow a dual future possibility to a single actual result.”¹⁹ This is not mere freedom of will, as if the will were detachable, but freedom of the self or person. It involves the power to step back in the moral scale, to be less than a person. The action in question is done to meet a need, in the presence of an ambiguity which must be resolved if one shall proceed. It implies desire, not caprice; a contrast between my actual self and the self I might be, with a possibility that I may commit moral suicide. One clear course will keep me harmonious with my better self and with society. The other courses would mean self-destruction. For me there are *not* alternative “rational” ideals: no reasoner has *many* sound conclusions among which to choose; he either hits the valid ones or falls into error. A narrow freedom attends a wide vision. A great statesman, merchant, inventor, chess-player sees but one thing to do where the amateur sees a dozen. The implied purposive linkages are no less clearly knit than are mechanical sequences. The moral self, once committed to its decision, every step follows of necessity. The rational being, capable of irrationality, narrows the possibilities, eliminates the possibility of self-contradiction, and casts the die; he is free because he could have disregarded reason. Moral thought is thus influential because the person is a coördinating center, a fresh creative power, contrasted in kind with other agencies which meet in his life.

The experimental evidence of such freedom, as already suggested above, is found in the experience of freedom, not as mere intuitive certainty, but in the act of decision which cuts off various possibilities: I feel myself free where possibilities exist. Freedom is a unique fact, inwardly observable, in the mandate that such an act shall occur, *ought* to occur. The alternative chosen does not become a

¹⁹ See *op. cit.*, Chap. VIII.

fact until I have fixed my attention on it, selected it and sent it forth. I am directly conscious of what I choose. I am not directly conscious of what I might have chosen: this does not become a fact.

This experience of an alternative becoming a fact, unmistakably attributable to myself, is the source of the widespread conviction that freedom is real, belief in which is imbedded in the structure of society. We employ phrases unintelligible save on libertarian grounds, for example, the fact of blame and praise: we do not blame *things*.²⁰ Estimates of worth or value implying freedom are deeply inwrought in all human intercourse. Praise is a way of securing a recurrence of the good by appeal to freedom, implying a sense on our part that wrong is avoidable. The righteous man believes he could fall. We carry a consciousness of uncertainty even when with ever increased precision and effort we mechanize our conduct according to a pattern, whereas for determinism certitude of prediction is increased in proportion to the degree of knowledge.

Limitations of Freedom.—The considerations which make for determinism are carried forward and given a more adequate interpretation. We frankly admit that man is a human being, that only nature can execute his decisions, only such acts go forth from the self as will not jar with those that have the right of way, that our decisions must often await their eventuations. We admit too all that psychology tells us concerning pre-inclinations, habits, and human bondage to habit. We no less readily admit that the wise man continually cuts off sections of his freedom; that freedom in one sense is not precious, is not to be retained. It is significant that our processes of deliberation involve ambiguity, that is, lack of acquaintance with the world. Much life is wasted in double-mindedness. Strength is gained by mechanizing a large range of decisions, that we may by narrowing our freedom realize a certain high ideal. We are encompassed too by duties which close many paths for us. We need to concentrate, we must be constant, and increasingly consistent. Our

²⁰ Palmer, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

sense of freedom assures us that we are not compelled to do as duty bids. Yet we realize that the only alternative, as we advance by narrowing our future in behalf of our ideal, would be some sort of disruption of the self, a disintegration of character. Yet awareness of the limitations of freedom increases one's conviction that it is a reality. It is well to give fullest recognition to the arguments for determinism, to see how large they loom upon our intellectual horizon, how they increase as our knowledge grows, that we may see how powerful are two or three considerations which offset them all. It is important also frankly to admit that our sense of freedom is partly a conviction where we can not wholly see, that freedom is still in a respect a fact to marvel over, as Tennyson says:

Our wills are ours, we know not how;
Our wills are ours, to make them thine.

Yet freedom within limits which we did not create and which we can not change still seems to the ethical idealist real freedom involving real responsibility, and a real self whose existence we can not deny. It has been said that self-consciousness is the greatest marvel in psychology: we can establish the fact but can not comprehend it; we can analyze the conditions and prerequisites without accounting for the appearance of this marvelous fact.²¹ It is a puzzle to know how thought, emerging from this consciousness, becomes influential, "how ideals get their clutch on events." But, finding the fact, we undertake the interpretation which is most faithful to the fullness of the facts and the amplitude of values. Here Bergson's statement comes into play that we are most free when acting with the whole self, that the action which involves the whole of our person, the action which is most free, is most truly ours, also the one which could not have been foreseen. We are sent back to "the true and living unity" which surpasses the factitious unity of the understanding, that in us which is most removed from externality, in the

²¹ W. Windelband, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, tr. by J. McCabe, 1921, p. 281.

depths of our nature where we are most intimately ourselves.²²

There is need then of an appeal from subtle analysis to experience, which gives back to us the rich content of our awareness of freedom. Our analysis leaves us with the impression that power to step back in the moral scale, or to accept an alternative making for the good is power at its minimum. But freedom is proved real even by this precise limitation. The self is real in this its decision which makes for or against. Granted the sure reality of the moral self, we may supplement the poverty of our analysis by the other principles of our faith. Thus Bergson's inspiring conception of intuition as yielding awareness of the full true self in its completer freedom gives horizon to our thought, and once more reminds us of the limitations of the intellect. The self, real in the moment of its minutest analyses, is also real in its vision of ideals, its conviction that there is a realm of values. In actual practice what avails with most of us is our working consciousness of freedom, our faith in the moral order, and our interest in the opportunities which enable us to contribute our part toward its fulfillment.

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²² *Creative Evolution*, pp. 47, 199; see, also, pp. 29, 212, 270, 262, 306.

CHAPTER XVIII

OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM

Interpretations of Freedom.—The ultimate meaning of freedom is a question which lies outside the field of ethics. Each man introduces the justification of the fact or truth of freedom in the theological or metaphysical terms which he finds acceptable. What is significant for ethics in any case is the practical consequence of the optimism, pessimism, meliorism, or whatever the faith may be by which the results of ethical analysis are supplemented.

One man will try, for example, to reconcile God's foreknowledge with our freedom, on the ground that, as God is eternal, the divine foreknowledge sees all at once what to us is spread out in the realm of time. Another will maintain that predestination is not attributable to the original Christianity, hence that we should now renew our practical faith in the original teachings of Jesus. A third will approach the situation with the assumption that, despite the fact that freedom was *given* us by the Creator, in the divine purpose we have real freedom, and an obligation is put upon us to see what this truth means in our actual situation in the world. For, it is pointed out, man is in equilibrium between two tendencies or loves: (1) the love of self, of worldly power, of ruling over men; and (2) love for God and the neighbor.

The Ruling Love.—The argument for this position runs somewhat as follows: Freedom is for the sake of man's moral and spiritual development. Choice between a ruling love of self and its consequences, and a ruling love toward God and the neighbor must be a real one, a choice which will tend to establish man in his love; otherwise man's moral experience would have no real meaning at all. For it is plain that goodness or virtue can not be forced upon

us. Man needs to see the consequences of a ruling passion that degrades, a dominating love of self that enslaves, a prevailing love of the world that disappoints. He needs to will to be free from such dominion and such results of *his own true volition*, or the alternative love will have no meaning for him. Hence man must have sufficient experience to acquire a love which springs from self in order to make a real judgment in favor of the good and the true. To be able to acquire this complex of experiences of his own, he must have power which makes him relatively independent. Even though he shares divine power, and in choosing is guided by divine wisdom and in acting is quickened by divine love, he at any rate chooses and acts as if this wisdom and love were his own. Whatever in fact man does through love has the full value of freedom. As truth becomes such for us when we make it our own, so does goodness. When we think, will and act "from the heart" we believe that we are truly ourselves, if ever in all our experience. Granted this free expression of the whole self, then indeed a man is willing to be led into that ever-increasing spiritual freedom which coincides with rational freedom.

Types of Freedom.—It is said then that (1) in his natural freedom, through inheritance, man loves himself and the world, readily thinks and wills evils, confirming himself in them by his reasonings; (2) in his more intelligent freedom he is prompted by love of reputation for the sake of honor, gain, the appearance of morality, deterred as he is from certain evils because he wishes to preserve his reputation; but (3) in his spiritual freedom evils once lightly regarded are looked upon as sins and so are no longer willed: man looks above his lesser self in love toward God and the neighbor, and wills the good from a more interior love. As his natural freedom decreases, his spiritual freedom increases, and so his moral liberty unites itself with a rational freedom which purifies it. As he turns from selfishness and its results, he unites his will more affirmatively with the good; and as this union of will becomes constant it becomes a prevailing love

worthy of continuing into the future life. In its eternal aspect then ethical freedom unites the several meanings which taken by themselves make it difficult to prove that man is free. Man's relative freedom within the limits of a purpose inclusive of the whole race is compatible with an absolute standard which we approximate as we narrow the issues, foregoing the liberty that is not worth while for that greater freedom which becomes "the glory of the imperfect." Only through a conception of the grades and degrees of freedom are we able then to overcome the appearances and relativities which at certain points threaten the argument.

The Degrees of Freedom.—It is clear then that only when we rise above the level of mere mechanisms, with the implied conception of rigidity and uniformity of natural law and of causality as an irresistible necessity, to the plane of *unifying purpose* are we able rightly to place man's freedom as a true quality or possession in the universe. This least degree of freedom, namely, the power to step back or advance in the moral scale, finds its fulfillment in the maximum freedom of the eternal values. The slightly possible freedom-experience which psychology enables us to describe in part, takes on increasing value as we ascend the ethical scale. Foster, for instance, makes moral freedom turn upon psychical freedom, as "that state of consciousness in which reflection upon the whole content of our ego is possible, and along with this a clearly conscious deliberation and decision of the will," this psychical freedom being the indispensable presupposition of any clear thinking upon moral requirements.¹ Determinism does justice to the passivity-moment of our moral experience, but not to the activity-element present in all reality. "There is a gradedness of activity which is the criterion of the dignity of all reality, if the static had been original, processes would not have started at all. The active moment is necessary first." There is then an original archetypal act, immanent and constant, and the static element is a deposit of the active. In our moral decisions

¹ *Present Expression of Christianity*, 1921, p. 198.

the consciousness of freedom is combined with this consciousness of motivation.² Determinism, failing thus to get back of the deposit of the original activity, puts *explanation* in place of moral responsibility; and the guilt-feeling and remorse are reduced to mere pain with reference to the situation. But granted *interpretation*, freedom is "the capacity for self-determination according to motives of its own. The will is not under accidental impulses in its choice, but new motives overbear the existing impulses."³ Our freedom is our ability to move toward *values* as an end rather than toward "consequences." If, then, we ask, what is it that the will wills? the answer is, Not consequences, but goods, values. Its doing that, is its freedom.

Freedom as an Ideal.—We add to this account the fact that the resulting joys and benefits coming from the choice of the higher alternative show that the consequences could not have been truly moral unless we had willed to make them ours by a real decision. While we contemplate the dual possibility, we do not know what choice we will make; we do not assuredly know that we will not make the wrong one. But experience has given assurance of great values to be added, *if* we make the right one. Once having seen that moral freedom is the vital consideration, we may press on from the minimum degree of freedom accorded us by Palmer's view to the values and powers of rational and spiritual freedom as ideals to live by.

What interests us is the hope that by becoming more rational we may acquire a higher and more constant state of character, further removed from the time when we hesitated between a ruling passion and a wise prevailing love. If we were most free when acting with the whole self, as Bergson assures us, in facing this crucial situation, then indeed, we may grow in freedom by becoming ever more true to the ideal. Becoming steadfast in the pursuit of goodness, we find ourselves less concerned by the unpleasant consciousness that we may fail, less harassed by limita-

² *Ibid.*, p. 207.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 210.

tions. By sharing a spiritual goodness which is open to all, we also share a freedom which involves fewer constraints. In retrospect we realize that the struggles and uncertainties of life's earlier contrasts have brought rich compensation, as we have approximated the abundant life.

Popular Optimism.—Anticipation of ultimate victory over evil readily follows from the theory that sin is due to ignorance. Evil being less real, according to this view, the great need is for increasing knowledge of human nature and a cheerful philosophy. Recent popular optimism dwells on what is positive or affirmative; seeks to avoid condemnatory judgments. But such optimism assumes its points and is a working faith only. So, too, with the optimism which, in a light and easy fashion, assures us that everything will be well with those who do God's will; that the very fact of the moral order is a guarantee that the good cause will triumph.⁴ Rashdall contends that the hypothesis of pure optimism is not necessary to morality, but is positively hostile to it.⁵ The ends which we feel ourselves bound to work for are not attainable unless we will them. Wrong deeds actually retard, while right ones promote the end. We are convinced that the moral means by which we are seeking to attain the end are real means, although we do not positively know. "Only if the universe is less good than a universe which we can imagine, can the alternative which is presented to us in every act of moral judgment be, as our moral consciousness assures us that it is, a real alternative."⁶

Moral Optimism.—The kind of optimism our argument for freedom calls for, then is not sheer assertion that all will be well, but realization of the opportunities disclosed by the fact of freedom as real. We are not urged to postpone till the future life those crucial matters which popular optimism uncritically believes will somehow turn out well. The world of experience which we are constrained

⁴ Criticized by J. Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 1892, p. 441.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 288.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

to accept as a fact involves difficulties which we do not yet understand, uncertainties to be resolved. "The world has inevitably the moment of relatively capricious will about it. Its existence is a fact, chosen from eternity by the Self. We can not fathom this choice, we can not be clear as to the precise meaning of this decree, except in so far as we men too share in the choice, in our own active life, are conscious of our own purposes. In choosing for ourselves we enter into and partake of the Self who chooses this from the infinity of possible worlds. No abstract 'descriptive' reason can deduce what it is about the world which makes it good, that is, worth choosing. We can, for the first only say, 'So it is.'"⁷

Most of the idealists have been optimists in the sense that the Eternal Ideas (Plato) are the ends of all our striving, that there is a moral order higher in worth than the empirical world of sense-experience. Leibnitz, who persuasively argued that all is for the best in the best of worlds, is the type in modern times. But, ethical idealists guard against the assumption that this leaves us nothing significant to do. In practice this is to be *made* the best of possible worlds by *working together* to realize the moral ideal in precisely this given realm of ordinary experience where, apparently, there is so much that is hostile to the moral order. "God's world, in being good, can surely be nothing less serious than a moral order."⁸ Royce believes that faith in good as the final goal of ill does not become rational till we have taken account of the gravity of the issues of the spiritual life, not until one has fairly comprehended the bitterness of such a pessimism as even that of Schopenhauer. A half-hearted scheme of the moral order eventuates in pessimism, not optimism. The good world is not innocent, does not ignore evil; but possesses and still conquers it.⁹ God's glory is not vindicated by ignoring but by hating and triumphing over evil. There is an outcry for God's truth by those who find it not.

⁷ Royce, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

⁸ Royce, *ibid.*, p. 440.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 459.

So, too, Ward holds that customary optimism seeks a world of unmixed happiness, with no physical and moral evil, this pure happiness is to be permanent and universal.¹⁰ But this belief implies only the hedonistic standard of right and wrong. Happiness in itself is not the supreme goal of the moral life. It follows indeed from our whole inquiry into the nature of the good that there are several ends to be sought in order that happiness may even be anticipated as an accompaniment of virtue. Popular thought has reacted against the idea of a heaven of perfect blessedness, with nothing to overcome: the good life is to be found in *activity*. With the decay of theologies affirming blessedness as absolutely secure for those who have right beliefs, has come renewed moral conviction in what must be done to win a heaven worth while. Moral optimism then is very far from being bare assertion that good will be the goal of ill. There is a tendency to react toward pessimism, then to seek a constructive point of view. Even the great optimists too readily adopted their faith.

Pessimism.—Hedonism, we have seen easily passes into pessimism with the conclusion that pleasure is unattainable; it also follows from the view that evil is a mystery, that dualism of good and evil is ultimate, or that the will is depraved. It is popularly assumed that evil is stronger than good, human nature is selfish and can not be changed, and sin is "the most real fact in the world." Hence, follow arguments against theism: how could a God who is good permit all this misery, sin, vice, degradation, and suffering? Schopenhauer, typical pessimist, developed a motive in philosophy which dates back to ancient India. He held that existence itself (due to the will to live) is evil, misery and pain are inevitably our lot on this plane of being.¹¹ This view as current in Buddhistic and theosophic form amounts to this: we are bound by desire to "the wheel of life," we are sufferers from our own past Karma (the burden of deeds from a former existence or

¹⁰ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 339.

¹¹ See P. Deussen, *The Elements of Metaphysics*, tr. by C. M. Duff, 1894.

incarnation); and can only escape by killing out desire, and attaining freedom through Nirvana (the cessation of all this strife, escape from life's wheel).

The despair of the hedonist has been met by pointing out that pleasure is not the only value, that we should develop our whole nature to the full. History brought a cure for Christian despair of the world, in the quest for the good amidst social life in its fullness, in the world as found. Pessimism has been set down as cowardice: it is ethical to regard the world face to face and "see it whole," working through and beyond whatever needs to be overcome. Our modern psychological knowledge of human nature has undermined popular pessimisms. There is no reason to "kill out desire." It is a question of eligible desires unified by a purpose. Our deeds live on and produce consequences; but it is better not to generalize. It is a question of particular deeds, not of a mass of deeds, said to produce the "karma" of another embodiment. And the moral value of a deed is a more intelligible basis of judgment than its mere consequences. Schopenhauer's conclusion that the sum of pains is greater than the sum of pleasures, hence it were better if we were not, has not met with either philosophical or popular acceptance.

Pessimistic Types.—To some it has seemed that the logical conclusion of Schopenhauer's philosophy would be universal suicide. Hartmann, who followed Schopenhauer, held that true pessimism will continue till the race is persuaded that life should cease: we ought not to leave our fellowmen to suffer. All might then join in common suicide. A typical way of escape that reverts to ancient India is through meditation, said to culminate in realization of the individual's oneness with the Absolute. The pessimism of the Old Testament, with its "vanity of vanities," passed with a larger vision of faith, although pessimism remained as an element. The pessimism of the *Rubaiyat* of Omar Khayyam is typical of views current in literature and poetry. Pessimism breaks out afresh with social disorders and passes with the coming of prosperity, and the reaction from a great war brings moral values to

the fore. It breaks out, not only with the young poet, disappointed in love, but with the preacher who blames the world because it turns against him in his heresy. But this is "the pathetic fallacy." The fault is not in the world when a man does not make good. Again, individual pessimism may be due to disease or a prevailing adverse mood. There have been so many instances—Schopenhauer, who was grouchy in the extreme, Hartmann, who had been mangled in battle, Carlyle the dyspeptic, Leopardi, who became insane, Nietzsche, who went insane meanwhile—that the world makes large allowance for the subjective element.

Limitations of Pessimism.—It would be difficult to show, with Hartmann, that the main conditions and values of life—health, youth, hunger, passion, love, home, friendship, envy, repentance, hope, religion, honor, business, wealth, knowledge, art—bring negative pleasures. We do not prize the home "because it protects us from so many miseries." We may indeed fail for the most part in quest of renown, honor, worldly success; but we attain other and greater values meanwhile. Science and art were once indeed accessible only to the few, but have been made more extensively accessible with the growth of civilization, notably within the last hundred years. Wealth depends on the man who possesses it. The social conditions of life are not fixed, but vary with our use of them. There are wonderful possibilities in our nature for overcoming misery. We well know what one night's sleep will do for us on occasion, what changes are wrought by "a square meal," how we recover from a shock, an illness, a sorrow. Pain is primarily remedial in the organism, not a sign of evil: the organism tends to regain harmony. Pleasure, when intense, becomes pain and warns us. The "will to live" is good, beneficent. The isolation of the will from the rest of our nature as "evil" or depraved being unsound psychologically speaking, we are not called upon to refute the creeds founded on this assertion. Our desires bring evil only so far as they are not regulated.

The Values of Pessimism.—It is generally admitted

that pessimism has done the world a service, has set us free from shallow and invertebrate optimism; quickened us to knowledge of the facts of pain and misery, to pity, sympathy, love. There must often be adverse criticism, restlessness, strife, even destruction, before reconstruction can begin. Out of the conflict new moral convictions arise. People must first be aroused by a sense of need. They must be made uncomfortable in their mere pleasure-seeking and selfishness.

So we come to see the deeper meanings of our strife, the limitations of pleasure, feeling, desire. On the whole it has not been the pure pleasures we have sought, but those that are mixed with pain. The pessimists are in error who argue that pain destroys pleasure. What men love is *life*, not pleasure as such; and men show by their conduct and the tenacity wherewith they cling to life how strong and normal is this desire. From the fact that pain is prevalent in the world there is no sound inference to the effect that life is not worth living. Let us then have the judgments of men who are normal, whatever the maimed and morbid may contribute by their pessimisms. We have the future before us. We find people of great attainments assuring us that, instead of doing something "to end it all," what they would ask for would be an opportunity to live this life over with the privilege of profiting by experience.

Meliorism.—Thus optimism with its shallowness and pessimism with its profound lessons gives way to meliorism, or the doctrine that the world can be made better. As lovers of combat, morally courageous, we are ready to put up with the uncertainty, make the act of faith, and push through in full test of higher possibilities. Our wants are indications of our potentialities, not signs of pain and evil. The triumphant life is lived amidst many adverse conditions. This is already in part the ideal world. Life is so constituted that many wrongs right themselves. Since evil is disorganization, it tends toward its own destruction, rises to the surface, discloses its motives or schemes; confesses. Adverse reactions increase as sins increase, and

with their disclosure we have opportunity to judge. Vice contains, from the beginning, the seed of its own destruction. Almost without knowing why, people reach the parting of the ways and turn from sin: all they are able to say is that their "better nature" would not let them continue any longer. Sin then is not a success—not in the long run, whatever the appearances. Some one has said, "Hell has no power outside of itself." Evil fights with evil, rather than against good; produces its own poisons. So the world has been seeing since the great war. The instruments of war have been made so terrible that apparently war will not "pay" even for the most malicious. Evil has had full power to run itself out, in war.

Limitations of Evil.—The fact of evil in its sphere does not prove that it is an independent power, able to break the bounds of hell and disrupt either the natural world or the moral order. We no longer allege that evil is "needed" to oppose the good. If it could be defined as necessary, evil would indeed appear to be an element in the world-plan. We could then argue that we should do wrong that good might come. The modern attitude is one of frank admission of the facts in the light of growing knowledge, with reference to what life might be without evil in the world. Evil is real to those who are within it, subject to it, victims of it; and those who have fought know indeed that "war is hell." But even within its sphere there may come the strongest assurance of the greater reality which evil can not touch. Evil can not be understood on its own level. But profoundly significant indeed is the contrast by which we are lifted above it by insight into the motives from which it springs, and the results to which it leads, given free play as it is to run to its limit, to annihilate itself. We refuse to limit ourselves to the mere portrayal of the horrors, as if the pessimist were right in painting the blackness of hell. There is no explanation of darkness while we dwell on the darkness. So far those who emphasize the affirmative are right. The lower can not explain the higher. What is to be hoped for, is that we may come out of the conflict with determi-

nation to do our part wherever we find opportunity to enlighten, encourage, serve through what we can best contribute.

As Paulsen puts the matter, the universe supplies us with appropriate conditions of growth, furnishes our capacities with the necessary tasks, and gives to our life, if we only wish it, a rich and beautiful content: we could not, being what we are, have any use for a different world. In the only human history which we know our great institutions have come about through struggle between good and evil. Prudence, perseverance, courage, presuppose sensuousness as a means of resistance; the social virtues presuppose the natural selfishness of the sensuous man. All the great heroes of humanity became what they were only by struggling with evil. The sentence and death of Socrates gave his life their proper setting. Jesus had to be glorified by death. Without rapacity and the love of war on the part of neighbors there would be no defensive union; without injustice and violence among confederates, no legal order; the Church was established as a power for good to battle with sin.

From these facts the conclusion nowadays is, not that the deeds done in the past are those to be repeated, not that war is to be eulogized, or that any evil has value in itself; but that we can now find higher means. The evil in the world does not benefit itself, it benefits the good. Jesus does not depart from the world with a curse on his lips, but with a prayer: "Forgive them, for they know not what they do." "It must be that offences come; but woe unto that man by whom the offence cometh." War has produced heroes, but war is not therefore justifiable. There are obstacles enough to test man's abilities without defending the existence of evil as a stimulus, obstacle, or foil. Social evolution takes place through struggle between parties and classes, rather than struggle between good and evil. There is darkness enough in the world to give us contrast, without sin. It does not follow that because the Church came into being to save men from their sins, the existence of sin is the essential reason for its continuance.

What is essential is *experience*, manifold contacts, wealth of opportunity, fullness of life. The argument for meliorism has been greatly strengthened by changing views of egoism and altruism.

Summary.—Looking back over the field of our argument in preceding chapters, we do not then find that the existence of evil or sin militates against the conception of goodness as self-realization. It is chiefly a question of admitting the facts of evil, sin, vice, crime in such a way as intelligibly to place them—neither too real nor too nearly unreal—that we may be in a position to do our part. Emphasis falls, not on the mere obstacles to be overcome, but on the profound promptings of our nature spurring us on toward victory. Conscience does not disclose to us out of hand what is right, what wrong: these are matters to be delved for, the good is something to be wrought out. Our freedom does not guarantee virtue, it makes virtue possible. Our freedom to choose is not even something to boast of. But freedom as an ideal, as rational and spiritual is a privilege to rejoice in. Freedom implies something better than optimism as usually understood. Pain has its meanings for us. Pessimism is sound in part. What we need is a working faith to enable us to be constructive in thought, word, and deed. Affirmation does not carry far. Denial of evil scarcely avails at all. But what is needed is interpretation, not mere explanation.

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CHAPTER XIX

THE WORTH OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Egoism.—It was formerly assumed that all men are by nature self-seeking; for the instinct of self-preservation was regarded as central, fundamental, also prior in time; and evidences from the field of evolution were said to prove that self-assertion is the prevailing principle. So, too, in the economic world the struggle for existence is so intense that self-interest has seemingly been the prevailing motive in all history. Religion has added its word in favor of the original perversity of human nature, without inquiring in a thorough way into the nature and origin of man's perverse "self-love." To call a man "selfish" is to condemn him, and apparently nothing more need be said. To praise conduct as "unselfish" has been to say enough about it. Very little attention has been given to the fact that extreme self-sacrifice begets its opposite.

The moral theory founded on these evidences is known as egoism, the view that as all men are in reality self-seeking, self-interest, or the greatest attainable pleasure of the ego, should be the explicit motive. A natural history has been developed to fit the theory. The argument seemed highly plausible, especially before the days of comparative study into the origin and development of moral ideas; and it seems to be confirmed by the fact that selfish men and women abound everywhere. Indeed, the theory of self-interest appears to be the only one that can be verified by appeal to facts. To Hobbes, with whom the history of English ethics began with vigor, man seemed to be essentially a brutish or selfish mortal, tending by instinct to make war upon his fellowmen; while the alleged sociality of men dwelling together in peace was due to a contract

adopted for egoistic reasons.¹ Mandeville undertook to show that all apparent other-regarding motives are really motives of self-interest.² Spinoza's *Ethics* also emphasizes self-preservation. It is an easy step from any argument for egoism to skepticism concerning human nature.

Appeal to public life as we all find it discloses manifold evidences. We find politicians, ostensibly representatives of the people, using their high office to foster private ambition; and there is much truth in the claim made by a sometime leader of Tammany Hall: "to the victor belong the spoils." Even in the philanthropies the social worker's own development appears to be the prevailing motive; the missionary in foreign fields is said to be one who was disappointed in love; the clergyman enters the Church to gain "a good living"; in education the teacher is awaiting an opportunity to be married. "Competition is the life of trade," and competition never claimed to be anything except self-interest. Our whole social system is said to be founded on self-interest, and that is the trouble with it: we must all keep in the game. The demand exists that the whole economic order shall be overthrown, but overthrown in favor of what? Another group actuated by self-interests opposing those of capitalism.

Altruism.—In contrast with egoism, altruism is brought forward, that is, the good of others through appeal to sympathy, pity, benevolence; the call to charity, or service. This demand is based on *society*, supposedly later in origin than the individual, and in a measure in opposition to the individual. The problem then is to make the transition from egoism to altruism. The difficulty is great indeed, on the assumption that man is naturally and prevailingly self-seeking, if not selfish. Moralists have appealed to men in the name of duty to love the neighbor and dedicate themselves to his good. It is said that one *ought* to be unselfish, one "ought" to serve humanity. But the problem is to prove the duty of altruism. Assuming that pure altruism is the

¹ The *Leviathan*, 1651.

² The *Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices Made Public Benefits*, 1706.

moral ideal, while self-preservation is the order of nature, the moral life and nature have been put in sharpest antithesis. A man does what is right when he is altruistic, whatever is egoistic is wrong. Hence there is so much to condemn in human nature and human life that the situation seems hopeless. Christianity has set us the example of self-denial, but how indeed shall we rouse people to attain it?

Naturalism as a Solution.—McConnell has more courageously faced the issues than most moralists.³ It may be admitted that duties to self and to others sometimes coincide, but what of cases where the interests of self and of others are antagonistic? Spencer fails to weigh egoism and altruism in the scales of moral worth. The organic view of society is not the whole truth: society is more nearly an aggregate of human individuals; human beings can isolate themselves from one another; the social organization is psychical—an organization of thoughts, sentiments, desires, volitions, consciences—entirely different from a biological organism. The analogy is not indeed a good one. It is not clear that the good of each is inseparably bound up with the good of the parts.

The only recourse seems then for me to say: "You can never succeed in finding in my good a durable point of union with yours; my interests never cease at bottom to repel each other." I should strive after what is good for myself without considering whether others' welfare is thereby furthered or hindered. "Under the outward form of mutual regard there is always an armed peace. . . . Instinct conserves self; habitude conserves self; all the natural tendencies conserve self; evolution conserves and enlarges self. . . ." ⁴ By contrast it might indeed be said that "egoism rests upon the dogmatic assertion of an isolated ego, closed toward others, impenetrable . . . [but] real man is in the midst of a society of similar personal beings. . . . The isolated man [is] a pure abstraction." ⁵ Yet the contrast is real, and the need of a solution im-

³ R. M. McConnell, *The Duty of Altruism*, 1910.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

perative. The theological attempt at a rational solution fails because it takes refuge in something transcendental, inexplicable, mysterious, unintelligible, conjectural.⁶ Metaphysics does not offer a satisfactory explanation. Kant, for instance, can not even admit the conflict of duties, ignorance, or indecision.⁷ However, the civil law may undertake to settle the problem of obligation, no external regulation can excuse the individual from reflective thinking. Logic is no real help, for altruism is not determined by logical considerations; logic is not strong enough to restrain a man: will is more primary and fundamental than intellect. The psychological explanation is not convincing on the point that we *ought* to be altruistic; if egoism and altruism were born together, evidence is lacking that altruism is to be preferred to egoism.⁸ There *are* men who are altruistic, but why should a man be so? Evolutionary ethics supplies no regulative principle, it does not supply a sure ground for moral obligation.

Altruism as a Natural Fact.—When McConnell examines reason and will, he comes to his solution. Although he is unable to accept the view that ideas are forces—since experience is prior to thought, and sympathy is prior to movements of thought founded on it—he does indeed find that will is prior and fundamental, in contrast with reason.⁹ Ideals are not purely intellectual, but are products of the whole character, especially of the will; and so an *accepted* ideal is indeed a force. “The thought must be recognized and affirmed by the will as valid and binding. If I obey the idea, it is because I believe it *good*, and because I love and will the *good* which the idea represents. It is the will that ascribes or denies value to the idea. . . . The idea is not a finality. . . . The theoretical is not first and the practical second. No man ever sacrificed self as the result of a conclusion due wholly to reason.”¹⁰ The result for McConnell is emphasis on the will as a product

⁶ *Ibid.*, Chap. II.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Chap. IX.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

of nature. It is one's *nature* to be selfish, another's *nature* to be unselfish. The duty of acting contrary to one's nature can not, he holds, be demonstrated to any man. Nor can the duty to love others be proved to the man who does not love others. Goodness is not indeed the product of the intellect. It would be absurd to argue for "duty for duty's sake."

What then is McConnell's solution? The "ought" rests upon the *is*; human conduct is subject to natural laws; and so it is a question: What *does* the individual will?¹¹ How can he attain what he wills? It is merely a question of means to ends; the ought is "only a logical accord of the consequence with the principle." "Moral science and moral philosophy can not change an egoist into an altruist. Differences of character are inborn and unchangeable. The bad man is bad from birth." A wrong will is essentially and permanently bad, a bad act is due to something inherent in our nature. Duty is in line with the tendency already being taken by the will. One's own nature is the judge of what is good, what is bad. An ideal then is consciousness of the will's fundamental direction or aim: in the ideal life every power would be perfectly active. Hence McConnell puts great stress on "the will to live the largest life." Both egoism and altruism are abnormalities. Man already wills to be social. Generosity is inseparable from man's existence.¹² "Life can maintain itself only on the condition that it expands, grows, gives of itself." Hence there is every reason for activity, expression, giving, unfolding, developing, expanding, loving; morality is indeed "the result of superabundance of life, interior expression," and it is justified only because the individual wills it.

Objections to the Naturalistic View.—Taken merely as it reads, this view involves rejection of the distinction that ethics is a normative science; it gives up the idea of duty altogether. The bare fact remains that one either is or is not prompted by love toward God and the neighbor.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 231.

If the bad man is and remains bad, while the good was born so; if it be a question of a perverse will, in the case of the wrong-doer; then indeed many distinctions fall, and with them most of our efforts to aid one another will naturally cease. If "my own nature is judge of what is good, and what is bad," we are back where Socrates found the Sophists. There is then no ground for objections to hedonism, not even in its psychological or egoistic form.

Yet McConnell's argument is for the most part directed against the artificial sundering of altruism from egoism: it strongly reinforces the conviction that virtue is natural, that there is in us an urge prompting us toward self-realization or the fullness of life. One must accept most of his conclusions, while still maintaining that there is a moral constant in human thought and life, in our consciences, sense of duty; hence that duty is fundamental, is to be recognized as yielding a standard such that we can rationally pass from mere nature to the adoption of a valid ideal. McConnell too greatly separates will and reason, and so he fails to see the force of the great rationalistic movement from Plato and Aristotle to modern times. It is reason which, limiting will at times, discerns the ideal of the largest life in its rich content. Morality is not the result of will alone, in its expression of nature's superabundant life. It is not, as Aristotle has shown, a question of capacities or potentialities only, but of criticism through the life of reason. From Plato and Aristotle we might long ago have learned why egoism and altruism are not separable: the self which needed knowledge and development was for them already the social self. Man is by capacity at once many-sided, individual, capable of contributing to his fellows that adequate self-expression which is service, as we would now say.

Altruistic Origins.—Psychology tends to confirm the intimate relationship of those dispositions of our nature which originally make for egoism and altruism, while social psychology, as we have noted, advances further still toward an essentially *social* view of the self as a whole. It would be difficult to substantiate the view nowadays that

altruism is concealed egoism. What can be shown is that sympathetic-altruistic and egoistic motives come together. Since there is no break due to the opposition of faculties, there is no need of trying to make the transition from the one to the other as moralists once essayed to make it. The real contrast is the one which we have been considering from the first, namely, between what "is" and what *ought* to be. The mere fact of the existence of altruistic emotions would be no guarantee that their expression would mean moral goodness as a standard; for it would still be a question what emotions, such as pity or sympathy, are eligible, and how these are to be organized. There is abundant evidence that man's more distinctively "gregarious" instincts are as surely native to the individual as the over-heralded "instinct of self-preservation." The trend of ethical thought is away from the old-time position. It is no longer usual to say, with Spencer, that egoism comes before altruism, as the first requisite to universal welfare, or that egoism is ultimate and must take precedence over altruism.¹³

The Reaction Against Egoism.—The thorough-going egoist is abhorred in theory as in practice, and egoism is condemned by organized humanity as expressed in custom, law, public opinion; and this reaction is on moral grounds.¹⁴ It is the *common good* that is urged. The social conscience has demanded self-sacrifice on the part of the individual, even the laying down of his life if need be; and has opposed egoistic calculation. "The very existence of the family, the tribe, the state is a protest against pure egoism."¹⁵ Public opinion, sitting in moral judgment, sees in the pleasure-seeker an egoist. We have noted the fact that hedonism in its egoistic form quickly ran itself out. Egoism as a theory proves indeed to be as inconsistent as self-sacrifice, taken by itself. Even in popular morality there is "an unbalanced combination" of egoism

¹³ *Data of Ethics*, Secs. 68, 69.

¹⁴ Fullerton, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 217. Cf. Palmer, *Altruism, its Nature and Varieties*, p. 8.

and altruism, rather than explicit egoism.¹⁶ It is indeed difficult to approximate consistency with either term.

Paulsen maintains that there is no duty towards individual life which can not be construed as a duty toward others, none towards others that can not be shown to be a duty towards self.¹⁷ The acquisition of wealth seems to be the central purpose of our egoistic strivings; yet industry, energy, and frugality are no less truly duties towards others. It is proverbial that "honesty is the best policy," that ill-gotten goods seldom prosper, and that dishonesty deadens the desire for honest acquisition, while theft is always an uncertain and precarious means of livelihood. In actual life our motives are always mingled. Indeed the strange assumption many have made is that every act must have *one* motive; as if duties toward self and toward others were mutually exclusive.¹⁸ Even in case of self-sacrifice motives are numerous and are blended. "Every self-sacrifice is at the same time self-preservation, namely, preservation of the *ideal* self; indeed, it is the proudest kind of self-assertion for me to sacrifice myself, for me to stake my life in battling for a good which I esteem higher than my life. There is always a 'selfish' element in it; 'unselfish' conduct is a contradiction in terms. The self is always involved, it sacrifices a good only for a higher good, possessions for fame, a good name for a good conscience, life for the freedom and honor of the people."¹⁹ Life indeed is not such an antagonistic affair as some moralists have tried to make out. It is not a constant struggle between mine and thine. Nor is the sacrifice of individual interest for those of others always a duty; or the sacrifice of personal interests, even when the welfare of others is promoted, invariably meritorious and praiseworthy.²⁰

The Individual as Starting-point.—If then we conclude that self-regarding and other-regarding tendencies

¹⁶ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 369.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 383.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 389.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

are to be understood together, the first need is to assign the individual to his appropriate place. In so doing we may be free to use the symbol of the "organism" by way of illustration of the intimate relation between the individual and his group, despite any objection, remembering that it is a symbol, that no analogy drawn from things in space is adequate to portray coöperation between selves.

In beginning with the facts of the individual's consciousness, we start with data which any one can verify. Any sure approach to knowledge of society must take account of the fact that society consists of conscious beings, not of "units" constituting a group, which somehow has a "mind." All knowledge of the inner life of other people necessarily begins with a measure of self-knowledge. Moral consciousness begins with the individual, whatever the decrees and power of society over the individual by appeal to custom. Moral reform starts with the individual. Any change or moral growth in which the individual participates takes place from within outward. The individual must see the situation in which a change is called for, must acknowledge its meaning or value; and probably he will be called on to admit his own motives, to recognize conduct that is wrong. It is the individual who cleaves to a standard as "right," who takes a moral opportunity. The moral response, if made at all, must be made by the individual, and in freedom. No one can make a moral decision or take a moral step for another, although at times the individual may do little more than give assent to the advice of another. It is the individual who sees the need of a scale of values, who realizes obligation, discerns the power of the moral law, becomes aware of the ought; and by acquiring a dominant desire which enlists varied dispositions develops a purpose sufficient to unify or strengthen character. It is the individual who makes effort, overcomes obstacles; learns his relation to heredity and environment through education and experience, and by adaptation to the social order of which he is a member. He it is who must make the adjustments, adapting himself to all kinds of social situations. Whatever society does

for him, he must find himself through reactions to demands made upon him, while he earns his living, meets the requirements of varied groups expecting more of him than he can do except by a process of selection between loyalties. Society helps a man discover his function, but it is the man himself who learns his limitations. The more highly selective he becomes the more truly individual. In fine, human evolution is by individuation.

The individual, in uncorrected beginnings, tends to develop self-love to the extreme; hence comes egotism, self-conceit, selfishness. But out of self-reliance may come strength, efficiency, and eventually enlargement of interests and motives so that other-regarding motives occupy a larger place than self-regarding. Profound belief in one's abilities is essential to success in the moral as in any other field. The limited self-culture of one period of a man's development may greatly contribute to the productive service of the next. In any case the individual is the ground and starting-point of moral development, and we have repeatedly seen that natural content is essential to moral form: self-assertion belongs to the natural stage, self-realization to the moral.

Self-love and Altruism.—Where it was once customary to dwell on the differences between egoism and altruism, the more recent tendency is to point to the resemblances. Rashdall holds that we can not distinguish between the good a man does to himself and the good he bestows on others. "True human good consists in activities which are at once my good and the good of others." One man's contribution to the general good, in its quantity and quality is never exactly the same as that of another man. Unlikenesses and inequalities accompany differentiation in social progress. Differentiation involves exceptional sacrifice for some, exceptional advantages and enjoyment for others. The true good of every individual is necessarily unlike that of every other.²¹

So too Alexander points out that morality is itself the answer to the problem of reconciling the manifold likes

²¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 277.

and dislikes of many persons. "Self-love and love of others describe the moral relation from opposite ends. . . . Every act of respect for others is an act of self-furtherance. Self-furtherance turns to selfishness when the gratification is incompatible with the moral development of others."²²

The Basis of Values.—It is a question then of putting matters in right relation so that we understand in what sense the individual is the basis of values. From the point of view of individualism the situation is forcefully put by Warner Fite: (1) the individual is the original source and constituent of all value, and there is no higher standard of obligation than that set by our personal ends and ideals; (2) in a community of conscious beings, the personal interests of the several individuals are strictly coördinate, each is committed to a consideration of the ends of each of the others; (3) but this is possible only through consciousness or coördinateness of interests as a function of self-consciousness.²³ The individual is (1) external as he appears to others, (2) internal as he appears to himself. In the latter sense the individual's act is not the effect of a cause, but *the expression of a reason*, defined by a meaning or purpose. I, the spiritual individual, am not coextensive with the mass of my body; but indeterminate. Yet as self-conscious I am perfectly determinate, with my concrete interests.

Outwardly I am seen as part of the mechanical order of nature; but inwardly as part of an idealistic social order, a society of conscious individuals united by consciousness of kind, with functions to fulfill in the social organism. The individual can guard himself from putting too much emphasis on the unity of society by being mindful of the fact that his needs and instincts are not necessarily in harmony with those of his fellows. The *meaning* which defines our consciousness and makes us truly individual must be our own meaning. "If the glory of God is not also my glory, and the salvation of society not also my salva-

²² S. Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, 1889, p. 172.

²³ *Individualism*, 1911, p. 5.

tion, then God and society are necessarily strangers to me." ²⁴

The interests of human individuals are not essentially in harmony because this harmony is divinely pre-established; not by heredity, or by social education; nor even by mysterious "consciousness of kind": but because men are conscious beings and know themselves and one another. It is *consciousness* which creates the unity. The unity is not gained by mutual concession of individual claims, but by complete fulfillment of all individual purposes. The intelligence which enables us to adjust our actions to our physical environment ought to enable us to adjust our actions to one another.

The Union of Opposites.—To accept this view is to find that many of the problems once raised have ceased to be, for they were due to an artificial conception of the individual, which in turn arose through an old-time psychology. Other problems were due to the bare assertion that all men were born free and equal; or that there would have been equality of opportunity if the existing social order had been different. In contrast with any materialistic interpretation of history, economic determinism, or any other substitution of external for internal values, ethical idealism conceives of the individual from the point of view of the inner life by taking the clue from consciousness. In our consciousness we find actually attained that unity in diversity which is the despair of all seekers for harmony in material things. For, as we have constantly noted in the foregoing chapters, our several powers interpenetrate so that cognition, desire, will, thought, and feeling may all be operative at the same time. Our awareness of an object may involve many interests, also one dominant ideal or purpose. Our desires may be manifold, and, taken one by one, in sharp contrast if not in conflict; yet there can also be a centralizing universe of desire. It is this inward union of opposites, interpenetrated by a purpose, which should give us the idea of what it means to be an individual. A moral judgment discloses the possibility of

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

being one and the same person in any number of acts, of realizing one and the same purpose where to all appearances there is a mere assemblage of aims and values. Our consciousness is remarkable for its inclusiveness. Hence a conscious aim can never be exclusive. Like an idea, it is both itself and includes aims other than itself.²⁵

Consciousness as the Type.—The function of consciousness is not merely to select one aim to the exclusion of others, but involves the selection of acts which will completely realize all our aims. Thus consciousness, by its ideal of mutual inclusiveness, genuinely many, yet as genuinely one, yields the ideal or type. In this unity one thing is not sacrificed for the sake of another, but the course is chosen which will attain both. It is this inclusive selection which distinguishes the conscious act. It is your consciousness which makes you an individual person. As a conscious being you are necessarily both here and there, both yesterday and today. Thus consciousness involves an infinitely graduated and indefinitely extended scale. The measure of your consciousness is the precise measure of your individuality.²⁶

The reality of consciousness means its efficiency: to *know what you are doing* makes a difference. You also know what you were doing yesterday and mean to do tomorrow. Thus to understand our conduct is to realize that we act now not merely from personal stimulus but from unity of personal interests. Consciousness as thus described is the antithesis of chance-action, and so it is more than ever law-governed. But the implied law is the consistent expression of one's personal meaning. The conscious individual, regarded as a free agent, is free to do what seems best when all things are considered. So in becoming a conscious individual a man becomes an end in himself. Fite avoids the formalism of Kant by insisting that a disinterested choice is absolutely out of the question, for consciousness involves a reference to an individual and personal point of view. In other words, nothing is known to

²⁵ Fite, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

me as an individual save that which involves an expression of my attitude.

The Social Relation.—A strong point in favor of this view is its synthesis of knowing with action. It is not interaction alone which constitutes a social relation, since each agent must know himself: A social relation is a self-conscious relation.²⁷ Mutual understanding is essential. There is need of a system of mutual ends determined in mutual freedom and agreement. There is then no contradiction between social welfare and individual freedom. Duty of self-sacrifice for the common good would be a paradox and unintelligible. By becoming conscious an individual does not become less self-regarding, but more so. Since an organization means a union of differences, in which individual differences are not to be transcended or destroyed, each man must know himself far more acutely in order to realize himself. The individuality which this argument pleads for can never be transcended. "In the measure of the individuality which is realized is to be found the measure of the reality of the social organization."²⁸ The social good is not a common good, but is mutual and distributive.²⁹

This conclusion accords with the conception of goodness as self-realization. There is something in our nature which strongly impels us to be individual, to lose nothing from our varied powers of initiative. Hence our objection to any view which asserts equality of birth or affirms that equality shall be imposed on us by society. There must somehow be individual values, so we reason, which we shall be able to preserve to the utmost and yet do our duty. And the conviction is strong with many that the conduct which is to secure this end must spring from individual leaders, free to express themselves to the full; not hampered by any demand which puts society above the individual. Thus Sheldon holds that, "however fundamental are the social relations, individuals will always differ in endowment; for

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

each is not simply a social function, but real and unique in himself. Some will get their wants better satisfied than others. Equal opportunity will not insure equal distribution of goods; the socialistic ideal is impractical. . . . Successful enterprise can be carried on only by individual initiative and individual responsibility.”³⁰

The Ideal Unity.—The terms “function” and “social organism” then are figurative. If we are “members one of another” it is by a higher relationship than any external organization exhibits in full. Even the term “organic perfection” is a figure of speech. No less faulty is the term “individualism” unless carefully qualified. To assume, with Leibnitz, that the harmony between individuals is pre-established is to leave no room for real productivity. Better the pluralisms and dualisms which various philosophers have pleaded for than any *asserted* unison of wills. The unity amidst variety which is the ethical ideal is to be an *achieved* unity, first created in the consciousness of the individual, then in his conduct and then in coöperation with others who have had the vision. The complete adjustment between individuals within society which is to be heaven on earth is at the outset a possibility only, not a plan. Something essential depends on the individual, however great, yes, however divine his potentialities. The harmony which we discover between what we have to give and what society in our day needs is not mechanical, as if by some subtle power of attraction we were able to draw to us those whom we can best serve. Nor is it a mere unfolding of our capacities in coincident rhythm with the manifestation of power in those most in accord with us.

The Social Will.—Our nature involves the will that selects as well as the urge which attracts. If our choices “converge upon some comprehensive end,” it is because our volitions have been “intelligently harmonized and unified” in actual conduct.³¹ The social will for which Fullerton pleads, as relatively permanent, but also moving

³⁰ W. H. Sheldon, *Productive Individuality*, 1918, p. 441.

³¹ Fullerton, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

with more or less consistency toward comprehensive ends, with the clash of conflicting desires reduced to the minimum, is likewise an attainment, not an unfolding.³² It is only by the recognition of all wills that evolution of the enlightened social will is to follow. Moral intuitions as attainments are indispensable too.³³ Utilitarianism is to be assimilated in part, since there is no reason to ignore the fact that men do generally desire to gain pleasure and avoid pain: it is only the exaggeration of this truth that is to be combated. And so any term that is employed must be explained in accordance with the larger ethical thought of the day which seeks to be at once social and true to the individual, with his reason, enlightened will, moral intuitions. If the limitations of egoism and pessimism are seen, it is not necessary to plead for altruism. The argument for goodness as self-realization is throughout an argument for altruism. What now concerns us is to consider how the ideal is to be carried into practice.

The Individual and Orthodoxy.—We may illustrate another phase of the life of the individual by the difficulties which beset the man of exceptional ability, notably in relation to the Church. We have traveled far from the times when men were burned at the stake or made victims of heresy trials. But there are other ways of making life miserable for those who love truth too well to recant. To cultivate their powers in marked degree men have turned to art or science, to public service or business. Statesmen carry on their affairs without paying much heed to the Church.

In the arts it has been more customary to encourage talent and individuality. The artist surely works best who dedicates all his powers to Beauty. The medieval artist wrought his masterpieces under the inspiration of the Church, and we look back to that period as one of the great epochs in the history of art. But art was fostered by the Church rather than being ruled by it. The ideals of the two coincided for a time, as did the ideals

³² See summary, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

of the Beautiful, the True, and the Good in ancient Greece. The situation was very different in the field of science and philosophy. While theology ruled, science was quiescent; and philosophy was practically a slave. The lovers of truth who laid the foundations of modern science had to fight for the privilege amidst constant dangers of martyrdom. We now realize that the scholar must be wholly free to follow truth wherever his love for it may lead. Liberty to pursue truth in this way gave us the marvelous epoch of modern science.

Creative Work.—What would equivalent freedom mean in the sphere of man's religious activities? The question is a new one for some. We have not entertained the possibility that creative work might be done for the moral and spiritual life, as an artist might produce a picture through direct observation of nature and life, instead of consulting authorities to see what may permissibly be portrayed. We lack a complete theory of what we call "the creative instinct."

In the arts, when a young girl with a great voice is discovered she is put under the instruction of the best teachers in a musical atmosphere, and everything in her life is fostered by appeal to certain high standards; when a youth is found modeling beautiful figures in clay he is put in charge of masters who will help to develop his talent or genius to the full, for Beauty's sake. We have separated the arts from the other disciplines, because we now recognize their rights, as we do those of science.

We have tended to isolate matters pertaining to the Church, leaving them to specialists with their particular standards; while talents for the world's activities at large are given over to our educational and practical systems. But if there is something akin in all creative work, we might well encourage people to find their places in religion as in every other sphere, so that there shall be free recognition of any of the Eternal Ideas, notably the relation of the Good to Beauty and Truth. Any work that is worth doing bears relation to the Ideas. We are preparing for our heavenly functions by doing earthly things well. The

spiritual life may be said to grow up out of the common occupations whenever man cherishes an ideal which appeals to his whole nature.

Vocations.—The art of finding one's place and of helping others to find themselves and their places may well become one of the greatest topics in the moral life.³⁴ Ideally speaking, every individual has his place, no two are alike, no two would fulfill precisely the same functions, no two would express absolutely the same sentiments; and there would be every reason for encouraging each individual to find an adequate form of self-expression and work. It may be that what is required of us in the moral order—instead of trying to reform people, by persuading them of our own views and ways—is to encourage each man to find his type and live his own life to the full. It may be that all our instincts are for productivity—not originally for mere self-preservation or egoism at all—and that we have been assiduously curbing them, if not trying to exterminate some of them.

It was said of a great teacher in one of our universities that he "created men," had creative insight into their type. This summoning of a man into power is the greatest creative work on earth. There is no subordination of the individual here. Each is recognized according to his inherent worth. This means a return to the sources of our best experience; it puts a new value upon human experience, and we note new reasons for learning from one another, by whatever road we have come, whatever we have seen and heard and felt along the way. Not all of us have heard as distinct a call as that which came to Paul on the road to Damascus, for we have not had the same need, we are not of the same type. But the call has been according to gradually recognized capacities and needs, in the light of the use made of individual experience. In this the profounder view of human life the experience of each of us is a revelation of the moral ideal.

Limiting the Individual.—In contrast with this recognition of the worth of the individual, we find many evidences of a wholly different attitude. In some of the in-

³⁴ Cf. Rashdall, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Chap. IV.

dustries, under the present system of organization, a man is expected to conform as strictly to the rules of the union to which he belongs as true believers once conformed to orthodoxy. The typical example is that of the bricklayers' union, decreeing how many bricks a man shall lay in an hour, how many hours he shall work, and what grade of work he shall do. The man of skill must moderate his skill and the quick-motioned man must moderate his pace to fit the deadly average. If a grievance arises, a man must strike with the others if ordered to do so. He has little freedom and few opportunities for initiative. These conditions prevail in varied forms in the economic world. Even in what we call the higher walks of life conformity is also the rule. Thus one finds either an external system applied to men as soldiers are organized into an imperial army; or, rules, a system, a creed, a political machine or other scheme managed by the few and put upon the many. Even teachers must teach what conservatives insist upon. The result is that men of real ability feel restrained and cramped. The moral problem is to show that the ideal of creative individuality is not incompatible with society as it exists today. Conservatism, doing its deadly work, strives against the individual; and so it becomes a question, not of egoism and altruism as of old, but of conservatism and progress. To ascend the scale of values is to encounter varied leveling influences struggling to keep man where he is. But there need be no moral antagonism between the conservation of values and the effort of the individual to contribute his best life. The individual discovers himself by what he overcomes. A man's experiences fit him for his greater work. Egoism, with its extremes, is a passing stage only, like the pursuit of pleasure as an end in itself. Emerson reminds us that society is a conspiracy against the individual, and that "whoso would be a man must be a nonconformist." What is needed is horizon, that a man may put first things first. A man also needs to understand his repressions, including those put upon him as the skilled mason or carpenter is checked by the mandates of the labor union. Meanwhile there are also

resources in the realm of the eternal values, however limited the opportunities accorded us by our mundane occupations. There are resources too in the old-time interest in work well done for work's sake, with conscience, enthusiasm, over and above any question of the number of hours and the compensation. All the higher values may well be pursued as if each were independent. The individual finds himself; society grants the conditions, discloses the occasions. The social group exists for the benefit of individuals. Our argument does not lead to the conclusion that the state is above the individual, that the universal can rightfully impose itself. The individual is neither a mere unit, nor a mere organ, function, or official. We are "members one of another." Our relationship is moral. It is a matter of consciousness, of attitude, of life.

Questions.—In what sense is virtue its own reward?

What is the surest way to keep one's conscience clean?

What is the value of such a maxim as, "Honesty is the best policy"?

Is all good action conscious action?

In what respects is self-sacrifice a leap in the dark?

Is happiness in any respect a criterion of goodness?

How far can a person be distinguished from his environment?

What is the objection to the idea of absolute chance in the universe?

Is individualism a complete moral ideal?

What is the function of a social ideal?

How are ideals formed?

How can duality of self be overcome?

To what extent is it desirable that conduct should be mechanized, and therefore predictable?

When is the prediction of conduct offensive?

Does an ideal always appear in the mind as a present fact, or has it other qualities or powers?

Is the sense of duty equivalent to respect for law?

Is any view of duty compatible with the purpose of each man to realize himself?

Can the idea of self-organization become too prominent?

Would not a course of conduct which resulted in human misery be abandoned; and, if so, is this an argument in favor of hedonism?

Would perfect morality blot out duty?

In what sense is intuition a guide to right conduct?

What is the moral value of "the still small voice"?

Is the existence of evil an insuperable objection to belief in the moral goodness of the universe?

Is moral experience in general worth what it costs?

Is it probable that a man's ideal of complete social self-realization coincides with the divine purpose?

What part does faith play in meeting the issues of the moral life?

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PART THREE

THE MORAL LIFE

CHAPTER XX

THE VIRTUES

The Value of Knowledge.—Ethics, we have seen, is not a purely practical science. It does not undertake to tell individuals what to do, does not promise to make men better. Yet one can hardly follow any ethical system to the end without finding practical issues cleared up, without gaining an impetus to live more wisely; for ethics counsels man to *know*, to *be*, and to *do*. We have all been reared amid some kind of moral teaching, and the study of ethics is inevitably in part a criticism of the views we have acquired. Moreover, there is a large measure of truth in the Socratic teaching that knowledge is virtue; hence increase of ethical knowledge insensibly tends towards benefit. It has been said that all knowledge affects practice, although not all knowledge guides it.

If the intuitionist theory in extreme form were true, experience would not be required, and we would need only to consult the appropriate section of our moral code. But if the empirical theories were adequate, it would be solely a matter of practice. It is idealistic ethics which yield rich results, since theory and practice are brought into closest relation. Study shows that it makes a great difference what conclusions we reach concerning desire, love of pleasure, egoism, pessimism, self-sacrifice, conscience, and

other subjects which have come before us. We have not been led to the conclusion that those principles only are to be adopted which can be fully applied at once. Unexpected practical values appear in the course of time. Even the formal ethics of Kant, with its neglect of the content of duty, has practical value.

Morality we have defined as ethics in practice, the moral life. The study of it not only involves knowledge of the inner life of the individual but knowledge of the conditions of social welfare in our own age. Granted a conception of goodness defended against objections, the problem is to consider how this conception can be carried into practice. It is one thing to understand right action, another to see why men encounter difficulties in endeavoring to realize ideals, why men do not always act rightly. Emerson reminds us that "the step from knowing to doing is rarely taken." Increasing knowledge of ethical principles has not been followed by equal increase of effort in making knowledge virtue. Moral teachers in touch with all types of men still appeal to philosophers to know how to arouse the moral will. Even when loyalty, brotherhood, love, service is accepted as the ruling motive, it is a question how to embody this motive in productive conduct. It is our province to consider the application of ethics to practice so far at least as the virtues are concerned, the implied rules of action, and the problem of human nature in relation to virtue.

The Nature of Virtue.—Under other terms, we have already considered virtue in the foregoing chapters. For we have regarded the moral standard as involving unity, consistency, integrity, insight into goodness and its elements; and each topic we have taken up was an approach to the same subject. To do one's duty, act rightly, realize goodness in practice is virtue; one's duties imply the virtues, and to possess integrity at the center is to manifest it in lines of conduct proceeding from this "purity of heart," this kingdom to be sought before all others. Yet the term virtue, although it originally stood for "duty" as defined in a later period of moral history, is also used

in another sense with reference to goodness carried into practice in the inner life of the individual and in the social order.

Virtue is what man possesses who is faithful to the moral ideal, who does his duty in specific situations, instead of allowing it to remain a general principle. It is the permanent character of the will, attained through single decisions of will, successive appeals to moral reason; steadfastness in the direction of the will toward the moral end; determinateness of the ideational, emotional, and volitional life. It implies regularity or orderliness in mental processes, modes of conduct which spring from integrity or constancy of character as its basis. Hence it is a many in one, involving various inner attitudes or modes of expressing character.

The Greek View.—For Plato and Aristotle goodness and the virtues were one, the several virtues being the characteristic activities making for the good as the ideal end. Virtue was said to appeal to the man of intelligence as the natural or reasonable thing. It was not then necessary to introduce duty as an additional motive. Aristotle held that the virtues are habits of deliberate choice due to stability of character and the attainment of the mean, which in his system is the essence of virtue. Accordingly he characterized most of the chief virtues by indicating the extremes to be avoided.

The term virtue naturally suggests the Greek conception, with various maxims for the guidance of the individual; whereas the Hebraic conception suggests the Commandments, which pertain to overt acts and prohibitions, while the modern Christian term is duty. The virtues first emphasized by the Greeks relate to the individual, with the personal habit of valuation in mind. The Greeks expected to attain virtue because they regarded man as constituted for it; hence the emphasis on self-knowledge and self-culture, in contrast with appeal to the supernatural in the early Christian scheme. Granted a prevailing attitude or disposition toward virtue, every virtue can be acquired through effort, and mastery over the irrational

impulses. Virtue thus regarded has been called a well-spring of right deeds, the will which leads one continually to right actions.

Classifications.—From the individual virtues, such as temperance, courage, the more social virtues, chiefly justice, follow. Piety and reverence were later distinguished as the religious virtues. The cardinal virtues in Plato's scheme are wisdom, temperance, courage and justice. The theologic virtues, also known as the triad of Christian graces, are faith, hope, and charity; contrasted in the medieval period with the deadly and venial sins.¹ The virtues have also been classed with reference to the exercise of the higher intellectual and æsthetic powers; and those which consist in due control of the lower impulses, such as temperance, purity, and the other self-regarding duties.² It would be impossible to draw up a table of virtues to be agreed upon for any length of time; since very much depends on the prevailing view of human nature, the customs which supply content, the philosophy or theology which happens to be in vogue. Belief in the first and last things of the Christian life was once so great a virtue that even to believe what seemed absurd was right, to doubt was sin. Hope "springs eternal in the human breast" according to needs and occasions. Love "comes," it is not often regarded as a duty: its expression through charity depends on social theory. The Greek virtues are no longer disparaged as "pagan" or as "splendid vices." What signifies in any period is whole-hearted interest in the direction or mode of life in which virtue is being expressed. Virtue in any age implies integrity, purity of heart, or sincerity. Hence the force of the term "cardinal" as applied to the virtues, namely, the virtues which are essential to morality.

Prudence.—It is customary, from one ethical point of view, to discriminate rather sharply between prudence and duty. Martineau's distinction is clearest.³ In moral judg-

¹ See Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, p. 134.

² Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 192.

³ *Types of Ethical Theory*, 1891, Vol. II, p. 70.

ments we discriminate the springs of action within us; in the prudential we are concerned with the effects of action upon ourselves. Moral judgments anticipate action, while prudence has to wait for it. Ethically speaking, an act contrary to what we judge to be higher (right), in the presence of a lower alternative, would be a sin; but an act contrary to prudence would be a blunder. In our moral judgments conscience is already given, latent, whereas prudence is arrived at through experience, and we are imprudent from lack of experience. It is essential to moral discernment that it be spontaneous, not a mere product of experience. There is indeed a natural order of values, according to the strength of our promptings; but this prudential scale is variable. Prudence then is definable as "self-surrender to the strongest impulse," while acceptance of duty would be "self-surrender to the highest."⁴

Although we can not fully agree with Martineau, for reasons given in discussing his theory of the springs of action,⁵ we note the fact that prudence is not necessarily ethical, it may stop with the individual's private interests. It is a matter of prudence for a man to fit into the economic scheme, to "play the game," be on the alert in the sharp struggle for existence in the world of trade; and to earn enough for a good livelihood, to provide for a rainy day, for possible hard times, illness, and for old age. So-called "worldly wisdom" is in point here, namely, what is proverbial or axiomatic. For example, it is said to "pay" to be honest. Again, it is matter of prudence, that is, of hygiene, to eat a wise amount of food, to take sufficient exercise, rest, sleep, recreation; to protect one's self against wet and cold weather, to eat and drink with due care in extremely hot weather. One keeps good hours to keep fit, playing occasionally, taking a vacation now and then, in order to avoid routine or servitude to circumstance. If you are a day-worker rather than a night-worker, it is well to know this fact and keep to your type. Again, one acquires the best method of work, one con-

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁵ See above, Chap. XV.

concentrates, adapting hours, plans, and the whole scheme of life to fit the occupation. One learns to be patient, persistent, gradually acquiring the art of success.⁶ To be prudent is also to do what is politic or long-headed. Hence people await occasions for putting their plans through, they seek influence, use their friends, disguise their real motives under the pretense of virtue. On the other hand it is duty or love which prompts one to care for a sick mother, to visit the widowed and fatherless, and help the poor; and at times, when self-neglectful in social service, one may pass far beyond what is prudent in personal care and efficiency. It is not now a question of what "pays," but of what is right; not what is customary or expected, but what is best; not for myself, but what I owe to others; not mere physical health, but also moral health.

It is impossible however to distinguish prudence as mere egoism and separate all matters of duty from all prudential matters, under the head of altruism. We have seen that the two are found together and belong together. Most items of prudence rightfully belong under the head of the moral life. One must keep fit, to realize the higher self. While prudence is not necessarily moral, it is essential to morality, notably in case of the individual virtues, such as temperance. The honesty which merely "pays" in the economic world becomes a virtue in the moral. It does more than pay to be virtuous. The question of integrity so enters in that one sees it to be essential to individual life. Unless you are faithful, true, upright, your life is scarcely worth developing to the point of efficiency or success.

To arouse greater interest in moral issues, a teacher of ethics in one of our leading colleges once began his course by an experimental appeal. Instead of first defining terms, analyzing principles, and classic types of ethical theory, he asked his students to take careful note during a week of the way they lived and worked, what methods of study were efficient, what habits of life successful, what rules effective, and what was prudent in general; and to report

⁶ On thrift, punctuality, commercial honor, see Rogers, *The Theory of Ethics*, 1922, p. 168.

on what they had learned from experience, untaught as they were in the science of moral conduct. The result was a deeply suggestive discovery in regard to better modes of living, study, arranging hours, adapting habits; increased interest in temperamental differences, in character, ideals, standards of judgment; and a desire to know how one could acquire a scale of values. In short, these prudential matters quickly led over into the typical considerations which imply the Greek conception of virtue.

Self-control.—Although it is an element of individual virtue, rather than a virtue, as such, self-control is regarded as moral in so far it implies knowledge of what is to be controlled through the supremacy of the higher self. Self-control involves rational will or wise choice, and organization of our powers. Paulsen defines it as “capacity to govern life by purposes and ideals.”⁷ It is thus the fundamental condition of the virtues, the fundamental pre-condition of human worth, the basis of freedom and personality in practice. It involves knowledge of temperament, mastery over the animal nature; the conservation of values, in contrast with “dissipation” or vice. It is the basis of moral efficiency. As conceived nowadays it is plainly not asceticism, not mere self-discipline, although it involves power to face and overcome the disagreeable. In another aspect it implies calmness, inner peace, equanimity: “in confidence and equanimity shall be your strength.” Thus it is implied in the typical Stoic virtue of serenity amidst rational adjustment to the cosmos.⁸

Temperance.—The values of prudence and self-control, so far as they are moral, pertain especially to the cardinal virtue known as temperance or self-discipline. Essential to this initial virtue is knowledge of the impulses, desires, passions, coarser emotions, refining emotions—the conditions under which they rise into prominence—as tendencies to action, and knowledge of the consequences to which these actions lead. Self-control is not only called for, but also

⁷ *System of Ethics*, trans., p. 481.

⁸ For a discussion of bodily life and control see Paulsen, *op. cit.*, p. 505.

the adoption of a worthy universe of desire which makes possible the curbing of unruly desires, resistance to the allurements of sense, not only in the obvious cases of eating and drinking but in the desires as a whole. Temperance implies the idea of subordination of detached promptings to action, each one of which, like desire for sensuous pleasure, tends by itself to run to excess; and the organization and wiser use of all promptings classified as "lower," not necessarily as "animalistic," but as involving lesser values. The end in view is individual well-being as essential to self-realization. For temperance is a means to other virtues, and is to be understood both in the light of what it controls and of what it contributes. It is not then abstinence or repression but wise use of our powers. The Greek maxim in this connection is, "Nothing to excess," implying the golden mean of Aristotle's ethics. Much then will depend on temperament, for some people are naturally too emotional, others impulsive, cold, arbitrary, exacting, or of the single-tracked type. We learn temperance experimentally, profiting by the lessons of excess, by pain, and over-indulgence. Some points in its favor are obvious, but if *nothing* to excess is to be the rule, much testing is required. The moderation which is essential to health is part of the art of life, so is the moderation which we come to approve of by noting instances of extreme self-sacrifice.

Seth interprets temperance to mean the reign of reason, and the subjection and obedience of sensibility: character is nature disciplined.⁹ But this mastery of natural impulse by reason will call forth varied criticisms on the part of those who, strong in their sensibilities, maintain that all our promptings to do good spring from impulse. The larger meaning which Seth has in view is, utilization of the *dynamic* which our impulses yield, conversion of irrational into rational energy, the transmutation of impulse into character. Intemperance is disintegration, and implies unorganized sensibility. The element of subjection of all impulse to higher rule is the negative aspect only;

⁹ *Ethical Principles*, p. 241.

coördination or control is the positive, that is, unity of purpose. So too in Paulsen's account the power to resist temptation is a pre-condition, not the larger meaning of temperance.¹⁰ Efficient action in line with the ideal is the goal. Temperance is whole-mindedness. At times it calls for negative self-control, restraint, inhibition; but, again, it involves reverence, recognition of the unique, or invaluable worth embodied in any situation or act of life, involving control of excitement and the guidance of a superior interest.¹¹ Green discloses its essence by comparing this cardinal Greek virtue with the Christian virtue of self-denial.¹² There is a unity of principle, but a difference of range or comprehension. The fundamental conviction implied in this virtue is that there is a lower and a higher. In the end it is a question of the fuller capacities of the self. These are larger in the Christian view. They involve a wider activity in the work of perfecting mankind.¹³

Courage.—Self-control in another form implies courage, coördination of powers so that one may rise above difficulties, persevere, overcome what appears to be the insuperable. Here too there is a negative aspect and a positive, the checking of conflicting desires and emotions, the desire to escape, the emotion of fear, resistance of the fear of pain; but also the vigorous throwing of one's self into action to "carry on." The term fortitude covers the first aspect, while bravery is a synonym for martial courage. Sometimes it is a question of putting aside personal comfort and safety, the immediate good; again, there is a plunging in where all seems uncertain, where the present is ominous, and the future no less so. One's conclusion regarding the worth of self-sacrifice will enter into this "leap in the dark." Something too will depend on one's view of loyalty, devotion to duty other than through patriotism, love for people, fidelity to principle.¹⁴ Moral

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 485.

¹¹ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 406.

¹² *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 3d ed., p. 281.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

¹⁴ Wright distinguishes courage as physical economic, and moral, *Self-Realization*, p. 341, foll.

courage in the popular sense has varied meanings which change with our estimates of things worth doing. The martial courage which has been praised and sung for centuries is falling into disrepute with changed views concerning war.

Manliness.—To take standards of manliness into account as clues to courage is to note that in a mythical period the ideal was centered in the hero, in a Hercules or Samson, representative of physical strength. Later, came the knight of the Middle Ages, in America the hero who went out West to kill Indians; while more recently the hero was one who had the hardihood to venture forth into No Man's Land at night, the sailor lashed in position aboard a destroyer in quest of German submarines, the aviator in the scout or bombing-plane, or the one who transported the mail at night in the transcontinental air-mail service. Manliness has also been more or less identified with habits of smoking, drinking, and swearing, with the idea of "being a sport," whatever that might mean, and possibly it meant that a man was supposed to sow his wild oats in youth. But the moral idealist has long distinguished between use of brute strength as evidence of physical courage, and deeds of daring involving real devotion to duty as in war-time, or wherever the danger was great. It takes no courage to follow the crowd, uncritically adopting external standards, degrading one's self on the vain assumption that to be a true sport is to indulge in compromises. Courage enters when one refuses to adopt vice of any sort at any time, however strongly one may be urged. True manliness consists in faithfulness to a standard, in business or society, war or peace. It increases with victory over enticement in all its subtle forms, by triumph over temptation which the multitude would not regard as temptation; with strength to do what is right, to speak and act according to conviction. In the world of trade it involves the square deal, in society adaptation to conventions without compromise in favor of pleasure-seekers who appeal to a person to yield "just this once." Sometimes it means readiness to apologize, or to do any-

thing difficult, where fidelity to an ideal means "standing up to a thing," facing it with open eye. Gradually our standards have changed from the martial virtues to the gentler virtues, although we have often failed to note modern equivalents for manliness. True manliness goes with courtesy, kindness; the true gentleman refuses to adopt two standards to govern his speech and conduct—one in the company of women, the other in the company of men. Hence the clue is once more found in self-consistency.

Endurance.—Courage is also known as perseverance or endurance, the power to accept and steadily to meet adverse conditions attendant upon difficult enterprises. Endurance implies meeting pain with calmness of self-control or constancy of spirit. Persistence is courage in pushing through routine, the less agreeable phases of life and work encountered on the way to success. It involves concentration on the goal, pushing through intertias, adaptation to the natural rhythms of work, the alternation between work and rest, the relation of pauses to the second wind. Where martial courage was once the ideal, endurance of the conditions of labor is often the modern expression. The enterprise of the pioneer in meeting hardships, of the explorer in facing the difficulties of a voyage toward the Poles, is also a typical instance. In the endurance of pain woman may surpass man, as in submissiveness, and patience.

Independence.—Courage is frequently signalized as "moral" when independence of thought is implied, in the case of liberality in religion, constancy in the pursuit of truth despite opposition, or any venture where higher self-assertion is called for. Fidelity to principle in an unpopular cause, superiority to adverse criticism when doing one's duty, standing by an ideal when subject to condemnation, composure under attack and persecution—all these are regarded as matters to be rejoiced over in behalf of true individualism. There are degrees of such allegiance in religious matters: when one espouses an ideal as applicable to all situations in life, then passes from loyalty to creed or institution to loyalty to Christ, the Church In-

visible, to purity of faith in God. To stand by conviction to the end, even to become known as a conscientious objector, is to find that there is increasing need of courage, inner power to resist all inducements and arguments. By moral courage in the more distinctive sense is meant courage which does not depend on physical strength or outward appeal. From such courage follow ardent consistency, exceptional veracity, and utter sincerity.

Patience.—Patience is usually thought of as ability to meet hardship or bear pain without being overcome and without showing signs of annoyance. But patience is called for in meeting details and routine, in adjustment to people of varied types, particularly those who are stupid, inert, excitable, overbearing; those who have “moods” and are “difficult.” Patience in waiting is no less typical, also in meeting complaints, in adaptation to varied conditions of travel, in facing losses, meeting defeats, in disappointments. Such patience grows with increase of serenity, with refinement and beauty of spirit. Patience in general has been called “feminine courage,”¹⁵ as if seldom found in man, who, because of his more vigorous self-assertion in the world, is unwilling to endure adversities with quietude. Endurance in meeting pain is to be distinguished however from patience as a manifestation of wisdom and composure. Man does not necessarily rouse up in vigorous defense and attack. Some men practice the higher resistance. Stoic composure in meeting the vicissitudes of life is as much needed by man as by woman. The Greek Stoics contributed the wise man’s ideal as one of the great classic types. Woman’s composure is described by Paulsen as “active patience . . . the elastic resistance of the soul . . . one of the most beautiful and valuable qualities of woman. It is harder for a man to get up again after he has met with misfortunes. A woman generally finds less difficulty in beginning anew; she soon begins to hope and fear again, to work and strive; she has a more flexible nature. Man’s strength is more unbending and brittle. A woman is also better able to battle with long-continued troubles and ob-

¹⁵ See, for example, Paulsen, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

stacles; when the man impatiently sinks beneath the load, she retains her equanimity and even her cheerfulness. For that reason woman is the born guardian of youth, the nurse of the sick, and the counsellor of old age.”¹⁶

Wisdom.—In Plato’s sense of the term, wisdom accompanies the attainment of philosophic knowledge, harmonious and controlled activity, coördination of the elements of the soul, as essential to uprightness or justice. Wisdom in the individual corresponds to the governing class in the state. In the inner life it includes prudence, which is, we have seen, for the most part a virtue. It includes order, balance, a scale of worths or values. The morally efficient person sees the superiority of rationalism over materialism, and adopts the most efficient means to the end. Wisdom is acquired by experience, involves volition as an organizing agency directed by thought (reason, enlightenment). Through wisdom one assigns both perplexing and spontaneous promptings to their proper places. Only through wisdom can one realize the Greek maxim, “nothing to excess.” It is not a simple matter to decide what promptings are eligible, how to preserve spontaneity, yet have sufficient system. Through wisdom one gives heed more and more to ends to be attained, with less thought of origins. The modern term for wisdom is “conscientiousness.”

Self-culture.—The subject of self-culture has a whole literature of its own involving self-knowledge, development, expression, according to the point of view of the moral teacher. The basis is found in the principle that true good is inner excellence, as characterized by the Greeks; or in the kingdom “within,” the realities and verities of the spirit, in Christianity. The æsthetic element in religious terms is “the beauty of holiness,” in contrast with the superficial attainments of the æsthete. In Greek terms, the rational (ideal) self is the self to be cultivated to the full; in Christian terms, the losing or denial of the lesser self in the greater involves different points of emphasis. Self-culture also calls for preservation of spon-

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 499.

taneity, lest there be too much self-restraint. It is out of the question to understand and develop to the full one's truer nature without realizing that it is social, that its expression is for the benefit of others.

Culture in this larger sense has been called "the perfect development of the spiritual life,"¹⁷ also the symmetrical development of our several capacities.¹⁸ There would then be no atrophy of the emotional nature, or incapacity for practical activity. True intellectual culture is impossible without culture of will and emotion. Culture calls for knowledge of both the poetry and the prose of life, quest for the truth, the use of constructive or creative imagination, assimilation of the values of training in the arts and sciences. The Greek ideal was that of the beautiful soul in the beautiful body. Physical culture is then both a means and an end as expressive of value.¹⁹ Intellectual culture is not to be separated as an end, as if the intellect were a thing apart, but is to be regarded as instrumental, as an aid to wise volition, and desirable expression of the emotions. Intellectual knowledge is a leading clue to virtue, but it is the life of the spirit as a whole which fosters culture. We distinguish "mere" knowledge or intellect from "wisdom" taught by experience. True individuality involves diversity in unity, is to be conserved in *personality*. Hence we guard against narrowness, over-specialization, a too minute division of intellectual labor. The individual may specialize in his culture, become efficient, practical enough to learn a good living; and yet acquire breadth of view, seek insight in varied directions, retain both partisanship and disinterestedness in different connections. In developing the technique of culture, one may avoid over-precision as one would guard against intellectual pride, vanity, self-conceit.

All self-culture is not necessarily moral. Intellectual and æsthetic culture may often fall short. Ethics comes as the corrective of our educational systems, to show what

¹⁷ Paulsen, *op. cit.*, p. 543.

¹⁸ Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

¹⁹ Cf. Seth, *ibid.*, p. 250.

true self-realization is. We once more note the intimate relationship of egoism and altruism. Self-culture in the deeper sense eventuates in altruism by avoiding the excesses above indicated.²⁰

The Christian View.—The Christian ideal of our own time is likely to appeal to us as coming not to destroy but to recognize and fulfill the Greek ideal of self-culture. The Greek ideal did not fail on its individualistic side. It called for the modern conception of the more social development of culture. Greek culture did not necessarily involve social service as we understand it. Stoic self-control did not necessarily mean recognition of the brotherhood of man. Yet the ethical ideals of Plato and Aristotle involved social application in the state in a way which we have hardly attained as yet, and the Stoic ideal actually called for true citizenship in the world. Return to the Greek ideal in contrast with the Christian is not likely to be understood (since the World War) as reaction against the gentler virtues of Christianity, disparaged by Nietzsche. We have seen what the culture of the Teutonic peoples leads to, in its exaltation of the "super-man." We have also been shown the limitations of the type of moral theory which seeks support in the materialistic interpretation of evolution, as the struggle of those who organize brute-force to the limit. The judgment of many moral teachers, since the war, is that the gentler virtues have never been given fair and full trial. The influence of the martial standard has been too strong. It remains for the world to reconsider peace, the higher resistance, humility, gentleness, kindness, forgiveness, charity, love as tests of true self-culture seeking more complete social expression. The true super-man is not a god of physical force. The individual virtues are essentials of the social virtues. Temperance, courage, wisdom as we have interpreted them above prepare the way for justice, service, brotherhood.

²⁰ On the limitations of idealism, see Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 256; Paulsen, *op. cit.*, p. 565.

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CHAPTER XXI

THE SOCIAL VIRTUES

Sources of Social Virtue.—Our study of virtue passes from the individual to the more explicitly social virtues, with recognition of the fact that man as a social being is prompted by sympathetic impulses and emotions, manifests pity, altruistic sentiments of various kinds side by side with promptings making for self-culture not explicitly due to an altruistic motive. The content of social virtue is found in the social life prevailing at the time, tested by standards on the part of moral leaders, or wrought into ethical systems, as in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. This content varies greatly as moral change goes on from age to age, and in various lands. Certain of the greater virtues persist as ideal types, although the list of the cardinal virtues is not everywhere the same. Thus for Confucius the list included humanity (universal sympathy), justice, conformity, rectitude, and sincerity.

Justice.—In Plato's ethical system justice occupies the highest place, as the culmination of the virtues—temperance, courage, and wisdom—which stand in need of a co-ordinating principle. The individual virtues call for balance, order, self-control in the inner life of the person, whose talents enable him to do his best; these virtues anticipate the more social virtue, which is in essence virtue itself in human life as a whole. Virtue would indeed be self-regarding without justice as the enriching quality which discloses goodness in its true estate.

The original prompting toward virtue is due to the quickening of love, as we have seen in another chapter, not alone for the Beautiful and the True, but for the Good; not for friendship or completeness through ideal interchange between individuals and small groups alone,

but in the state as the realization of social virtue in its highest form. Whatever may be said concerning the details and methods of Plato's ideal state, his conception of justice as the crowning virtue is the productive principle of his idealism. This is not to be justice attained by sheer democracy or assumed equalities of capacity, character, and class-relationships; but justice according to wisdom, the rule of the best.

Aristotle's View.—Aristotle, starting with the nature of man as social, adds to the Platonic virtues of the individual such virtues as liberality, magnificence, highmindedness. The test, as in courage and temperance, is the mean between extremes of conduct in each case. Gentleness, friendliness, and truthfulness also find places in his enriched conception. Justice is the moral state which enables a man not only to intend but actually to do what is right or just; it is complete virtue in relation to one's neighbors, the one virtue which unqualifiedly seeks the good of others. Justice, thus defined, is not then a part of virtue but the whole; and the discussion of the larger relations of justice includes matters pertaining to politics, law, and the state in its ethical completeness. Aristotle significantly remarks that justice is difficult of attainment, as it consists not in actions alone but in a moral state.

Justice involves, for example, being faithful to the laws of the land, as well as in being fair in all one's dealings: the law-abiding person is just, and laws pronounce upon all subjects for the good of the community. He who is unjust is not only unfair but is neglectful of equality, indulges in excess or defect. Justice then is proportionate, and just conduct is a mean between committing and suffering injustice: to commit injustice is to have too much, to suffer it is to have too little. In actual social groups in various lands the conceptions of justice vary according to what is conventional, but there is everywhere "one naturally perfect polity."¹ Meanwhile it is, of course, impossible to pronounce upon human action with complete accuracy.

¹ *Ethics*, Bk. V, Chap. X.

The Scope of Justice.—If, with Plato, we hold that the realization of justice calls for the ideal state, we are concerned with the total situation as outlined in the *Republic*, with the program of Aristotle's *Ethics* as a whole, and his inquiries into existing states and constitutions. It is first a question of the moral order of powers within the individual, their full development and greatest use; and of the complete carrying out of the same ethical principles in every sphere of social activity, in education, the arts, the quest for truth, in ideas pertaining to the gods, and in political life in its highest sense. Justice in this scheme of the virtues occupies the place corresponding to righteousness in the Christian plan.

It has been remarked that failure to include justice is the greatest omission of early Christianity, but this criticism is no doubt due to failure to consider in what respects "justice" and "righteousness" are equivalent terms. The original differences were partly matters of application. The Greek ideal in general looked forward to the establishment of a bettered state on earth, while the Christian's interest centered for ages about salvation and the kingdom of heaven. To consider justice as the ideal for an earthly state is to inquire into inequality, poverty, oppression, the reasons for slavery, and all other conditions which impede the realization of the ideal. The struggle for justice has become the more intense with increase of conditions unfavorable to it. Hence, attention has been given more and more to social salvation here and now, rather than to individual salvation in the future life. The social virtues called for on earth spring from the needs and wants of people under given conditions, favorable and unfavorable. Thus justice is in a way negative. Seth suggests that justice be regarded as social virtue on its negative side, with its corresponding duty of freedom and equality; while on its positive side the virtue is benevolence, and the implied duty fraternity or brotherliness. "Whenever I do not repress another personality, but allow it room to develop, I am just to [that personality] . . . whenever I help another in the fulfillment of his moral task, I

exercise towards him the virtue of benevolence.”² Justice then as a relation between moral beings implies recognition of the *alter ego* in one’s fellowman, whom we should love as we do ourselves. Each man counts for one. In Kant’s terms, each man is an end in a kingdom of ends. Justice involves consideration of all the rights of man—life, freedom, property, the protection provided by law—although “rights” taken collectively are not the same as justice as the organizing principle. Ethically speaking, we are first of all concerned with justice as a cardinal virtue, not with such problems as a just law and its execution, a righteous government, or the administration of justice among the nations. Even in this restricted sense it is difficult to define the meaning of justice without putting the term in relation to such matters as equality, reciprocity, mutuality, service, fraternity; since it is essentially a question of righteousness in fullness of expression.

If we say that justice consists in granting to every man an autonomous control over his active powers, with the understanding that he shall not interfere with the same rights and privileges granted to other men,³ it then becomes a question of the divergent conceptions of rights and privileges. Hence the real problem of justice is that of reconciling the conflicting demands of individuals, and eventually the demands of states and nations, finally of the nations constituting the complete world-group.

Equality.—History shows that in the movement towards justice very much depends on the prevailing views of equality. Where the belief in natural inequality is a dogma, as in India, where the Brahmanic ethics is a matter of social grades, castes or classes, the development of moral conceptions will be remote from genuine equality and brotherhood as regarded in other lands.⁴ The result in India was a different moral code for each caste. In other nations, radical views concerning liberty, equality,

² *Op. cit.*, p. 273.

³ Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

⁴ Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

and fraternity have brought about great social upheavals in the endeavor after justice.

Although the implied conception of equality is essential to the conception of justice prevailing, equality has proved to be an extremely difficult term to define. In general it might be agreed that each man is to count as one; since human life is sacred, and every man should enjoy certain privileges of existence, food, shelter, protection, the right to enjoy fruits of his toil. "To each according to his need, from each according to his ability" would seem then to be the underlying principle. Justice might accordingly be defined as the realization of moral obligation with respect to such equality. A man ought then to regard the good of any other man as of equal intrinsic value with the good of any one else. Equal distribution of the good seems to be what is called for; and social justice is the principle on which the good is to be distributed, that is, with impartial treatment of the individual, due regard for the individual's needs and claims.⁵

Our study of conceptions of the good has shown the difficulty of any quantitative standard, for example, in the effort to define the good as pleasure or happiness, to develop a calculus of pleasures, and maintain, with Bentham, that it is question of the greatest happiness of the greatest number: "everybody to count for one and nobody for more than one." Insurmountable difficulties have been encountered by those who have proposed equal distribution of money or other material wealth, equal distribution of the rewards of labor on the basis of manual labor as the test, or any leveling scheme; for moral matters are questions of quality, individuality, differences in type, kinds of service, diversity of needs. The "equality of opportunity" demanded by those who have set up a socialistic standard, founded on a materialistic interpretation of history, has turned out to be opportunity to enjoy the results of material success, with almost entire neglect of the inner life.

⁵ Cf. Rashdall, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 185.

Natural Equality.—It was once readily assumed that “all men are born free and equal,” that is, substantially and potentially equal, physically and mentally. As matter of fact, men are born markedly unequal, in ancestry, parentage, hereditary equipment in all its phases; in environmental conditions, and the opportunities which successive social situations afford; and all their life is spent in inequality. The point of view has so changed since social differences were inquired into that inequality has been called “nature’s inexorable law.” For neither in living nor in dying is there equality. “The infinite variety of nature” is, however, the truer phrase.⁶ The law of variation is not the same as a law of inequality. The idea of inequality was not suggested by nature but by study of human society. Psychology has been forcing home the fact of native inequalities by pointing to individual differences in sense-types,⁷ and more recently by the application of intelligence tests to bring out the native differences in intelligence. The significant fact is that no two men are precisely equal in capacity or intelligence, and that the native equipment has so wide a range that mental differences rather than supposed identities are the direct clues: differences in equipment mean differences in selecting occupations all along the line, differences in efficiency, production, execution, choice of opportunities, selection of mates, response to environment, and adoption of types of belief. We are scarcely born equal in helplessness, innocence, or even in ignorance.

Spiritual Equality.—It is said indeed that we are equal before God, who is “no respecter of persons,” whose mercy falls upon all without partiality. But this equality in the divine presence has been interpreted to mean “equality of consideration,” and the matters to be brought before the divine tribunal would differ with the individual. “Common fellowship with Christ” is another way of stating the possibility of spiritual union in which all shall count as one. In this sense we are ideally “members one of an-

⁶ Cf. I. W. Howerth, *The Scientific Monthly*, Nov., 1924.

⁷ See H. C. Warren, *Elements of Human Psychology*, 1922, p. 373.

other," and the ideal of "the beloved community" is the perfect type of brotherhood. By contrast we are reminded that while "equality before the law" is a widely-recognized principle, in practice it is difficult to secure equal consideration. Equality of political rights has not readily followed from the affirmation that we are equal before God and in the eyes of the law. Man does not find himself counting as one only, in the economic world. Even in communistic schemes designed to secure justice, the idea of equality has usually been approached from the point of view of earthly needs, not with reference to heaven. Capitalism as a materialistic scheme has been opposed by another materialistic scheme, not to secure justice in terms of equality but by the abolition of rights which are said to have been greedily grasped by promoters of the great industries of the world. The cry, "Liberty, Freedom, and Equality," signified, "Down with oppression." The quest has been for a corrective of natural or unmerited inequalities, not for realization of spiritual equality on earth. It has seemed impossible to win what has been called equality, that is, freedom for working classes, by equal distribution of goods which have different values for different persons at various times. Meanwhile there has been persistent ignoring of the fact that value is the moral consideration, hence a neglect of the one direction in which to look for hope. Inequality has often been socially beneficial, but this seems to be an unpleasant fact. The obvious thing, granted spiritual equality as the only sort of equality we may take for granted, would be to inquire into individual capacities and endeavor to attain perfect adjustment between fitness and vocation on an *ethical basis*.

Proportionality.—Willoughby has suggested that we should turn from the notion of equality to proportionality, or reward according to labor wrought. This brings us in sight of the ethical goal, namely, the ideal of moral worth in any occupation with reference not merely to external standards but to effort put forth, the changes brought about in character, the goals won through constancy of purpose in meeting the adverse conditions of labor. For work

differs in quality more than in quantity. It is a question of the type of work, the thought and effort required, the kind of skill, and of many other matters which have never been successfully measured by any standard of manual efficiency, time-schedules, or any scheme of work adopted by labor unions to regulate quality by quantity. Moral rewards are not assigned by any leveling scheme. Merit does not depend upon the number of hours or on any purely external test. The man who understands life's situation from a moral point of view expects consequences rather than rewards, that is, fruits of character, earned results, deserved reactions; he does not expect a reward for duty, as rewards are understood in the world, although he may be pleased to receive recognition. Thus a man would reasonably expect a material reward which bears relation to moral effort, a reward for his labors in proportion to his native ability, skill, the difficulties and intensities involved. There appears to be no common measure applicable all along the line, and even the idea of proportionality would fall short at some point. But where obscurity or complexity meets us when we regard the problem of labor externally, clear light is discoverable within. If "every individual is under moral obligation to employ his talents to their full extent for the benefit of humanity," as Willoughby maintains,⁸ the moral principle is the starting-point; and we have every reason for anticipating failure only, when material or quantitative standards are applied as if they embraced all factors.

Opportunity.—By "equality of opportunity" we might then rightfully mean freedom to know our type and develop into adequate self-expression. Opportunity is a moral consideration. Man approaches it equipped by heredity, good or bad; helped or hindered by environment; defeated, encouraged, or benefited by education or training according to his knowledge, the use made of native abilities, the effort put forth; and according to his powers of selection, influenced by his prevailing beliefs, for example, the acceptance of a materialistic interpretation of

⁸ W. W. Willoughby, *Social Justice*, 1900, p. 197.

history. The proposition, "to each according to his needs," would therefore, cover a wide range. "To each according to his ability" would involve other knowledge of native abilities than even the latest psychological methods of measurement have been able to disclose. A man may "need" a loaf of bread, or may need to learn the fact and meaning of inequality in the social order. It has been remarked that the most loudly voiced wants are not always the most urgent needs. The right to subsistence is granted to those who will work. In any situation we expect a man to "know his opportunity." Man is neither primarily a unit among equal units, a manual laborer, an economic agent, or a soldier in the vocational world; he is a moral being, called upon to face the situation as it is, however many unsolved problems of social justice there may be.

Equality and Justice.—An initial difficulty in seeking knowledge of justice is due then to conflict between two standards, as stated by Rashdall: (1) the idea that every human being is of equal intrinsic value, and is therefore entitled to respect; and (2) the conviction that the good ought to be preferred to the bad, that is, that men ought to be rewarded according to their goodness or according to their work.⁹ The first conception implies equality, the second just recompense. Bentham's doctrine concerning the distribution of happiness exemplifies the first of these standards, and the objection is that an equal distribution of good diminishes the amount of good to be distributed. There is no concrete tangible thing, or even specific liberty of action or acquisition to which every individual has a right under all circumstances. No right of man is unconditional save the *right to consideration*.¹⁰ If it were a question of equality of opportunity every state would need to supply the child with an equally good mother, and equal educational opportunities for the dunce and the genius. But if liberty of action actually implies *inequality*, if some inequality is a condition of well-being, the maxim should

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 223.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

be: "Every man's good to count as equal to *the like good* of every other man."¹¹

It is then *just recompense*, not equality that people seek: to every man according to his merit, to every man according to his work. If this principle is interpreted from an economic point of view the problem arises; How shall the quality or amount be determined? But if *the value of persons* is understood to be the test, then, indeed justice prescribes that "we should aim at bestowing equal good on equal capacity," and some sacrifice of the individual to the whole will be prescribed by the just claims of the majority.¹²

The Self-determining Individual.—Leighton expresses the ideal end of justice, as it has been clarified through the historical process, as follows: "the progressive discovery and recognition of the right of every normal human being to be treated as a *self-determining individual, as a rational self*, free and responsible. . . . Thus the dynamic principle in the evolution of the concept of justice is the emergence and universalization of the ideal of *moral personality*. The development of the idea of legal responsibility, as dependent upon choice or moral responsibility, and of equality before the law, and the doctrine of the inalienable rights of man, are all expressions of this central principle."¹³ The advance in recognizing individual liberty keeps step with the ideas of justice. Liberty is definable as "the sphere or scope of the exercise of individual freedom, of self-direction in society, in so far as such exercise is compatible with the exercise of a like freedom on the part of all the other members of society." One limitation has been removed after another. The modern industrial system still greatly hinders man in the exercise of economic self-determination or freedom, and man's spiritual liberty is also greatly hampered by economic serfdom. The demand today for fuller opportunity indicates the trend toward a fuller measure of economic liberty to be gained in the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 240; see summary, p. 241.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 268.

¹³ *The Field of Philosophy*, p. 508.

future. A fair opportunity "to become and live as a full and free moral agent is the logical sequence of justice and liberty."¹⁴ Opportunity, ethically speaking, does not then mean absolute economic equality, but so much opportunity as a man can use. We have yet to attain a constant relation between the economic status into which a man is born and his congenital abilities. "Social progress will depend chiefly on the degree in which the economic life of society is so ordered that the individual shall have full opportunity to develop and exercise his native abilities. To say that such is the case now is to be false to the facts. Here is the heart of the social problem. Social institutions should be organized so as to remove, as far as possible, hindrances to the development of personality due to economic handicaps, thus leaving free play to the natural and uncontrollable source of individuality and inequality, the *reproductive* process, which is a *re-creative* process."¹⁵

Good Fortune.—From the moral point of view a man can not fall back on the easy-going assumption that some are lucky, fortunate in birth, surroundings, and opportunities; while others, born into adverse conditions, have no chance, as if this assumption covered the whole ground. For there is always the factor of consciousness, of the use made of opportunities, favorable or unfavorable, as well as the factor of intelligence or native capacity. The uncritical assumption is that some are "under the law," whatever that phrase may mean; while others are born "free." The unfortunate in the slums are no more "under the law" than any one else. Injustice is a social condition, not a cosmic situation, not the fault of life, of the moral order of the universe. As a natural being every man is subject to causal sequences, and is so far a precise product of the environmental and ancestral conditions which went before. Unable to "begin with our grandparents," we start, one and all, with nature and nurture. The "lucky" people of the world are not those who, born amidst luxury,

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 509.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 510.

are "free" because others toil for them. Not exemption from work, but persistent work with a purpose carried through to attainment characterizes the fortunate. The true rationalist no longer seeks something for nothing, or more than he deserves and labors for. The degree of equality or inequality, justice or injustice depends to a large extent on the social group, the state of enlightenment and advancement, the period of history. Each man begins with the capital which his experience yields him, and squanders or spends it according to the way he takes his opportunity. Each works through social conditions, favorable and unfavorable. Externally, there may appear to be little correspondence between what a man takes himself to be, wills to be, and thinks he ought to have; and what he finds himself possessing. But man's true measure is moral, hence internal. He has rights in the inner life as a moral being which no external organization ever granted him. He can be true to what he judges to be right, can accept responsibility, refrain from blaming others for what he did himself; he can *look to himself*, come to judgment, even though justice is not meted out in the law-courts of his community, and whether or not he is blamed. As a moral being he is less interested to have his rights vindicated through civil proceedings (distributive and corrective justice) than to manifest fairness, equity, impartiality, honesty in all his dealings; and this because for him justice in the last analysis is uprightness or rectitude, virtue itself.¹⁶

Benevolence.—In English ethics, benevolence received special recognition through emphasis on the moral sentiments in contrast with reason as the guide to virtue. Indeed, disinterested benevolence was said to be the essence or basis of virtue. Hutcheson held that there is "a benevolent universal instinct." Butler contended however that benevolence is no more disinterested than other moral affections, although most of the virtues imply this love of the neighbor: conscience in any event is above all the

¹⁶ Cf. Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 414.

moral sentiments, encouraging man to benevolence to the greatest extent. Adam Smith found the basis of all the altruistic sentiments in sympathy. Pity or compassion is the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, while sympathy enlivens joy and alleviates grief. Generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship, and esteem belong together in Smith's conception of the social and benevolent affections. The test is the sympathy of the impartial spectator. Through sympathy one adopts the principle or point of view of the agent, and moves in spirit with the affections which influence the agent's conduct, as well as beating time to the gratitude felt for personal benefits. Thus, eventually "we endeavor to examine our own conduct as we imagine any fair and impartial spectator would examine it."¹⁷

Some have maintained that the altruistic impulse was originally as blind as the egoistic. It is rational insight into the good of another which enables the doer of good works to avoid "unwise kindness," to discern and love the neighbor's true good instead of loving and trying to serve him in a general way. Brotherly sympathy enables one to appreciate another's task. Sympathy in active expression, avoiding self-sacrifice on the assumption that it is a good because it is a sacrifice, should seek the other's greater social good, a good which is not likely to conflict with the good of the agent. The use of the terms "disinterested," "impartial spectator," on the part of moralists who emphasize the sentiments, is a tacit admission that reason is the complementary principle. The impartial spectator might indeed be identified with the agent who, accepting Kant's ethical principle, wills that the conduct which he judges acceptable shall become a universal law. So benevolence has been defined as "the promotion of the maximum social good without reference to the question of its distribution."¹⁸ Plainly, benevolence is not to be identified with either the pleasure of the agent or the happiness of the recipient. Pleasure may indeed be an element of

¹⁷ *The Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, Part III, Chap. I.

¹⁸ Rashdall, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 185.

the anticipation, as happiness may result from doing for another what is not primarily done to promote his happiness. The "considerate benevolence" and "reasonable self-love" once put in antithesis have come to be regarded as aspects of a common good.¹⁹ It is significant that the use of the term benevolence, and to some extent the terms philanthropy and charity have given place to the word "service," as indicating a union of kindly motives with knowledge of social situations and wisdom in meeting them.

Charity.—The Christian term charity may be taken as typical of terms which have come to represent various social virtues in the light of criticism. Charity in the larger sense includes (1) righteous judgment; (2) sympathy with another's needs and point of view; (3) a prompting to service, aided by the best available knowledge or wisdom; (4) love, as the term was later used in place of charity, as the greatest gift. The whole field of Christian activity is included, from the stage of the soliciting monk, dependent on funds and food secured by begging from door to door, to the high degree of organization of today, when one is expected to contribute to numerous philanthropies or community chest funds.

Charity long ago ceased then to be almsgiving in general or mere liberality in relieving the wants of others, but has come to be regarded in the light of motive and intention, according to one's view of the social order and one's moral ideal. This virtue may now be said to rest more in the attitude or spirit than to depend on the deed. We expect our fellowmen to take this attitude toward us in any situation where the frailties of human nature enter in. We realize that people expect righteous judgment of us. Charity is an *ideal* calling for increased effort to know one another to the foundation and understand the conditions under which we live; the spirit which quickens the best in others, which believes the best even when appearances are conflicting.

By allegiance to this standard emotions of the sympa-

¹⁹ Green, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

thetic type may be lifted from the level of impulse to the plane of deeds done for the real or lasting benefit of others. By charity we mean unselfishness and benevolence fostered or modified by wisdom. The intellectual element involves considerateness, the emotional includes what we call "the heart," while the will is expressed in the endeavor "to do something about it," not to pass by on the other side. There is widespread agreement, so far as the attitude or spirit is concerned; differences come in a social group or institution adopting various methods of classification and investigation from other departments. In practice, charity calls for that union of "faith" with "works" which keeps the human spirit alive amidst numberless tendencies toward crystallization. Charity in the sense of purity of heart may well yield the dynamic which so quickens the personality that the one who serves never becomes a mere "agent" of the charities, never forgets the higher service which may accompany or crown the material deed. Indeed, charity might be defined as purity of heart or love in wise activity.

The Good Life.—Charity brings love into expression, not alone by wishing well to the neighbor, but by making faith concrete so that a mutual good is established. It has been well said that the quality of our faith is known from our charity, that there is "a life of charity" in which the objects of faith and love become one. In such conduct lesser motives, such as pity, sympathy, mercy are transfigured, and need not be specified. By common consent, charity as an attitude atones for many a failing in lesser matters. When we know a man's heart as shown in his deeds of mercy, we believe that we have begun to know him in very truth. And so in our day to "live the good life" has become a test of genuineness where all signs had become doubtful so far as allegiance to creed and institution were concerned. The good life in this sense is the moral life, and it is compatible with various forms of faith; it indicates what a man really loves and is, in contrast with what he is reputed to be. The world has tried other tests of what a man is said truly to be: it (1) has put knowledge

first; (2) emphasized the bestowing of all one's goods to feed the poor; (3) sought faith apart from works, salvation as an end in itself. In contrast, the only test which does not fall short is: *wisdom quickened by love* (charity).

Prompted by charity, we never celebrate the fall of our adversary, but give him the benefit of the doubt; we attain the affirmative attitude in full, on the ground that "to know all is to forgive all." Hence it has been said that when there is love, there is a way. Love in this enlightened sense might indeed be said to be virtue itself: righteous judgment in thought and attitude, and wisdom in its manifestation. Hence it might also be said that man does not really love when "self" is his incentive: he exists, he struggles, *trying* to control events and things. What passes for love in the world is passion, selfishness, organized self-interest, fondness for power, desire to rule. These motives make for separateness, but love makes for conjunction, manifests itself so that it not only may bring love in return but inspire love as the universal motive.

Summary.—The social virtues imply the whole field of the individual's life in relation to the social order in which he lives. The individual virtues prepare him, progressively, to find his place among the groups with which he is brought in contact, as he discovers his talents, is enlightened by social contacts, and helped to find the sphere in which he can become most fully productive. The ideal in view from a very early period is justice, and justice is essentially social. But, as justice implies social virtue itself in all its fullness, what appeared to be simple proves highly complex; and problems relating to equality, freedom, fraternity, and opportunity are brought forward for solution. Each of these matters pertains to the economic situation, as surely as to the moral, and for many the question of economic adjustment is the central problem. Ethically speaking, the problem of justice centers about the discovery, enlightenment, and gradual freeing of the self-determining individual, who is in process of finding himself amidst conditions more or less adverse. There would be no social problem if every man enjoyed oppor-

tunities essential to his complete self-expression as an organic member of society. But inequalities of the social situation afford opportunity for pity, sympathy, benevolence, charity, service, love; hence for brotherhood, moral coöperation in realizing the ideals of the social order. The social virtues are not to be understood apart from either the environmental conditions in which they are progressively manifested or the inner conditions amidst which the individual gradually comes to know and to realize his true selfhood. Accordingly, we have still to consider other principles which aid us in the study of the social virtues.

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CHAPTER XXII

THE SPHERE OF ALTRUISM

Giving.—It is often assumed that a prevailing motive in the world is the only defensible motive, namely, to be on the alert to secure possessions, money, position, influence. Hence it is said that a man should put his own interests first, taking care not to be cheated, making sure that he will have a return for everything done. Then, if opportunity offers by the way, or later in life, one may indulge in philanthropy. That is to say, egoism is to be the real motive, whatever the plea for altruism, as established by ethical theory or sustained by religious conviction; and the secondary values are to be, for practical purposes, primary. To acquire, to store up, and to be prepared to defend one's possessions, seems indeed to be the first law of social life.

Meanwhile, the ideal that we should seek first *to give*, not because we have received, or measure for measure, but out of the treasure of the heart, with giving as the highest motive, in love toward God and the neighbor—this ideal has never been fully believed by great numbers of people. To give something to every man who asks, even when in giving we practice so-called non-resistance, as if tempting a man to take advantage of us, would seem to be the height of folly. When we need more, the customary way is to demand or take more. Even when we bestow gifts, we are apt to qualify by tacit reference to a theory of compensation. Since self-interest appears to be the prevalent motive, since no one seems to be prompted by love toward the neighbor, there appears to be no value even in an attempt to give rather than to get.

The Mechanisms of Giving.—Yet morally speaking, as we have seen, individual needs are inseparable from social

needs; hence when one needs more, one might at least try the experiment of giving more. In giving there is power, large-mindedness. Giving rather than self-sacrifice is the positive idea to put over against self-interest. It is commonly admitted that "true self-sacrifice never knows itself to be sacrifice." I should not then make self-sacrifice my conscious aim, but I may rightfully make devotion to the good of others by means of the best I can give my purpose in life.

What one is bidden to do, instead of adopting passive resistance as a rule of life, is to give that which is of greater worth, namely, peace, forgiveness, love, even though one is tempted to return an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. Our great difficulty has been that giving is not *organized* as getting is. It lacks the mechanisms which are employed with such skill in the art of getting, keeping, insuring, guarding, and fighting for. Giving on a greater scale will come, not alone through general appeals to people to live at peace; but by understanding the psychology of giving. For it is already admitted that a man's best gifts are what he gives of or from himself. The psycho-physical organism is already a mechanism for giving.

Gifts.—(1) The truest gift is made "out of the abundance of the heart," because I am prompted to contribute from my store of possessions, such as truth, knowledge essential to the art of living, music, instruction, work for the welfare of the community. Such a gift may be called forth from me because I realize the needs of people whom I know. Or I may be prompted to give in general, with the hope that what I thus give will reach those who can best profit by it. There is likely to be affinity between giver and recipients, when I give most to individuals who most need the wisdom which life has taught me. When I give in such wise, I also receive. Giving indeed in a way supersedes itself and involves the values of altruism in its highest forms.¹

¹ Cf. G. H. Palmer, *Altruism, Its Nature and Varieties*, 1919, p. 36.

(2) But giving is also by explicit adaptation to the assured needs of others who, by being benefited, will benefit the community.² Thus I may give articles of my own possession, pleasures which I divert from myself to another, and opportunities for growth which I bestow even at my own cost.³ It is a question of gradually acquired foresight, knowledge of the neediest cases, the moral claims of those most directly related to or dependent on me; and of the limitations of gifts in so far as they are exceptional, irrational, and condescending.⁴ Altruistic giving, separated from personal gain and established as an independent principle for the guidance of our conduct, is not possible. A strong egoistic sense is rightfully a condition of altruistic conduct. Higher than the intrinsic worth of the gift is the expression it makes of the giver's will, his attitude, or "heart." So, once more, we turn from the lesser activity to the greater and find that love is the completest ground of giving and receiving. "Where love is there is no superior or inferior, no giver or receiver. The two make up a conjunct self with mutual gain."⁵

The Ideal Neighbor.—It is commonly agreed that the ideal neighbor is the one who is kind, hospitable, outgoing in attitude, speech and manners; one who practices the Golden Rule. He is the Good Samaritan, the one who actually does the deed which others merely contemplate or talk about. Again, the ideal neighbor is the one who is considerate, unprejudiced, dispassionate; the one to whom we go for sympathy, advice, help in times of sickness, conference concerning the good of the community. You may also go to him with adverse criticism, to free your system. The true neighbor is human, and regards you as human, whatever your beliefs, social situation, vocation, or religious creed. You may go to him to give out of your abundance, without thought of reward. Neighborliness is a real test of character, unselfishness, faith, freedom, wisdom, love.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 40. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57, foll.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

It is the universal element in you which enables you to be a true neighbor. So, too, you see the universal element in your neighbor, loving with all lovers, loving all children, succoring all suffering. You love your neighbor because of the manifestation of God in him, you are prompted to give because of the God in you. Hence it has been said that "God is the neighbor," God made concrete, incarnated. There is then a divine kinship, the ideal neighbor is the true friend; ideal neighborliness is brotherhood. To help another through wise charity we ask: What is the divine good in him? What is the best or greater good needed by him? This is his spiritual benefit. It may mean bringing him to himself. A heart-to-heart talk may disclose this greatest need. The neighbor may call out from you the guidance he needs. Sometimes then those to whom we are drawn by an inner affinity are much closer to us than those whom we try to find by aid of a social organization.

Service.—The social virtues imply in brief what we call in our day "service." The individual virtues are presupposed, also a degree of special training so that one may fit into some organized activity and give one's best. The leader in social service work may indeed be better equipped in economics, the principles and methods of the charities, than in psychology, ethics, and insight into the moral life. Much will depend on the emphasis, whether on external social conditions to be ameliorated, or on the inner life needing bettered expression through improved environmental conditions. Ethically speaking, the previous chapters have prepared us to see that the starting-point is the inter-dependence of members of society as participants in groups, giving and receiving, mutually contributory, with social self-realization as the ideal. The individuals served and being served are of varied capacities, unequal in manifold respects, relatively independent, self-determining, yet also no less mutually dependent. The term "mutualism" is frequently used in this connection: "an economy of mutual service and mutual sacrifice on the part of all its members."⁶ The ideal of moral association with

⁶ Cf. C. A. Ellwood, *Christianity and Social Service*, p. 88.

one another would then be "equality of service rendered." Hence Ellwood defines social justice as "such a balance and equality in the services and sacrifices which the members of a group render to one another in order to live together that all are benefited either in proportion to the service they render, or at least in proportion to their ability to receive."⁷ This implies adjustment between the contributive and the possessive attitudes, such that giving shall take precedence over getting. The illusions of the "lust of possession" must be understood at last. Ellwood regards "the economy of self-interest" or the possessive pattern as a pagan survival, while the contributing attitude involves not only giving but creating. This accords with our conclusion that in the moral ideal there is always a place for the creative element. It finds an adequate place also for love defined as "a valuing of, and a devotion to, persons rather than things"; or as "a social attitude of unselfish, passionate devotion to the welfare of others."⁸

Reciprocity.—The essence of justice has sometimes been regarded as reciprocity, understood to mean equable return. Confucius made this idea central in his formulation of the Golden Rule: "What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others." That is, each individual is to do his proper part in the relationships of daily life. Again, reciprocity has been taken to mean recompensing others for what they have done for you, with the paying of all one's social debts. More profoundly, reciprocity is said to imply a law of compensation in human relationships in their entirety, a law of action and reaction such that deeds done signify the rebound of experience for experience. The moral order is then regarded as a system of inter-related deeds which, by accumulation, yield results after their kind. "As a man soweth, so shall he also reap." In the case of Buddhism, the accumulated deeds determine one's future till these deeds have achieved their fruition and have given place to yet other deeds: the working out of one's past deeds so that there shall be recompense is the

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 116, 117.

great reason for reincarnation. Justice as thus regarded would be a kind of mechanical adjustment in precise correspondence to deeds done.

Compensation.—But this idea of eventual readjustment according to one's character or deeds has also been held by peoples who do not believe in the necessity of re-birth. Thus Emerson refers to a justice which "executes itself," each man receiving what he deserves by a principle which nothing can defeat.⁹ The objection to this view as sometimes understood is that it substitutes an easily assumed optimism for the needed investigation of social conditions. In fact, it ignores the problem of injustice, denies that injustice actually exists.

Reciprocity would involve something more than a recompense of like reactions for like deeds, or their equivalent in terms of mechanical compensation. There is a higher motive than to act toward my neighbor as I would have him act in return. If I give, I am likely to receive, but not by a principle of mechanical adjustment. There is indeed what Emerson calls a law of compensation, and a man does indeed reap if he sows; but in the full context of Emerson's moral idealism this principle means far more than mechanical reciprocity.¹⁰ What Emerson teaches is that "You can not do wrong without suffering wrong. . . . Men suffer all their life long, under the foolish superstition that they can be cheated. But it is as impossible for a man to be cheated by anyone but himself, as for a thing to be and not to be at the same time." That is to say, "we are begirt by laws which execute themselves," hence "none of us can wrong the universe." The conclusion which follows from this teaching is adaptation to the forces of the moral order, with recognition of the truth that our own conduct is decisive; that nothing is to be won without effort; but that the moral universe is to be depended on to reward man according to his efforts. "Life invests itself with inevitable conditions which the unwise seek to dodge."

⁹ *Essays*, First Series.

¹⁰ See "Spiritual Laws," "Self-reliance," "The Over-soul."

Participation.—It is a question then of putting the truth in the principle of compensation in its proper setting, without dwelling too emphatically on the mechanical law of cause and effect. Our study of ethical values has shown us that the principle of action and reaction as a descriptive law is not sufficient to account for the moral order of experiences. If it were, I might indeed serenely fold my hands and wait for justice to execute itself, and for all wrongs to right themselves. The moral principle is everywhere founded in the concrete deeds of daily life. I am called upon to meet the needs of people precisely as they are now conditioned. I ought, of course, to help them to see the compensations which life yields, sooner or later. But if I am a Good Samaritan, I do not impassively stand apart in sublime trust that the compensations will be great. I take a hand and do my part as if the present deed were the one great act to be done. For there is another principle to be put with this idea of reciprocity, namely, the truth that while interiorly we are open to a universal Life which seeks to bestow what is right upon all by a law of compensation, exteriorly we are conditioned by inequalities and maladjustments (it is through these that we have our experience). In other words, while my inner life may indeed correspond point by point with a universal compensating principle, my outer life is more or less out of correspondence. Hence, as innocent, I may suffer with the guilty, as zealous for truth, I may suffer from the mal-treatment accorded truth-lovers in this world.

Mutuality.—The term mutuality may be said to fulfill the higher meanings of reciprocity. Mutuality is defined by Palmer as "the recognition of another and myself as inseparable elements of one another, each being essential to the welfare of each. . . . Even Jesus did not seek simply to give, but to induce in those to whom he gave a similar disposition. Rightly is it counted higher than simple giving, including, as it does, all which that contains and more."¹¹ In partnership of the higher sort, for example, common interest supersedes private control. So, too, this

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

principle is realized in clubs and other organizations where the members also recognize themselves as members one of another. Commerce too may have this deep ethical ground, with widespread ethical opportunities, coöperation being as essential to it as competition.¹² By mutuality in its highest relations is to be understood, love, as "familiar yet mysterious," potent in developing the best that is in us; with both egoism and altruism given ample room, that is, the wish to be loved and the love which brings return.¹³ Love in the sense of mutuality then is definable as "the joint service of a common life."

Love as a Motive.—We have already noted that the highest moral life follows from love rather than from a sense of duty. Professor Palmer calls emphatic attention to this fact by saying that love has "a strange aversion to duty. Any suspicion that we are expected to love a certain person alienates us from him. We can not force ourselves to love even when we see it to be desirable; nor can we expel love when we find it unreturned or unworthy. Love insists on freedom, a certain absence of constraint, either from a person, from circumstance, from collateral advantages, or even from our own volition. Like giving, it recognizes no claim. . . . It can not be bought or sold. But though so little submissive to obligation, it is highly sensitive to suggestion and clamorous appeal. Indeed, it soon perishes when fresh suggestion is withheld. Indirectly, therefore, and accepting time for an ally, we can control love."¹⁴

Love and Justice.—According to this view of the moral life, only when "the conjunct self" has taken the place of the separate self is altruism completely realized. Yet there is a qualification even here. For love is selective. It chooses one and leaves another, is exercised only toward definite persons, a little group, preferably two persons, and the smaller the group the warmer the love; while altruism is supposed to permeate life as a whole. We are

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

led by this consideration to the idea of justice, once more. Ethically speaking, justice is the highest principle to be considered, that is, justice as "noble public love." Such love is made universal, is freed from selection, and from the restrictions of knowledge, circumstance, and temperament on which choice is based. Justice seeks to benefit all alike, disinterestedly. Hence, the main work of justice is its "equal distribution of advantage and its insistence that each individual shall be faithful to what he undertakes for the benefit of all."¹⁵

To accept this view as complete, however, is to be mindful of the truth frequently insisted on in the foregoing, namely, that no general principle is adequate by itself. Virtue for justice's sake would be as general as duty for duty's sake. In the last analysis it is love which makes justice complete, despite the qualifications which enter into the ethical conception of love. It is love for this particular form of social service in which one is engaging, this great work to be done, these persons with whom one is associated which makes justice definite and effective.

The Concrete Universal.—The road is from the particular to the universal. The mother's love for her own babe, as the selective expression of her motherhood, brings love for other babes. All mankind "loves a lover" because all mankind begins by loving a person through whom one comes to love *love*. The lover may indeed love an ideal at first, rather than a particular person, and may be disappointed to find that the ideal is not identified with the person. But love yields its intuition of what love in essence is by being selective before it generalizes. We begin even in youth to have ideals of love, through identification of love with parent, sister, brother, friend. If we ever in later life become for the most part dispassionate, serving any one in need, as in war-time, the greater love which thus prompts us to a life of constant devotion to the good of others is quickened in us by the power of example, or because we have first been deeply touched by one or two individuals. And so in general we come to see that ethical

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

principles always receive their verification from experience: the true universal is concrete.

Ethical Love.—The subject of love in its fullness belongs to literature and religion. But there are problems for every one who, seeking to do what is right in all relationships, is constrained at times to limit the expressions of love. The love of a husband for one wife is typical; since marriage involves fidelity, the will to make the given marriage-relation complete, in contrast with temptations due to the subtleties of human affections as a whole. Love among friends exemplifies mutuality, with ideals of sincerity and loyalty, and in most instances such affection develops spontaneously, so that there may be no limit put upon the expressions of affection. But with marriage come many obligations and relationships calling for the highest standard of constancy in the whole of human life.

Marriage.—As ethical, marriage is indeed a standard of judgment by which to measure the whole sphere of duties in our complex relationships within the family, and in the community, enlarging into one's place in the world. Emphasis belongs on devotion, rather than on the self-sacrifices of married life. Either husband or wife might long remain in subjection to the other, if self-sacrifice were uncritically accepted as the rule. To the degree that devotion to love in the home prevails and in the forms of service which correlate the home and the world, the various adjustments may be conceived in positive terms, as willing acts of dedication. In marriage there may be the fullest measure of self-realization through the fullest measure of productivity, that is, through the granting of freedom, through recognition of individuality, and encouragement given to creative work.

Marriage is inevitably selective, and in its earlier stages it may limit unduly; but this is incidental to larger self-discovery and mutual helpfulness. It can become an ideal union of the best elements in the moral life—if it be regarded as existing for development, not alone for pleasure, or happiness—so that each partner shall give the best to the world. It is this element of mutual understanding,

fostered by talking matters over thoughtfully as they occur, which makes marriage more than a "success." Married life affords the supreme opportunity for the mastery of selfishness. Hence it should be known for what it gives, not for what it takes. It has ample room for ideal friendship, for the perfect instance of mutuality; and the attainment of many-sided expression through wide contrasts of differing types, each partner appreciating yet in due measure restraining the other. Nothing is "too good to be true," too ideal to anticipate from such mutuality. Indeed, it is lack of moral faith or ethical idealism which has characterized some marriages as failures when love seemed to be present in large measure. While love is indeed leader and inspirer in married life, it is wisdom which first follows, then guides; hence love and wisdom belong together as the true basis of marriage. When love is united with wisdom in each, then the two who are married may also be united in love-wisdom. This union of love with wisdom in the innermost of man is one of the great secrets of the moral universe, admitting us into the heart of the divine nature. The duties of parents to children and of children to parents will be very differently regarded, if this profound spirit of love united with wisdom prevails in the home.

Friendship.—It is widely recognized that ties of blood are often less strong than those of friendship; hence that men and women seek associates with whom there are mutual sympathies, interests, and kindly recognition of differences in type. Thus in a group of young friends there will be seen the sharpest contrasts in temperament coupled with the most delightful give-and-take, the helpful criticisms being softened by a courtesy sometimes lacking in other social groups. One may be a singer, finely constituted, contemplative; another a pianist, eminently practical in type, as well as artistic; a third, quiet, inclined to be reticent, but extremely studious, with high ideals; a fourth, excellent in conversation, possessing insight and marked executive ability; a fifth, a teacher in preparation, thoughtful, very companionable; and a sixth an artist and

writer, versatile and joyous. If there is any tendency to excessive merry-making in the group, this may be offset by the stabilizing presence of those who are more quiet; tendencies to be too practical are countered by idealistic sentiments; the less communicative may be helped into expression by those who excel in conversation; and what actuates the group in arriving at mutual decisions will usually be an articulation of what the Quakers call "the spirit of the meeting." No member may manage or even seek to manage any other too much. Ethical questions may never be mentioned, or even thought of, until it becomes a question of choosing a vocation or helping some one in the group wisely to choose a partner in marriage. Then the mutuality which has grown up spontaneously, amidst the greatest freedom, not at all self-conscious, may be quickened into an ideal instance of the type of goodness for which we have been pleading.

In such mutuality there is give-and-take without thought of return, with no explicit reference to reciprocity as a principle; hence there may be no awareness of obligation save so far as loyalty is concerned, the sincerity and fidelity to a high standard without which there can be no intimate friendship. Yet, to the ethical onlooker, eager to find ideal standards exemplified, here is an embodiment of those principles which are most essential to peace and good-will in the world. Granted such groups, brought together through mutual interests, and becoming aware of the deep meaning of their relationships, this mutuality might conceivably be extended throughout the world.

The Implications of Friendship.—Ever since groups of men, interested in knowledge and virtue, gathered about Socrates in Athens, ethical philosophers have turned to friendship in actual life as yielding unsurpassed expression of the moral ideal; and both Plato and Aristotle assigned a very important place to friendship. Even the Christian term "brotherhood" is likely to be inferior, unless the principle on which friendship at its best comes about, is first made explicit; for it is said to be a duty to regard all men as brothers, while friendship springs from real

affinity. The serious problems of life enter into the account in so far as we permit ourselves in thought, attitude, and conduct to drop down from the level of friendship—standing apart in criticism and condemnation, taking advantage of one another, scheming, deceiving, fighting. To “do things together,” to pursue the Beautiful, the True, and the Good in friendly interchange, as people young and old do in college, is indeed to realize an ideal which by implication is capable of development without limit, scarcely needing the formalities by which, later in life, we hedge ourselves about, becoming remote from one another, partisans where we might have been co-workers, sectarians where we should have been Christians.

The gain is very great when such a social relationship, implicitly ethical, becomes explicitly so; for life is apt to exceed theory, and to come nearer an exemplification of the perfect ideal. Granted the realization of what a friendship group implies, there may then be an extension of the kind of deeds which it yields, just as groups of boy scouts and girl scouts, acquiring ideal principles among the faithful, begin to extend these by doing at least one act of kindness each day. Only gradually does it dawn upon us that here and there in such groups there is an actual realization of what the ideal kingdom is meant to be in the greatest way. Where everybody helps and everybody works, there is true coöperation, and the leader of such a group (at once young and old) is the one whose privilege it is to make explicit the principles by which all are actuated as principles of very great value in the world at large.

The same is true of friendships between older and younger persons beginning in the relationship of teacher and student, pastor and especially interested listener, physician and patient, official and co-worker, where such motives as gratitude and mutuality of interests enter in. So, too, co-workers in public service may find commonplace relationships deepening into those that are ideal, and involving the question how far affection shall be allowed to take the lead, what ought to be done for the invalid father or the widowed mother, how one shall find one's

proper sphere of work in the world yet meet one's greater obligations.

Fundamental Relationships.—Our conclusion is that no principle by itself is absolute, but that each consideration—ideals of equality in the moral sense of the term, the principle of reciprocity, of compensation, mutuality, service, charity, justice, love—affords a clue to the fundamental relationship of principles in the moral order. Love is the greatest motive which sends human beings forth into moral activity. It is love which energizes the will, and each of us tends to develop a prevailing love. But ethical love finds place among both principles and persons, and can no more be singled out in terms of mere duty than one can make happiness the object of all endeavor. Love creates the relationships which may then receive their best development through the guidance of wisdom, and the ideals of brotherhood or justice. Love is greater than virtue, gives of the best. Justice is intelligible as the highest social virtue, the goal which love strives for in the social order. Love of our fellowmen prompts us to service, but it is by rational inquiry that we become informed concerning those ends which must be realized if there shall be righteous consideration of all.

For some of us then all tests resolve themselves into one: self-consistency. What pertains to my moral integrity is right. For I am then faithful alike to the ideal I am seeking to realize and to the self in its wholeness by which my being is linked with my fellowmen and with the divine purpose. "To thine own self be true," is Shakespeare's advice, put into the mouth of Polonius, "it must follow, as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man." It is not in the last analysis a question of what is done, as I join in companionship with my fellowmen, but of my endeavor to be the same self in process of complete realization wherever I am placed. What to some would be harmless might be for me a vice, and what I do with ease in my best work in the world others would find difficult. Each finds his own road to constancy, although each of us in being constant attains the same universal principle.

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CHAPTER XXIII

TESTS OF VIRTUE

The Unity of Virtue.—Our studies have disclosed several underlying conceptions which belong together in closest relation. As moral obligation implies a standard of goodness which enables us to test the values of various theories of the good, so duty as a central principle involves relationships between the several duties. Conscience as the moral constant of human history underlies manifold judgments in the name of goodness or duty. Virtue as a general principle is another term for the good, the right, or duty; while the virtues are modes of realizing goodness by means of the several duties. Conscience is the standard of judgment throughout. The unity of virtue follows from the unity of the good, duty, and conscience. In studying the individual and social virtues we have been making this unity explicit.

Comparison of Systems.—The unity of the virtues within a given group, such as the cardinal virtues of Plato's scheme, the larger classification of Aristotle's system, or in Christian ethics of the primitive type, is more evident than when unity is sought by comparison of the groups of virtues found in the leading moral systems of the world. War was denounced in China by a great moral leader, Mencius (371–288 B.C.) with such emphasis as to foster the gentler virtues, while in Rome the martial virtues were predominant. Oriental countries in general are contrasted with Occidental because of the prevalence of the virtues pertaining to peace. Yet fiercely warlike tribes have come out of the East to invade the West. There are striking points of resemblance between the ethical systems of ancient China and ancient Greece, notably in the adoption of "nature's way" understood as "Tao"

in China, and as "the nature of things" to be followed in the life of reason, by the Stoics. Emphasis in each case belongs on serenity, inner quiet, constancy, and the wise man's ideal. Resemblances and identities have frequently been traced between the monastic life, with the virtues which it involves, in the case of Buddhism and the life of virtue of medieval Christianity. With resemblances or identities are always found differences, when actual lists of virtues are compared. The cardinal virtues of Plato, supplemented by liberality, magnificence, high-mindedness, ambition, and allied virtues, in the Aristotelian system, call for a different mode of life from that of the early Christian ideal of obedience, patience, benevolence, purity, humility, and alienation from the flesh and the world. The individual virtues are displaced for the most part in an ethical system like that of Hobbes, with its emphasis on justice, equity, requital of benefits, moderate forgiveness, and the avoidance of pride and arrogance; while in other English ethical systems, reacting against the egoism of Hobbes' doctrine, benevolence occupies the central position. Much depends on the place assigned either to sentiment or to reason as the test of virtue. Justice, veracity, and regard to common good might, with Butler, seem to be the virtues everywhere prevailing; while Leslie Stephen would expect mercy, truth, and temperance.¹

The differences in groups of virtues are what we would rationally anticipate, when we note that it is the social life of a nation which gives content to virtue, as in ancient China, with its reverence for the past as perfect, its worship of ancestors, and the conviction that filial virtue, reverence for superiors, and conformity to ancient custom are central in the moral life; in contrast with India, with its caste-system, its belief in re-birth, and the virtues which follow from acceptance of spiritual pantheism and the life of contemplation. Identical lists of virtues are not to be expected, although we look for universal condemnation of cruelty, falsity, intemperance; and expect to find either

¹ See Fullerton's discussion of the content of virtue, *Handbook of Ethical Theory*, Chap. I.

mercy or benevolence, sympathy or compassion, and justice or righteousness. Wherever the individual virtues are regarded as important, we would look for temperance, balance, the "just mean" or "golden mean." The unity of virtue means diversity in unity, and a wide range of values, from the martial to the gentler virtues, from those pertaining to worldly success to those anticipating heaven as the abode of the blessed. If a test of this unity can be discovered, by reference, for example, to Myers' *History as Past Ethics*, it is to be found in the central point of emphasis in the given moral ideal, as justice becomes central for Plato or righteousness for Christianity.

Contrasted Types.—The test, too, may be found in the type of character embodied in this ideal, for instance, (1) the balanced type of the ancient Greeks, (2) the other-worldly or self-denying type of the early Christians, (3) the ideal of Stoic self-control. The inner life then is a test, especially in its emphasis on freedom from outward circumstance, as opposed to the Utilitarian type of virtue. Myers notes the fact that the fusion of races in Europe has resulted in a very composite type of conscience, with Greek, Roman, Hebraic, Celtic, Gothic, and Slavonic elements.² "This heterogeneous conscience, so different, for instance, from the comparatively homogeneous conscience of ancient Egypt and of China, has been the most important factor in the life and civilization of the European people. It is largely because Europe has been constantly getting a new conscience that its history has been so disturbed and so progressive, just as it is because China has had the same Confucian conscience for two thousand years and more, that her history has been so uneventful and unchanging." If then there appears to be no common list of virtues as the guide, what is indeed common is the zeal with which the prevalent type is adhered to, whatever its content. Hence Myers generalizes by saying: "Do the thing thou seest to be good; realize thy ideal. In the words of Sabatier, 'The essential thing in the world is not to serve this ideal or that, but with all one's soul to serve the ideal

² *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

which one has chosen.' Such loyalty to one's ideal is moral goodness. This imperative of conscience that one be true to the best one knows is the only thing absolute and categorical in the utterance of the moral faculty."³

Codes as Tests.—If we compare such a code as the Ten Commandments with codes adopted by other peoples, we note impressive differences, and in case of a given command we find variations dependent on custom. The command, "Thou shalt not kill," depends in its application on the interpretation, for example, in the case of capital punishment or war. In contrast with the absolute veracity which one might expect among the peoples, we meet the lie of courtesy, the clever lie, the lie to the stranger. Hence one asks, with Fullerton, "Where does the silence of indifference shade into purposed concealment, and the latter into what is unequivocally deception?"⁴ Sincerity or truthfulness has often been rated very low in the Western world, also the keeping of contracts and treaties; but for Zoroaster truthfulness was the paramount virtue, international morality occupied the highest rank, the keeping of treaties was a sacred obligation.⁵ It is right according to some ancient codes to hold slaves, suicide was regarded by some as a virtuous act, or the right of the father to kill grown-up children or to sell them as slaves was recognized. Universal benevolence, tolerance, and compassion have been advocated by Buddhists as seldom by Christians. It would be difficult to determine the nature of justice, veracity, or even the common good by comparison of codes, but a greater code might be developed by selecting the nobler precepts of various systems. In the Buddhistic Ten Commandments the duties toward God are omitted, while in addition to the commands not to kill, steal, or lie, it is said, "Thou shalt not drink intoxicating drink, defame, boast, be stingy, or angry, or revile the three precious ones."⁶

³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁵ See Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁶ For points of excellence in the ancient Egyptian system, see Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

Ancient Greece had a very great advantage in the fact that there was no priestly class to enforce theocratic morality, with its artificial ritual duties and its conservative tendencies.⁷ Hence in Greece the points of excellence were to be found in the philosophical systems, not in a series of prohibitions. The nearest approach to a criterion may perhaps be found by comparing the spirit of various codes and noting points of resemblance or identity, without dwelling on differences in content, as in Buddhism and Christianity, both being universal systems teaching the brotherhood of man, exalting the gentle and self-denying virtues, requiring self-conquest, and enjoining benevolence as a duty.⁸

The Golden Rule as a Test.—More direct guidance is found by selecting one precept or rule and considering its universal significance. The Golden Rule is a maxim implying a judgment of disinterestedness, regard for all concerned, on the ground that as moral beings we are "members one of another." It implies Mill's "disinterested and benevolent spectator," Samuel Clark's "rule of righteousness," namely, that "we should so deal with every man, as in like circumstances we could reasonably expect he should with us." It is expressed in other terms by Kant as the categorical imperative, with the accompanying maxims. In the *Mahabharata* it is said: "Let no man do to another that which would be repugnant to himself; this is the sum of righteousness; the rest is according to inclination." When Confucius was asked if there were a word which would serve as a rule of practice for all one's life he said: "Is not reciprocity such a word?" Confucius also indicated four special attainments to be made by the superior man: to serve his father as he would require his son to serve him, to serve his prince as he would require his minister to serve him, to serve his elder brother as he would require his younger brother to serve him, and to set the example in behaving to a friend as he would require the friend to behave to him.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁸ Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

Throughout the various formulations of this rule the implication is that all moral rules ought to be obeyed without regard to selfish considerations. "Do your duty disinterestedly" is the universal command. Dewey and Tufts interpret the principle to mean, not a command to act or forbear acting in a given way; but "it is a tool for analyzing a special situation, the right or wrong being determined by the situation in its entirety, and not by the rule as such."⁹ The mere adoption of this rule, in business, for example, would not then imply the immediate settlement of all industrial disputes and difficulties; the rule would not tell just what to do in all situations: what it yields is "*a point of view from which to consider acts.*"

What This Rule Demands.—Is this point of view adequate? Some critics have maintained that it is not. A typical criticism is that this rule implies a private standard only, hence that it fails to give sufficient guidance for group relations: "the Golden Rule assumes that the parties concerned are related as like to like."¹⁰ But in groups people are found to be unlike, and to have unlike functions; while unlike groups have relationships with other unlike groups. The reply is that the rule need not be regarded as a private standard only, and should not be limited, as Adler thinks it would be to the relationships of those who are like one another. It calls upon the moral agent to put himself in the other person's place. In Confucius' formulation, the rule includes the idea of "reciprocity," and this principle is meant to apply to like and unlike, among individuals and groups.

Adler's corresponding term is "equivalence," as the basis for defining distinctions: the true spiritual ideal is individual-social, ethico-religious, based on recognition of equality in worth plus unlikeness of nature and function. Hence Adler's reconstructed rule is: "Seek to elicit the best in others, and thereby you will bring to light the best that is in yourself . . . let the unlike seek to elicit the unlike." This more explicit statement however simply

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 334.

¹⁰ Felix Adler, *Reconstruction of the Spiritual Ideal*, 1924.

brings out an additional meaning already implicit in the original rule. No one would be likely to assume that when bidden to regard his fellowmen as members one of another such brotherhood means identity or likeness; since the whole idea of membership in an organism is based on recognition of differences in type and function, as in Paul's comparison between the eye, the hand, and other bodily members, and the vocations to be fulfilled by men living and working together "all in the same spirit." Granted the qualification with regard to unlike members attaining different functions, we may make the rule as brief as in Augustine's formulation of it: "Do as thou wouldst be done by."

Moderation as the Test.—If any rule must be understood in the light of diversity of elements and differences in specific situations to which man is called upon to adjust himself, the same should be said of any maxim or proverb. "Nothing to excess" summarizes, for those who already understand it, the classic type of ethical theory which is the world's greatest contribution to individual morality, that is, the Greek ideal. There are many social situations in which the idea of the golden mean applies as directly as to individual matters calling for temperance or moderation, for example, various situations in which self-sacrifice is assumed to be the highest demand. Self-sacrifice, when wisely moderated, is freed from objections, is transformed into "devotion" or "participation." But moderation or control from within must not be carried to excess, or the moral agent will lose all spontaneity. It is easier to see that courage is a mean between cowardice and foolhardiness, temperance a mean between licentiousness and insensibility, than to contrast ambition and lack of ambition.¹¹ The idea of moderation suggests self-consciousness or self-culture: there are times to forget self *in action*, to lose one's self that one may find it.

Universality as the Test.—Examination of the maxims which have come down to us from the great nations, leads one to the conclusion that no summary statement covers all

¹¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics*, Bk. II, Chap. VII.

cases, but that everything depends upon what the principle under consideration is taken to mean with respect to given situations; and sometimes one rule is more applicable than another, according to the use one habitually makes of it. At times it is sufficient to consider, with Kant, whether in all seriousness one would will to have one's proposed conduct become a universal law. But at other times, it is more specifically a question of another's higher good, for example, when prompted by charity either to give material things, supply money, or refrain from making such gifts and to open the way toward a moral opportunity instead. Again, the greater good of a group, of the state or nation may be in view, and various loyalties are brought in contrast. Conduciveness to self-realization or the fullness of life is sometimes the test, granted much prior knowledge and experience concerning that which contributes to this ideal. One may consider now this test, now that, among the three or four which have proved most workable, bearing in mind that the moral situation is too rich in meanings and values to be reduced to fewer tests. Universality must then in the end signify variety in unity.

The inertia, sense of dependence, allegiance to authority in which most of us grow up is such that we would like to believe that a brief collection of precepts or prohibitions applies to all cases, so that all that is required of us will be to select the right one to fit the instance in point. Thus the Ten Commandments tell us what not to do, while the Beatitudes praise the highest motives to action, and so we seem to have a complete system of tests. But a rule to be applied without thought would be devoid of moral value. Morality is always a problem. The Greek maxim, "nothing to excess," means the adoption of a philosophy, and the Greeks did not contribute a code to show precisely how one should live this philosophy by rule. No system of commandments actually in vogue has settled all of the most vital problems. The world is still considering under what conditions it is right to kill, in the long list of possible occasions for killing, including the duties of the execu-

tioner, the soldier, the problems of self-defense, the protection of society against criminals and the insane.

Neither in theory nor in practice has the world come any nearer a solution of all problems than by means of the central principle which has guided our study throughout, namely, the only supreme law is the universality of the command to do what is judged to be right, what is the higher or greater good. If any specific command or group of commands were absolute, taken as it reads, there would be relativity indeed. It is impossible to divorce the moral principle from the agent, his conscience, philosophy, series of specific social situations involving problems and calling for coöperative response.

Casuistry.—No system of casuistry (the attempt to foresee all typical cases and lay down rules for meeting them) has ever proved exhaustive or satisfactory; and one might easily become lost in the woods for the trees if one were to try to find one's way through the minute distinctions demanded by such a system. The effort to develop a calculus of moral values to be attributed to each motive and deed, with exact contrasts between vice and virtue, turpitude and innocence, would be more hopeless than the quest for a calculus of pleasures. Casuistry does not settle the problem of the conflict of duties: what settles it is resoluteness in facing the issues which must be met, as when war arises, by bringing to bear the wisdom which life has thus far yielded, by the comparison, for example, of loyalties.¹² The great need in any case is some central ideal, like the martial ideal of character (Bushido) which has meant so much in creating moral consciousness in Japan;¹³ freedom as fostered by our forefathers in America; or social service as the recent synthetic ideal in many lands.

Qualifying Ideas.—Where there is greatest regard for ancestors and parents, as in China and Japan, this ideal will enter into the whole moral system, find expression in

¹² See, for instance, Myers' analysis of the ideal of knighthood, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

¹³ Myers, *ibid.*, p. 79.

the rules and precepts, the inquiry into motives, intentions, and the consequences of moral action. Where there is acceptance of a divine sanction, it will be difficult to avoid the blighting effects of the idea of authority, likely to prevent freedom of thought in analyzing the meanings and applications of the moral code. No less blighting are ideas regarding the supernatural which introduce belittling distinctions into all our thinking about the natural man—to what extent his nature or conduct may be said to be good, in contrast with “spiritual goodness,” which is said to be the only true goodness, as opposed to “moral goodness” in ethical systems admitting no supernatural sanction.

Causistry seems to be called for by any moral system dependent upon a theology, adopted on authority; and casuistry is open to the many objections raised by moralists and well summed up by Dewey and Tufts: (1) it tends to magnify the letter of morality at the expense of its spirit; (2) in practice it tends to a legal view of conduct; (3) while its worst evil is that it tends to deprive the moral life of freedom and spontaneity.¹⁴

Limitations of Rules.—The rules drawn up for the guidance of practice tend to run into fixed customs, that is, to become static; hence they are to be understood as intellectual rather than imperative, as means of judging social situations, for example, by aid of the Golden Rule. But if rules are to be means to the dynamic, the principle involved must be kept relatively flexible if life or spontaneity is to be preserved. What is to be kept in view is the greater end to be attained by means of the lesser ends which become our objectives from time to time.

Thus freedom to believe, and worship, and live as their consciences prompted them was the idea kept in view by our forefathers in encountering the hardships of existence in primitive New England and in reacting against the oppression due to the rule of kings. When a commandment is broken by a group living up to its moral ideal, the higher or greater good becomes the rule. To draw up rules to cover all exceptions and try to justify them would be to

¹⁴ *Ethics*, p. 327.

overlook the truth once more that even the Commandments are means to ends, are intelligible only in the light of the moral spirit which *uses* formulas but can not submit to be used by them. In actual practice every man simplifies his moral philosophy to the few principles which, confessedly imperfect, serve his purpose and come to represent the highest values. Obedience, chastity, and benevolence may be the virtues which man keeps before him as tests in a given period in history; while justice may be his ideal, and social justice his problem, in another age. The idea of "reciprocity" is too general for most of us; the conception of society as an organism seems open to too many objections, to others; and objections are made to every working idea which, as in case of the good will or loyalty, seems devoid of specific content. The obligation which moral life in society puts upon us is that we shall consider the specific content as a real problem.

Test Questions.—In facing issues and considering various plans of action tentatively, one naturally asks one's self, "How does this plan seem? Does it ring true? Is it right?" Meanwhile, one sends one's thought forward in imagination to the time for taking action in the given group—in business, in a philanthropic institution, in the missionary field, in the war-zone. What would be the main incentive to such action? What rises up within one's spirit in protest or approval? Is one able to anticipate action with *one's whole nature*, in freedom, so that this course of action appears to be the right one?

Having joined a certain Christian church, shall one be loyal to its creed in any event, or be faithful to the increasing liberalism of various leaders in different denominations? Much will depend upon one's insight into the original Christianity, the stress put on the dynamic element in religion, in contrast with formulas. What is one's real community—that of the neighborhood as given, of this or that organization, one's race, or "the beloved community" of those who espouse the same moral ideal, say social justice, spiritual freedom, or the right to pursue truth wherever it may lead? Which loyalty ought to stand

first—to the profession, the union, or public health and public welfare? Much will turn upon the degree of freedom one has gained from sheer partisanship, as in politics. Something will also depend on one's view of economic determinism, expediency, policy; one's attitude in regard to racial prejudices, and on any other attitude or habit likely to be put in relation to moral standards.

The Value of Analysis.—Our knowledge of the subjective life, with its tendencies toward extreme conscientiousness, introversion, or self-analysis, has taught most of us by this time that it is wise to avoid prolonged weighing of motives, as if by balancing all the alternatives one could arrive at a decision. By nature some of us tend to analyze too much; hence we lose impetus, hesitate till the only way out seems to be *to do something*, anything to end the uncertainty. The solution proffered by the practical man is, "Plunge in, show your colors," try out a plan; for the practical man dreads irresoluteness of will. Yet, as we have repeatedly noted, there are two native types, introverts and extroverts, those who dwell on motives and those who look to the effects, those who tend to be either idealists or empiricists, rationalists or utilitarians. The ideal moral type is synthetic. No one can avoid minute analyses who would see the issue through to the end, and we find that even in the mechanical age in which we live, with its reactions against "the New England conscience," fine distinctions are being drawn where no moralizers ever discriminated before. In the last analysis moral thought is neither subjective nor objective in the sense in which these terms have been used. What is required is that we shall *think through to the end*, whatever line of interests we follow. Perplexities of conscience afford opportunity for knowing what conscience is, not inerrant or infallible, not an inscrutable "voice," not a mere feeling or sense of what is right, not a "self-evident" intuition; but a growing power of moral judgment and righteous action, developed by use and criticism. Fortunate indeed are we if we have raised the central questions involved in the conflict of duties. A comparison of the customs of America with

those of China and Japan, may help us more than any abstract analysis of marital and filial virtues.

One need not however hesitate to analyze personal experiences, because some men and women in the past have been too scrupulous. It is incomplete subjectivity which is our undoing, not introspection in itself. If the resource at times is to consult our friends, visit a physician, or psychologist or clergyman; at other times it is to "walk alone," throwing off as many environing social influences as one can, seeing the issues and seeing them whole, as indeed we try to envisage life and see it whole. The man of strong moral faith sees a relation between his problems and his ability to meet them. He is affirmative. He does not trouble over the fact that relativities beset him where he anticipated something absolute. He has learned once for all that everything moral takes on conditions, everything perfect is achieved through the imperfect, while everything divine is manifested amid the mitigating factors of what we now briefly call "the personal equation."

Conscientious Scruples.—What then shall one do, given a supposedly sincere or faithful friend, who has played false? What shall the apprentice do who finds his instructor dishonest, his employer resorting to the tricks of the trade? What is the newspaper reporter to do who is bidden to work up into a scandalous story the bare facts of a love-affair in which both parties are innocent, although there are damaging appearances? It matters little what the situation is, if so be it suggests central issues which seem in utter conflict for the moment. One may have opportunity to be of lasting service to the man who has told a falsehood to a friend. He may be passing through one of the great crises of life, unable to see anything clearly. And so his lie may be a superficial incident. The youth may discover himself in a profound way, morally, for the first time, who realizes that he must decide between dishonesty in trade and fidelity to an honest standard. For the newspaper writer the opportunities are great indeed, when he realizes that he is a responsible participant in making and re-making public opinion.

We have seen that it is not rational sharply to divide motive from consequence, since the two are aspects of the moral deed in process of taking shape and becoming overt. It follows that it is permissible at times to dwell on the motive, while at other times it is wiser to note results. In the end, we learn how to test virtue both by examining motives to see what was wrong, and by profiting when experience teaches its most effective lessons. Retrospectively, we see where impulse played its fateful part, and we learn what impulse sprang from, that is, from swift desire, vague sentiment, blind emotion, and, negatively, lack of self-control, indecision, failure to consider carefully what ought to be done. Inquiring more searchingly, we learn from what mode of life higher motives and bettered results spring; hence we learn what virtues are central, for instance, temperance, order, or balance. Thus our insight becomes more nearly complete. The test of the individual virtues, especially, is seen to be the state of mind and character from which they arise; for instance, inner poise, peace, inner control as tending to the best-adjusted life. Less and less analysis of moral states is required, in so far as a mode of life is fostered which includes all these by including something better, that is, a life characterized by faith, a purpose, with a work to do which yields deepening satisfaction and makes for fullness of life. We are bidden to *be*, as well as to *do*, and so character is an end, not a means simply, although character is also a means as contributory to the moral development and well-being of others.

Coming to Judgment.—We need not dwell then on the value of self-examination. A man must indeed come to judgment, see wherein he is insincere, not in earnest, and he must avoid compromise and self-deception. A man should know himself better than his critics and those who praise him. But many matters once deemed primary are now seen to be secondary, since we found solutions for problems in enriched social life and service which men tried to solve by methods of lonely meditation, and by dwelling on sins in dejected self-condemnation. It is much

more reasonable to endeavor to live by *principle* than to examine one's self to see whether one is actually conscientious in this or that undertaking, and so we single out in public life men of principle as our models, in contrast with partisans who put the welfare of a party above the good of the nation as a whole. There is an advantage in admitting a fault, a moral necessity in acknowledging a sin; but the moral life must be affirmative through and through. The complete solution is found by realizing our capacities in a mode of life lifted above both self-complacency and self-reproach.

Evidences of Moral Success.—Many of our difficulties are doubtless due to conflict between teachings taken on from various sources, at home, at school, through contacts with society, and the adoption of a religious creed. What we need is the centralizing principle expressed above in varied terms, which Confucius and other law-givers saw so clearly when they formulated the Golden Rule. To see as an illuminating truth that we are so intimately participants in the moral life that even the figure of the "organism" falls short of the moral reality, is to realize that mutuality in doing our part is the one great opportunity. One need not devote much time to asking whether this or that deed bears evidence of virtue, if it be a sign of goodness or of duty faithfully performed. For one's consciousness spontaneously yields from time to time unmistakable evidences that productivity, service and duty coincide in work well done, the work which one is fitted by type and capacity to do. What one thus gives is mutual, it arouses reciprocal action, is an instance of what one would will to have become universal, namely, that all men should so think, will, live, and work as to give of what each can give best for the good of the whole of which one is ever more truly a part.

Moral Correlations.—In this deeper sense of dedication to what is best for humanity, it might be said that there is "no such thing as a conflict of duties."¹⁵ For that which I am led to do from time to time as my life or work

¹⁵ Cf. Green, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

progresses is what develops out of the contributory mode of life I am living, by "putting first things first," doing first my work in the world, for example, teaching the subjects I am best able to teach to those whose mental types or age I am best adapted, together with leading a mode of life in accord with this universal principle. But until one attains such harmony as this, conflict of duties certainly exists, inasmuch as this very mutuality which serves as our clue also involves obligations to family, to parents, the community, the nation, so that we are often as much bound as free—"finding ourselves," as we say, learning where we can best fit in, what we can best do; how by some fortunate insight we may learn to meet all these obligations so as to be faithful to each in its place. Oftentimes we realize that we do not know enough to classify this opportunity as greater or higher than that. Hence we depend on some other principle. We see "in a glass darkly." Perfectly to know our full duty would be to see "face to face." The test of virtue is found in the realization that one is moving toward this clear vision by endeavoring to do as well as possible what is at hand. Hence one tends to realize the nature of virtue, not in the sense of credit due to one's self, but by realizing it as many others are achieving it who are working side by side with us. When we understand this inter-relatedness we need no longer be disappointed that no rule applies to all cases without explanations; for we realize that the life of goodness is multiform, with various lines of approach, each with its rule, it may be, but with differences due to diverse situations.

The Geometry of Virtue.—It is still maintained by some that as in mathematics there is but one solution to a problem that is right, so in moral conduct, as E. E. Slosson has recently insisted, only one way is right. The argument is that truth is one, falsehoods are infinite; nine-tenths of the ideas that come into our heads are wrong; nine-tenths of the impulses that beset us are wrong; while rules of conduct are as invariable and absolute as the rules of geometry, the difficulty being that we can not see so clearly in ethics as in mathematics. It follows from this assumption that

there are no indifferent actions, no equivalent choices; hence it is not by any means a matter of indifference, for example, what street one turns down when out for a stroll: if you turn down one street, you may be run over by an automobile, if you turn down the next you may meet a man who will make your fortune, while on the third you may catch a fatal microbe, or on the fourth may meet the girl you want to marry. In our uncertainty there seems no way to decide save to toss up a penny, but in reality there is but one right way, one straight and narrow path. If we knew what this is we would take it. Our disagreements are due solely to our ignorance.

Objections to this View.—The fallacy here is in the tacit assumption of determinism as absolute, in a universe so meager that only one road leads to our destination. If the test of virtue were so simple, we might well return to the *Ethics* of Spinoza, and undertake to finish his ambitious attempt to make a complete explanation of every motive actuating the human self. Or, we might return to Socrates, agreeing absolutely that "knowledge is virtue." A profounder logic has taught us that many of the nine other statements put in relation with the tenth that is judged to be wholly true are also in part true; hence that nine-tenths of the ideas that come into our heads are not "wrong," but partly right. A truer psychology has shown us that all of the other nine impulses are partly right, each is wholly so in its own sphere, as in the case of impulses to procure food, seek shelter, produce and care for offspring, acquire knowledge, manifest beauty, and achieve goodness. Hedonism as a test of virtue is partly right. The true ethical theory is synthetic. True moral conduct is cumulative. Granted increase of virtue—not through increase of knowledge alone—more and more matters may be seen in true relations. Meanwhile, the roads to virtue are so numerous that no one who is enlightened will dogmatise, as much as to say, "In my set of rules you will find absolute guides to virtue: all other rules are wrong." It is because of this surpassing wealth of the moral life that freedom can be a glorious opportunity.

The Complete Test.—There are, indeed, indifferent actions. The Greek Stoics saw this long ago. Many of the sentiments which pass in and out of our consciousness are without moral significance or result. What is not indifferent is genuine but truly significant *thought*, reason, will, conduct in accord with the rational nature of things. It is a matter of vital moment that I should know myself, discover what I can do best, and do it with a will, working together with my fellowmen toward social perfection. But, "nothing to excess," is still my rule. I need a pastime, need to do some things without set purpose. I need to profit by those moralists who have made morals too dry, too serious, sanctimonious, self-conscious, and self-righteous. Joy, happiness is a great and sure test of virtue. It is not a matter of seriousness of purpose alone. All the virtues are not found in the Hebraic code. Christianity is constantly in the process of qualification, that is, in its actual working out in the minds and hearts of men. Ultimately speaking, there may be but one system of the virtues. But actual history as "past ethics" is so rich that we find each great nation making its contribution, just as the individual contributes what he can do best. The complete test of virtue then is found both in its central principle, implied in the Golden Rule, and in the several virtues which make manifest the rich content of the universal principle.

In practice one should guard against the apparent conflict of duties arising from the fact that there is what Green calls "a competition of reverences," whose injunctions, real or supposed, do not agree.¹⁶ Many of us are in the habit of identifying with duty injunctions given us by this or that person in authority, this or that creed; these matters of advice are inconsistent, and so the situation becomes needlessly complex. What we need is a centralizing purpose in life, an ethical philosophy of life's situation so that we are not disconcerted by differences which mean wealth of possibilities in the moral life. Any rule or maxim which

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 355.

we have found wisely applicable is worth keeping, even though we do not yet see how it accords with other precepts. Simplicity of statement is essential to concentration.

The Need of Simplifying.—We repeat, the apparently insuperable conflict is often no real conflict at all. We have made social life too complex, with too many interests, too many clubs, organizations, and societies. In each case a so-called duty is imposed, and the duties fall heavily on the very few who do the major part of the work. One's duty is not to attend to all these interests which divide up a person's time so that nothing is done well, but to find a basis of reconciliation or settlement on which those matters can be adjusted which belong together in one's chosen universe of desire, as in the life of a musician, painter, teacher, or man of affairs who dedicates himself to his art or science. There is no conflict between the eternal values. The relative conflicts are between instrumental values. Most of us are in process of learning just what values are instrumental and how. It is well to cherish the hope of complete adjustment between the values which a man finds important in just his life and his vocation. And the ethical test should always be a means of simplifying.

A Working Scale of Values.—Hence we may well ask, What do we mean when we say that we should put first things first? How shall one attain a scale of values? The effort to find a scale of values is at least as old as Plato's time. It comes with the judgment that there are lower and higher goods; the lower depend upon the soul, in Plato's system, while the soul depends upon wisdom. The cardinal virtues are higher than those which serve as means to ends in doing one's work for the state. The highest culminates in a vision of the Good. So in any system the scale takes its clue from that which is regarded as goodness, virtue, rectitude, or justice, whatever the term may be. In practice the scale is likely to turn upon the following essentials: (1) Human considerations belong in the first rank. It is a question of being human in the home, as a teacher,

as an official, as head of a business house, president of an institution; but also as a sub-official, as clerk, expressman, grocer, farmer, neighbor. Things, processes, details belong in second rank. Hence with matters belonging in the first rank will come considerateness, kindness, forgiveness, willingness to begin again; and, especially, recognition of individual worth. (2) The values which serve human well-being belong in the second rank—food, clothing, shelter, economic values—that is to say, the methods whereby we provide for these, the processes which we endeavor to use but which are after all *for use*, and are not to use us. (3) The added values which yield recreation, social interchange, contrast, and help to preserve spontaneity.

The Still Small Voice.—To what extent may the so-called voice of conscience be regarded as a test in all these matters which we have been passing in review? There is a respect in which this is the supreme test, despite the criticisms passed on intuition and conscience. For, granted that neither intuition nor conscience is a separate power functioning apart from the content of experience, there remains no ground for discounting the effective way in which the individual brings together those considerations which for him are decisive. Although any element of the process is dependent and coöperative, not absolute and infallible, in *moral integration* there is power.

One of the great moral values of the ages is the still small voice, regarded in our childhood as “the voice of God in the soul of man.” Inquiring into this voice as heard amidst the din of human conflicts, we are constrained to say that it is scarcely a voice at all; but merely an uncritical projection of our own consciousness. But when we consider that every one of us at times needs to “walk alone” in order to throw off all influences that might be prejudicial, while resolutely seeking to know what is right, we must admit that conscience may be discerned in silence and solitude when it can not be distinguished in any other way. And so the emphasis belongs on the stillness, not on the voice.

The reality of what we believe in depends to a large extent

on our intuition, and intuition may always be regarded from above as well as from below. Looked at from below, we are thinking of its processes. Regarded from above, we are concerned with what it discloses. We believe in God, for instance, "because there are experiences in life at once so arresting and so significant that apart from God it is psychologically impossible for us to account for them."¹⁷ In this sense of the word intuition is defined as "inner response to the divine communication . . . the one final and convincing proof of revelation."¹⁸ What we need is a unifying principle in terms of which we can verify our creative experience, "without limiting the possibility of a similar enlargement and enrichment of life in other persons." For what my "voice" tells me may not be what yours tells you. Mine may check me by an impeding impression, as Socrates' "divine something" stopped him if he were about to start in the wrong direction. What yours discloses to you may be a flash of insight surpassing all other moments of meditation so that, for you, there is moral conviction at last. In any event, Emerson's principle is the direct one: "There is guidance for each one of us, and by lowly listening we shall hear the right word." The "lowly listening" process is conscience in its purest moment of receptivity. The Quaker, believing in "inner guidance" as the supreme rule of practical life, brings to his receptivity a whole series of anticipations. The silence is his mode of simplification. Others would have different modes. Let each follow the method which he finds best. Let every sensitively organized person especially heed the fact that times for coming to one's self are imperative. What is needed by all is moral integration, conviction. And this may be best attained and best preserved by keeping both thought and life fairly simple.

¹⁷ W. A. Brown, *Imperialistic Religion and the Religion of Democracy*, 1923, p. 188.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

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CHAPTER XXIV

MORAL FORCES

The Problem of Idealism.—We have seen that some moralists bring motives and ideals to the fore; while others dwell on present conditions which permit expression of utilitarian values. It is easy for the idealist to overlook the fact that moral values, in one aspect eternal, are to be made temporal through gradual achievements in the world of experience which we all know. But those who put stress on social conditions as readily neglect the universal principle which gives system to the particulars of morality progressively attained. In other terms, faith is vested in God, who will, we trust, somehow bring the world round to righteousness. Or, faith is supposed to turn upon human accomplishment, with God left out of account. Again, it is a question of “the world of appreciation,” and the possibility of realizing in this world of prosaic “description” (where everything depends on cause and effect) the ideals which make life supremely worth while. Is it possible through knowledge of immanent tendencies, social trends, and human types; with insight into the virtues which men seek at their best, to bring the universal and the concrete into closer relation, so as to keep the vision while being more practical?

How Ideals are Realized.—A moral decision or impetus toward the ideal may be said to become effective when a concrete deed results in the causal series of events in which our organisms move, as when a man, having entered into an agreement, keeps his promise, meets his obligation on the day appointed, and so by his example in the community embodies an ideal of real influence upon others. It is obvious that many ideals remain in the realm of good intentions, through lack of effort or because of failure to consider

precisely how they may be introduced into the actual trend of events, under conditions likely to thwart them. There are several points of view from which attempts have been made to solve this problem. The ethical philosopher is apt to approach it without considering the psychological elements of the translation of thought into action. Students of human behavior who depend on statistical methods as readily neglect the factors of variation which imply moral freedom, as if ideals had no power at all. But the plain man proceeds on the conviction that ideals have greater power than material forces. The problem is to define and utilize a moral force in relation to a system of physical energies which seem to make moral conduct impossible as a real fact.

Ideas as Forces.—A typical point of view turns on the assumption, seldom analyzed in detail, that ideas are as truly forces as those we classify as physical and chemical. It appears then to be *ideas* which direct our desires, set free our motor-tensions, release our energies; hence the conclusion follows that ideas tend toward realization and eventuate in action without further effort on our part. "Beliefs are rules for action," was the typical generalization of an older psychology; ideas are for the most part motor in type, moral ideals first take shape in our thought, and tend to express themselves in appropriate conduct. Every idea has been said to be "a tendency and indivisibly an action."¹ Ideas are said to realize themselves in the measure of their veracity. Practice is theory in action: to think is to act. An ideal is not inert, dead, or abstract, but exerts a real force and liberating influence.

Objections to this View.—McConnell, who holds a rival theory, objects that this view (1) reverses the true order of occurrence by assuming that we first conceive, then sympathize; for in reality we feel with others first, then understand; (2) introduces confusion by regarding intellect as a dynamic agency, a motor principle or force; since it is feelings which lead to volition, and action is the comple-

¹ See McConnell's summary of Fouillée's theory of *idées-forces*, *The Duty of Altruism*, p. 175.

tion of the process.² Reason and will are generically distinct. We negate many ideas. An ideal is not purely intellectual, but is a product of our whole character, especially the will. In McConnell's description, an *accepted* ideal is a force; it is not reason that leads to disinterested action, but intellect receives from will its intuitions: will is interested, intellect assists; will is primary, intelligence accessory. It is therefore a question of "good" and "bad" wills.

Synthetic Action.—The objection to McConnell's view in turn is that it too greatly separates and minimizes the intellectual factor, and almost makes will a "faculty," reducing the moral problem to utilizing wills which can not be changed. Both will and reason should be taken in conjunction. Sometimes the moral decision is almost wholly intellectual; hence the conclusions that "knowledge is power," and that "knowledge is virtue." In some people, calm, dispassionate reason predominates; with them clearly to see is to begin to act. But other people are prevailingly of a will-type—the obstinate will, the explosive will,³ the autocratic will—and reason is subordinated. Still others are more centrally of an emotional type, intellect and will being agents of the prevailing or ruling emotions. Actual conduct in any event emerges from the inner world as synthetic, in the case, for example, of what is called an intuition. Attention plays its part in making a state of mind efficacious. Sometimes will gives quiet assent, rather than indulging in what we call effort. We inhibit many ideas which might have become effective. What finally becomes efficacious is a motive, and motives, we have seen, are inner aspects of conduct which are in part inseparable from the outer aspects which we call overt action.

To understand why synthetic inner activity, or moral decision, is followed by overt action, we need to consider a person's whole nature, including whatever measure of truth there is in the proposition that our nature is for the most

² *Op. cit.*, p. 179.

³ See James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 537.

part subconscious. To learn why desirable action is delayed, made extremely difficult, or checked altogether, at least for years, it is important to understand the truth in Freudism concerning repressions in the unconscious. It is not ideas only which become "rules for action," but especially desires, more persistently thwarted as they are than our ideas. No explanation of efficacious action is to be found in the hypothesis that mental states "attract" their like, sum themselves up and achieve success in action; for it is desire, emotion, or will which supplies the dynamic. Nor can we reasonably assume that a moral state, such as veracity, has greater power because it embodies a virtue which seems strong merely because we approve of it. It is out of date to await divine action to reinforce our moral states, as if social adjustment had little or nothing to do with preparing the way. There is indeed a moral scale, and in this scale some virtues, such as temperance, courage, are assigned a place such that we anticipate prompt overt action. But sufficient attention has not been given to self-control on its inner side in relation to psycho-physical states resulting in effective action, as when, through appeal to an ideal of temperance, a man checks his activities to avoid any excess in eating, drinking, working, taking pleasure, tending to become intense, too emotional, too self-restrained; or, when a man rises to the occasion in behalf of courage and plunges into heroic action.

The Causal Series.—What is the regulative power of human action? How is the transition made from moral state to overt act in the external world, under natural law? Laing, who has drawn attention to this question anew, holds that the solution is to be found in the relation between natural processes and human action at the point where an act finds place in the causal series.⁴ A human being is a natural organism, subject to natural causality, internal and external. The expression of a moral state turns upon the possibility of controlling natural processes through knowledge of the conditions of those processes.

⁴ B. M. Laing, *A Study in Moral Problems*, p. 9.

The problem is to control the processes so that they shall be subservient to the realization and preservation of moral values. A natural process can be controlled only by controlling conditions on which it rests, or causes which set it going. Are the controlling factors in human life biological and economical? Do moral forces exist? Are moral sentiments "causes" which operate after the manner of natural forces? If so, psychology should be able to inform us concerning their springs of action. Zeal, earnestness, enthusiasm would be instances. These, as psychology describes them, are like any other qualities subject to natural processes, that is, they are *indifferent to values*, to "explain" them is not to show their moral power. Moral forces are not to be explained but rather to be justified. Causes serve by way of explanation, values for purposes of justification: a purpose, being a result, can not be one of the causal factors which bring it about. Though value and desire are closely connected, the connection is not a causal one, value does not bring desire into play; hence the difficulty.⁵

Values and Causes.—Butler has shown that conscience has authority, but not power. The same is true of values in general. Conscience merely sets values before us, values are not capable of compelling acceptance; there is nothing inherent in nature that will inevitably lead to progress. In order that values may be realized causes are necessary, and the difficulty is that causes are matters of physics, economics, and psychology. Values must be wanted or desired: they can be realized through persons. Yet the effectiveness of man's action depends on other forces beyond himself, and upon his knowledge and control of those forces. A desire for the good is abstract and general: action is concrete and specific. Hence the rôle of values is to render it possible for the individual to coördinate forces, in view of the fact that values do not compel their own selection but are only regulative principles. Laing finds a chief source of our difficulty in the fact that we

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

have not distinguished between values and causes, also our confusion between values and a consciousness of values.⁶ It is not value which influences a man's action: it is through his consciousness of value that a man's action is determined.

Effective Forces.—Analyzing the problem from the point of view of causes, Laing finds it doubtful whether there are certain primary ineradicable psychological forces (instincts) which move the individual in a certain direction.⁷ It is customary to regard instincts and emotions as elementary forces which determine human action. But when these forces are actually effective the cause is to be sought in the conditions in which the organism is placed. Although the appropriate mechanisms may be present, the organism is not bound to act in these directions, but must receive a stimulus. An impulse is a form of activity, not a cause of activity; not a force urging the individual to act, but intelligible in relation to the organism in the process of acting or reacting, the stimulus being in the given situation. The full conditions are required to explain the unique features of the reaction and response. The same is true of the emotions, or of the inner psychological complexes which psychoanalysts describe. The sources of mental and nervous disorders, for example, are found in external conditions. The elementary psychical forces which become dangerous if repressed are primary forms of reactions to situations. That is, the causes of the disorders are in the conflicting appeals made to the individual amid the conditions in which he is placed. Repressions occur because certain things a man would do are forbidden by the society in which he lives.

How Mind is Conditioned.—Again, if we approach the problem from the point of view of habit, we find that habits derived from instincts are not the only motive power of thought and action. It can not be said that man is by nature acquisitive. It is once more a question of conditions leading to action or reaction on the part of the individual.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

The mind is conditioned by non-mental factors; and matter is to be regarded as a reservoir of potentialities which, given certain suitable conditions, will emerge as actual movements of a certain type.⁸ The mind is not an inert entity to be aroused, but a force analogous to electricity, which, released, is known only in the form of activity. We should avoid such generalities as the notion that sex-tendencies are due to the innate "nature" of the organism. It is always a question of enlisting or favoring conditions. The mind does not even create except by using non-mental forces so as to bring about something different: what the mind does is to bring conditions or forces into relation, thereby enabling them to operate in ways in which they do not or might not operate when left to themselves. And so selection resolves itself into the appropriation of what is fit.

Attaining Fitness.—We may illustrate Laing's chief point by reference to well-known facts. If one is weary after the exertions of many days, one can not immediately spring into efficient action as if the organism were perfectly fit. The results of efforts to recuperate do not appear immediately. Change in bodily states are secured by conformity to favoring conditions over which we have no direct control. Granted a bettered state of the organism, one may await the right moment to plunge in and begin work anew. The mind functions most freely when the organism presents fewest impeding conditions.

Realizing the power which certain desires, already in effective or habitual expression, have over us, we endeavor to "outwit ourselves" by putting the organism in relationships likely to prove favorable, as when a man breaks from tempting surroundings and puts himself where social influences will help him to gain freedom from adverse habits. Our power over the body is dependent on causal sequences already in operation and tending to continue in activity in the given direction unless other forces are strengthened to counteract them. The same is true of power over higher psycho-physical states. There are always favorable or

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

unfavorable conditions, even if it seems to be a mere matter of "moods," as with the artist who can not paint when his mood is adverse, the writer who sometimes can not write; while on other days everything is favorable.

Favorable Conditions.—To make the thorough study of moral forces which Laing's conclusions call for would be to inquire into fitting and disturbing conditions all along the line of the moral life. For the unity of the good, as we have already noted, is *something to be created*.⁹ It emerges as a "need of action," to be achieved only if two conditions are satisfied: (1) there must be nothing inherent in the nature of values implying a conflict between them, and (2) the various forces must be so related that they will coöperate effectively. For values are in contrast with the struggle for existence, and only when values coincide with certain conditions fostering their expression are they actually effective. When forced into a struggle, as in war, people will, if need be, abandon their higher values; hence ends that are lowest in the scale of values may drive out higher values in process of expression. The values for which action is taken in a vigorous way are already operative in the given situation, as when a person, arriving at the front, sees that every interest whatever must be subordinated to the need of the hour.

To make an ideal effective then is to organize it in relation to the concrete situation which confronts us, otherwise it will remain purely general. It is the psychophysical individual who acts as a cause, not the value.¹⁰ In the light of values one may indeed select objects at which to aim so as to bring values into expression, through the interaction of the organism with the environment. If our actions are effective, the reason is to be found in the accompanying conditions. In the social conditions in which we find ourselves, for instance, struggles are in process; and we may participate or contend against actual processes. Men will struggle for primary ends of action, pertaining to existence and the means of sustaining it, as they will

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

not for higher values, on which their natural existence does not depend. But if the conditions of physical and economic welfare are first provided, then indeed it may be possible to secure action in favor of higher values.

Effective Deeds.—Hence to begin aright, so Laing maintains, would be to consider what physical and economic factors have brought about the given social situation which should be changed. Laing holds unqualifiedly that morality rests on conditions, for instance, when the state of affairs is such as to provoke a revolt, or when poverty affords a motive for philanthropy. The motive then is “objective”; it is not subjective because entertained by an individual. That is, the “reason” is based on an objective situation, the stimulus comes from the conditions; we can not grasp the tendency to action apart from the given situation. Thus when a man tells a lie or breaks a promise, the motive is in the conditions.¹¹ Moral deeds are not only relative to situations, but to what is possible in the given situations. The assumed universality of action is due to our idea that all men would be *likely* to act that way; but this is improbable. Our control of conditions is so far imperfect as to render it impossible to formulate general rules. Many of our ideals are “impracticable” because we have not based them on recognition of the causes or conditions under which they might be carried out. Self-sacrifice, if really needed, is due to the fact that morality is imperfectly realized: if it has any value at all, it lies in what is actually accomplished. It would be absurd to fall back on our faith in the virtues as “somehow” effective *because* they are so worthy. So, too, our efforts fail when we put reliance on some mystic power of reason or will.¹²

We uncritically assume that the defects of our action are due to the cleavage in our nature, to the presence of desires; but we can not will unless we desire, will is a stage in the process of desire: neither reason nor will, nor even desire is arbiter alone, although desirability is *one*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 203.

criterion. It would be an over-simplification of the real to select one desirable thing. We face the problem of divergence between the desired and the desirable, owing to the complexity of things and of the causal series. Natural forces operate through the organism and find continuation beyond it, and if the organism is not to be thrown into disorder these forces must be controlled before the organism is influenced.¹³ The only solution of the problems of freedom is by control of the conditions which make for freedom; mere will can effect nothing, as natural conditions are not controlled by a will, and natural conditions determine human action. Moral perfection itself is a question of controlling environment through knowledge of the factors affecting human action. Hence Laing holds that the ideal life would be one in which all desirable things would continually be realized, so that no man would have any motive for doing anything undesirable.

Moral Failures.—Doubtless there is much evidence for all these contentions. We have here an explanation in part of the moral failures of the ages. Moral leaders have devoted unlimited time and energy to eulogizing the virtuous life, as the disciples of peace praised peace before the World War, instead of engaging in persistent effort to discover and carry into execution "a moral equivalent for war," instead of organizing moral forces so as to *make* them effective among nations. So, too, the individual has contemplated ideals without considering the conditions which render their realization possible. It is indeed true, as Laing insists, that we need not wait for an inner change of will on the part of mankind; but we should set about the discovery of the conditions on which the realization of values depends, and having acquired the knowledge construct the mechanism to carry into effect what we know.¹⁴ To the extent that the moral life rests on mechanisms and natural processes, it is imperative to consider whether mechanisms and natural processes are being utilized to promote morality.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

Higher Values as Forces.—Yet to stop where Laing stops, as vitally important as his contentions may be, would not be to take all the factors of moral success into account. Laing emphasizes sensibility rather than reason, and approaches the moral situation from without rather than from within. What is needed is an equally searching inquiry into the inner conditions which make virtue effective. The power of moral ideals does not consist solely in that phase of values which can be realized through the organism so far as environmental conditions permit. Moral ideals have inspired and moral leaders have quickened people far beyond actual attainments. An ideal has power in its own sphere. It draws or uplifts the self, and the self may become identified in spirit with an ideal which can not by any means be realized except in moderate degree during a life-time. Ideals have contemplative value. There are values in the life of reason, the love of the Beautiful and the Good which surpass any creative production that can be brought forth in a given period. Indeed, ideals in Plato's sense of the term constitute a realm of eternal values as the one end really worth all our endeavors. So, too, the original Christianity may be said to have exercised its power in a sphere vastly great in comparison with man's meager attainments in living by the teaching of the Gospels. Man's greater attainments may result, not so much from direct effort to carry out ideals now, but as a later consequence of the identification he has made between his selfhood and the ideal, in so far as he has willed to realize the ideal, while mindful of the fact that life accomplishes its ends in its own way, and in its own time.

The Power of Ideals.—Ideals have two aspects: (1) an ideal may be an incentive to action *now*, implying something to be done forthwith, as Laing suggests, a stimulus to work, to select fitting conditions; changes in habits and methods may be imperative, also more persistent effort, greater thoughtfulness in choosing conditions favorable to the realization of a worthy universe of desire; hence alertness in taking opportunities may be called for, wiser adaptation to circumstances, more self-control; but (2) an ideal

may also be a vision of a far-off goal to be approximated, such as the command to be perfect, to live the abundant life; it may bring an uplift of the heart, an inspiration to the spirit; as an object of repeated contemplation, quickening thought at its best, enlisting creative reason; it may be efficacious in high degree.

The Value of Inner Peace.—An ideal of poise, or inner peace has power over the mind as an objective to work for steadily, day by day, and year by year. With the growth of serenity in meeting the vicissitudes of life, there is increase of inner control. This inner control in turn finds expression in a mode of life in correspondence with it, as we note in marked degree in the case of Quakers and others who have long cultivated the gentler virtues; who have checked all coarser emotions, such as jealousy, anger, hatred. Granted this inner control, whether fostered as the Stoics of old cultivated equanimity, or as the Quakers increase it by worshipping in silence, listening to and obeying the inner guidance; there result changes never consciously sought. One whose inner life is thus serene is, of course, free from the vexations which other people permit, far more free from disturbing nervous states and their accompanying bodily responses; hence, at need, there is greater power in reserve to insure the triumph of the higher resistance, and efficacious expression of the gentler virtues. The greater power is attributable to the ideal, the lesser to the harmonious mental states which reinforce equanimity as a habit. It is not then a question of waiting, with those who put stress on external situations, for conditions favorable to the growth of serenity: the devotee of the quieter values of the serene life cultivates composure as a habit so that, when social situations occur, he will be able to meet them with that quietness or confidence which is strength.

Ideal Attitudes.—A direction of mind toward an ideal becomes in time a habit, that is, an attitude, attitudes increase in power and become efficacious, as we note in the Quaker's attitude toward war. An ideal may be merely a thought at first, an affirmation, for instance, that war

shall cease. But anon an opportunity occurs to test one's faith, and the ideal is vigorously adopted as a rule for action then and there.

Again, experience leads us to distinguish between mental levels. On the lowest level, one is virtually a prisoner of bodily conditions or passing states, as when a man is swept along by impulse to a vicious deed. A little higher up, one is mostly enveloped by awareness of processes, as when illness or indigestion impedes the flow of thought. A little higher still, one is shut in at intervals, with occasional breaks in the clouds, in the moods suggestive of doubt, pessimism or despair. Steadily to ascend is to have an increasing sense of self-possession, control, freedom, with visions of the goal to be won. If we are most free from impeding states either when giving ourselves most fully to self-forgetting service for others or when doing what we call creative work which becomes so absorbing that we have practically no awareness of processes, or even of favorable conditions, an ideal may be said to have greatest power on the level of freest activity.

Ideals as Objectives.—In the world of successful action, people give themselves far more fully to their objectives than to the means essential to the end. It is the conviction that the end must be gained which sets free the energies which should be devoted to studying out the necessary conditions. We contemplate for years objectives which we are determined to realize. We venture to dream, even about that which is supposedly "too good to be true." We make our ideals more explicit as, year by year, we learn the lessons of failure. The sculptor sees as in a vision the beautiful figure he is to bring out of marble, the architect sees the completed structure he is about to build; the railroad president envisages the vast improvement to be made in the development of his great system, as in the case of Mr. Cassatt, coming home from Europe with a vision of a magnificent station in New York City, with a tunnel under the Hudson River. What seems utterly impractical or even impossible at first becomes a realized dream a few years later. Concentration of effort toward the goal is

essential to success, even in the most external field. It is a characteristic of virtue, notably in the case of courage, to make the venture even where everything seems antagonistic, and the project doomed to failure. From the moral point of view there is a great advantage in regarding the organism as an instrument for the realization of ideals, instead of so emphasizing conditions that one loses heart amidst an endless round of relativities.

An ideal of work in the world in adaptation to present conditions, expressive of common sense in meeting adversities, routine, economic necessities, is compatible with an ideal outlook on a higher level toward the eternal verities which are for the most part independent of transient conditions. The two ideal ventures sometimes coincide in a remarkable way, as in the case of the soldier who does his duty with exceptional efficiency when in action, but who also leaps forward at a bound in allegiance to "first and last things." Meanwhile, the chaplain who does not fight, and the Quaker who will not fight, exemplify moral force in another way, no less impressive. There are always values worth fighting for in some kind of way, howbeit in protest against all fighting with weapons or with a militant tongue. Too much attention has been given to the martial virtues of the overt type, to the neglect of highly organized serenity and the power it utilizes.

Virtues as Forces.—All the virtues we have been considering in the foregoing chapters are moral forces. Moral force is required to be patient, considerate, gentle, temperate or well-balanced, as surely as in the effort to be courageous, *just* in all one's dealings, *honest* even when it is the custom to defraud, or in the determination to speak the truth when frankness is unpopular. The power enlisted in the endeavor to attain inner control is available for use in overt action. The man of composure and marked inner control is a power as he moves about among his fellows. The master man in any field of action is also in considerable measure master of his inner life.

The power which any virtue has in the scale depends then to some extent on the recognition we give to it, and

there has been a tendency to over-emphasize virtues which foster economic necessities, to the neglect of the less apparent virtues without which material success is of slight avail. Nineteen centuries of interest in Christianity have hardly sufficed to show the real force of the virtues signalized by the Sermon on the Mount. The ethics of hedonism and the ethics of Hercules have had more than abundant recognition. The superman has exercised his power in full vigor. But even the Germans, utterly declining to accept responsibility for the World War or to admit defeat, gave heartiest recognition to the succoring Quakers, with their relief forces, and admitted them into the country when admission was refused to every other social group. The Quakers won their laurels solely by unostentatious deeds of brotherly sympathy and love.

Efficacious Virtue.—What is called for then is recognition of the great diversity in expression of the virtues, which range from the contemplative virtues, encouraged without any regard for possibilities of reforming the world on the outside, to virtues essential to social justice and largely dependent on economic evolution. The first fact to note is that, as moral forces have no independent power of attracting conditions favorable to their realization, as a given virtue, such as self-sacrifice, carries no guarantee that it *must* succeed, any virtue that is to be made efficacious must be brought into relation with actual processes. This is as true of virtues pertaining especially to the inner life as of admittedly social virtues. A man begins to ground an ideal in his conduct when he has *interest enough* to live by it, by conquering habits within or tendencies toward customs without. It is easy to return blow for blow, to exact an eye for an eye; but inner resistance is required to return good for evil, love for hate. A primary difficulty with many men is that they have not even tried the higher resistance; have not learned, with Buddha, that "hatred does not cease by hatred, but by love." What might result in the world by devotion to an unpopular moral ideal is best shown by the conduct of those who, like the Quakers, are willing to stand by a conviction without

compromise in any situation. To ground an ideal in conduct already in process is indeed uncompromisingly to cultivate the values which are most sharply contrasted with the individual and social states to be driven out. Psychologically, this involves the shifting of attention, for example, from an activity tending toward an emotion of anger to a sentiment of forgiveness, love, or peace. Spiritually, it means serving a higher master; since one can not serve two at a time. Morally, it means a different integration, concentration on a higher ideal. Underlying any such inner change is the question of possessing sufficient inner control to make it. He who really wishes to succeed, even when the odds appear to be against him, can accomplish his purpose by studiously cultivating the inner and outer conditions which will yield the desired results in time.

Moral Education.—All our wiser educational and religious methods proceed on this basis. We no longer expect miracles or sudden conversions. We do not wait till all the old buildings are torn down, till new equipment is installed, and better teachers are trained: we depend on higher environmental influences, the disclosure of opportunities, the power of example, the working together of intellectual, cultural, moral, and religious forces toward a synthetic end. The World War did not shake the faith of men in organized effort of this sort. It showed that we had not taught the youth of the nation to carry out this effort in the moral sphere as effectively as we have taught them to acquire mechanisms for economic efficiency. Moral sentiments can as reasonably be called forces as before. But the war taught us that the development of mechanisms had not been psychologically understood. We had been putting our faith in generalities, on the supposition that our natures somehow exercised a subtle power of selection and would see to it that the good will should triumph. Now that we have learned that the bodily organism as readily obeys one dominant mental state as another, we realize that we must be far more energetic in selecting a worthy universe of desire.

Moral Mechanisms.—By a “mechanism” as the term is above used, we mean a habit or group of habits which make virtue efficient, establish a balance of power in its favor. Self-control as a habit of life fostering composure, moderation, patience, skill, calmness of judgment, wisdom in selecting means to ends is a mechanism. The higher resistance practiced by the Quaker as a regular mode of life is a mechanism. Such a mechanism may be said to function automatically. A mechanism is not static, but is called into being by a purpose higher in type than the habits which constitute it. It belongs in the causal series of experiences or deeds in the individual’s life, because to acquire it the individual has put himself through training, has exercised inhibition, as when one checks an impulse to become angry, to strike back. Inhibition is always essential to control. The man who is outstanding because of his composure is notable in the community for *what he does not do*, as well as for what he actually does. He has the courage to believe that many of the forces of human nature which the majority have given up as beyond our control can actually be controlled. His example shows us that no man knows what passions can be mastered until he has tried. It also shows that very much more depends upon the use we make of our powers than upon the native trends, for example, various tendencies toward excess. For man grows strong by what he overcomes. The one who finds himself in urgent need of poise, inner peace, or composure may be brought through experience to appreciate, to strive for, and to maintain it as no naturally placid person is ever likely to value it. We submit then the conclusion that virtue as a force begins with the individual, that both knowledge and effort are required, that the means for acquiring the appropriate mechanisms are at hand, and that every man who begins with himself in this fundamentally searching way is preparing to solve the greater problem of making moral forces efficacious, as the greatest forces employed by the community.

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CHAPTER XXV.

MORAL PROBLEMS

Social Consciousness.—We have seen that as society consists of individuals, each of whom is a conscious being with varied interests and diverse capacities, in a measure self-directed, self-determining and free, what is called social consciousness is really the awareness of the individual of his relationships with his fellows. All these relationships—for mutual protection, by aid of custom, law, morality, religion—involve the individual's consciousness of society; human beings interact, but they are also aware of interacting. Consciousness is indeed more fundamental so far as moral relationships are concerned than action, although conduct is in every sense of the word an active term. Society, whether in large groups or small, is constituted by mutual understanding, and this understanding becomes more explicitly self-conscious to the degree that it is ethical. There is tacit agreement, there are unwritten laws, a common interest or purpose, for example, among educational groups, and any social situation with regard to the conduct of one's associates is a conscious situation. Education at its best is a matter of contact with other minds, the whole process of culture and civilization is in essence increasing consciousness in the individual and the race.¹

The Effect of Consciousness.—The first fact to note with special emphasis is that consciousness *makes a difference*, and the attitude of the individual towards his group, also his conduct in relation to it, changes with the changes in his consciousness. Mutual adjustment is fostered by mutual understanding. So in larger groups there may be what Fite calls "a system of personal ends determined in

¹ Cf. Fite, *Individualism*, 1911, p. 105.

mutual freedom and agreement.”² Social action by mutual agreement becomes progressively ethical through fellowship in mutual interests and purposes. The competition which keeps men apart in the economic world gives place to the intellectual rivalry of the friendly group where each participant offers those ideas which he can best contribute. The differences which keep people apart so long, as far as instrumental values are concerned, become incentives to draw them together in such mutuality; and so “your fellow by his very difference opens the way to a larger expansion of yourself.”

The Larger Self-consciousness.—This truth wholly offsets the objection sometimes raised against the ethical ideal of self-realization. Rogers insists that “self-realization is after all self-centered, and therefore petty when we put it alongside the bigger world.” He holds that the emphasis falls on *self*, where it should be a matter of a controlling interest or task.³ But it is precisely this *purpose* uniting us with our fellows in things worth doing which constitutes self-realization in the larger sense for which we have pleaded. “Each of us is aware of an immensely more comprehensive self than he is able to express in overt activity.”⁴ It is this larger or social consciousness which we begin to draw upon in the quickening groups of which we find ourselves parts. Since “the capacity for self-realization is limited by the narrowness of our attention,” we need those contacts which will rouse us into larger moral responsiveness. As one responds to the work of art through the awakening of the artist in one’s self, so one responds to the moral spirit in a group where ethical issues are brought to the fore. The individual, becoming aware of the issues which his fellow members are discussing, makes the implied ethical principles his own and awakens to greater responsibility. In awakening to moral self-consciousness the individual becomes more self-regarding, but this apparent centering of the issues about the self is rela-

² *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

³ *The Theory of Ethics*, pp. 134, 136.

⁴ Fite, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

tive to the profounder discovery of what Professor Palmer calls "the conjunct self."

The Honor System.—In the adoption of the honor system in colleges where student government has been inaugurated, we have an excellent illustration of this advance from the less conscious, the less moral to the more explicitly moral; and, with the increase of response to an ethical ideal, an enlargement of self-consciousness. In the honor system, the appeal to the individual conscience is substituted in large part for a set of rules imposed by those in authority, and enforced by reprimands and penalties. Rules are found necessary in an order of society where conscience is only slightly awakened. When put upon his honor the individual accepts responsibility and endeavors to do right without being watched, reminded, or reproved. He is appealed to as a person, no longer a mere child, careless and unwitting, as a person who is so far awake to the need for coöperation as to be ready voluntarily to do his part in sustaining the good of the whole. An appeal to honor is an appeal to manliness, uprightness, integrity. Although under the honor system all, including members of the student government, are still under rules and are treated alike, the rules are drawn up in coöperation, subject both to advice from administrative officers and to discussion on the part of the students themselves. The college seniors who are more mature in thoughtfulness, with greater self-control, more discretion than others, have a distinct advantage in administrative leadership; since, with keen appreciation of the care-free and pleasure-loving tendencies of youth, they can apply ethical principles more concretely and practically than many of their elders, who, unluckily, have not preserved freshness of spirit or spontaneity.

Misdemeanors.—Some people readily respond to the appeal to be more nearly a law unto themselves. The problem is to arouse those members of a group, in college, in business, in the world at large, who scout the ideal of moral coöperation. Shall the upholder of the honor system report the lapses from what is right for the community

on the part of those who break the community's written or unwritten rules? That would be to put the offenders on a lower level of moral conduct, where enforced rules are made painfully apparent. Some way must be found to encourage the offender to report his own misdeeds, and by reporting them to signify his willingness to coöperate in the future. It is still a problem to know how to appeal to those who lag behind in matters of conscience, and the problem must be worked out to its full solution by keeping in sympathetic touch with those who most need to be quickened, by saying the wise word at the fitting time. For all members of the community it is a question of advance beyond individual interpretation of rules involving compromises or opportunities for a moral lapse from the standard or ideal put before the group. The ideal involves recognition of principles which are for the good of all, and which a few at least in the group would sustain even if there were no rules. And for all there is steady progress toward freedom. No one likes to feel that he is being watched in class-room or dormitory, in office or salesroom, on the suspicion that he may be dishonest. To be free from the unpleasant consciousness that spies may be present, that proctors are necessary, that promises not to cheat must be exacted, the individual should resolve to do what is right *because it is right*, because it is not only best for the community which is striving to be ethical, but implies moral integrity on the part of each member of the group. One who appreciates the honor system is eager to reach the stage of moral development where he will no longer have any misdemeanors to report. He can then dismiss all unpleasant consciousness in the matter, and give himself more fully to his education, and to his purpose in life. Each one who takes the matter into his own hands, who no longer needs rules drawn up by others, who has no fear of incurring reprimands from any one in authority, is ready to do his part in the administration of the rules still needed by some who are less awakened. Thus by setting the example for others, he does his part in bringing society nearer the day when every man shall live by law and order.

Consistency as a Test.—Should I always give expression to virtue in the same way? Ought I, for example, always to tell the truth? Two considerations guide us here. I ought indeed always to be truthful, since this is essential to my moral integrity. But I ought also to take into consideration the greater good. If to save a life, preserve a woman's honor or reputation, or to save property of direct value in the greater interests of life, I am minded to mislead the probable wrong-doer, then this act is right, it implies a greater good than would be mere consistency in my utterances. By deceiving the would-be murderer, slanderer or thief, I am not lowering my moral standard. I still prefer truthfulness to lying. My act was for another's personal good. In so acting I am still true to my ideal: in the case of two alternatives, I ought always to choose the one which I judge to be higher.

Compromises.—Is it permissible, in order to avoid carrying any tendency or interest to excess, to indulge in a vice or two? For instance, gambling, which has now found its way into more cultural circles. There is one moralist at least who holds that the cause of morality has "sometimes suffered from the disposition to take too high a moral tone about such a vice as that of gambling, and to overwhelm it with emotional reproaches. The man who likes to risk a little money for the fun of the thing feels instinctively that this is overcharged, and he is apt in consequence to react against it. It is safer, and often more effective, to recognize gambling as primarily a business vice, and to attack the gambler because he is a fool rather than because he is a villain; though even here a sense of proportion ought to hold. Provided a man risks only what he can easily afford, is scrupulous to see that no one else, either, is encouraged to risk more than he ought, and is successful in keeping the practice outside of working hours as a pastime pure and simple, gambling seems an amusement at least as harmless as some others in better repute. The difficulty, however, lies in keeping it thus within bounds. The gambling spirit needs no special encouragement to become a mental habit, for it is part of that origi-

nal lack of coördination and persistency in human nature which every consideration of common sense urges us to overcome.”⁵

Smoking and Selfishness.—How then shall one indulge to the extent of a harmless diversion without permitting this highly dangerous vice to exceed the limits of a mere diversion? Some take the attitude that one should not counsel others to be any more moral in overt conduct than one chances to be one's self: every man has his vice, why expect people to be any better? For instance, most men smoke, why should one object to smoking on the part of either youth or man? Whatever might be said on hygienic grounds, the question becomes ethical by the fact that smoking readily fosters selfishness among some men. A man will be courteous in every respect called for by good breeding, but when the time comes for smoking, it matters not whether ladies are present, or whether there are men present who dislike tobacco smoke, he will indulge, perhaps with a preliminary struggle to consider others first. Women, emulating men, and claiming the right to do what men do, have recently contended that they should smoke too. But how horrified some men and many women have been! If compromises are permissible, so the argument seems to run, why should not every man and woman compromise? On the other hand it is contended that unless our elders of both sexes refrain, that our youth may not become sensuous pleasure-lovers, we can not expect the youth to follow. If people in authority indulge in precisely the vice that is forbidden, for instance, smoking in a girl's college, why then should others be kept in subjection to rules against smoking? If all the army officers gamble, how shall you enforce a rule against gambling among privates? Is a man able to indulge in his cigar or pipe at home and be as considerate of his wife and children as if he did not smoke? That is a moral question for the individual to decide.

Serving One Master.—Psychologically speaking, a compromise is highly dangerous. All unfortunate habits begin

⁵ Rogers, *The Theory of Ethics*, p. 169.

in a small way—as when one is urged to take his first drink of intoxicants, to make up a hand at table when a player is lacking, to smoke his first cigarette, keep the first money not rightfully his own, indulge in misrepresentation for business reasons, or to cheat in college on the ground that one probably will not be caught. The crucial moment is in the initial stage of action, when we have control over our conduct. The time to object is on the first occasion. Ethically speaking, a compromise is more serious still. For it involves the attempt to serve two masters. It is easy indeed by the aid of a compromise to slip into selfishness as one's master. It is difficult to know just when to stop, lest the harmless indulgence of today become the habit of tomorrow, and eventually become as fixed as the habit of tea or coffee-drinking upon people who think they can not go through a day without the one or the other, or both. In our reaction against the Puritanism which gave us some of our noblest moral ideals, we tend toward the other extreme today.

Lawlessness.—There are several sources of lawlessness. It may be an outcropping of youthful opposition to restraints and regulations, mostly temporary, due to transient self-assertion in capricious forms. It may be a reaction against paternalism in government, intensified with increase in the number of laws, and not to be overcome by passing more laws. The individual resents infringements on what he takes to be his private rights, for example, in drinking what he prefers. It may be a natural reaction from excessive regulation in war-time, and is likely to wane in a few years. But it increases with the number of mechanical inventions enabling the offenders to speed away. Lawlessness has always been a problem. It has to be met with much considerateness; since most offenders are youthful, or began in youth to be offenders and later turned against society. It is to be met by education, improvements in our prison-system, in the administration of justice; and by substituting *moral reason* for the mere authority of institutions.

Christ in Business.—Commenting on the failure of a

business man who "preached a little on the side" and had much to say about the iniquity of modern commercial methods, in connection with his own effort to introduce Christianity into business, a correspondent of the *Washington Star* maintains that business, "as the day's work goes, is not so crooked as the crooks make it out to be. Business is but one of the activities of men, and mankind keeps its lines of progress fairly straight. Business is as clean as the home or the school, or the church or the courthouse. Men are as decent in one relation as in others. And Christ is about as much in business as he is in the church or the school or the home. The Golden Rule is the basic philosophy of our Christian civilization. There are no perfect men, and no perfect institutions, but man and his ordinary activities run along about 70 per cent good and the rest fairly good."

Work.—The objections to work in our day spring from dissatisfactions with the present industrial system, and turn upon the view that the primary trouble is with the environment, that is, the economic order. From an ethical point of view, interest centers in craftsmanship, in doing a piece of work as well as it can be done for the sake of ideal ends, as if a master craftsman were looking on. The values of work in their influence on character, and the joys of work need not be disparaged, even though we are just now protesting against certain kinds of work and the conditions under which such work is done. Work is with the head as well as with the hands. Work is moral. By its aid we break through the inertias of the organism, overcome our selfishness, and begin to serve. Through it we may gain self-expression, increasing freedom in the inner life. But through mistaken ideas of self-sacrifice, allegiance to materialistic standards, and exacting labor-unions one may subordinate the soul. And so the problem is to arouse interest once more in the moral values of work, by directing attention to the inner life as intrinsic in value.

Arousing the Moral Will.—It can not truly be said that we lack knowledge of the principles and methods by which

the troubles that beset us can be overcome. It would be sheer evasion in these days to insist that it is a question of the mystery of evil or the unregeneracy of human nature. We know, for instance, what coöperation would accomplish, for we have seen it tried out; but many of us do not wish to try it. We know the principle that all men are brothers, but some of us do not care to regard them so. We know the superiority of Christian precepts which the few have sincerely lived by, for example, the Quakers. We might put ethics above politics, and revive the political ideal of Aristotle; but we allow politicians to play the game, while men of high principle refrain from taking public office. We could put ethical principles above the strife for private gain, and still acquire all that is needed for a good living.

The problem, when we meet individuals to whom we might appeal to advance in their morality, is to arouse the moral will. The problem has sometimes been given up as too difficult, even by clergymen, either because the will is said to be unregenerate or because the will is identified with "will-power" which we might exert but do not. But it should be noted once more that moral will is not separable from moral reason. Knowledge is to a large extent virtue, and with increase of knowledge virtue is likely to come. It is a question of appealing to the understanding and the affections, not directly to the will.

What is the situation with you and me, when we do not rouse into action as we should? Sometimes it is a matter of inertia, and this is partly physical and may be due to excessive fatigue; it may call for increased health and strength. It is also in part psychical, and we need to remind ourselves that in all undertakings persistence or concentration of effort is needed to press through the first difficulties. Our habits are acquired by pushing through the psycho-physical inertias. The egoistic love of pleasure is also a factor in our inertias. Oftentimes we much prefer to enjoy rather than to exert ourselves. We need to learn the greater values of higher pleasures and of happiness, compatible as they are with systematic effort. There is need

of knowledge of the so-called sense of effort, which is in part a question of renewing ideals day by day. Will is not a force to exert, as if it were latent and needed to be brought out of its place of hiding. Attention is will. Thought is will. When reason is appealed to and won, will insensibly follows. When the heart is touched, separate acts of will are not required. If then you would appeal to a man, first learn what his active interests are, what his ruling passion is, what is his prevailing love. Seek to win him by appealing to his understanding heart. The basic urges of human nature will remain the same, but these may be enlisted in progressively higher directions. What then is the next step for a man to take in his individual development? Where does he stand? What is he trying to be? Just where does he need wise counsel? Learn this, and then advise him accordingly.

The Problem of Duality of Self.—No argument is needed to show that “a double-minded man is unstable in all his ways.” It is morally true that no man can serve two masters: but what if the duality be involuntary, due to a conflict which is misunderstood? Must the problem be left for religion to solve, with its influences making for regeneration? Our study has led to the conclusion that the moral situation is far more promising than it was when the term selfishness was used as a mere generality, when egoism was too sharply distinguished from altruism. Since moral reform begins at home in the inner life of each individual, it is a question of the specific duality to be known and overcome; the undesirable traits or tendencies, and the sort of conduct to be substituted for those modes of expression which yield discord.

It is far too general to insist that there is a conflict between the will (in general) and a warring element (in general) in one's nature so that when we would do good evil is present with us. To classify the warring element as due to “sin” is to put off the day of the needed psychological analysis. The so-called “carnal” mind has ceased to be a generality, in the light of modern knowledge of our desires, the objects toward which they strive, the

opportunity that is ours to utilize the primal urges of our nature, with the hope of remaking the self.⁶ So too the "mind of Christ" which is to be renewed each day has taken on more definite meaning with insight into values coördinated in a scale.⁷ We no longer anticipate sudden conversions as if by miracle, but put our faith in the well-nigh insensible changes by which the self advances towards unity or consistency; and the more determinate our purpose the less time we need spend analyzing our dualities.

Sources of Duality.—The answer given by certain students of Paul's problem today is that man finds himself doing what he hates despite his will, because so large a part of his nature is subconscious, not yet understood. There is no hostile element by itself. Instead, there are various tendencies, emotional complexes, unrealized abilities and activities still in process, and these differ with the individual. It is not then primarily a question of the flesh, of our animal inheritance through evolution, of any given instinct alone, or even of the will apart from its sources in relation to sin or evil; but a problem of our whole deeper self understood in the light of the present stage of its development. The solution of the problem is to be found by establishing our aspirations in the concrete deeds of daily life, in our natural selfhood, no longer disparaged, as if "natural goodness" bore no relation to spiritual goodness. We must first understand if we would enlist or sublimate our tendencies, and overcome all interference with moral health and spiritual progress.

The Content of Mental Life.—What then is it in us that needs to be coördinated? Our mental life consists in part of desires more or less in conflict, and needing organization in an eligible universe of desire; emotions, which range all the way from the coarser and more selfish angers, hates, jealousies, envies, to the refined moral and spiritual sentiments which culminate in love at its best and may be taken as a standard; instinctive dispositions which we have habitually used according to our view or attitude

⁶ Cf. Hocking, *Human Nature and its Remaking*, p. 26.

⁷ Dresser, *Psychology in Theory and Application*, p. 689.

toward life; and feelings of pleasure and pain. Over against these commingling activities, stands the intellect with its cool scrutiny, and the will as the coördinating activity, dependent on the measure of self-knowledge and self-control which we possess. In many of us there is a break between the emotional-instinctive life and the will-intellectual. In others the break is between will and imagination, will and habit, or will and understanding; while a typical contrast is between "head" and "heart." The former term "inclination," contrasted with duty, is too general. So too is the term "self-love," put in antithesis with love toward others.⁸ In each case the negative or condemnatory terms involve activities which are good in proper relations. Duality of self is not to be overcome by dwelling on a specific contrast, say that between the emotions and the understanding; but by noting that the primary difficulty is in our view of life, with the attitude we take.

Substitution.—Desires, for example, can not be driven out: desires that are less eligible can be subordinated to those more worthy, the coarser controlled by the finer. So in time all desires may be assigned to their places in a scale, as we regulate desire for food, as we moderate our desires for pleasure. Many of our emotions can be overcome altogether. In time, "righteous indignation" may be the only emotion of anger left. Bitterness, jealousy, and similar emotions may wholly cease. Our emotions of fear and the exciting emotions allied with it may wane, as we acquire composure, and grow in wisdom. Pity, sympathy, compassion may be modified by giving heed to what is wise to do; while sentiments which never do any good may give place to those impulses which lead to efficient altruism. What will become of loyalty and patriotism as emotions will depend on our conclusions concerning their rightful objectives. Love of pleasure can not be eliminated, but it may be purified as the whole tone of mental life is purified; and love of giving pleasure,

⁸ Dresser, *op. cit.*, pp. 438, 683.

of making others happy may for the most part take its place. So too imagination may be put to higher uses. In short, the "warring element" in our nature is in every instance power that has not yet been rightly utilized. Anything in our nature may impede, but anything in our nature may aid.

Repressions.—Suppression is the prime reason for inner conflict, with most of us. Misapprehending the conflict, we try to put it down, or ignore it. Thus inhibition is constant in our inner life. Love of ease, laziness, inertia, and unwillingness to make persistent effort to understand and overcome our repressions are some of the reasons why we do not master our inhibitions. Conventionality carried to excess, a New England conscience, too much constraint, over-seriousness, and heightened self-consciousness are also reasons. Timidity, hesitancy in action, and undue sensitiveness are sometimes factors. The moral of the tale that is told about our inner life is not, unbridled expression; it is freedom of the sort which characterizes the inner life when we use our powers creatively, when we are doing what is worth while. When inhibition means "power confined," expression must become as free as possible, but always with a worthy end in view.

Affirmatively speaking, we may say that inner conflict signifies an opportunity for the moral realization of the self. The process of awakening into freedom is gradual with us all. Part of our difficulty is due to the fact that some of us tend to be over-masterful, while others tend to yield too much; some to be exacting or dominating, others to submit for the sake of harmony. Hence our inner struggles bear intimate relation to our social conduct, especially in the home. The tendency of thought today is to objectify the personal problems which remained mysterious so long only as the individual kept them to himself in the old self-analytical way.

Man's Mental Environment.—If it is to be a question of environment, ethically speaking, the question arises, What is my environment? Is it New England in contrast with India? Is it one's social sphere exclusively? Is it

one's brain (determinism)? Is it my sphere of thought and feeling, my inner life, my spiritual mind in contrast with all that the natural mind discloses? An unrepentant convict, writing from the United States Federal Prison in Atlanta, finds that for him it is the sphere of condemnation he is put under once for all. "I am," he writes, "a physician who allowed himself to become an investor and partner in a brokerage business. At the top of my profession, honored, rich, I am now disgraced, and a Government prisoner. . . . Although in full charge of the scientific research work in the hospital, where I have made several valuable discoveries . . . still I am now in the connotation of society's mind 'a convict,' with all the horrors that word always meant to me. My children no longer acknowledge me. Fraternal organizations that pose as 'brothers' . . . and society in general inexorably, permanently, heartlessly, and with sardonic joy, exert their resistless, crushing pressure to exact a thousand eyes for an eye, millions of teeth for a tooth. Human nature, tradition, clergymen, churches, schools, newspapers, see to it that you are indelibly and forever branded as 'an ex-convict,' 'a cheater,' 'a robber of orphans,' 'a felon,' 'a criminal,' and worse stigmas.

"Men here that crossed a state line with a woman to whom they were not married, distillers honored and respected until legislatures and Congress turned them into 'convicts,' pathetic ill-bred men crazed with narcotic diseases, insane men, ignorant boys . . . doctors prescribing liquor, druggists filling too many whiskey prescriptions, brokers misled by promoters, doctors and clergymen misled by sharpers—these are all here to be eternally branded and stigmatized, whether here for a year and a day, or four years or more, as long as they live, by their impeccable, virtuous, holier-than-thou public preachers, public prints, and public gossip. And this is not the half of it . . . " ⁹

The Moral Environment.—We reach the same conclusion then as in our study of moral forces. The sphere of influences to which a man is most directly subject is mental

⁹ Jan. 29, 1924, quoted (unsigned) in *The Boston Transcript*.

or moral, rather than material. Man is indeed conditioned by heredity and material environment. His problems grow out of his relationship to his social conditions. But primarily it is a question of the point attained in his moral development, in the light of the prevalent ideas to which he is subject. On the one hand is the attitude of people in the given social situation toward the individual, the prejudices, condemnations, or the appreciations and the hopes. On the other hand is the individual's response to the taboos and harsh judgments, or the sympathy and kindness. The total situation on the individual's part includes all those mental factors classified by the psychoanalysts in our day as "unconscious." Life is a process of awakening into knowledge of what all these influences are, and a growth in wisdom in meeting them. Over against all that is adverse on the part of society in its prohibitions, stands the individual, counseled by Emerson to believe in and rely on himself: "Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind . . . the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it." "The soul's emphasis is always right." The integrity of one's own mind is seen, in the light of the foregoing chapters, to be the larger self, the moral individual whose full nature is to be realized. The "right" which is "after my constitution" is that which accords with my social selfhood, typical as I am of all moral beings arriving at the stage of reflective consciousness. The emphasis of the self is "always right" because one abides by conscience, in contrast with any number of opinions and influences to the contrary.

Self-mastery.—The objection most likely to be raised to the whole method advocated in our study of the virtues is that it is still too analytical, that we have not succeeded in avoiding all introspection and subjectivity. Our reply is that the true method consists in penetrating all analysis to the end, to see its values as well as its limitations. Impeding self-consciousness is a stage only in the process of self-knowledge. Socrates, who set the example of profound self-knowledge, was noted in his life for his re-

markable self-mastery. He was the free spirit of the group, in those famous assemblages of the youth and the Sophists of Athens. He was the one who actually lived the maxim, "Nothing to excess." And any one who profits by his great example will reserve the right to keep free in spirit, to retain his spontaneity, "the dance of life," however far he carries his self-discipline.

The over-confident disciples of psycho-analysis in our day, steeped in the literature of sex-novels, reveling in everything Freud says about repressions in the unconscious, reacting against law and order, scoffing at Puritanism, glorying in the Soviet (which they idealize at a distance), and putting aside moral distinctions as sheer remains of the Mid-Victorian age, would fain have us believe that there is nothing good whatever in self-mastery. For the prime trouble with us is said to be "inhibition" or self-suppression; and the great need, expression. Therefore "the new psychology" is a complete substitute for the scientific psychology of all the ages and for all ethics too. As for intellectualism, as for our educational system—what does it avail, when it makes of us, who might have been free, such pent-up, self-restrained mortals?

"The new point of view," writes a partisan of this reactionism, "is utterly against self-mastery; it regards the very principle as wrong." "Conflict within ends all hope of happiness." "It is only within recent years that a clear grasp of love has been gained. This insight came out of behaviorism and psycho-analysis rather than from inductive or speculative fields of thought. We know today that it is instinctive, emotional, and physiological. . . . We respond in relation to our hereditary pattern. . . . Self-control or repression is the burying or denial of the tendency, holding it within the self . . ."

True Self-expression.—But of what avail, it might be asked, is your new attitude, if, reacting against intellectual education, aspiration after what is beautiful and the impetus toward the spiritual life, the new freedom is gained at the expense of what is highest and finest in the human self? To go from bondage to bondage is do little

more than to gain new literary material, in an age which, for the moment, has grown weary of the best, and is willing to jazz even the most beautiful melodies in its mania for something different. The man who checks his higher nature is likely for the time being to disparage the very wisdom that would set him free. But, on the other hand, the much-disparaged idealist, signalized as an example of all that is most unfortunate in self-mastery, possesses a very great advantage over the partisan of "the new freedom," in the fact that he knows he is using his self-mastery as a means, the end being true self-expression. It is the one who has passed through the process of intellectual education in our day who understands these processes. "Every new mind is a new classification," says Emerson. The great need is for knowledge of the type, with insight into the ideal which enables that mind to realize its type. The true clue is to be found, not by dredging to see what may have been lost overboard in life's voyage, but through the values put before the spirit as ideal objects of faith, as incentives to power. Not what we have come from, but where we are going, is the great consideration. Relapse into the literature of barbarism is a confession of the fact, on the part of its devotees, that one does not really wish to know the self, that one prefers camouflage for the nonce. So the pretense is that those who are serious-minded are endlessly self-restrained, pathetic in the extreme in their bondage to conventionality; while self-mastery is taken to be nothing more than "control of the powers of self by external means; a lashing of the spirit as it were, to set standards of conventional thought." Meanwhile, true self-mastery springs from realization of the fact that "that which a man can do best none but his Maker can teach him." "There is guidance for each one of us, and by lowly listening we shall hear the right word." "Do your work and you shall reinforce yourself."¹⁰

¹⁰ Emerson, *Essays*, First Series.

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CHAPTER XXVI

INTERNATIONAL ETHICS

World Issues.—It is sometimes maintained that international relations are never matters of ethics, because there is no power or international police to enforce treaties or other agreements. If a nation chooses to set treaties aside, and impose its rule on another nation by force of arms, or to invade a neighboring nation on the way to fight another, why then, as “necessity knows no law,” there is nothing to prevent. But certain principles of equity remain, in the form of a gentleman’s agreement among nations, and public sentiment increasingly sustains this agreement, even when governments try to set it aside. The Hague Tribunal was not sufficiently established to receive the recognition which was its due, when the World War became imminent. Since the armistice, it has seemed imperative, to many, to establish an international police to sustain the League of Nations. But the trend of public sentiment in some quarters has been in favor of an international court of arbitration, on the ground that the world is now ready to debate international issues precisely as matters have been adjusted between states on a smaller scale. There is a strong conviction that the principles of justice which have prevailed within one nation should be extended to the nations in general. This would be a further enlargement of relationships which have been in process of extension ever since families and tribes began to adjust their difficulties on an ethical basis in contrast with mere appeal to tradition or custom.

International Law.—Meanwhile, added groups of principles known as international law have contributed a point of view differing in some respects from civil laws in the community, and also set apart from international ethics;

hence as falling outside the scope of our inquiry. Fenwick, for example, raises the question of the real nature of international law as compared with national law.¹ International law may be regarded as a positive system in contrast with rules with legal validity, or rules asserted by individual governments, guided by either altruistic or egoistic (selfish) motives. The existing rules of international law may then be tested by the general conceptions of justice in vogue in the several states, international law being still in the formative stage. In the smaller social groups there are found, rules of conduct (1) governing the conflicts of individual claims, (2) protecting the rights of members of the community, (3) prescribing the respective duties. The criterion in each case is "the sense of justice prevailing at the given time within the community." The law is established as the basis of peace, and in the same way there is need of law between states. Hence Fenwick defines international law as "the body of rules accepted by the general community of nations as defining their rights and the means of procedure by which those rights may be protected or violations of them redressed." Fenwick makes no reference to "moral standards," as he interprets this term, because the criterion is: rules of conduct "actually recognized by nations" instead of "abstract theories or ideals of future conduct." That is to say, *rules* are kept distinct from "ethics," the sources of these being the body of customs prevailing in the several nations.

Sources of International Principles.—In behalf of our departmental ways of thinking, and for the sake of specialization, this distinction is an advantage. But to insist on it is to neglect both a profound historical fact and the greatest hope for conciliation among the nations. One of the radical misconceptions which prevent partisans of ethics, the law, sociology, social psychology, and economics from drawing more closely together is the assumption that a principle, because advocated by a philosopher, notably an idealist in the ethical field, is "abstract." But, as we

¹ C. G. Fenwick, *International Law*, 1924, p. 34.

have repeatedly seen in the foregoing chapters, the philosopher makes explicit the principles implied in the life and thought of the people. Confucius did not invent, or propose as an abstract theory, the Golden Rule, but formulated the principle of reciprocity as the most enlightened among his people already knew it and lived it. What Hobhouse, Westermarck, Myers, and other writers on "history as past ethics" disclose to us are the rules of conduct "actually recognized by nations," to use Fenwick's phrase. The ideal for future conduct is a better statement of principles already in operation, and it is a well-known fact that the conduct of people often exceeds in value any formulation of the ideal trend of such conduct. Thus Plato found inspiration in a type of national life which has never yet been surpassed in the world's history, so far at least as concrete relation between practice and the ideal is concerned.

All scientific wisdom began in systematic form with Aristotle, greatest among creators of special sciences; and Aristotle drew upon all available resources to master the existing constitutions of the world. Aristotle was abstract (that is, theoretical) at the point where all men become in a measure speculative, namely, when our learning gives out. Lacking the microscope, the telescope, and the scientific laboratory with its mechanical equipment, he indulged in abstractions to eke out his scant learning in regard to the astronomical system and the exceedingly minute structure of matter and organic life. The principles he formulated concerning the conduct of nations and individuals had a distinct advantage in comparison with our own excessive habit of categorizing: he did not separate what belongs together, but regarded man as an ethical and political or social being all in the same fundamental sense. We are carrying on the same process of making explicit the agreements and constitutions of men in terms of general principles which are still in their formative period.

Ethics and Laws.—Long ago, ethics and the law emerged out of the more persistent or approved customs of the several peoples, independently formulating essen-

tially the same rules. Today, we find international customs, flexible, uncertain, often in conflict, leading to formulation as international law and ethics. The principle proposed is identical with that which has been advocated throughout history, namely, that where disputes between groups were once settled by appeal to arms, these shall now be settled by appeal to reason or justice. And, granted an agreement, spoken or written, if it shall be carried into effect in any other way than by force of arms or an international police, this must be by appeal to *what ought to be done*, and any such appeal is an appeal to ethics. What is imperative then is comparative study of the principles of justice *as actually in practice* within the several nations, as concrete, not abstract, to see if we may now complete the work which Aristotle began, namely, by finding the international principles immanent in the national, already in practice by implication.

The ideal for the future will then be, not a speculative scheme, for such schemes soon fall by the wayside, as in case of some of Plato's modes of settling social difficulties; it will be the next formulation of principles already pointing toward a further advance in actual practices among nations. Whenever such a formulation runs counter to principles already strongly entrenched, as in the case of the opposition encountered by President Wilson in Paris and on the part of senators in the United States who put personal political quarrels above the peace of the world, then there is conflict, probably compromise, but eventually a controversy which brings into view the profound reasons for adopting the new formulation. An ideal does not, we have seen, become an actual force in the community till grounded in things in process. This is what we mean by a rational ideal. Up to that time it remains an hypothesis, as democracy is still regarded by some as an hypothesis never likely to be put into real effect.

Popular Sovereignty.—Thus Mussolini, when presented with a sword by the Fascisti of Imola, reflecting on the fact that Machiavelli's saying, "You can not maintain a State by words," was engraved on the sword, wrote that

there have been many attempts to make government subject to the free will of the people, but the theory is based on "foolishness and untruths." Why? Because "such a theory is merely a political abstraction. No one knows where it commences or where it ends. The adjective sovereign applied to the people is a tragic farce. At most, the people appoint delegates, but it is absurd to suppose that the people exercise sovereignty. There is little moral justification for representative government, but a great deal can be said for its mechanical usefulness. Even in countries where representative government has always obtained, a time occurs when it is fatal to consult the people. In times of war the card-board crown of sovereignty is stripped from the people (for it is only fit for normal times), and the people have no alternative but to plunge into the unknown perils of war or to declare for revolution. For such occasions the people have but one duty to affirm and obey. It is evident that the sovereignty graciously granted to the people is taken from it when it is most needed. In fact, it is only allowed to continue when it is innocuous, or considered as such, that is to say, during the placid course of ordinary administration. . . . Can any one imagine a war being declared by a referendum? A referendum is a very good thing when it is a question of choosing the best spot for the village pump. But when the supreme interests of the people are at stake, even the most ultra-democratic governments take care not to submit them to the judgment of the people. . . ."

The Rule of the Best.—Secretary Hughes was quoted awhile ago as saying that "the greatest difficulty that we have in making democratic institutions work is in securing play for expert ability. Paradoxical as it may seem, we are too often overpowered by feebleness." Hence what is needed is "balance" in our Government, to secure us "against rashness, ignorance, and passion."² This balance Plato and Aristotle long ago provided for in terms of the rule of the best, a plan which we still try occasionally—in the case of the Galveston disaster, when the commis-

² Quoted in *The New York Times*.

sion form of government was employed; in war-time, when, to save the day, politicians and diplomats are set aside in favor of the man of the hour, a Lloyd George or a Clemenceau; in the army, amidst the greatest crisis, when even the commanding general must be dispossessed of his command, or when an Allied generalissimo is put over all the armies, whatever the feeling on the part of other generals. In actual practice the world already knows what the most effective principle is. In actual moral conviction the world already knows what principles ought to be carried into international realization.

The Two Ethical Types.—McDougall's attempted solution of the difficulty, within the field of ethics, is based on the observation that our civilization has developed on a dual ethical basis: there are two very different systems, national and universal, which have never been harmonized but have been in perpetual conflict. With partial exceptions, all historic moral codes have been codes regulating the conduct of *individuals*, with little regard for the relationships of nation with nation.³ Hence theoretical and practical ethics have in the main been the ethics of the individual. Christianity and Buddhism, and in a measure Mohammedanism, are universal, are identified with religious endeavors to bring all men under the sway of one system of rules of conduct; in contrast with the ethical systems of Judaism, Japan, China, and Brahmanism, as typical national types. China, for instance, is the supreme case of the endurance among nations of an ethical creed. A system of national ethics is incapable of extension to alien peoples. To succeed in establishing international ethics, we should "refine by criticism the ethico-political principles which will best further the progress of mankind. . . ." ⁴ It is imperative to combine national and universal ethics, by regarding the several nations as the bearers of culture and moral tradition, with due regard for the native qualities of the population of each nation, and by looking upon each man as not only an end in him-

³ W. McDougall, *Ethics and Modern World Problems*, 1924, p. 5.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 164.

self but as an element in the life of the nation in relation to the supreme ethical goal, his welfare being in some degree subordinated to that of the nation. The ideal might be regarded as representative democracy in which the aristocratic principle is given due weight.

Representative Democracy.—In this connection McDougall raises the question why England went into the war for civilization at once while the United States delayed three years, and the reason he gives is that "in Great Britain the political organization retained more of the truly representative and aristocratic principle, had not drifted so far down the slope towards ultra-democracy as had the United States."⁵ He quotes an authority high in diplomatic circles on the point that President Wilson used with great effect the prestige of his high office to suppress the sounder judgments and more generous impulses of the American people; and thereby reaches the conclusion that if the American nation had been better organized on the true principles of representative democracy due weight would have been given to the best elements, the most instructed, the most capable, those in whom the moral tradition was most fully embodied. The world would then have been spared immense sufferings, immense losses of life and morale. There might have been a signal enforcement of international morality. To secure ethical principles in the political field, McDougall would substitute for the principle, "one adult, one vote," the principle, "one qualified citizen, one vote," eliminating (1) the mentally deficient, (2) the convicted criminals, and (3) the illiterate (the literate are those who attain or pass a certain grade of the educational system). He would not then give one vote to every adult and "leave the rest to nature."

Anti-nationalism.—Probably very few among the enthusiasts and radicals of our day have considered what is involved in their vague idea that the abolition of nationalism is the solution of our difficulties. McDougall interprets anti-nationalism to mean that all national boundaries and distinctions shall be abolished, together with national preju-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

dices, preferences and anti-racial sentiments, including the feeling in regard to colored and yellow folk. Everybody in all the present nations would then be accepted on the basis of equality, with no differences due to religious creeds or ecclesiastical systems. There would be no class-distinctions based on differences in wealth, or the amount and quality of labor. The government might either be called an anarchy or world-wide cosmopolitanism.

What class would have the privilege of establishing this universalism? Shall it be the laborites who insist on the standards of manual labor? If so, would the world then be completely industrialized? Shall it be a so-called proletariat of the people imposing a new tyranny on the world? In any event would the gains equal the losses? The test question then is, Is it real love of brotherhood or envy which underlies the movement to abolish all things national?

McDougall foresees, in the adoption of such a scheme (1) immense multiplication of the peoples of the lower cultures; (2) with freedom to emigrate or wander, a wide distribution of peoples; people of the most diverse origins would mingle in complete social equality, with no hindrances due to color, caste, or class distinctions of any kind; there would be intermarriages or at least interunions on a great scale; (3) the people of higher culture would not multiply rapidly, but would dwindle in numbers; (4) miscegenation would result, as all social and legal bans to intermarriage would be removed. Would the prime result be "a completely civilized, industrialized, and cosmopolitan world, a world in which swarms of variegated and parti-colored men and women pullulate in vast cities of steel and glass . . . ?"⁶

Such a process of so-called civilization would be carried out on the discredited assumption that "all men were created free and equal," hence that any man is as good as any other, that all social distinctions should die out, the spirit of nationality ceasing to exist, with no more race-pride. All these anti-national assumptions would fall if

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

tested by the principles we have laid down above, namely, in favor of recognizing and developing differences and individualisms in so far as they are contributory to the moral wealth of the world. For we have advocated larger groupings with reference to diversities in capacity, in gifts, in power to become morally productive. Thus the emigrant could still be actuated by the desire to become a true American, proud of his citizenship in "the greatest nation in the world," aspiring to maintain and promote the greatness of his adopted country. National pride and aspiration would not be mere memories of "a dark and dreadful past." Nor would the assumption that "all men are potentially as good as the best" become the universal principle, with "every Hottentot, every dweller in the slums of Canton, of Madras, or of London," regarded as by nature the equal of Washington and Lincoln.

Ultra-democracy.—McDougall calls special attention to the facts that (1) some races or peoples have been more prolific than others in individuals who have displayed great capacities; (2) some peoples have contributed far more than others to the development of culture; and some have proved their capacity to sustain for a time a high level of civilization, while the capacity of other peoples to do so remains unproved; (3) among all people there is a considerable proportion of individuals who do not assimilate the higher culture and who, therefore, do not and can not contribute to the maintenance and further development of civilization, but require constant supervision and regulation.⁷ The result of some of the experimental attempts to ignore these and other facts, that is, by the imposition of manual labor doctrines, is seen in the case of bricklayers striking for a basic wage of \$12.00 per day, and expressing dissatisfaction because they are not getting \$18.00; scavengers and street-cleaners receiving higher salaries than elementary school teachers; while no unskilled trade-unionist would be allowed for a day to accept the salary of an average clergyman. The prime result of "unmitigated democracy" would be "the destruction of all those pre-

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

rogatives which the brain-workers have enjoyed in every flourishing civilization," whereas under former conditions the exceptional hand-worker had a natural ambition to rise into the brain-working class.⁸ In ultra-democracy the conditions would be unfavorable to the perpetuation of the stronger strains. The more grossly constituted would supplant the more finely constituted. There would be strict communism and brotherly love, on the assumption that all men have an equal claim to an equal share in all that is worth having.

McDougall's Solution.—What now is McDougall's solution on an ethical basis for the problem of uniting the two types of ethical theory, the national with the universal? Examining utilitarianism anew, he finds need of a social organization to provide for or guarantee the continuance of pleasure and happiness as the good, that is, "*the enduring and the highest happiness of the greatest number.*"⁹ In this scheme each man is to be both means and end. The principle of ultra-democracy does not afford the clue because it is founded on deep-lying distrust of human nature: each man is to be regarded as of equal value because no man can be trusted to act fairly towards his fellow-men. Hence ultra-democracy is the counsel of despair, and the implied principles have never yet been practiced by any large and enduring community.

Yet McDougall is also skeptical regarding any such agreement as the League of Nations, unless it shall be enforced by an international airplane force. While then his argument is a strong plea for an ethical solution on the basis of the preservation of nationalism, its weak point is due to neglect of the alternatives to utilitarianism. If happiness is to be "enduring," as well as "highest," and for "the greatest number," the organization of values essential to these ends will be the significant consideration. The "greatest number" will include, in the case of international relations, the peoples of the several lands brought into the organization, on the basis of recognition of national types.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

It might then be said that the ideal for each nation is realization of the characteristic ideals.¹⁰ "Live and let live" will then be the policy, in contrast with the imperial ambitions of the great nations of the past. The United States, as a one in many, has already exemplified the principle of relationship which may sometime be realized in a "United States of Europe" and a "United States of the World." But if such a union is to be achieved profound recognition of national types will be imperative, amid even greater divergences than those which have beset the United States Government since the incoming of a vast tide of immigrants, many of whom brought their radicalisms and discontents from the Old World.

Christianity and Democracy.—Other scholars, more hopeful than McDougall, have found no essential conflict between Christianity, as a system of universal ethics, and democracy as yielding the greatest impetus which the ethical movement has received since the rise of Christianity.¹¹ It is the democratic movement which has extended "the Christian principle of equality to the political, the social, and the economic domain. . . . It is this identity of the essential spirit of democracy with the essential spirit of Christianity which makes the incoming of democracy a revolution of such supreme importance in the moral history of the world." Prominent among the agencies which have fostered the growth of civilization in the ethical direction are the great inventions which have broken the isolation of the nations, and bound them together by a thousand ties, commercial, social, and intellectual, leading toward "the growing international conscience of today." Social revolutions, such as the French Revolution of 1789, have aided the ethical movement; democracy has broken down the invidious caste and class distinctions of old; modern education has greatly aided the process.

Myers finds the failure of the new industrialism as a move-

¹⁰ Fullerton proposes as the solution of the contrasted ethical ideals the principle of the Rational Social Will, *Handbook of Ethical Theory*, p. 339.

¹¹ Cf. Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

ment which might have fostered true democracy to be due to the divorce between ethics and business, as in Italy during the Renaissance there was a divorce of ethics from politics.¹² Unfortunately, economists have taught that ethics has nothing to do with economics. On the other hand there is ever-growing recognition of the truth that the relationships of men in business are conditioned by the law of human brotherhood. Myers cites as an example of the growing "social conscience" the changed moral judgments concerning the African slave-trade, in contrast with the period when the peoples of Western Christendom had practically no conscience whatever in the matter, although the conscience of the age was in many other matters true and sensitive. "The whole subject lay practically outside the realm of morals. The slave-trade was looked upon as a perfectly legitimate business. Practically no one thought it wrong to go to Africa, kidnap or purchase a shipload of the natives, bring them in stifling holds—where sometimes half the unhappy victims died on the passage—to the West Indies or to the Spanish and English mainland of the Americas and sell them as slaves."¹³

International Progress.—Then came the profoundly significant revolt of conscience. The history of the growth of conscience in any social group—clan, tribe, nation—is much the same, also in the slow history of the development of conscience in humanity at large, between the groups which compose the human race. First comes the clarifying conscience, then the law codes, private and public, which embody it; and so too the development of international law follows the earlier development of municipal law. Hence Myers defines moral progress in the international domain as "the gradual assimilation of international to intranational ethics, or, in other words, the growing conformity of the standard of public morality to that of private morality."¹⁴ Thus, there is increasing recognition by governments of the fact that the obligations of the

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 348.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 372.

strong toward the weak are the same for nations as for individuals. Our dealings with Cuba since its liberation is an instance of this progress in international morality. Again, the movement toward the abolition of war is an evidence of quickened social conscience, with the widespread protest against the assumption that nations may suspend the ordinary moral code when they will to make war; also the protest against the eulogizing of the martial virtues: these protests "announce the birth into the modern world of a new international conscience."¹⁵

The Social Conscience.—Admitting that equality is not ultimate even in democracy, but will always remain more or less a fiction, also that "the average man" is mythical, Mecklin nevertheless maintains that democracy as the solvent may become increasingly efficient through the organization and self-consciousness of a body of sentiment, hence that we may rightfully speak of a *social conscience* as authoritative.¹⁶ Indeed, the average man is the keeper of the conscience of the community, for better or worse we have committed our destinies to him, and the salvation of society will be his salvation. Hence the need of looking back through the ages to discover with renewed interest the origins of the moral sentiments which for the most part constitute the conscience of today, for example, Puritanism as an element, Calvinism, the individualistic element, also the growing conception of the Great Society.¹⁷ There are still "vast areas of our modern life that have completely outgrown the traditional norms of the social conscience. For it is a familiar fact that the principles of right and wrong that one generation applies to its problems are usually the product of the moral experiences of its fathers."¹⁸

The moral indifference or anarchy which we experience are then in part due to the fact that we have not brought our principles up to the standard of our conduct. Truly

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

¹⁶ *Introd. to Social Ethics*, p. 5.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Chap. IV.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

to think in ethical terms would be to correlate one's thought with the actual problems of the community and the nation; since, in the last analysis, morality is a matter of social sanity. "Ethical values are those which are fundamental for the solution of the social problem, the essence of which is how to enable men and women to live together with the least amount of friction and the best safeguarding of human values." ¹⁹

The American Conscience.—What Mecklin finds to be a primary difficulty with morality in America, namely, that it is "haphazard, local, piecemeal," is true of the world: the world has not yet brought its ethical thinking up to the standard of the best practice within the greater nations or between the nations. So far the morality of America is "the morality that embraces those norms which must be observed if the business man is to get along peacefully and successfully with his business associate . . . if the minister is to enjoy the sympathy and confidence of his sect," or the morality which the member of the labor union "finds essential to the welfare of his group," which the political party "insists each shall observe if he plays the political game." What we lack is the comprehensive authoritative norms, "acknowledged by all classes and set up as the common goal of a common citizenship in a great democracy," we lack a fully self-conscious democracy. It is indeed true that despite our localisms we possess such conceptions as justice, fidelity to contract, truthfulness, honor, intermingled with "the great democratic norms" of liberty, equality, and fraternity; and it may be said that these are what hold society together. But these must be made concrete in an actual social program.

It would not be difficult to agree upon a definition of justice: the difficulty is in trying to unite upon a social policy which shall embody the principle of justice. We have still to reckon with the conflict between individualism and collectivism. There is a dualism in American life. In theory we are idealists, in practice pragmatists or materialists. "When the tide of life runs smoothly and the stern

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

necessity for criticism and analysis does not press upon us, the average American is apt to be thoughtless and adventurous, materialist in business, a Philistine in culture and a prig in religion and morals." ²⁰

Social Conscience Defined.—To play our part, therefore, in the solution of world problems we should rise to the level of thought which we occasionally attain when facing a great crisis, as in our civil war and in the World War. This means, if one shall profit by Mecklin's keen analysis, more careful discrimination between (1) custom, in which we yield to social habit without any feeling of obligation, and (2) social conscience, which is to be understood in the light of its traditional norms. Mecklin defines the social conscience as "that body of comprehensive ethical norms that are integral parts of the moral sentiments of the members of the group, that enjoy unchallenged authority, that function almost automatically in the settlement of ethical issues, and that insure the continuity and the integrity of the group's life." ²¹ The primary objects are social justice and civic righteousness, intimately associated as they are with the institutional forms which safeguard national welfare. The social conscience then is "the subjective correlative in the minds of the members of the community of that objective balance of wills that finds expression through a well-ordered institutional life." It is "individual in residence" but "social in function." It is meant to be essentially disinterested. As a result of the World War it should become international or cosmopolitan. Indeed the Stoic conception of humanitarianism has become a matter of immediate and practical statecraft. The social consciences of the nations must be reorganized in terms of the common interests and ideals of a family of nations, so that the new internationalism shall be based on the organization of the sentiments of the private citizen. ²²

This will mean, for one thing, more intimate knowledge of the limiting types of social conscience, of public opinion,

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 139.

the tyranny of the majority, the prevalence of prejudice, the reign of such habits in politics as "the solid South." One might add to this list the tyranny of "the vociferous minority," responsible, no doubt, for the introduction of the prohibition amendment before the conscience of the community had adjusted itself to the scientific facts concerning the use of alcoholic drinks; the tyranny of "the machine" in politics; of the demagogue whose group is too influential in national life; of "the irreconcilables" and of the senators who are averse to ratifying any sort of treaty with any sort of nation.

The International Conscience.—It is plain then from our analysis of matters which demand a large volume on international ethics that we are still in the formative period of thought, hesitating to make the step from the application of ethical principles to large groups which we have successfully applied to small, notably in the historic days when the Constitution and Congress were in the making, and political life had not degenerated from the ethical to the irrationally partisan level. International law in process of more explicit formulation represents a stage in the progress toward the coming international conscience. It will be made more effective by becoming frankly ethical, not in the sense of allegiance (with McDougall) to a particular system, such as utilitarianism; but with regard for the common principles of justice as already recognized by leading nations. So too the larger social conscience will develop by more searchingly testing out such contrasted views of democracy as we have summarized above. Economists and sociologists can help by overcoming the habit of over-categorizing, as if their respective departments had nothing in common with ethics, or even with social psychology, is if it were almost a duty to persuade people not to make ethics a major subject, but resolutely to rule out all ethical questions. Religionists can help by inquiring into the genesis of their doctrinal patterns, by analyzing to the limit the elements of their faith, and returning in full vigor to allegiance to what is dynamic, quickening. Devotees of programs for radical social reform can help by

coming to self-consciousness concerning the materialistic philosophy of history on which Marxian socialism is based. So too pacifists may help by enlarging their sphere of interest from the discredited pacifisms of the World War period to recognition that problems of justice are higher than problems of peace.

Organic Coöperation.—More productive still may be the idealism of all who have a vision concerning the realization of the Christian ideal that we are “members one of another.” If the conception of organic coöperation is applicable within the sphere of the individual’s most personal life, in the relationships between the individual and the family, the small community, and to various types of social organization, it must in time prove applicable on the largest possible scale. The comparison with an organism is, we have seen, only in part a good one. Human beings are free-moving agents, and are not at all like attached eyes, ears, arms, or even the brain as the central organ. If they are “parts of a whole,” there is no common organic life circulating through these parts. So too in society, as we have repeatedly seen, there is no “social consciousness” in the sense of a group mind apart from individual minds taking social attitudes. Hence, in absolute strictness, there is no “social conscience” and can be no international conscience, if by such terms we mean an entity functioning over and above the functions of its elements, varying from the least critical public opinion to the influence of the most powerful minds in the community.

The Ethical Horizon.—But the phenomenon exists, whatever we call it. We are in process of enlarging our horizon, and the symbol of the organism surpasses all others in the portrayal of the intimacy of relationship of fellow-members fulfilling varied purposes, diverse in type yet working together in a spirit of corporate unity. There is both relatedness and headship expressive of purpose in an organism. There is a measure of distinctive activity, yet dependence, and the welfare of one organism is fostered by that of others. Singling out the points of resemblance, and adopting the principle of variety in unity, it is per-

missible to carry over into the field of the largest body politic, or social organization on a world-scale, the idea of *moral order in all things*, of mutuality, service, justice, amid the contributions made by distinctive groups and distinctive individuals. For moral beings, the figure of the organism briefly suggests the ideal to be striven for, especially as the larger part which each is to contribute is to be an extension of activities which begin at home.

The differences to be understood and mastered between nations are no more sharply contrasted than those within the individual, torn as he often is in two directions, rent asunder by the conflicts of two phases, promptings or voices of his own nature. As desire, emotion, feeling, imagination, the primal urge, will, and reason are to be coördinated in the inner life, that there may be division of labor without friction, so there may be coördination among larger groups in society, each with its representative mentalities. The first result of the coming together of rival moral tendencies may be tremendous loss on the part of the one, with exceedingly slow gains on the part of the other, as when Christian supernaturalism dispossessed Greek ethics. But then may begin the long process of coördination, with the breaking down of the doctrinal patterns which sluggishly hold back the social conscience. The emphasis here as elsewhere belongs on the achieving moral spirit rising superior alike to things Christian and things Greek and making in the direction of a union between national ethics and universal ethics.

Our study of moral forces shows that the real problem is to develop the mechanisms for carrying into effect the principles already agreed upon as highest, so that friendship, mutuality, justice shall be realized among the nations. For the social situation is far more complex and difficult in the international world than within the leading nations regarded by themselves. To make the moral mechanisms effective so that, for one thing, there shall be a complete equivalent for war, it will be necessary to subordinate political and financial interests which will strive to the fore on the ground that diplomacy, political ambition, and eco-

conomic demands should settle world-issues. It is difficult enough even within a nation so to curb ambitious political leaders as to secure what is best in national welfare, difficult too to secure the passage of a treaty with neighboring nations when the most enlightened people heartily approve of such a treaty. The political situation is "a condition, not a theory." So too is the situation among the great financiers who claim to have the power in their hands to determine the fate of nations. Meanwhile, we have been steadily educating one another, and our youth, to believe that economic determinism is decisive. We have not taken ethical principles seriously enough to ground them in mechanisms able to outwit all partisans of secondary values, namely, politicians, diplomats, financial leaders, and other wielders of public policy who are unwilling to carry ethical principles into execution. This much we have gained however if we have learned what the next step is: to put into practice what we believe so that moral forces shall predominate. We know that there is a moral equivalent for war. We know that justice is the chief social virtue, what its elements are, and the recognition to be given to national characteristics in contrast with anti-nationalism. We also know that no additional ethical principle is needed. Meanwhile, the larger social conscience called for by the international situation is steadily being acquired in these days of widespread interchange, rapidly increasing information concerning the nations, and growing knowledge of the difficulties which beset moral idealism.

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CHAPTER XXVII

MORAL PROGRESS

Progress as Inevitable.—From several points of view, the assumption is readily made that progress necessarily results from the interaction of forces at work in civilization. To start with the proposition that God, whose world-plan we find in process of outward manifestation, is omnipotent, and in foresight omniscient, is to conclude that nothing can defeat the divine purpose to achieve the noblest result for the good of all, whatever the transitory opposition. If in ultimate nature the universe is spiritual, we anticipate the triumph of spiritual verities, despite the unruliness of material things, and even though this triumph be postponed till the future life. The very truth that a moral order exists is taken to mean that moral forces will eventually be supreme in actuality as they are now potentially, hence the assumption that moral history means moral progress. From the point of view of the virtues it is maintained that love, kindness, and justice must triumph; since these virtues are “socially right.” Indeed, virtue will, we are assured, not only bring its reward, but more. Vice, sin, crime, evil must fail, while virtue must triumph because of its worth, because the moral life is profoundly worth while. Finally, evolution—however understood, whatever factors of organic development may win supremacy—apparently signifies that progress is inevitable, even though it be progress through struggle, sacrifice and relative defeat, and the triumph of the most fit only.

Ancient Views of the World.—Yet other assumptions once seemed as plausible to moral idealists who believed no less profoundly than we in the ultimate reality of goodness. The past was for centuries revered as perfect by the Chinese. To ancient Hindoo sages, aware of nearly all

the great typical viewpoints in philosophy, the world of things and events in space and time seemed a lapse from the timeless and spaceless reality of Absolute Being. In both India and Greece, cosmic events were conceived as a cycle which might sometime repeat itself, as indeed there have been other cycles reproducing world-events that had gone before. The idea of a Golden Age in the remote past has not wholly disappeared from the world. What is perfect has often been regarded as pure Being in a changeless state of bliss from which souls came and to which they will return. With static ideas of perfection came crystallized moral standards. Hence wrong-doing was a lapse, apparent moral victory a repentance. The idea that a temporal round of experiences, with no antecedent perfection to spring from, necessitates or signifies progress, is a modern idea. Heraclitus long ago advanced the thought that what we call Being is more truly a perpetual Becoming, and Bergson has recently contributed the conception of creative evolution as the central principle of all reality. Yet on the whole the idea of Being has been triumphant.

Modern Conceptions.—Although the beginnings of a theory of progress are found in ancient thought, the conception belongs to modern times, and is partly due to the enlargement of the cosmic horizon from the limited outlook of the old astronomy to the heliocentric theory, in Copernicus' time, and the conception of the universe as infinite which begins with Bruno, burned at the stake in 1600. The ancient Greeks thought of the universe as a cosmos (order), a thing of beauty, complete, perfect. Christians for centuries contemplated heaven as an abode of perfect bliss beyond earth's restlessness and strife, with nothing more to attain. The Nirvana of the Buddhists has always been conceived as the negation of every incentive and power which we associate with this life of desire and accomplishment. From any outlook upon perfection, either past or present, as immutable, hence as above time, the idea of change would be repulsive, as somehow suggestive of decline and decay. Religious thinkers have surpassed all

others in the defense of the faith; in contrast with the extremely modern notion that the endless quest for truth wherever it may lead is life's greatest adventure. Hence theology is even now protesting against encroachments on the part of those who insist upon the value of restatements of faith, and on fidelity to the dynamic element of thought.

With the enlargement of the world-horizon, realization of the meaning of discoveries and explorations in all quarters of the globe, increasing opportunities for travel and intercommunication, and the development of the historical point of view in the special sciences, in the nineteenth century, came in time a new outlook on the world of human society finding expression in liberalism in religion, an idea of progress in all branches of social endeavor, and a new moral ideal. We so long ago lost the localism that went with the conception of the earth as the center of things that we take it for granted that existence means progress with infinite resources on which to draw. Almost every discipline has undergone change since the theory of evolution accustomed us to the idea of organic development.

Growth.—We are not likely to lose any of our interest and enthusiasm for progress by pausing calmly to consider what we mean by progress, and to distinguish between assumption and intelligible conception. Progress can hardly be the same as organic growth by means of cells and tissues to reproduction of endless individuals of a species, essentially fixed in type. The attempt has been made to compare the successive changes through which a civilization passes to the childhood, youth, middle life, and decline of the human body, but this analogy has not carried very far. The growth of a tree, with some of its branches hanging down, while a few branches only appear at the top, has been moderately suggestive, in contrast with the assumption that progress always means upward growth. By mental growth has been understood multiplication and association of units, like atoms; but mental development is not so simple as associationist psychology would make out. The mind can keep on developing after the body has grown

to full proportions and begun to wear out. Mental progress is a matter of insight, freedom, and productivity.

Evolution.—It is easy to confuse evolution with progress, on the assumption that all evolution means “continuous progressive change” due to inherent or immanent forces essentially purposive in type.¹ It has been found extremely difficult to defend the thesis that all nature exemplifies purpose, since the evolutionists called attention to the great struggles and losses of the animal and plant worlds. Evolution may, indeed, signify continuous change in the sense of modifications due to response to environment. But finalism is as difficult to prove as absolute chance.² On the whole evolution has been conceived as an automatic process, chiefly from lower to higher, but not necessarily from lowest to highest. Evolutionists are in the habit of beating down everything called higher to what is lower, of minimizing quality in favor of quantity. They afford scant solace to the believer in moral progress.

History.—What does history show? That there has been progress on the whole? It may be so, but with great losses. Civilizations come and go, as in ancient Egypt and other lands bordering on the Mediterranean. There have been great flowering periods, and then lost arts, points of view, moral values. Was the change from Greek culture, art, and philosophy to Christian civilization wholly a progress? Have we after nineteen centuries succeeded in regaining all that the world lost by passing over to supernaturalism and ecclesiastical authority? The changes in process in China seem on the whole to mean progress, howbeit the inheritors of many centuries of the moral idealism of peace are learning the arts of war from the Western world. The change from the despotism of the Czars to the despotism of the Soviets in Russia is widely heralded as progress. We are at least able to say that the given type of civilization fits the conditions and character of the people, as in ancient China, Egypt, and Greece. The ideals

¹ Cf. J. Le Conte, *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought*.

² Cf. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans., p. 39.

of knighthood, Puritanism, and the like come and go, and leave their contributions. We have passed into the period of great mechanical inventions as if to a period where history and progress are synonymous, but we too appear to have lost very much by becoming so greatly devoted to external values, more determined than ever to reduce all qualities into measurable things and statistical deeds. Wise philosophers of history, trying in vain to determine what progress means, or decide whether or not history means progress, have said in conclusion, at any rate there is change.³

What Civilization Means.—Progress is plainly not an unfolding of what is all the while implicit by preëstablished harmony. It must add or contribute, differentiate or individualize by developing new types, integrations, or values. It is not in any case something that goes on automatically or inevitably, as if struggle always signified betterment; for epochs of progress have been followed by long ages of stagnation or retrogression.⁴ The disorders and reactions of history seem indeed fatal to a finalistic or teleological interpretation. If we regard civilization as inherently valuable, we are frequently reminded of the fact that in many respects it is still an experiment, with possibilities of collapse.⁵ During the World War it was often feared that civilization might be destroyed. We are slow to learn anything from history. And so we are slow in discovering what we mean by civilization and how to keep it. Hard upon an unsatisfactory treaty of peace, forced on the defeated nation, there follow new hatreds and schemings preparatory to the next armed conflict. We have repeatedly been disillusioned, when we cherished the hope that now at last the love of peace was established in the hearts of men. Nature has not proved to be wholly beneficent. Events, such as earthquakes in Sicily and Japan, floods in China, and famines in India, take place without regard to human welfare; and if there is ever to

³ Cf. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 1893, p. 499.

⁴ L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. II, p. 280.

⁵ B. M. Laing, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

be victory in these matters man must learn to build elsewhere, build more securely, and be far more provident and philanthropic. Progress depends then on human beings, and human beings are fertile in devices, ready to make new experiments, inventing new things that are inferior for the sake of change, prone to neglect what is best as history discloses it to us. Certain it is that the forces of history are not synonymous with progress.

Our Spiritual Needs.—The old-time antithesis between spirit and flesh has not wholly disappeared. Mayhap this world was not made for progress any way. If for discipline, that each soul may try out its forces and be sent back into itself to seek higher sources of consolation, then all that one would expect would be a changing historical scene amid essentially the same laws, conditions, and opportunities. To have real spiritual progress on earth would be to deprive unborn generations of the opportunity to begin at the beginning; for we need to start in ignorance, need to struggle from darkness into light, through failure and relative defeat. All material things, and especially all fleshly things are disappointing. The earthly life is not permanent and can never become so. But this is pessimism once more. We have rejected it in a previous chapter. We have also set aside the view that sin and evil are essential to the moral order. To be moral is to be bent on knowing and conquering the conditions of life. The human spirit is subject to conditions which make possible its full development through mastery. With the attainment of perfect adjustment to nature's forces and conditions, there would still be abundant opportunity for unborn generations, especially if we go on multiplying mechanical devices and increasing our material efficiency. Although there may be nothing inherent in natural conditions to guarantee the triumph of the higher type, man has the opportunity to increase moral values, and depend more on moral forces, where he now surrenders to material conditions. What is achieved in one epoch may become the starting-point for the next, when at last we are more serious in our effort to conserve moral values.

The Religious Horizon.—We must agree then that the world needs something more than a soft gospel of inevitable spiritual progress under remote conditions, chiefly in the future life. It needs salvation from its ignorance, its sin, its inefficiency, its apathy, its silly optimism, and appalling carelessness.⁶ Hope lies in our new scientific control over the latent resources of the earth without and over our mental and moral forces within. We are committed to the hope of making progress the dominant idea. An immeasurable increase of man's self-reliance is an effect of the idea of progress, confidence in humanity's power to take care of itself. Hence, we see the abiding necessity of religion in a progressive world. "Jesus Christ . . . has given us the most glorious interpretation of life's meaning that the sons of men have ever had. The fatherhood of God, the friendship of the Spirit, the sovereignty of righteousness, the law of love, the glory of service, the coming of the kingdom, the eternal hope."⁷ What we need is spiritual mastery of science's new powers, that is, mastery by another kind of power which it is not the business of science to supply, spiritual power which "comes out of the soul's deep fellowship with the living God." Religion shows that life develops from within, with possibilities of changing human nature, the new birth being still essential. Spiritual development must accompany environmental change, but must reorganize social life and the ideas that underlie it. The great conflict is now centered in economics.

Finality.—We are coming to see that Christianity is a changing movement in a changing world. Christianity is no longer "passive submission to God's will, but an aggressive prayer for the victory of God and righteousness . . . active loyalty to the will of God as something to be achieved."⁸ We now count it our duty to be "tirelessly unresigned." Here is "a new mood in Christianity," that is, a progressive movement instead of a static finality, a system of doctrines, defended as static in a progressive world.

⁶ H. E. Fosdick, *Christianity and Progress*, 1922, p. 40.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

Even within the New Testament there is no static creed. Even the Fourth Gospel is a sermon, not a philosophy. Progress does not, however, shut out finality. It makes each new finality a point of departure for a new adventure.⁹ While a revelation *from* God might conceivably be final and complete, religion as Fosdick regards it “deals with a revelation *of* God.” Discovery on man’s part is the under side of the process. Meanwhile, the idea of authority is one of the historic curses of religion: religion by its very nature is one of the realms to which external authority is least applicable. The one vital thing in religion is first-hand, personal experience; religion is the most intimate, inward, incommunicable fellowship of the human soul, and the only God you ever will know is the God you know for yourself.

Christianity as a Life.—It follows then that if the world had understood Christianity as Dr. Fosdick, among others, is interpreting it to us now, there might have been progress where there was delay for centuries during the long disputes of ecclesiastics. For, in Fosdick’s terms, the original Christian fellowship “consisted of a group of men keeping company with Jesus and learning how to live. They had no creeds to recite . . . no sacraments to distinguish their faith . . . no organization to join . . . Christianity in the beginning was an intensely personal experience.”¹⁰ The creeds, written in sheer self-defense at a later time, gave static shape to what was meant to be a life. “So historic Christianity grew, organized, creedalized, ritualized.” But as a first-hand, personal experience of God in Christ is “alone vital in Christianity,” all the rest is once or twice or thrice removed from life: Christianity is not a creed, nor an organization, nor a ritual, but a *life*. We can not stereotype its expressions in set and final forms. When it once more becomes a life in fellowship with the living God it will build new organizations, expand into new symbolic expressions. Faith in God can indeed satisfy man’s craving for spiritual stability amid change. The central ele-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

ment in the conception of a progressive world is that "men's thoughts and lives have changed, are changing and will change," that nothing is settled in the sense of being finally formulated.¹¹ There are, indeed, desperate endeavors, perennially made, to congeal the Christian movement at some one stage and to call that stage final. Against this they indeed protest who believe in the living God as disclosed through inner experience.

Moral Advance as the Test.—What is here said about Christianity applies with great force to moral doctrines, too often the dry or crystallized expressions of theological conservatives, almost totally neglectful of the moral dynamic of the ages. We find scholars agreeing that moral progress is the test of all true progress, the true reading of history.¹² The ethical motive is "the most constant and regulative force." Moral progress constitutes "the very essence of the historic movement." As Myers regards the subject, certain tendencies become characteristic among the nations, virtues develop and become standards or ideals for natural life and thought during ages. Comparison between the virtues emphasized by the nations naturally follows, norm is compared with norm, system with system. The result, for one thing, is the discovery of unevenness among the nations: where one excels, another lags. Meanwhile, the ethical motive is becoming more dominant, disclosing successive enlargements. In no domain has progress been greater than in the moral sphere. Here, indeed, is "the one increasing purpose" which runs through the ages. The standard to be employed in judging any civilization is the moral ideal, the group of virtues held in esteem by a given people or a given age, those moral incentives which have a unique dynamic force.

How does this ethical progress proceed? Does it act through tradition, as Hobhouse suggests? ¹³ Hobhouse does not venture to say whether the actual improvement in our conduct is greater than we might expect or even as much

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

¹² Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 283.

as we might expect; he sees a prospect that further development of society may fall within the scope of an organizing intelligence, removed from the play of blind force. But the very ideas which are to direct this progress toward "the sphere of rational order" are yet in their infancy. The promising fact is that there is a culminating self-consciousness, a blending of the moral, the scientific, and the religious. This, indeed, is the culminating fact of all ethical evolution. "Mind grasps the conditions of its development, that it may master and make use of them in its further growth." We know little as yet about this growth. But we do know that this slowly wrought out dominance of mind in things is "the central fact of evolution."

What is the Moral Test.—Laing finds difficulty in discovering anything in morality by which progress can be tested, amidst the multiplicity of standards. Happiness or pleasure is difficult to gauge. There is no one bold enough to maintain that men have a greater sense of duty, more conscience, more self-sacrifice than in the Homeric age; more refined manners or greater courtesy than in the Middle Ages. The emergence of new values is not a test, for example, the growing emphasis upon freedom, the abolition of slavery, the greater respect for human life and property, the desire for more stable conditions of life, the recognition of personality and of the need of providing opportunities for its development, and the growing sense of brotherhood. For all these are values on which great emphasis was also placed in primitive tribal communities. They are not values freshly created but values revived, after a long period in which they were obscured amid social chaos. Moral progress "means something more than the consciousness and even the acknowledgment of abstract values."¹⁴ It means "a new and concrete condition of human life." Hence the criticisms passed by laborites upon the present social organization.

Slavery is apparently abolished only to give place to economic bondage. The existing industrial conditions deprive the worker of any freedom, they create as great a danger

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 262.

to health and life as ever existed in less civilized times. The struggle for existence has become keener with increasing industrial development. The old conditions exist under new forms. The attainment of some particular end desired is not an evidence of progress. Progress must be general, must imply the attainment of all or of the most desirable ends, not the attainment of one end at the expense of another. Progress implies value, value is correlated with desire; while perfection, to be attained, involves control over conditions so that what is desirable can be attained free from any admixture of undesirable elements, and so that such a type of life can be preserved and made secure.¹⁵ What then is the totality of desirable things which has been or is being realized? Laing's results are typical of all moralists who, failing to interpret desire, can only say that desire is a process which ends in the realization of values "provided it is not interfered with by any other process."

Community of Interests as the Test.—The result is not much better when, with Perry, we regard morality as a concentration, and agree that "through morality a plurality of interests becomes an economy or community of interests," hence that "only the fulfillment of an organization of interests is morally good."¹⁶ Progress is indeed an increase in the course of time of the *value* of life, whatever that may be, a gain on the whole; but what shall be the measure of value? Not favorable environment, as Laing would doubtless say; for, as Perry well shows, unfavorable environments conduce to moral progress, it is "the *menace* of nature" which stimulates progress.¹⁷ The tendency to develop coherence and unity, or rationality, is the one internal principle of progress, through knowledge of the good, and the correction of existing usages. Perry's test of moral progress therefore is: "the persistence through the whole course of human history of certain identical interests and purposes," for example, in such fixed

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 267.

¹⁶ R. B. Perry, *The Moral Economy*, 1909, pp. 13, 15.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

moral necessities as government, education, science, and religion. Each of these might indeed be regarded as secondary tests of progress. But the primary difficulty with Perry's term "interest" is the same as that which attaches to any general term, such as "loyalty." From the point of view of any ethical theory, there is economy or community of interests, moral integration or concentration. What is needed is an explicit statement of the content of moral interests.

Moral Changes.—We have seen that moral development is not a question of transition from the non-moral to the moral; since man is from the first potentially moral, and the moral life is all the while supplied with content, as natural goodness becomes moral goodness through man's reflective consciousness. The advance from custom to morality is in process all along the line of development. Different types of morality appear and then pass from the scene, as in the case of egoistic or psychological hedonism, epicureanism and cynicism. Within the field of a given moral interest there are indeed successive changes, hence a development of the implied principles toward their own completion. Thus there is a history of the pleasure-theory from the days of hedonism in its simplest form in Greece to the latest form of evolutionary hedonism and idealistic utilitarianism. But we must distinguish between development, history, and evolution in the moral field; and moral progress, with its estimates put upon various lines of development. Both Westermarck and Hobhouse exhibit "morals in evolution," but neither one offers a criterion of all moral progress.

Self-discovery as the Test.—It might be said that the law of progress is "the progressive discovery of the individual."¹⁸ This is, indeed, an enlightening test; for, in Seth's terms, the true nature of the individual answers to the true nature of society, with the self-discovery of the former comes the self-discovery of the latter; and we need not presuppose an original antagonism between egoism and altruism. We have noted many evidences of this advance,

¹⁸ Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

for example, the stage of moral integration attained when Confucius formulated the principle of reciprocity, when Socrates, reacting against the sheer individualism of the Sophists, made explicit the moral universal, as the basis for ethics, for the first time in history. Plato, we saw, tended to subordinate the individual to the state, and this point of view is still working itself out in moral history. The Stoics advanced a freer conception of the individual, in the direction of a city of God for all mankind. But it was Christianity which contributed the conception of human personality as of supreme worth, both in this world and in the future life, including the uncultured and down-trodden, the freeman and the slave, and the poor as well as the rich. This conception has been tried out in various modes of social life in the intervening centuries until, to-day, the controversy in behalf of true individualism is highly complex and difficult to estimate. In the foregoing pages we have argued throughout for that individualism which is to be harmonious with social self-realization, we have placed much emphasis on self-knowledge, self-development, and self-expression. Hence, our whole inquiry has turned upon the progressive discovery of the individual. But in so far as this discovery may rightfully be taken as the law of moral progress it must be with most explicit recognition of the central moral truth which it is the object of this book to make clear, that is, that we are "members one of another" in a relationship symbolized by the organism.

The Law of Progress.—Looking back over the long ages of discovery of the worth of the individual, we must agree with Seth that there has been a recoil from one solution of the problem to another, that no solution has proved final; but that "it belongs to the nature of progress that no solution will satisfy a later age which does not do full justice to, and rest upon a better understanding of the individual than any previous solution."¹⁹ The law of progress involves (1) a gradual transition from an external and utilitarian to an internal and spiritual estimate of

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

action, with emphasis on character, on being rather than doing, on what a man *is* more than on what he is *good for*; hence the true criterion of virtue is internal and spiritual; (2) subordination of the sterner to the gentler virtues; and (3) increasing scope, the change from particularism to universalism, from patriotism or nationalism to humanism or cosmopolitanism. But this progress is always likely to include competition as well as coöperation, rivalry as well as love and mutual service, although the rivalry may be generous.

Social Equilibrium.—So, too, Mecklin holds that a conception of the equilibrium between the individual and society is the test of moral progress, with special reference to the richness and variety of the demands made upon men for social adjustment. The test of the truth of moral ideas must then be sought in the extent to which men in a given social situation are able to eliminate their differences and attain fruitful human relationships. "Where we deal with active and intelligent wills every act, good or bad, brings about a need for readjustment. . . . A community of active moral beings assures to us, therefore, a mobile rather than a static moral order. . . . Change is inherent in the very structure of the moral life. . . . On the heels of the good act completed rise new moral issues."²⁰

Moral Betterment.—Alexander defines these moral issues making for progress with reference to the continuous variation and transmutation of morality from one form to another as the struggle between ideals proceeds.²¹ This continuous change is not identical with progress, but the clue is to be found in the process by which each individual approximates to the highest development and re-expresses the ideal. The good as the goal of this process is always ultimate, but owing to the development of human nature it is always in motion. For individuals in process of development it is not a question of relationship between the good as it is being realized and the best, but always a contrast between the good and a better. Progress from

²⁰ *Introd. to Social Ethics*, pp. 186, 188.

²¹ S. Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, 1889, p. 262.

lower to higher does not necessitate finality or a highest, as if morality were sometime to pass away and give place to a different condition. The acts of adjustment by which individuals meet certain conditions alter the sentiments of the agents, and create new needs; and these new needs demand a new satisfaction. The persistence of the ideal through these successive changes reveals its own inadequacy, the attainment of goodness extends the data and renders the former solution unavailable. What "is commonly called the moral standard is a kind of generalization from the extremely various operations of different persons as to what is or is not right." Chastity, courage, and temperance, for example, are general names which we retain although the conditions included under them may vary. The name employed signifies the continuity of tradition and the permanence of form, while the contents change from age to age. The forces at work are more constantly operative in changing the moral order than in maintaining it. Every good act alters the moral standard, and so "moral development is the history of human nature exhibited . . . as a Becoming."²²

Goodness and Its Conditions.—There is real moral progress then, progressive goodness making in the direction of perfection, but our ideas of perfection change and so our conceptions of goodness change also. Morality proceeds by "an oscillation of two movements, the one solving the problem proposed, the other destroying each solution as it emerges." We look back to an exemplification of goodness in a citizen of ancient Greece, signalizing a man as good whose conduct we would condemn in part. The same would be true were we to compare a good man in England in the twelfth century with a good man in the nineteenth, although a good man in the nineteenth is no better than a good man in the twelfth. The relativity of goodness to its conditions instead of being a term of reproach is in reality its highest praise. Conduct is good because *appropriately related to its conditions*. It is both good and inadequate. In brief, an ideal of good conduct,

²² *Ibid.*, p. 291.

being a solution of its conditions, is eternally true for them; morality is identical or eternal in virtue of its form; there are "successive stages of one continuous law. Every ideal while giving place to a new one is the foundation of it. In creating a new standard we do not begin afresh, but at some point where the old was found insufficient. Progress is thus not mere destruction of the lower but fulfillment." ²³

Progress in Our Ideals.—Perhaps the best verification of these successive changes is in the fact that no one who is meeting life reflectively, who is aspiring, doing his best to serve, is able even to restate his ideal without modifying it. The spirit lives on, the expression of it in words and mental imagery changes, and every overt expression in deeds of service yields dissatisfaction, which, in turn, is a stimulus to further progress. Thus our ideals changed during the World War, and the expressions of virtue which served to hearten the men at the front were unsuited to the new conditions which came after the armistice. The men in action had an opportunity to rise to a supreme height of courage, energy, ideal response to duty; but when the war was over they could not again have been persuaded to give such an expression to their ideal. The martial virtues which were glorified, possibly for the last time in history, must change in their mode of expression still more if war shall cease and a full moral equivalent be substituted.

A moral tendency develops then, has its history and fruition, and passes from the scene, as Puritanism served its purpose for a time and ceased to be, as knighthood flourished and then disappeared. So Christianity allied itself with the martial virtues and developed for generations, and now we are in process of separating these virtues from the Gospel, that we may try out the original Christianity as a pure gospel of peace. We are convinced that there has been real moral progress as a result of our reactions against the World War, howbeit this is in part a

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

matter of revival of values which have never been given adequate recognition by the world.

Static and Dynamic Elements.—Any estimate of the ideals which have received varied recognition throughout the ages must take account of the fact, therefore, that we are always returning to neglected moral principles almost ignored for generations, and sometimes forgotten for centuries. The apparent progress made in European morals in the reaction from Greek ethical standards to the early Christian is viewed in a very different light today, endeavoring as we are to revive both the original Gospel and Greek ethical standards at their best. What might have been the progress of Christianity was sadly interfered with by the formalisms of ages of theology. What might have been the progress of Greek ethics was sadly interfered with by the circumstances under which Greek civilization was forced into decline. The struggle is between the dynamic and the static elements, the static is strongly entrenched, and the dynamic must repeatedly disclose the lost arts anew. For us today, the Golden Age is in the future. Yet we are all the while constructing it by recovering neglected moral values which attributed perfection to the past.

National Ideals.—Each moral ideal is indeed a species, perfect after its own kind as Alexander shows in behalf of general principles,²⁴ and as Myers shows by summarizing in the case of each nation the elements which constitute the given ideal. Myers' results might be generalized by saying that as the individual ideal culminates in self-realization so the national ideal culminates in national self-realization. What Myers advises for the individual, namely, "Do the thing thou seest to be good; realize thy ideal,"²⁵ might be applied to all the nations: "Realize your type, be loyal to your standards of virtue unto the end." For according to Myers moral character is not determined by the ideal of conduct but "by the way this ideal is lived up to," hence, "by the effort put forth in

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 369.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

the direction of achieving the national type." In estimating the contributions of the nations to universal morality, we should judge therefore, not by this or that formulation of the ideal at any given time, but by the achieving spirit of the people during long periods.

Progress in the Social Conscience.—Goodness in this sense may confidently be said to be progressive. The alternative to goodness is wickedness, retrogression or stagnation. The moral spirit does run into its opposite, but external conditions become at times utterly unfavorable, as when by force of arms Rome conquered Greece. In the actual course of expression of the moral spirit the change is from one form to another, from what is right under one set of conditions to what is right under another. Thus it ceases to be right to hold captives taken in war as slaves, or to enslave negroes, although it may still be permissible to enslave woman, to compel men to make war, or to indulge in industrial slavery. While we may be no more conscientious than were the ancient Spartans who abandoned their weaklings, the non-Christian peoples who persecuted the early Christians, or the later Christians who indulged in the inquisition, there has certainly been marked progress in the social conscience, as one practice after another has been brought forth into the light for condemnation. The evils we tolerate may often be greater than those that were ignored of old. But the social conscience, with its modern means of enlightenment through the rapid gathering and distribution of information, is swiftly passing judgments where moral consciousness once lagged. Where it was once a question of moral progress within a nation in relative isolation, surpassing its neighbors in some respects, falling below them in others, it is now more truly a question of world progress.

Alexander's Definition of Progress.—Progress is defined by Alexander as "the direction in which all the forces acting within and upon a society dispose it to move, so as to maintain its equilibrium."²⁶ This definition does not imply the notion that "whatever is, is right"; but that

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

"wherever right is, there is progress." The main course of progress is not linear, or in one continuous direction. Mere differentiation is insufficient to define progress. There is also integration. Sometimes there is simplification. Christianity introduced a principle of life simpler than the duty of Greek to Greek, or Roman to Roman; it obliterated national distinctions and decreased diversity. Differentiation, for example, tells us nothing of the forces by which progress is produced, and gives no connected view of the actual facts of historical development. The classification and description of institutions and duties will differ with each age, therefore it is vain to map out a scheme of morality for all eternity: as the ideal changes, the highest moral sentiment will change with it.²⁷ To the ancient Greek, for example, the highest moral conception was the fitting, the proper, the just, and the beautiful. But obedience to law was highest for the Jew, and the claims of duty for the Christian.

The Productive Principle.—We have tried in the foregoing chapters to bring the conceptions of goodness, duty, moral law, freedom, conscience, and virtue into as close relation as possible. Yet we must, with Alexander, leave abundant room for moral changes, while putting in clearest relief the moral constant which persists through them all. We must agree also with the conclusion that no formulation of the ideal is final. What is worthy of strongest emphasis in the theories of moral progress we have passed in review is the productive principle which leaves its successive crystallizations in the moral order as a whole. Scholars hesitate to say that mankind as a whole is surely moving towards one universal end.²⁸ We lack the requisite "systematic theory of moral values educed, by constructive analysis, from the systematic study of the moral history of humanity." We have not yet attained "the historically grounded and systematically organized doctrine of ethical value-judgments" wherewith to estimate contemporary society, a society still in transition. The Ori-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

²⁸ Leighton, *op. cit.*, p. 500.

ental and Occidental civilizations are now in closer contact, but what is to be the issue of this meeting? Can it be said that we have ethically mastered "the vast industrial mechanism" which we have invoked from the forces of nature to do our bidding? Are the intervening generations mere "hewers of wood and drawers of water" to serve the welfare of the final and happy one? The final resource, if we would maintain the thesis of moral progress, is to declare, with Seth, that the worth of the individual in the inner life, in character rather than in what a man does in overt conduct, is the real test or criterion of progress. It is "*the individual life* which alone feels, thinks and wills, alone knows the bitterness of defeat, the joy of achievement, alone feels the sorrow and the happiness of the common lot, is the actual agent and embodiment of ethical values."²⁹ Religious faith accomplishes for us what knowledge of moral history fails to yield as yet, namely, "consecration of the highest human values," the affirmation that these values are "integral constituents in, or essential qualities" of the universal and enduring order; that "the higher meanings and purposes of the human spirit are blood kin to the supreme meaning and purpose of life."

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²⁹ Leighton, *op. cit.*, p. 502.

CHAPTER XXVIII

ETHICS AND RELIGION

Points of Resemblance.—It is not easy to draw sharp distinctions between ethics and religion. The two are one in marked respects. Every religious system involves ethical principles. Some of the greater ethical principles as definitely involve religious teachings. It can not truly be said that religion is the parent of morality. Nor do ethical teachings necessarily lead to religion. A moral code and a religious view of life may coincide at significant points, and the sanctions of the one may be the sanctions of the other. Religion would be nothing without the righteous life which gives evidence that it is genuine, and righteous conduct yields incentives for the development of moral theory. One can neither agree with those ethical leaders who separate ethics as distinctively as possible from religious objects, sources, and interests; nor with partisans of religion who so strongly insist on their particular system of theology as the basis for ethics that they put ethical principles in a subordinate place. Our best course is to maintain that religion and ethics belong intrinsically together, with factors that occasionally interact, and with activities that at times fuse with one another and move forward in a single stream.¹ If at other times they part, they retain their mutual influences, and the distinctions we draw between them point forward to reconsideration of their relationships.

The Problem of Loyalty.—The only ethical instructions many of us receive are given under religious auspices. Few people ever undertake to separate out the theological elements of their faith, to consider what ethical principles they have acquired, or to discriminate between moral au-

¹ Cf. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. II, p. 2, note.

thority and the authority of the creed which they have adopted. It has long been customary in Christian circles to try to do right because the Bible says so, because it is taught by leaders of the Church. It does not occur to the average believer to consider whether alien moral teachings have been introduced into Christianity at some period of history or by some one in authority, to the disadvantage of the original ethical teachings of the Gospels. To adopt the religion of authority is to put a theological system in the first rank, to regard its sanctions as final; hence to rule out inquiries which might be profoundly enlightening from an ethical point of view. Loyalty to the system is put first, at the expense of loyalty to truth and to progress in knowledge concerning other peoples, other systems, other sacred books. Yet this larger vision might be gained without in any way sacrificing loyalty to the Christian faith.

The result is often intolerance, sometimes persecution, if not coercion; and controversies arise which obscure real issues in favor of points of doctrine of no real moment. But such controversies are often primarily ethical, rather than theological. It becomes a question of what one *ought* to believe, of one's duty regarding the creed or sect; one's attitude toward science, biblical criticism, and the modern outlook on life in general. It is sometimes ethical principles which decide whether or not a religious dogma makes any difference to life or conduct, rather than the arguments for or against the dogma itself. If it appears that one can be an equally good Christian by regarding the dogma as either essential or non-essential, the question arises once more, What ethical principles are essential to the Christian faith and life? Again, if we find points of ethical identity and resemblance between the great religions of the world, or between different sects within one of the chief living religions, we have good reason for maintaining that it is on the ethical side, not the theological, that religions will find their meeting-points; that it will be in terms of life, not by identity of doctrine, that the religious peoples of the world will finally come together.

Priority of Experience as a Clue.—It is plain that the question of inter-relationship is not to be settled by appeal to origins; for the beginnings of both religion and ethics are crude, and we are concerned to know how far each is valid.² The problem of the original authority and method of acquiring religious doctrines enters the case only on the assumption that the sacred books in which the doctrines are found were given by revelation, on the mechanical theory, that is, dictation word by word, so that the text is regarded as inerrant. On such a view the doctrines are infallible, without discrimination in favor of degrees of inspiration; and the idea of the supernatural or miraculous plays a constant part. A certain sectarian interpretation of the Bible is then put above the researches and conclusions of biblical scholars, and the authority of the Scriptures is beyond appeal save through allegiance to the Church. But on the so-called dynamic view of revelation and inspiration the human factors of the process of receiving divine truth are taken into account, revelation is then said to make its progressive appeal to human intelligence, inspiration is not by miracle, and the text is regarded as divine-human rather than merely divine. This view accords with ethics on the ground that experience, both moral and religious, is prior to doctrine, that man becomes aware of inner needs of the spirit, and of values which in a measure meet these needs, before he adopts either codes of morals or systematic views concerning the deity, the soul, and the future life. An ethical principle or spiritual teaching is not then said to be true merely or solely because it is in the Bible, but also because reason and practice find it true, and comparative study of the world's great religions shows it to be universal.

Theology as a Sign.—Ethics is a science, dependent on philosophy rather than on theology; on the data of the natural sciences rather than on the Church, with its creeds, officials, and sacred books. Moral science implies reasoned principles developed by analysis of the inner life, and by study of the evolution of moral tendencies among nations

² See Palmer, *The Field of Ethics*, p. 136.

investigated as freely as any other conceptions are studied. Reason in the sphere of ethics possesses the same freedom to follow truth wherever it may lead which we grant to any special science, including mathematics. It is not necessary to make the implied philosophy explicit in all its bearings, but the usual conviction is that ethical truth and reality pertain to the ultimate nature of things, that the moral order is part of the cosmic order. Religion in its most intelligible forms may be said to imply a science in the same way, that is, by appeal to the history of the great faiths of the world, by aid of psychology, and in as far as theology becomes philosophy. For religion has often been defined with respect to the attitude which man takes toward the universe, his emotional response, and the mode of life to which the cosmic emotion leads. Thus at the top religion and ethics might draw together in closest unity. But religion is frequently identified with a theology accepted on authority, not arrived at by beginning with the data of human experience in its fullness and adopting those principles which accurately described facts of experience demand. Thus the religion of authority may look askance at modern knowledge, may take alarm when ethical teachings are grounded in human reason and experience. Meanwhile, the religion of the spirit is apt to be in fullest accord with ethical idealism. From this point of view it is well understood that neither intuition nor conscience discloses a different type of knowledge, not even in the case of revelation; but that there are ascending degrees of moral and religious experience, intuitions, judgments in the name of conscience, with which the mind associates higher truths and greater values.

Precepts as the Test.—If the laws of morality are said to be laws of God, this is a question of the divine sanction, an added interpretation. The field which ethics and religion share is so rich that it needs to be cultivated in the two ways. Theologically speaking, the ethics of Jesus, for example, are inseparable from a view of the nature and origin of the authority attributed to Jesus. But from an ethical point of view the implied principles may be singled

out of the recorded teachings of the Gospels and compared, for instance, with the ethics of Buddhism, apart from the sharp contrast usually noted between (1) the Christian conceptions of the Father, the human spirit, and heaven; and (2) Buddhistic teachings in regard to Karma (the persistence of moral deeds, rather than the persistence of personality) and the possibility of overcoming all desires in order that Nirvana (freedom from desires and incarnations) may be attained. The Christian is apt to assume that if true knowledge of God is lacking in any ethical system, such as Buddhism or Confucianism, its precepts will be inferior, its consequences more or less degrading. But comparison between the great ethical systems does not sustain this assumption.³ Yet no disparagement of Christianity as religion is implied in the discovery that sometimes the precepts of Jesus have been anticipated, or that in some respects morality in India or China has surpassed that of the Christian world. Ethics as a science rather than as an argument for a given religion is concerned with the truth of moral teachings, their hold upon humanity, their results as disclosed by history, whenever they have appeared, and whatever the auspices. Each precept may indeed be investigated by itself, notably in the case of the doctrine of the higher resistance (love conquering hate) so often taken negatively as mere non-resistance, or interpreted both in India and among Christian peoples in the monastic period in terms of a negative or ascetic view of self-sacrifice.

Religious Realities.—Religion involves at least three elements: (1) belief in a Supreme Reality or God regarded as the source of all goodness, power, wisdom, love; together with beliefs which follow from this concerning the reality of the human spirit, the future life, heaven; (2) inner experience taken to be supreme or decisive in value, and implying certain responses to the Supreme Reality, such as prayer, worship; and (3) a mode of conduct or life arising from this quickened inner experience and mani-

³ See Hume, *The World's Living Religions*, Chap. IV.

festing itself in a distinctive attitude toward the world, toward people, yielding evidences of the realities of faith and experience, for example, a conviction that God as immanent Presence guides, governs, or sustains. In brief there is conviction or judgment in regard to the highest values in life, their sources, their power, and the results to be anticipated from fidelity to these.⁴ Religion, by contrast, implies recognition of failures, dissatisfactions, discords in the usual life of allegiance to material things; disappointment with one's own lesser conduct; and aspiration to live a bettered life in coöperation with the life, love or wisdom springing from the divine source. Religion in its best estate is not departmental, but touches the whole of life, appealing to man to manifest the highest that is in him, as in its turn a manifestation of the divine presence. In so far as religion thus becomes a "total attitude of the spirit," it yields the supreme test or criterion. What had previously been a theory becomes a conviction, what had been cautiously accepted as knowledge, becomes a penetrating faith, while the ensuing conduct is the final evidence of the quality of this inward change. It is not necessary for our present purposes to consider what one of the elements of religion is prior. What signifies is the ideal of the fullness of life, with the emotional, intellectual, and volitional consequences which spring from this realization.

Granted then the enlarged horizon, due to the cosmic emotion and "the sense of dependence"⁵ on God which man feels in his weakness in the presence of the problems of life, morality may be said to look to religion not only for horizon and hope, but also in man's yearning for the divine love. Here love of God and duty may coincide, and in Jesus' criticism of the Ten Commandments we come in sight of the unity of virtue, in that love which is the fulfilling of the law.⁶ In this sense morality is incapable of completion without religion. "In the call for help," says

⁴ Cf. J. A. Leighton, *Religion and the Mind of To-day*, 1924, p. 4.

⁵ For definitions, see Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁶ Palmer, *The Field of Ethics*, p. 142.

Palmer, "we reach the clearest consciousness of God." In our reverential love for possible greatness as manifested in a supreme personality we attain a height which is indeed far above us so long as we dwell on moral processes in the thick of things, where we seem "born for trouble," where vice may come in if religion wanes, where religion itself is sensibly dependent on morality.

The Element of Controversy.—When, however, theology intervenes to sustain by argument what can not be proved by present fact or history, religion and ethics part company. Thus Augustine, in his assertion of the fall of man and its consequences, created facts to suit theory. So, too, Calvin introduced his view of predestination, to make good the glory of God. In our day, bishops have asserted that facts concerning the virgin birth, for instance, are created by the creed, that churchmen are bound by their vows to teach what is in the creed *because* it is in the creed, even though the doctrine in question may not be established by the Scriptures. The student of ethics is concerned to ascertain what actually happened in the course of history, not what "must have happened" because its asserted existence is needed to prove a creed.

Yet a controversy over points of doctrine becomes ethical rather than theological, the moment the question of values becomes paramount. For the term value is apt to be ambiguous in ecclesiastical circles.⁸ It may serve to connote those surpassing realities of the religious life which no words of ours can do more than suggest, those values which we enter into by the aid of poetry and music, which uplift us in heart and will in our worship. Thus the enlightened believer may sincerely assign the highest place to the eternal values, realizing that no mere explanation will ever take the place of appreciation. But the liberal may conceal his progressive views under the term "value," while the agnostic may allege that hymns and creeds which are antiquated in sentiment, doctrine, and phraseology are still useful as "values for worship."

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁸ Dresser, *Psychology in Theory and Application*, p. 703.

Liberalism.—When, therefore, the bishops insist that the entire creed shall be taken literally or not at all, that the term “symbol” connotes dishonesty, the issue becomes plainly a matter of conscience. If the liberal remains in orthodox circles, he is likely to be regarded as insincere, if not a heretic, as cloaking his heterodoxy under a verbal device. But he may see his way to a solution on ethical grounds by distinguishing between static and dynamic conceptions of both religion and ethics: the static individual is one who conservatively defends the original wording of a creed or theological system, while the dynamic leader is one who, realizing that values always surpass formulas and are subject to growth with increase of spiritual life, favors renewed expressions of the eternal verities.⁹ The liberal may, therefore, insist that the conservative has no right to rule out that freer, progressive interpretation which seeks to be loyal to what is universal or permanent in religion and ethics, in contrast with elements regarded as particular, transient or non-essential. He holds too that an endeavor to follow the spirit of truth is of more significance than a vow to sustain a creed subject to varied interpretations and likely to be outgrown. It is often then a question of relative loyalties: what ought I to do as a religious teacher? What place does belief occupy? To what extent does one owe loyalty to “the church invisible” rather than to the established Church? What motive involves an appeal to a principle or idea; regarded as “transcending human purposes and as deriving its validity from an all-inclusive meaning”?¹⁰

Contacts and Divergencies.—Is man when especially religious peculiarly moral? When most moral is man also especially religious? Palmer thinks the evidences point to the contrary.¹¹ There are people who are very religious in the emotional sense whom we should not be quite willing to trust. The moral view of life is on the whole manward, while the religious view is Godward.¹² The religious

⁹ Cf. Fosdick, *Christianity and Progress*, p. 207.

¹⁰ See Everett, *Moral Values*, p. 389.

¹¹ *The Field of Ethics*, p. 172.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 175; see, also, Everett, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

soul seeks for God as all in all, while man in his essentially moral interests is always thinking of matters limited in space and time, in scope and consequences. Thus religion and ethics may be in closest alliance, the moral life supplying the opportunities for service in an intimately practical way; while religion gives not only a wider horizon, and greater stability, but a hope at the point where the world is especially discouraging. In Palmer's view this hope finds its realization in the gospel of the abundant life taught by Jesus.

In Everett's view, ethical conceptions are likely to diverge more emphatically from religious doctrines in so far as other-world doctrines hostile to life in this world intervene.¹³ There is then a conflict of values, as if the real interests of this life could rightfully dictate one mode of conduct, while another mode pertains to the future life. The presumption is wholly in favor, ethically speaking, of a continuity of values with those of the present order, since we have no evidence of discontinuity. "As all possible knowledge of values is derived from experiences of the present life, no other world can prescribe standards of value to this world. In our highest endeavors after a truly spiritual life it still holds good that we must 'live by realities.' Dualism in values ignores the fact that every attempt to represent to ourselves the values of another sphere of life is based upon actual experiences here and now."¹⁴ We part company then, as ethical idealists, with any religious conception which undertakes to pass judgment on present conduct in terms of a system of future rewards and punishments, also any religious pessimism which involves "a sense of human helplessness and of the illusory and worthless character of earthly experience."

Ethics as the Criterion.—For us the worth of life is a cardinal proposition. There is a widespread critical reaction in our day against the assumption that supernatural forces direct man's fate. If religion is to indicate

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 399.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 400.

the highest ends of thinking and willing, to set up the highest standards or patterns, this must be done, so we now insist, by means of a different view of the spiritual life, based on an immanent teleology. Only thus, by developing a dynamic conception, and avoiding the pitfalls of a static creed, is religion likely to keep pace with our progressing ethical conceptions. Höffding has put forward a strong plea for a more soundly ethical religion, on a philosophic basis.¹⁵ Thus approached, it is seen that religion advances with the growth of man's aims, and it is plainly "impossible for man to conceive of divine capacities and wishes which he himself has never experienced in any degree."¹⁶ The transition from natural to ethical religions is the most important transition in the whole history of religion. Thus in time it is seen that good is not good because God wills it, but that God wills the good because it is good; "he who is just because the God in whom he believes is just, must attribute value to justice itself."¹⁷ And this is why it is clearly seen at least that values must be discovered and produced in the world of experience before they can be said to exist in another world. So, too, "the criterion of the value of religion and of its significance as an expression of spiritual culture must ultimately be an ethical one."¹⁸ It is ethics then which shows how far and in what way the nature of man is developed by means of spiritual culture, although it is religion which yields a *motive for action* of very great consequence. One agrees with Höffding then, that it is not a sufficient justification of a religious motive that it is an expression of a man's personality, for religious motives should be tested in every possible way. In the last analysis, therefore, motives would be ruled out which flourish at the cost of love of truth, which hide under ambiguous verbal subtleties. And if ethics and religion finally coincide it will be because there is "a profound conviction that there is a value which must be maintained as the highest."

¹⁵ *The Philosophy of Religion*, trans., Chap. IV.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

If however we say, with Leighton, that ethics is "the doctrine of the good, of the Supreme Values of Life,"¹⁹ we may agree that religion is "the faith that these values are eternally realized in the Supreme Reality, that God is the Perfect Fulfillment"; and so we may find complete harmony between our ethical and religious conceptions. We have contended for the position that ethics is not alone "the doctrine" but is inseparable from the moral life which follows on the part of all who are in earnest, and we have found that even a relatively impersonal morality, such as Stoicism, becomes a religion when the element of duty is discerned. Thus morality passes over into religion unless, perchance, as in some ethical culture movements, the element of worship is kept out and agnosticism intervenes. Religion and ethics unite in emphasizing "the supreme worth and reality of the individual soul, the moral freedom and responsibility of the self."²⁰ And in this intimate alliance with religion morality avoids any suspicion that the ideal of self-realization is in any sense a merely cultural ideal without the impetus to the life of service. To regard God as the Perfect Individual "because he is wholly and completely social," because he cares for all and gives of his life without stint, is to find the moral ideal transfigured by the highest standard of fellowship.

Creeds as Fetters.—It is important to distinguish (1) the inner experience which yields such convictions and shows the unity between ethics and religion from (2) the interpretations put upon it which make formal matters paramount. For if religion is to yield horizon and give hope, it must be as a life, an experience which is closely akin to morality as an art. In fact religion and morality might have been developed as the art of life, might have been one in spirit and method all along the line had it not been for the imposition of authoritative systems on the facts of experience. Havelock Ellis has a graphic way of putting this matter: "It is only too familiar a fact how, when the impulse of religion first germinates in the

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁰ Leighton, *ibid.*, p. 123.

young soul, the ghouls of the Churches rush out and proceed to assure him that his rapture is, not a natural manifestation, as free as the sunlight and as gracious as the unfolding of a rose, but the manifest sign that he has been branded by a supernatural force and fettered forever to a dead theological creed. Too often he is thus caught by the bait of his own rapture; the hook is firmly fixed in his jaw and he is drawn whither his blind guides will; his wings droop and fall away; so far as the finer issues of life are concerned, he is doomed and damned.”²¹

Religion as Life.—Ellis regards religion as “the art of finding our emotional relationship to the world conceived as a whole.”²² Its core is mysticism, in the sense of an advance beyond the individual’s personal ends to an adjustment to larger ends, through harmony with the Whole, through devotion or love. Such mysticism is an art, and one that is in perfect accord with science at its best. To see this deep-lying unity, at this late day in human history, is to clear away all the accumulated superstitions, the unreasoned prepossessions, on either side; and to see that the development of the religious instinct and the development of the scientific instinct are alike natural.²³ It is the figments of our thought which have obscured the simple realities, our timid dread lest religion should kill our science or science kill religion. In contrast with all this artificiality, is the real essence of religion, coming as the revelation of a new life springing up from within; a simple process, a natural function, an art which nature makes.

The Content of Religion.—To follow this clue is to realize afresh that religion appeals to various elements of our nature: It touches the emotions and hence quickens in us the process which Ellis calls mystical. It appeals to the heart, with sympathy and compassion, and so discloses the service motive. It arouses the understanding to consideration of the great ideas—the idea of God, of the human spirit, of immortality, and the relation of man as

²¹ *The Dance of Life*, 1923, p. 227.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 191.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

person to the divine personality—and so it may lead to a quickening intellectual development, if thought is not checked by servitude to ecclesiastical authority. It appeals to the will to go forth and live by the heart's promptings, to lead the life of service which accords with the thought of God, so that love toward God and man shall be the reigning motive. It involves worship, meditation, prayer; so it is in large measure for the sake of the inner life of the individual, and hence religion may take on highly subjective forms. But its appeal is also to objective standards, to a God who is above all, is for all in the larger cosmos of a social order, where the test is not what a man feels and thinks but also what he does as an effective member of the community. Religion leads to the idea of the beloved community in so far as it passes beyond mere motives of salvation, and by leading to the beloved community it yields vision and power to ethics.

The Contributions of Christianity.—Comparison between ethics and religion becomes more specific when we consider the ethics of Christianity from typical points of view, since for many of us religion and Christianity are identical. The conclusions of Hobhouse are negative; for he identifies Christianity with a life which might be lived for a time by a selected brotherhood of perfect men and women, with no rule of life applicable to a world in which people are far from perfect.²⁴ According to Bowne, the significance of Christianity lies less in the field of moral judgments and more in the conceptions which condition their application in moral relationships.²⁵ The moral nature is not transformed by this teaching, but the conditions of its best unfolding have been furnished, so that although the same life is lived it has very different relations and meanings. For example, the conceptions of God, life, and death are greatly clarified; moral principles are greatly extended, the sense of obligation is reinforced; inalienable sacredness is given to the origin and destiny of man, all men are regarded as children of a common

²⁴ *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. II, p. 152.

²⁵ B. P. Bowne, *The Principles of Ethics*, 1892, p. 201.

Father and heirs of eternal life. It now becomes a question of seeking first the kingdom of God and its righteousness. There is seen to be a moral kingdom stretching over all worlds and ages. The moral law is seen as not merely an expression of fact but also of the divine will. Hence its triumph is seen as secure: the universe and God are seen to be on the side of righteousness. A transcendent personal ideal is set up—the master-light of all our moral seeing and our chief inspiration. Rights grow more sacred, duties enlarge. Love and loyalty to a person take the place of reverence for an abstract law, and this consciousness is vastly more effective, is of incalculable significance for the moral life. Man is now explicitly seen as of divine parentage and divine destiny. Implied in the Christian conception of God is the conviction that the moral essence is the same in God and man: hence later conceptions of Christianity have rejected the view that the divine will is exalted above the divine goodness, as if right and wrong had been created by the will of God.

The Christian Type.—This more intelligible ethical conception also finds expression in the summary of the philosophical postulates of Christian ethics given by Newman Smyth.²⁶ Human nature is constituted for moral life, involves the idea of moral obligation, the authority of conscience: the ought is a moral constant of the universe;²⁷ it is essential to the nature of God. If it were not God's eternal nature, it would not be our absolute obligation. Moral sovereignty is the sole sovereignty. Life without an ideal is unmoral; we are distinguished from the brute creation by this power of forming ideals.

What is the best object then according to the Christian for which a man may live? The ideal has been given historically in the Person of Christ, the real example of it; it has been mediated through the Christian life and testimony which the Master's coming and the divine spirit have called forth and inspired. It is partly realized in Christian history, and is still further to be interpreted. Jesus was

²⁶ *Christian Ethics*, 1892, p. 26.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

both an original and originative moral power. He brought in a changed conception, a new type of virtue: the Christian character is a distinct moral type. His moral ideal is disclosed in the doctrine of the kingdom of God, the kingdom as *here*. His doctrine of the supreme good is personal. The kingdom is constituted of persons: the fullness and completeness of personal relationships, including holiness, righteousness, benevolence, love, blessedness. Sacrifice is the method of Jesus' rule. Men should be perfect. The ideal is absolute, its absolute quality is holiness, passion for righteousness, an ideal which is coextensive with life, comprehends all objects and aims that are good. In contrast with the supreme ideal of Buddhism (renunciation) the essence of the Christian ideal is consecration. Christian conscience thus receives distinctive character, namely, from its informing principle of love; including duties to self as a moral end, to others as moral ends, and duties in relation to God as willing the supreme end of being.

Christianity as Final.—In relation to Christian theology, the task of Christian ethics as defined by a typical expositor, is to make clear the meaning and basis of the Christian ideal from the point of view of its connection with Christian faith.²⁸ Its interest is to exhibit the content of the Christian ideal, therefore the individual and social life required by that ideal; the grounds of conviction of the attainability of the ideal in the dynamic which Christian faith supplies. Foster finds the basis for this procedure in the Christian value-judgment that the Christian ideal is the culmination of the moral life of humanity: this ideal is characterized by universal validity. The content is "a fellowship of persons united by the principle of self-denying love."²⁹ In this kingdom of moral personalities all individuals are ends, and in all these ends love rules. In contrast with old-time emphasis on self-sacrifice, Foster restates the ideal in terms of the modern

²⁸ See G. B. Foster, *Christianity in its Modern Expression*, 1921, p. 190.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

ethical ideal that nothing should be *denied*, but all should be *organized*. So we may come to realize that the Christian moral law opens up to the individual the way to perfect unity and freedom, and with this to the supreme content of the inner life. For Foster the ideal of Christian morality is indeed unsurpassable; for there is nothing higher than personality, nothing higher than the fellowship of love of such persons, with the infinite capacity for development which this ideal affords.

Doctrinal Limitations.—Whatever the student of ethics may conclude regarding arguments for the finality of the Christian religion, the great need throughout is to note that it is a question of a given system already accepted as final on doctrinal grounds. On the other hand a study of the situation as historically developed by Myers shows how and when the doctrinal ideas were introduced, without pre-judgments for or against any given Christian system.³⁰ Myers regards the displacing of naturalism by supernaturalism in ethics as one of the most momentous in history. Thus was made rigid large sections of the moral code, and a certain immobility tended to characterize the religious-ethical life of European civilization. So too the dogma of the fall of man became one of the most influential conceptions in the moral domain ever entertained by the human mind.³¹ Orthodoxy came to mean the substitution of correct religious opinion in place of the former emphasis on moral life as the ideal: orthodoxy has been unwilling to admit that charity, "though combined with perfect uprightness of life and expressed in noblest acts of self-abnegating service of humanity, is a saving virtue unless associated with correctness of religious belief and the outgrowth of it."³² And so came into Christian thought certain limitations, and the exclusion of ideals highly esteemed by the Greeks and Romans. With the exaltation of faith above reason came the assumption that in the revealed word of the Church was possessed all knowledge really

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 256, foll.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 262.

essential to man's welfare and salvation. The chief defect was in making the acceptance of all the articles of a given creed an indispensable virtue. "In assigning orthodox belief this place in the ideal of moral goodness, theological ethics has marred Christian morality by fostering the faults of intolerance and intellectual insincerity. This dogma inspired in the Church, as soon as it became powerful, a persecuting spirit, and made Christianity for centuries something alien to its real genius and spirit—one of the most intolerant of the world's religions." ³³ Thereby was discouraged intellectual veracity and open-mindedness, and the vice of insincere conformity was fostered more than any other fault, to the detriment of Christian morality even to the present day.

The resource would be to learn the lesson which history teaches when treated as Myers regards it, to return to the sources of Christianity by returning to the sources of religion in unfettered human experience. Just what Christianity meant in its original form, apart from all sectarian versions, would still be a problem. But for one thing it meant fullness of life as an intelligible moral ideal discoverable by each individual through experience. And this ideal may be put in intelligible relation with the other great moral ideals of history, to see what part religion has played in the development of ethics as a whole.

The Ethical Problem Today.—For many Christians it is no longer a question of fidelity to this or that creed but of a moral obligation to make one's organization as distinctively ethical and as strongly Christian as one can. The recent tendency among leaders in various Christian churches in America, for example, has been to recover the original Gospel at its best, to make this teaching more explicit as emphatically ethical, and to show that it is *a Gospel of social salvation*. Hence, in the foregoing chapters, we have indicated that the real problem today is to carry out in actual social life what we believe, making our moral creed an efficient force, adapting it to present needs while at the same time emphasizing the truth that all

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

true reform begins in the inner life. Such a union of forces shows ethics and religion working together, where sectarian considerations would have separated them.

Rauschenbusch, for example, has been looked up to as leader in this emphasis on the social gospel of Christianity. According to this inspiring view, Christianity was pure and unperverted when it "lived as a divine reality in the heart of Jesus Christ."³⁴ The purpose of Jesus was the social redemption of the entire life of the human race on earth. Jesus was never very passive. He was "high-power energy from first to last. His death itself was action. It was the most terrific blow that organized evil ever got. . . ."³⁵ The idea of justice was not lacking in Christianity as thus regarded, but justice was looked upon as the most fundamental quality needed in the moral relationships of men, the condition of good-will between individuals, the foundation in very truth of the social order. Hence the fundamental step toward Christianizing the social order will be the establishing of social justice by the abolition of unjust privilege.³⁶ The objective is "the highest degree of personal liberty plus the most effective coöperation of all, freedom being "the condition of a Christian social order." The kingdom of God to be established on this basis will include, in Rauschenbusch's view, the economic order; since it means "the progressive transformation of all human affairs by the thought and spirit of Christ," with opportunity for every one to realize the full humanity which God has put into him as a promise and a call.³⁷

Summary.—Religion as we have regarded it in this volume is a life, and the dynamic or life-giving element should be paramount from first to last. There are points of divergence between ethics and religion, especially in relation to theology and the churches; but emphasis belongs rather on the points of resemblance and identity. For religion, regarded as making for the fullness of life, con-

³⁴ *Christianizing the Social Order*, p. 49.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

³⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 458, foll.

tributes the quickening power or incentive, the hope, and horizon needed by morality. Ethics is concerned with what is universal, and so with universal principles in the great religions of the world; not with arguments for finality or ecclesiastical authority, or even for the supremacy of the Christian religion as Christianity has often been conceived.

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CHAPTER XXIX

ULTIMATE VALUES

First and Last Things.—To turn to the consideration of ultimate or metaphysical questions in relation to ethics is not to engage in a distinctively different inquiry. Metaphysics is the study of first principles, the ultimate nature of reality. It is concerned with “first and last things”—the nature and structure of Being, the significance of Becoming (evolution), the reality of the human self and human experience. It investigates the beginnings and endings or presuppositions and conclusions of the special sciences, such as physics, chemistry, biology; and considers these in their inter-relationship, unity, or system. Every special discipline makes its assumptions, develops the hypotheses peculiar to it; but also leaves issues for consideration, as fundamental to any thorough-going study of the nature of things.

In the foregoing chapters we have considered some of the first and last things, without sharply distinguishing these matters, as if they belonged wholly outside of ethics. We began with moral activity, moral experience, the self or personality regarded as *real*; we accepted moral values as bearing relation to experience of the highest type in a realm of values; and we have considered the basis of moral obligation, duty, or conscience as a principle of constancy fundamental to the structure of moral reality. We have, in brief, taken the moral order itself to be part of the ultimate structure of the universe. The question of freedom, which some moralists treat as a metaphysical rather than an ethical issue,¹ was introduced as essential to a study of theories of the good; also the problems of evil, optimism,

¹ Cf. Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

and pessimism. The relation of ideals as moral forces to causal sequences has come before us, too. Hence the persistent question is this: What is the relation of values to reality? This problem is as old as Plato's time, namely, the relation of experience in general—with its appearances or relativities, its imperfections and disappointments—to the Ideas as archetypes. Space will not permit an analysis of the problem except so far as we may indicate certain typical lines of approach.

The Conservation of Values.—A direct road to the issues likely to be raised by the student of ethics, approaching ultimate problems from the point of view of values, is found in Höffding's *Philosophy of Religion*. Although the principle proposed by Höffding bears special reference to religion, it is as directly applicable to ethics; since the criterion is to be discovered within ethics rather than in any religious system. The hypothesis is this: *the conservation of value* is the fundamental axiom of religion. Value is defined as "the property possessed by a thing either of conferring immediate satisfaction or serving as a means to procuring it. Value therefore may be mediate or immediate. Where immediate value is given we seek it to preserve it; where not given, to produce it. We make it . . . our end."² Höffding finds that the question of the conservation of religious values is an ethical question because it is for ethics to show what is the highest present value, how value is to be fostered as of central importance. It is in experience that values are discovered, we look to experience to disclose whatever values may yet be given, and not until experience has made its full deliverance shall we know what other values are to be considered. The question of the relation of values to reality is a metaphysical question because, in the first place, the theory of knowledge is involved.

The Basis of Values.—If, for example, we analyze religious views of the world, to find a secure basis for values, we find that since Kant's day such views are no longer defensible as scientific conceptions of the nature of things,

² *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

as if religion offered primary knowledge of reality: the essence of religion is *valuation*, not comprehension of existence, the central conviction being that no value perishes out of the world. Religion sought to show that the world was produced by a push from without, by divine will. But there are fundamental difficulties besetting the idea of a First Cause, as the beginning of a series of causes. The tendency to localize God in space, as "above" while the world is "below," gave way in time to the conception of "above" and "below" as symbolical, that is, it became a distinction of value. A change came about also in regard to time. Creation was once regarded as time running out, with a beginning and end, with means and ends separated; and while this mundane sphere was a place for work without enjoyment, heaven was to be enjoyment without work. The dualism of past and present, time and eternity, Höffding regards as the worst of dualisms. Work and development should have immediate value, with permanence of value throughout time's changes; the eternal life is already present.

What now is the central question for those who are seeking a basis for the persistence of values? Höffding begins with the problem of the interconnection of phenomena, the need for continuity in our consciousness, an inner law-abiding connection which holds the world together from within. The principle of unity must not lead out beyond itself, must round out knowledge, conclude the intellectual process. If we start with the idea of God, as the rational explanatory principle, and regard God and the world as two beings, the conception fails: we can not deduce the manifold from unity, the world from God, the imperfect from the perfect, the mutable from the immutable. Neither creation nor emanation is adequate. God as the absolutely unchangeable ground of continuous change is unthinkable. We are thrown back to the view that possibly Being is not complete. We may of course regard God as inclusive of the highest known values, ethical and æsthetic. Since experience is inexhaustible, there is indeed no objective conclusion to our knowledge.

Being as the Basis.—What results if we try out the idea of the psychical side of existence as continuous, as the innermost essence of reality, experience being spiritual activity? Höffding's difficulty here is that we do not know whether the inner essence is psychical or material.³ The question can not be answered. Our arguments from the facts of consciousness to the conception of a world-ground proceed according to analogy. But analogy is not knowledge. The analogy falls short, idealism remains a faith only. Our thought changes indeed from concepts to figures of speech, because of the inadequacy of our more precise terms. Figurative ideas express *relations*, hence never yield an absolute conclusion. Even the idea of "personality," applied to God or the ultimate Principle, fails at the essential point; for it is drawn from the idea of a finite ego—a single member of the great world-order, in contrast with the inexhaustible principle. But in the idea of God nothing finite remains. So too ideas of "Force," "Life," "Substance," fall short. The result of Höffding's inquiry can not however be sheer agnosticism or doubt, for whatever knowledge we have is a part of existence. It is still rational to regard Being as the home of the development and conservation of value.

Inner Experience as the Basis.—It is plain that the object of religious consciousness can no longer be grasped by immediate intuition. We can not claim, by "an expansion of feeling" that we have arrived at the ultimate essence of things. By experience (1) we acquire only particular and definite values, conditioned by our nature, and the special conditions of life; (2) we learn nothing positive about the conservation of values—the highest value is not shown by experience to be the central fact of existence; (3) we gain only at best *a motive for believing*. In other words, (1) we do not experience the *cause*, what is immediately experienced being an abstraction; (2) we do not learn the supernatural in contrast with the natural: we judge by tradition, that is, we experience the strivings

³ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

and states inculcated by tradition; our experiences are *made* for us by the creeds, are assigned to a lower rank; we need therefore a counter-test to test experience; and (3) our experience remains individual. Nevertheless, religious feeling presupposes (1) experience of life, truth, beauty, goodness; (2) a striving to maintain values.⁴ Where our knowledge falls short, we tend to supplement knowledge by faith, that we may pass beyond the oscillations of experience to steadfastness in our search for rest, our effort to rise above differences and struggles. Faith assumes the principle of continuity, comprehensibility, God as its object, and the principle of the conservation of value through all experience; it implies stable and continuous direction of the mind in the assertion of the persistence of values. Höffding concedes that experience is thus far real experience of the relation between value and reality. The content of religious experience always depends however on the experiences of man, what he has found to be of value. The highest value is not demonstrable. The religious life still yields a greater continuity than religious ideas. As the center or basis of these ever-persistent experiences of ours, seeking values and endeavoring to preserve them, human personality should be regarded as end, above mere means, above mere authority; as winning and developing conviction.

The Present Life as Basis.—When it becomes a matter of selection between values, discovered and produced as they are in the world of experience, the ethical standpoint is decisive, with the implied faith in present values. Höffding does not at all depend on the supposed moral compensations of the future life. He is too agnostic or skeptical to say whether there be a future life. All values are discovered and produced in *this* world. The idea of the other world is derived from ideas of this one, and the idea of another world can never be a primary concept.⁵ Real life is life in this world. Only experience can ever decide whether another world exist. Hence in the last analysis

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

we are sent back to the present movement toward culture, under the ethical command to make this life valuable.⁶

Few writers have more searchingly narrowed down the issues to those that are central for ethics. Höffding's conclusion seems for the moment meager in the extreme. His point of view is purely naturalistic; the laws and forces of nature stand first in order; law is primary, qualities secondary; the axiom of the conservation of values is regarded as inferior in validity to the conception of the conservation of energy. Religious ideas are assigned to second rank throughout; for religion lives on in human feelings and needs, not by surety of knowledge; religious thought either (1) hesitates between literal and figurative terms or (2) falls back on mysticism, rejecting all analogies, holding that God is outside of every concept or genus. The prime result is paradox, dependence on habit and imagination, a return to the salvation-motive, the interspersing of gaps in knowledge with dogmas and symbols, dependence on "saints" and prophetic personalities. But while this critique is disillusioning in the extreme for religion, it is of prime significance for ethics: the discovery, production, and conservation of values in this world affords sufficient moral opportunity for all men. If a spiritual world exist, life here in behalf of the highest known values will be the best preparation. God, as object of faith, is the ideal basis of just these values whose persistence we believe in and work for. Ethics does not call upon man to do more than is implied in the axiom of the conservation of values.

The Value of Faith.—The uncertainty with which this critique leaves us is indeed characteristic of the moral life. This fact came before us in the study of freedom, or the ambiguities of our moral future. Because of this uncertainty man as essentially a moral being is under obligation to choose, choice is a venture implying faith: man in part creates his own future by his deed. If man knew what we all at times wish we knew, precisely how the future is to

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

develop for us, he could not make a real decision. Even an act of self-sacrifice is "a leap in the dark." No virtuous deed carries with the motive that gives it impetus a guarantee that it will necessarily bring the consequences sought. Our faith is that the moral order is more real, good is greater in power than evil, meliorism more nearly true than pessimism; but it is still a faith.

The remarkable fact about man's moral history is that there is a moral constant persisting through all changes so that, however great the relativity of his knowledge, whatever the upheavals in the period in which he lives, he still passes moral judgment, considers moral law and obligation, goes forth into duties, and makes the ventures of faith with moral conviction. The conservation of values is indeed a profound fact of his history. It is this which gives constancy to his religion. This fact points forward to a constructive faith in the integrity of conduct and character regarded as implying the future life and a spiritual world, so that the ethical argument for immortality is by common consent the strongest.

Beyond Agnosticism.—To note the relativities on which Höffding and others who build on the critical philosophy of Kant insist is not then to revert to mere positivism, empiricism, or phenomenalism. For ethics, in developing conceptions of goodness, duty, moral law, conscience, freedom *is concerned with realities*; and the implied constant, principle, or highest value accepted as needing no demonstration, is a principle central to our intelligence in acquiring metaphysics or "first philosophy." We have to this extent already advanced beyond the point of view of description and begun to interpret, whereas natural science, with all its certainty, in terms of the reign of law, the conservation of energy, the persistence of the relationship of cause and effect, remains on the level of description. The moral order is an interpretative order. It demands what Seth calls "speculative courage," which is at the root of all intellectual progress.⁷ The moral philosopher contrib-

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 356.

utes a system of value-judgments to be brought into relation with æsthetic judgments and judgments concerning scientific truth, convinced as he is that the Good is one of the three surpassing Eternal Values. He insists as stoutly that the facts of moral experience shall have final hearing as the cosmologist with all his assurance insists that the mechanical order of nature qualifies ultimate reality. It is a notable fact that men more nearly agree in ethics than in theology or in metaphysics. Indeed, allowing for differences in terms it might be said that a single ethical system is implied in the trend of thought, assimilating as it does elements from both empirical and rationalistic theories with reference to a conception of the ideal self, in process of attaining realization, satisfaction or perfection. It is ethics, with its strong emphasis on the worth of the individual, alike in empirical and in idealistic theories, which more than any other discipline, holds out against any mere monism or pantheism insisting on a single self or the lumping of Self with the World. Still, for ethics as surely as for any other fundamental point of view, the unity of the cosmos is a postulate.⁸ Whether the basis of this conception is to be gained, with Green, by a study of the spiritual principle in knowledge, in nature, in man, as intelligence, is too large a question to concern us here.⁹ The student of ethics is likely to consider the traditional three issues at least—God, freedom, and immortality—in their relation.¹⁰ He probably will not be satisfied with mere pragmatism, namely, the notion that an ethical conception suffices if it “works” in application to this life as just now presented. What “works” is not thereby proved true. It may not take us beyond custom or appearance. What works at one time may not at another. Thus far we have not penetrated beyond particular judgments concerning what is right, as among the Spartans, who abandoned their weaklings to perish. What accords with our moral nature in the long run is what we seek. Our moral nature

⁸ Cf. Muirhead, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

⁹ See *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Bk. I.

¹⁰ Cf. Seth, *op. cit.*, Part III.

persists through all the mutations of particular judgments. What is the meaning of this persistence of the self through all its discoveries, the production and preservation of values?

Ethical Points of View.—It is not difficult to see why some writers on ethics, holding in general to a critical rationalism akin to Höffding's, are skeptical in regard to ultimate reality and accept little more than the positive knowledge of the surest of the special sciences. The moral life is said to be a scheme of values for this life because, for one thing, such writers have experienced a reaction against the religious conception of the world. Their attitude is typical of the decay of belief in God, doubt concerning immortality. The only authority left is that of moral reason in its most meager form. Hence, instead of undertaking to develop an ethical system by including the greatest conceptions of the ages, what these writers expound is their own temperamental reaction upon life as they view it, devoid as their life is of insight. The resulting ethical conceptions are so meager that one is surprised that the moral life was chosen for discussion at all. It is significant that some of these writers are still trying to be hedonists, in the face of the long array of arguments against it. Others become antagonistic the moment one mentions Christianity as in any way superior to other religions, and such writers would rule out of the present volume every term suggestive of theology or the spiritual life: one must be absolutely impartial, never for a moment suggesting that ethics is of value in the remaking of human nature. But to be so dreadfully dispassionate is to neglect one of the great lessons of the whole history of ethics, namely, that the true universal is concrete, is grounded in particulars. Hence we have insisted throughout that it is wholly ethical to believe and to do something in particular, to cleave to some system, some institution, or religion, and to work to make that system the best it can become. Hence we have given consideration to the religious view of the world, and accorded a hearing to teachings which find in Christianity the fulfillment of ethical systems at their best.

In a work like Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory*, there is also, it is true, a temperamental reaction upon the world; but, in contrast with the various naturalisms, it is a reaction rich in result, because Martineau brings to his task a constructive religious faith enabling him to appreciate realities of the moral order which scarcely exist even as appearances for those whose ethical faith is limited by naturalism. So too Leighton, on the basis of a closely reasoned philosophical system and an idealistic point of view in ethics, defends the religious conception of the world, and sees in Christianity the culmination of the great religions.¹¹

For Rashdall, the starting-point in constructive faith is the basic reality of the self, as implied in all knowledge, as the cause of its own activities; together with the objectivity of the moral law, conceived as having real existence.¹² Morality then is absolute. If we ask *where* it exists, the reply is, not in material things, or merely in the mind of this or that individual. For there exists a Mind "for which the true moral ideal is already in some sense real . . . the source of whatever is true in our own moral judgments."¹³ Belief in God then is the logical presupposition of an objective or absolute morality, the postulate of God's existence is a postulate of sound morality: the universe must have a rational purpose or end. The postulate of immortality follows. The ultimate coincidence between the higher and lower kinds of goods demands immortality, namely, as essential to the true and full well-being of the soul. It is typical of many writers on ethics thus to start with the reality of the moral self and its relation to human action as the primary postulate of ethics, with belief in God as the second postulate, and immortality the third, all three being postulates of what Kant called the practical reason.

Christianity as Ultimate Basis.—For writers like Watson an interpretation of Christianity is from the start

¹¹ See, especially, *Religion and the Mind of To-day*, 1924.

¹² *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 189.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

essential to a constructive faith.¹⁴ Christianity as Watson interprets it shows morality and religion indissolubly connected. The whole race is taken to be a single spiritual organism. Each man is to gain his own perfection by self-conscious identification with all the rest. This community of life is possible because identical in nature with the one divine principle. To attain unity with himself, the individual must surrender his whole being to the influence of the Holy Spirit. There is no other basis for the moral ideal, and no possibility of its realization apart from the religious ideal: the life of man is moral in so far as it is in harmony with the divine nature. It follows then that goodness is real in the ultimate nature of things. It follows too that it is religious faith which alone gives fullness of meaning to moral effort: to overcome the world is to overcome one's lower self. Repentance is a personal consciousness of the infinite love of God.¹⁵ The kingdom of heaven is already present in the souls of those who have absolute faith in the goodness of God, a faith expressed in unselfish devotion to one's fellowmen, rejoicing in the adversities which beset those who live by this faith. Righteousness in the fuller sense of the word depends on spiritual regeneration. The source of morality is found then, not in the external act, but in the inner spirit from which the act proceeds; the moral law is indestructible. The spirit of God is present in each member of the whole spiritual organism, "at once distinguishing and uniting them."¹⁶ There is then a spiritual community in which each man is to find himself by losing himself.

The Philosophy of History.—It is plain that such an interpretation of values, in contrast with their mere conservation on a naturalistic basis, involves a philosophy of history which in turn is a clue to a system of metaphysics. We have seen that it was not customary in the ancient world to regard human life and civilization as a progress, and so the philosophy of history did not, as in the case of

¹⁴ J. Watson, *Christianity and Idealism*, 1897.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

the other philosophical disciplines, begin with the Greeks. Plato and Aristotle interpreted existence in the light of eternal values, but not in the sense of an interpretation of human history regarded as a whole.¹⁷ The idea of a connected world-plan of historical development had not yet been conceived. But with Christianity came the conception of the whole movement of the world towards an end as essentially the *experiences of personalities*, while the outer world became the field for the development of the relationships of persons. The principle of love became the determining power, with the consciousness of the solidarity of the human race. Here, to be sure, Christian thought deviated for generations into the pathways of dogma turning upon the conviction of universal sinfulness and the need for a common redemption; and so the subsequent history falls outside of the ethical field till ethics wins its freedom. But the point of view of an interpretation of human history had come to stay, the educative value of the divine revelation became a prevailing interest, man and his destiny was a starting-point, and these conceptions found fruitful development in a later period. In the days of Lessing and Herder, for example, religion as made possible by revelation is still the clue from which the education of the human race is regarded.¹⁸ Hence comes the problem of civilization of a still later generation, the question whether civilization has fostered the moral order and increased man's true happiness. The starting-point for interpretation need not be that of a divine revelation alone, but may begin with a view of man's first estate when compared with actual history, or with history regarded as an uninterrupted progress of natural development, as in Herder's philosophy of history. It is the idea of *humanity* then which comes to be the great interest.¹⁹

Our interest in the philosophy of history centers about the fact that the system of ethical values which we adopt

¹⁷ See Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, trans., p. 255.

¹⁸ Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 498.

¹⁹ For the later developments of the philosophy of history, see Windelband, *op. cit.*, pp. 605, 612, 652; Leighton, *The Field of Philosophy*, p. 485, foll.

is the basis for such a philosophy.²⁰ It is, to be sure, the study of history which yields the data on which such a system is founded, as we have seen in our frequent references to the history of ethics and to the works of Myers, Hobhouse, and other writers who treat ethics historically. There appears indeed to be a logical circle here: history is judged by a system of ethical values which appear to have been derived from a study of history; and there seems to be no escape from the circle. But although it was Christianity which brought in the idea of the interpretation of human history in terms of the development of personalities, it was the analytical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle which yielded the norms. Our study of ethical conceptions as found in the historical studies of the subject would have very slight value for us were it not for the profounder ethical principles which were arrived at when *the moral universal* (of the Socratic insight) was put over against the deliverances of man's mere history. Partisans of divine revelation as the starting-point contend that without a revelation man would never have been able to interpret history aright, while devotees of moral reason (developed independently of any specific theory of revelation) emphasize man's intuition or creative insight as yielding the true universal. Certain it is that the central basis of ethical judgment is a value which does not need to be demonstrated, which man brings to his history as his principle of interpretation. The central principle is metaphysical, and is to be carried over into the implied system of philosophy, together with the assumed reality of moral selves, and the postulates of God, freedom, and immortality.

The Future Life.—Whatever view one may adopt concerning religious conceptions which we have touched on above so as to put in strong relief the alternatives to naturalism, the final issue for many of us is that of immortality; and here it is chiefly a question of the reconstructed faith which many have acquired by facing the critical

²⁰ Cf. Leighton, *The Field of Philosophy*, p. 498.

problems dwelt on by writers like Höffding. The starting-point is in an affirmative conception of goodness or value implying the reality of the moral self and a field of experience sufficient for the complete working out of the age-long issues of freedom, equality, and justice. Granted this firm belief in the moral order of the world, with prospect of continued moral progress, the point of view of ethical idealism becomes triumphant, the natural world is looked upon as the first field of exercise of the moral spirit, and the future life as the carrying out of the activities here scarcely begun in the larger sense.

So we note that with the breaking down of attempts to localize God in space, to think of creation as a beginning and ending of time, or of heaven as a "place" just above the earth, many other conceptions have broken down too: eternity has ceased to be a sphere to be *entered*, heaven is no longer postponed to a remote spiritual world, but we already live in the realm of the Eternal Values. In short, the moral life has become continuous. Since earth is no longer a place where all is "work without enjoyment," heaven is no longer anticipated as a realm of perfect bliss in bare monotony of inactivity. Conduct through unbroken progressive changes has become the ideal whether here or there.

We are coming to know *this* life so well that it has ceased once for all to be temporal. The more deeply we live in the present, discerning and working for its values, the less we live in mere time, the more we are already in the eternal moral order where values survive. Death, as a relatively external event, is no longer the decisive moment of human striving, as if "probation" ended with it. Such deeds as we have done with heart and will persist in their effect on our character. Real changes are not due to the shifting of a spatial garment, as if we were to "put on" an immortality which *begins* then, by "entering" an eternity which was alien to us before. There are as few "leaps" in the moral order as in nature. The self does not "leave" time, if by time we mean the moments of our experience, that is, the "real time" of Bergson which we "live

through." Character is in the making, in the persistence of the moral self, along with the temporal process in the natural world wherethrough moral deeds are made actual in relation to other events. What is *inner* and in a measure concealed while we lead this mundane existence, with the conventionalities behind which we hide, the traditions which we keep, and the language which was given us to "conceal thought," will undoubtedly be disclosed in what we call the future life, so that each of us will stand for what we truly are; and what we truly were an incident or two before death we undoubtedly will continue to be an incident or two after—till new occasions suggest new duties.

Moral Persistence.—In Janet's terms the future life will not then be a "recompense," as Christians long thought, under the notion that virtue is a mere "reward"; it will be a "deliverance," freedom from illusions. Hence meditation on our future sends us back to profounder recognition of what we are in our present experience. Very far from being sheer creatures of circumstance, we as surely reap what we have sown as if we were nothing more than units of behavior in a causal series inexorably ruled by mechanical necessity. Indeed, moral choice is brought home to us as the quintessence of activity. We are actually in a measure creators of our destiny, despite the truth that, as Wordsworth assures us, we are "building up the creatures that we are." Whatever our potentialities, either as children of nature or as participants in the divine purpose, we have power of recognition, assent, rejection; hence power to keep on with what we have chosen. And what I in my decisive moment select bears fruit in kind, the activities set free by choice of potentialities persist as unmistakably in my future selfhood as if (with believers in Karma) I were bound by "the wheel of life," and doomed to be incarnated again. Moral persistence or conservation is higher in type than causal or mechanical sequence. The freedom we seek is as far from the old-time Christian heaven of bliss as from the Nirvana of the cessation of all desire. Activity through victory and the desire for more

opportunities and fresh victories is precisely what we have come to desire.

Everything turns upon our conception of personality as the locus of values.²¹ There is little to be said about immortality if we have succumbed to behaviorism and naturalism; there is everything to be said if we realize the significance of the ethical argument for personality. We live this life best by seeking to realize and to manifest it more abundantly. Emphasis belongs on the dynamic or creative element. Memory of the past remains to show us what we were in part, what we did in part. Meanwhile the "something more" in us that found only partial expression lives on through other moments of real experience, each with its more than temporal aspect because, as members of eternity, we pertain to the moral order. External things still partake of the imperfections which Plato signalized by ever reminding us of the Ideas. But we move forward to nearer realizations of the ideal, in touch inwardly with a higher type of life. Some of our attainments have barely begun. We are aware of possibilities scarcely realized under conditions imposed by our life as just now ordered, under economic needs and social demands. Our present moral life is in large measure an adjustment. But this adaptation to conditions and occasions is part and parcel of the moral order, the values acquired will persist. We may reasonably anticipate the future of ever more complete self-realization.

There is strong reason to believe that the human spirit is not merely constituted for existence in the natural world. If the spirit were thus limited the widespread belief in human immortality, with our moral ideals and high aspirations would be what Ward calls "unaccountable anomalies, a cruel and senseless mockery without a parallel. . . . Within the whole range of the wide world's literature we find no more constant theme than just this disparity between man's possibilities and aspirations on the one hand and the narrow scope afforded them in the brief space

²¹ Cf. Seth, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

of the present life on the other.”²² The conditions of the present life are inadequate to our highest personal ends, but also inadequate from the point of view of our possible moral victories, since “evil is not overcome unless overcome in each individual.” Hence our conviction that if the moral life has the full meaning which it seems to possess, “a certain personal continuity and continuity of development is essential.”²³

Man's True Selfhood.—From Kant's point of view, we find ourselves already living “*as if* immortal; in the moral life we constitute ourselves heirs of immortality, by living the life of immortal or eternal beings. Man's true life is not, like the animal's, in time, a life in time; its law issues from a world beyond ‘our bourne of Time and Place,’ from a sphere ‘where time and space are not.’ In every moral act, therefore, man transcends the limits of the present life, and becomes already a citizen of the eternal world. He has not to wait for his immortality; it broods over him even in the present, it is the very atmosphere of his life as a moral being.”²⁴

This conviction that man, the real moral self, is already a denizen of the eternal world, by implication, has been the central thought throughout the ages in the ethical idealisms which have been taken seriously. Moral values, regarded in this light, are not mere items of transitory utility. The values of our moral experience imply the Realm of the Eternal Values as an actual moral order of the universe. The self or soul, dwelling between, partakes of both the natural world of space and time and the eternal world of Values. As such in innermost essence, man is eternal, and interiorly he transcends the world of time by his moral deeds. His real life comes from the higher sphere. And so his life has real meaning, his moral deeds accomplish something, add actual values to the moral order. So too his freedom is real—not alone in the higher sphere from whence his power comes—but in the sphere of

²² *The Realm of Ends*, p. 386.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 407.

²⁴ Seth's summary, *op. cit.*, p. 451.

his moral deeds in this world, with the triumphs won in making his ideals efficacious. Thus the two worlds are brought closer than Kant brought them. "The strenuous and idealistic moral temper is rooted in the conviction of the eternal meaning of this life in time, and is willing to stake everything on this great Peradventure."²⁵

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²⁵ *Seth, ibid.*, p. 451. Seth gives telling expression to the widespread sentiment in favor of belief in immortality, p. 453, foll.

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